Chapter 19: Crimes against the Environment

Comment

Criminal law, then, leaves harm to the environment to environmental protection statutes. But in Working Paper 44 we proposed a new and distinct crime against the environment on the ground that certain behaviour so threatens fundamental values as to warrant criminal sanctions. That crime was to consist of conduct damaging the environment and thereby seriously harming or endangering human life or health.⁶⁹

Since then, however, we revised our opinion. First, we concluded that since environmental damage harming or endangering life and safety is covered by crimes of negligence against the person and by the newly proposed crime of endangering (clause 10(1)), there was no need for an environmental crime like that proposed. Second, our consultations on Working Paper 44 together with a series of environmental disasters since its publication convinced the majority of the Commissioners of the need to use criminal law to underpin the value of respect for the environment itself and stigmatize behaviour causing disastrous damage with long-term loss of natural resources. The proposed crime of disastrous damage to the environment, which a minority of the Commissioners would omit entirely for reasons elaborated in the commentary below, is designed to meet this need.

19(1) Disastrous Damage to the Environment. Everyone commits a crime who recklessly causes disastrous damage to the environment.

Comment

Clause 19(1) is similar to clause 107 of Bill C-74, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act which first saw light as clause 54 of the “Proposed Environmental Protection Act.” Clause 107 reads as follows:

107 (1) Every person who, in contravention of this Act,

(a) intentionally or recklessly causes a disaster that results in a loss of the use of the environment, or

(b) shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons and thereby causes a risk of death or harm to another person

is guilty ....⁷⁰

As was stated in the explanatory notes to the earlier proposed Act, clause 54 contained the essence of our recommendations in Working Paper 44. So does, with some modifications, clause 107 of Bill C-74. But for the reasons given above we restrict our proposed clause 19(1) to correspond only with paragraph (a) of clause 107.

⁶⁹. Supra, note 67 at 15 and following.
By virtue of clause 2(3)(b) of the new Code, the conduct required is a positive act. The culpability requirement is purpose or recklessness, negligence being reserved for crimes against the person. As with all other crimes, by virtue of clause 3(13), there is no liability for acts done under authorization of law.

"Disastrous" and "environment" are not defined in the new Code any more than in the "Proposed Environmental Protection Act." What amounts to disastrous is more a matter of degree than definition, and the term is used in its ordinary sense to mean generally ruinous or calamitous in two respects: first in respect of the size of area affected which must be significant enough to prejudice not simply single individuals but rather the whole community, and second in respect of the degree of damage which must be inordinately great. The environment can be taken in its usual meaning to include air, soil and water generally as well as specialized ecosystems such as wetlands or aquatic systems. Disastrous damage to the environment, then, can be construed as irreversible or widespread destruction or disruption either of the general environment or of a specialized ecological niche thereof. Accordingly, this clause contemplates events in the order of catastrophes rather than merely localized or temporary interferences.

A minority of the Commissioners, however, would omit this crime for a number of reasons in line with the Commission's own work in administrative and criminal law. The reasons are examined in a draft study paper prepared by the Commission's Administrative Law Project, scheduled for publication in the near future and outlining in detail developments on the regulatory side of environmental protection. In recent years the trend has been away from the simple, prohibitory "command-penalty" approach of criminal law and towards recognition that most serious pollution problems will only be solved where co-operation is the norm and adversarial and hostile relations are reserved for flagrant violators.

The dissenting Commissioners think it a retrograde step to introduce a special environmental crime at a time when more sophisticated and effective regulatory mechanisms for protecting the environment are being developed. Criminal prosecutions should be confined to situations where damage to the environment causes death or harm to persons, threatens human health and safety or destroys public or private property. In such situations the offenders should be charged with homicide, assault, endangering or vandalism as the case may be to bring out the truly criminal nature of their misconduct.

The key reasons for not creating a separate crime against the environment may be summarized as follows. First, the mischief dealt with by clause 19(1) is already addressed in other parts of our proposed Code, notably by offences against the person, and a central objective of our new Code is to eliminate the proliferation of special offences which merely particularize general crimes committed in special contexts.

Second, a separate crime against the environment is only justified if there is, beyond the human interest in a safe and clean environment, a distinct interest in the environment itself that can only be protected by creation of a special offence. Despite the aesthetic appeal in the view of the environment as a sacred trust meriting protection

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71. LRCC, Pollution Control in Canada: The Regulatory Approach in the 1980s, a Study Paper by Kenneth Webb (Ottawa: LRCC, to be released soon).
in its own right, the Commission concluded in Working Paper 44 that Canadian society is not yet ready to give such protection of the environment precedence over legitimate human needs. In any event, the proposed clause 19(1) is not based on recognition of any unique environmental interest but merely highlights imprecisely a potential evil already more effectively dealt with elsewhere in our new Code.

Third, protection of the environment will be adequately and indeed better achieved by rigorous enforcement of existing regulatory schemes. These can be tailored to address specific threats to the environment. Experience has shown that convictions for regulatory offences attract significant social condemnation. Charges of serious violations of environmental protection legislation are taken every bit as seriously as charges under the Criminal Code. Also, since regulatory offences are offences of strict liability where there is no need to prove the mens rea of the accused, they can be successfully prosecuted more easily than criminal offences.

Fourth, mixing criminal and regulatory enforcement will create jurisdictional confusion and give conflicting signals to the regulated parties. The same conduct might be dealt with by two different authorities using conflicting criteria and procedures for initiating and conducting prosecutions.

Fifth, the creation of a special crime against the environment will divert attention away from the real problems of regulatory enforcement. Presumably the proposed crime against the environment will be reserved for the most flagrant situations. This throws into question the currently held position that prosecutions for regulatory offences should be reserved only for the worst transgressions. Logically, the rationale for use of regulatory prosecutions would shift, leaving them to be directed against less serious violations now usually handled without recourse to the courts. This would result in increasingly legalistic and adversarial relations between government and the private sector and could actually frustrate rather than enhance efforts to promote and protect a safe and clean environment.

Finally, the concept of “disastrous damage to the environment,” central to the proposed crime in clause 19(1), cannot be defined with the precision required to comply with section 7 of the Charter which states that: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”

For these reasons a minority of the Commissioners would omit clause 19(1) from this Code.

[19(2) Non-compliance. Everyone commits a crime who persistently refuses or fails to comply with federal regulations for environmental protection.]

Comment

Clause 19(2) is a minority recommendation. The majority of the Commissioners would omit this clause entirely. In the view of the majority, the recommendation is based on a misinterpretation of Working Paper 6, Fines, and Report 3, Our Criminal
Law, which sought to create an offence of intentional defiance of all regulatory orders and standards, not simply those pertaining to environmental statutes. The proposal for such a general offence has subsequently been rejected by the Commission as representing an inappropriate intrusion of the criminal law into the regulatory sphere. It is felt by the majority that adequate penalties for repeat violators can be provided in the regulatory regime, as indeed is the case with most environmental protection legislation. Where the violation of regulatory orders and standards includes willful disregard of a court order imposed in the context of a regulatory prosecution, the violators could be charged with disobeying a lawful court order pursuant to clause 25(7)(b) of this Code.

A minority of Commissioners, although agreeing that the primary responsibility for environmental protection is administrative, would supplement clause 19(1) with a provision sanctioning persistent non-compliance with federal environmental regulations. The purpose of this provision is to provide a criminal law weapon to use against flagrant violators of federal laws.

This clause responds in part to the public perception that environmental regulations can be ignored with impunity and that polluters can continue polluting by paying a "licence fee" in the guise of a fine. It provides a more direct way of attacking persistent violators of environmental regulations than is available under present contempt of court powers which were invoked against two electroplating companies and their corporate officers in two highly publicized recent cases in Toronto. It would also go somewhat beyond clause 25(7)(b) in that it would allow criminal charges against flagrant and persistent violators of environmental regulations, even if there had not been specific compliance orders issued by a court in earlier proceedings.

Support for this clause may be found in Working Paper 44, which recommends that flagrant violations of federal statutes should be a necessary condition for determining the occurrence of a criminal environmental offence. It is also in the view of the minority consistent with our work in Working Paper 6 and Report 3.

Its rationale is to denounce outrageous and repeated departures from statutory environmental regulations, furnish administrators with an additional tool in their battle against polluters and enable attorneys general and citizens to invoke the criminal law if it is felt that administrators are being too understanding.

The conduct and culpability requirements for the proposed offence are obvious. The conduct required is repeated refusal or failure to comply with particular regulations found in various federal environmental statutes. The culpability requirement is purpose. In the event of such behaviour, the Crown will normally proceed against the accused


74. Supra, note 67 at 68.

75. See supra, note 72 at 41 and 36 respectively.
with charges under the offence provisions of the environmental statute in question, but, in rare circumstances, it may charge the offender with the crime set out in this clause.

Chapter 20: Crimes against Animals

Comment

Unlike damage to the environment, cruelty to animals is already dealt with both by criminal law and by regulatory legislation. Criminal offences were first introduced in the 1870s and the main provisions are now sections 400 to 403 of the Criminal Code. Legislation at both federal and provincial levels regulates such matters as food production, environmental protection, animal control and methods of hunting and fishing.

Criminal law serves to underline moral standards for the treatment of animals and accordingly to prohibit unnecessary cruelty. It therefore outlaws practices seriously offending against conventional standards as to killing or using animals. The new Code, then, retains offences against animals. Meanwhile it may well be appropriate to enact a separate federal Act protecting animals and co-ordinating offences with specialized regulatory activity.

The present law is contained in sections 400 to 403 in Part IX of the Criminal Code under the title, “Wilful and Forbidden Acts in Respect of Certain Property” along with crimes like mischief, arson, causing a false alarm and interfering with boundary lines and impeding the saving of wrecks. Section 400 creates an offence of wilfully killing, injuring or poisoning cattle, section 401 similar offences against other domestic animals and section 403 an offence of keeping a cock-pit. The main cruelty offences, however, are contained in section 402. Paragraph 402(1)(a) prohibits the wilfully causing of unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an animal or bird, while the remaining paragraphs deal with specific acts such as neglect of animals being conveyed, abandoning domestic animals, assisting the fighting or baiting of animals and promoting the shooting of captive birds. There is, however, no definition of “animal” in the Criminal Code.

The new Code aims to avoid mingling cruelty to animals with property offences, to concentrate on general principle rather than on specific marginal activities and to provide for modern institutional practices like scientific experimentation. Recognizing, however, that animals are different from people, that killing animals for food, for hunting and for other purposes is socially accepted and that large-scale social reform in this area cannot come overnight, the proposed Code rejects the notion of any parallel between animal crimes and crimes against the person. It does not, for instance, criminalize the killing of animals because any such message would be thoroughly diluted by all the exceptions to it, would appear hypocritical in theory and would work unfairly in practice. Instead it focuses on the central idea of unnecessary cruelty and aims, not so much to protect and preserve animal life, but rather to ensure its humane treatment.

While the new Code makes Chapter 20 a separate chapter for crimes against animals, damage caused to an animal in another person’s ownership may also constitute
vandalism under clause 17(1). Meanwhile the chapter reduces the crimes to three: cruelty to animals, organizing sporting events, and animal neglect. All three are subject to the General Part provisions on culpability and defences. Particularly relevant will be clause 3(13) on legal authority.

20(1) Cruelty to Animals. Everyone commits a crime who unnecessarily causes injury or serious physical pain to an animal.

Comment

This clause replaces paragraph 402(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Being the central organizing idea in the chapter, it is placed up-front. The idea of unnecessary cruelty is further developed through the exceptions provided in clause 20(2). The new Code limits the crime to serious physical pain to avoid criminalizing minor cases of hurting. By virtue of clause 2(3)(b) the crime can only be committed by a positive act. By virtue of clause 2(4)(d) the culpability requirement is purpose.

"Animal" as defined in clause 1(2) includes most of those developed species that can reasonably be considered to experience pain.

20(2) Exceptions: Necessary Measures. For the purpose of clause 20(1), no injury or serious physical pain is caused unnecessarily if it is a reasonably necessary means of achieving any of the following purposes:

(a) identification, medical treatment, spaying or neutering;
(b) provision of food or other animal products;
(c) hunting, trapping, fishing, and other sporting activities conducted in accordance with the lawful rules relating to them;
(d) pest, predator or disease control;
(e) protection of persons or property;
(f) scientific research unless the risk of injury or serious physical pain is disproportionate to the benefit expected from the research; and
(g) disciplining or training of an animal.

Comment

This clause exempts various customary and accepted practices such as the raising and slaughter of animals for food provided that the means used are reasonably necessary for such practices.

The exception for scientific research in clause 20(2)(f) incorporates the proportionality test used in current case-law: the pain and injury caused must be
justifiable in terms of the object pursued. Where a significant scientific or medical benefit is sought, considerable pain may be justified; where the research is pointless or trivial, very little is justified and the exemption may be lost. The animal experimentation must also be a “reasonably necessary means,” that is to say, it must be reasonably unavoidable because no alternative research technique is possible. Where animal experimentation is required or authorized by statute (as in the case of some product testing), a further defence is afforded by clause 3(13)(a) of the General Part.

20(3) Sporting Events. Everyone commits a crime who organizes, facilitates or participates in any meeting, competition, exhibition, pastime or display involving baiting animals, combat between animals or killing captive animals.

Comment

This provision replaces paragraphs 402(1)(d), (f) and (g) and section 403 of the Criminal Code. It is a preventive measure to criminalize the organization of cruel sports or exhibitions involving captive animals and exposing them to forms of torture in unfair and artificial settings. Commission of the crime requires a positive act together with purpose.

20(4) Animal Neglect. Everyone commits a crime who fails to take reasonable steps to provide necessaries of life to an animal under his care and unable to provide itself with necessaries and thereby causes it injury or serious physical pain.

Comment

This provision replaces paragraph 402(1)(c) of the Criminal Code. Normally, neglect will be committed by failure to provide adequate food, shelter or medical treatment to a domestic animal. It is a specific crime of omission. By virtue of clause 2(4)(d) the required culpability level is purpose.

TITLE V. Crimes against the Social Order

Comment

This title contains two chapters each dealing with a different category of crimes against society in general. Chapter 21, “Crimes against Social Harmony,” relates to some extent to common law sedition, which in Stephen’s wording included “an intention ... to promote feelings of ill will and hostility between different classes of

[Her Majesty’s] subjects," and replaces sections 281.1 and 281.2 of the Criminal Code on hate propaganda. Chapter 22, "Crimes against Public Order," deals with crimes of public disturbance such as unlawful assembly and riot.

Chapter 21: Crimes against Social Harmony

Comment

In this chapter, the new Code creates crimes designed to protect society at large from disruption of its social harmony. Crimes against social harmony are hate propaganda crimes likely to endanger significantly identifiable groups within society. Those deliberately stirring up hatred against socially important identifiable groups put at risk the safety and security not only of those groups but also of society as a whole.78

21(1) Stirring up Hatred. Everyone commits a crime who publicly stirs up hatred against any identifiable group.

Comment

This clause replaces subsection 281.2(2) of the Criminal Code in a modified form. "Promotes" in that subsection is replaced by "stirs up" to emphasize the deliberate nature of the conduct prescribed. "[O]ther than in private conversation" is replaced by "publicly" as being a more straightforward formulation. By virtue of clause 2(4)(d) the culpability requirement is purpose.

"Identifiable" is defined in clause 1(2) and applies to crimes within both chapters of Title V. It singles out for protection those groups which are specifically protected by the equality guarantee of subsection 15(1) of the Charter. It therefore replaces the present ad hoc definition of "identifiable group" with a principled definition in line with the Charter.

The defences contained in subsection 281.2(3) have also been omitted as unnecessary. In most cases where an accused knows that what he says is true, expresses in good faith an opinion on a religious subject, points out on reasonable grounds matters relevant to the public interest or intends to remove matters tending to produce hatred towards an identifiable group, he does not have the purpose of stirring up hatred. In the rare case, however, where such a purpose could be proved, conviction would be merited — if extremists of one religion make true statements in order to stir up hatred against members of another, does their truthfulness detract from their stirring up hatred?

21(2) Inciting Genocide. Everyone commits a crime who advocates, promotes or incites the destruction of any identifiable group.


Comment

This clause replaces section 281.1 of the Criminal Code. Instead of specifying means of destruction as does that section, it prohibits advocating, promoting or inciting destruction by any means, thereby avoiding unnecessary detail and according better with Canada's obligations under the Genocide Convention 1948. By virtue of clause 2(4)(d) the culpability required is purpose. Whether the Attorney General's consent should be necessary for prosecution is left to the Code of Criminal Procedure.

21(3) Stirring up Hatred in Public Place. Everyone commits a crime who publicly stirs up hatred against any identifiable group in a public place so as to cause risk of harm to the person or of serious damage to property.

Comment

A minority of Commissioners would insert under this chapter clause 21(3) which replaces subsection 281.2(1) of the Criminal Code, just as that subsection is located among the hate propaganda crimes. The majority, however, viewing this crime as more strictly a public order crime, decided to locate it in the following chapter. By virtue of clause 2(3)(b) and of the meaning of the words "stirs up," this crime can only be committed by a positive act. By virtue of clause 2(4)(d) the culpability required is purpose. The sort of conduct covered would be that of a hatemonger at a public rally who instils such hatred in his audience against a particular group as to whip them into a frenzy and lead them to attack members of that group. It is to be noted, however, that the stirring up must be done both publicly, not in private conversation, and in a public place, not at a meeting in a private house.

Chapter 22: Crimes against Public Order

Comment

The crimes contained in this chapter for the most part owe their origin to early common law. In English law the three principal offences under this rubric were the common law crimes of unlawful assembly, rout and riot, all designed for an era without professional policing. Related offences were affray, public mischief, public nuisance, duelling, prize-fighting, forcible entry and forcible detainer.

Bound up with these offences is the notion of breach of the peace of which, as Glanville Williams points out, there is no authoritative definition. Clearly, it covers battery, assault and prize-fights, but not mere noises disturbing tranquillity or threats of force to property. It seems to mean therefore, conduct involving danger to the person of another.

80. See Williams, supra, note 32 at 714.
The present law on these and kindred matters is found in Part II of the *Criminal Code*, "Offences against Public Order," and in Part IV, "Sexual Offences, Public Morals and Disorderly Conduct." Part II deals with treason and other offences against State security, with piracy and other international crimes, and with public order offences in the strict sense used in this chapter. Part IV deals with sexual offences, with indecency and other disorderly conduct, and with various kinds of nuisance.

The proposed new Code adopts a more logical arrangement. It places treason in Chapter 26 on "Crimes against State Security," deals with piracy by amending the provisions on jurisdiction and linking them with certain provisions in Titles II and III, and puts crimes against public order proper, in a separate chapter under the present title. This chapter then contains crimes disturbing public peace as opposed to crimes threatening the State itself or the community's morality.

Chapter 22 lists eight different crimes against public order. The first is the somewhat new crime of disturbing public order. The next four, disturbing public order by hatred, unlawful assembly, riot, and failure to disperse, are aggravated forms of this crime listed in ascending order of gravity. The remaining three, raising false alarm, public nuisance and loitering, are a miscellaneous group of offences commonly comprised under this heading.

Omitted from the chapter are some of the *Criminal Code* offences related to proclamation (section 69), neglect by a peace officer to suppress a riot (section 70), unlawful drilling (section 71), duelling (section 72), forcible entry and detainer (section 73), prize fights (section 81), indecent acts (section 169), nudity (section 170), causing disturbance, indecent exhibition, loitering (section 171), obstruction of clergymen (section 172), possession of an offensive volatile substance (section 174), vagrancy (section 175) and neglecting to bury a dead body (section 178). Most of these offences are already covered by other provisions in this chapter: the proclamation offences created by paragraphs 69(b) and 69(c) of the *Criminal Code* are covered by failure to disperse (clause 22(5)) while duelling, forcible entry and detainer, and prize-fighting are covered adequately either by disturbing public order (clause 22(1)) or unlawful assembly (clause 22(3)). Others are covered elsewhere in the new Code: the proclamation offence created by paragraph 69(a) of the *Criminal Code* is covered by assault (Chapter 7) or by obstructing public officers (clause 25(1)), obstructing clergymen by assault (Chapter 7), and volatile substance offences by endangering (clause 10(1)) or by possession of things in suspicious circumstances (clause 18(1)(b)). The offence of neglecting to suppress a riot is too specialized to constitute an offence under general criminal law and should be dealt with under police discipline regulations. The vagrancy and dead body provisions are dropped as archaic and, in the case of vagrancy, as inconsistent with the *Charter*. Unlawful drilling is omitted as being not an offence in its own right unless the Governor General makes it such by proclamation.81 Finally, causing a disturbance is adequately covered by disturbing public order (clause 22(1)) where fear is aroused, and by public nuisance (clause 22(7)) where serious inconvenience is caused. Where no such fear or inconvenience results, the behaviour falls below the threshold of real criminality, should be disregarded by criminal law in the interest of restraint, and is accordingly dropped from the new Code.

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81. According to our research, there has been no such proclamation since 1955 at least.
22(1) Disturbing Public Order. Everyone commits a crime who so behaves in public as to make others in the vicinity reasonably fear harm to the person or serious damage to property.

Comment

Clause 22(1) which has no corresponding section in the present Criminal Code is based partly on the notion of breach of the peace and partly on the concept of unlawful assembly. Unlike the latter, however, it can be committed by one person or by two. It forms, therefore, the basic crime against public order in the new Code. By virtue of clauses 2(3)(b) and 2(4)(d), the conduct and culpability requirements are positive acts and purpose, and by virtue of clause 2(4)(b), the defendant must either act as he does in order to make others in the vicinity fear harm or in order to effect some other consequence which he knows will do so.

22(2) Disturbing Public Order by Hatred. Everyone commits a crime who publicly stirs up hatred against any identifiable group in a public place so as to cause risk of harm to the person or serious damage to property.

Comment

This crime is the same as that which a minority of Commissioners would prefer to see defined in clause 21(3) as an aggravated form of stirring up hatred and located under "Crimes against Social Harmony" (Chapter 21). The majority, however, prefer to place it in this chapter as an aggravated form of disturbing public order (clause 22(1)). There are two aggravating factors. First, the behaviour must take the specific form of publicly stirring up hatred. Second, it must be such as to cause risk of harm or damage and not just make people in the vicinity reasonably fear harm or damage. The conduct and culpability requirements are positive acts and purpose as in clause 22(1).

22(3) Unlawful Assembly. Everyone commits a crime who jointly with two or more persons so behaves in public as to make others in the vicinity reasonably fear harm to the person or serious damage to property.

Comment

Clause 22(3) replaces section 64 of the Criminal Code. Both at common law and under section 64, unlawful assembly requires three or more persons to commit it. The number is probably connected with the notion that two make a couple but three make a crowd, and is preserved in the new Code by the words "jointly with two or more persons." Consequently, if three or more so behave in public as to make others fear harm or damage, they commit unlawful assembly, but if only two so behave, they disturb public order according to clause 22(1). The conduct and culpability requirements are again positive acts and purpose as in clause 22(1).
22(4) Riot. Everyone commits a crime who jointly with two or more persons so behaves in public as to make others in the vicinity reasonably fear harm to the person or serious damage to property and as to bring about such harm or serious damage.

Comment

Clause 22(4) replaces section 65 of the Criminal Code. Following common law, that section defines riot as “an unlawful assembly that has begun to disturb the peace tumultuously.” The unlawful assembly aspect is captured by the words “who jointly with two or more persons so behaves in public as to make others in the vicinity reasonably fear harm to the person or serious damage to property ....,” which repeat the definition of unlawful assembly given in clause 22(3). “[T]umultuously” is covered by the words “as to bring about such harm or serious damage.”

22(5) Failure to Disperse. Everyone committing unlawful assembly or riot commits a crime who fails to disperse when lawfully ordered to do so.

Comment

This clause replaces paragraphs 69(b) and 69(c) of the Criminal Code. The ritual of reading the riot act has been dropped as archaic and unnecessary and replaced by that of being lawfully ordered to disperse, for example by a peace officer. Provisions as to who may issue such a lawful order belong not to this Code but rather to the Code of Criminal Procedure. By definition this is a crime of omission. By virtue of clause 2(4)(d), the culpability requirement is purpose and, by virtue of clause 2(3)(b), the defendant must know, or be reckless as to the existence of, the circumstances giving rise to the duty to disperse (for example the issuing of the order).

22(6) Raising False Alarm. Everyone commits a crime who falsely alarms the public.

Comment

This replaces section 177 of the Criminal Code. That section criminalizes the wilful publishing of a false statement causing or likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest. Clause 22(6) covers false alarm given to the public by any means. The conduct and culpability requirements are act and purpose.

22(7) Public Nuisance. Everyone commits a crime who in a public place substantially and unreasonably either obstructs or inconveniences those exercising rights common to all members of the public.

Comment

This clause partly replaces section 171 and wholly replaces section 176 of the Criminal Code. The former section defines causing a disturbance and the latter, common nuisance.

At common law, public nuisance consists in "an act not warranted by law or an omission to discharge a legal duty, which act or omission obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects." Under the present Criminal Code, common nuisance is defined by subsection 176(2) in much the same terms. By virtue of subsection 176(1), however, no crime is committed unless the common nuisance "(a) endangers the lives, safety or health of the public, or (b) causes physical injury to any person, ...."

Clause 22(7) reverts to the common law position and criminalizes obstruction or inconvenience without endangerment or injury. It thereby avoids the need for a separate crime of disturbance to replace section 171. At the same time, in the interests of restraint, it restricts nuisance to obstruction or inconvenience that is both substantial and unreasonable.

The conduct requirement is an act, but in this context it should be noted that many an omission may in fact form part of a wider act. Failing to remove one's car from the middle of a highway is part of the act of obstructing that highway by putting and leaving the car there. The culpability requirement is purpose. Again it should be noted that the defendant need not actually desire to obstruct the public but may act as he does in order to effect some other purpose which he knows will obstruct or inconvenience the public. He may leave his car in the middle of the road, not to obstruct the public, but rather to do some shopping, but he knows that this will involve such obstruction.

22(8) Loitering. Everyone commits a crime who prowls or loiters at night on another's property near a dwelling-house on that property.

Comment

This clause replaces section 173 of the present Criminal Code. The words "without lawful excuse" in that section are omitted because the new Code provides in clause 3(13) a general defence of legal authority. The reverse onus clause is dropped as contrary to paragraph 11(d) of the Charter. Finally, the words "prowls" and "loiters" themselves cover only suspect behaviour: to prowl is to wander about in search of prey or plunder; to loiter is to hang around aimlessly for no obvious reason. A person searching the area for his lost wallet, therefore, would not be prowling, and a person waiting for the owner to arrive would not be loitering. Neither, therefore, would fall within clause 22(8).

83. See Stephen, supra, note 77 at 108.
It should be noted that whereas the present Criminal Code includes a part on
"Firearms and Other Offensive Weapons." (Part II.1) no such separate chapter is
included in the new Code. The reason is that it deals with these matters as follows.
First, in the definition clause it includes streamlined versions of the definitions in the
present Criminal Code. Second, it replaces the crime of using a firearm during the
commission of an offence (section 83) by the aggravating factor in clause 10(10)(e)
"with a weapon." Third, it covers the crime of pointing a firearm (section 84) by the
general crime of endangering in clause 10(1). Fourth, in clause 18(1)(b) it criminalizes
possession of a weapon in suspicious circumstances, in clause 18(3), possession of
prohibited and unregistered regulated weapons, and in clause 18(7), criminal dealing in
prohibited or unregistered regulated weapons. In restricting itself to these matters the
new Code leaves details of the firearms registration system, together with regulatory
offences, to specific firearms legislation.

TITLE VI. Crimes against the Governmental Order

Comment

This title contains further categories of crimes against society in general. They
differ from those in the previous title, however, in an important respect. The latter are
crimes against the public at large while those in Title VI are crimes against the
organized community, that is the State and its government. Chapters 23 to 25 deal with
offences against the organs of government, and Chapter 26 with treason, espionage and
related offences.

Chapters 23 to 25 contain crimes not so far satisfactorily classified. Injuring
neither identifiable individuals nor public order nor State security, they tended to form
a rag-bag of miscellaneous offences. For instance, in his book, A History of the
Criminal Law of England, Stephen examines under the heading "Miscellaneous
Offences," maintenance, perjury, bribery, slave-trading and intervention in foreign
hostilities.

A more rational classification was attempted by the English Draft Code of 1879
under the title "Offences Affecting the Administration of Justice and the Maintenance
of Public Order." One part of this title dealt with corruption and disobedience to
lawful orders, another with misleading justice and a third with escapes and rescues.
This scheme was followed by our present Criminal Code, which lists under Part III,
"Offences against the Administration of Law and Justice," three classes of offences:
corruption and disobedience, misleading justice, and escapes and rescues.

A more logical classification is found in the Model Penal Code. This focuses on
the common characteristic of all these offences as being the tendency to harm the
proper operation of all the administrative systems of government — executive and
legislative as well as judicial. Accordingly it groups them under the wider heading of
"Offenses against Public Administration," under which it lists: (1) bribery and corrupt

84. See Stephen, supra, note 46 at 234 and following.
85. See Stephen, supra, note 45 at 87 and following.
influence, (2) perjury and other falsification in official matters, (3) obstructing government operations, escapes, and (4) abuse of office. 86

The new Code follows that classification in two respects. It adopts a more general title, "Crimes against the Governmental Order." As well it uses the subclassifications "Corrupting Public Administration," (Chapter 23) "Misleading Public Administration," (Chapter 24) and "Obstructing Public Administration" (Chapter 25) (which includes, among other things, disobedience to court orders, clause 25(7)).

For the most part these three chapters leave the present law unchanged. They do, however, make certain formal alterations, follow the Model Penal Code's more coherent classification and simplify the law by ridding it of numerous unnecessary details. They also make minor changes in substance, omit certain current crimes like disobeying a statute (section 115), and include some new crimes like disrupting proceedings (clause 25(2)) to replace common law contempt of court.

In Report 17, Contempt of Court, we identified five forms of common law contempt of court: obstruction of justice, disruption of judicial proceedings, defiance of judicial authority, affront to judicial authority, and interference with judicial proceedings. 87 These are covered separately in the new Code as follows: obstruction of justice (clause 25(11)), disruption of judicial proceedings (clause 25(2)), defiance of judicial authority (clauses 25(5) and 25(7)), affront to judicial authority (clause 25(8)) and interference with judicial proceedings (clause 25(6)). For the purposes of this title, the following terms are defined in clause 1(2).

"Public administration" is defined in clause 1(2) and covers not only the executive but also the legislative and judicial process. By virtue of the definition of "province" in section 28 of the Interpretation Act, "provincial ... government" includes the governments of the Yukon and Northwest Territories.

The definition of "public officer" in clause 1(2) is taken from section 2 of the Criminal Code but for reasons of principle and practice has been extended to include peace officers. In principle, a peace officer, like other public officers, holds an office which is public in nature. In practice, the new Code can simplify the law by replacing the words "obstructs a public officer or peace officer" (paragraph 118(a), Criminal Code) by the words "obstructs a public officer" in clause 25(1).

"Public official" is defined in clause 1(2) and is based on section 107 of the Criminal Code which defines an "official" as a person who: "(a) holds an office, or (b) is appointed to discharge a public duty; ...." "Public official," then, is the widest term and covers "public officer," which includes "peace officers." Persons appointed to perform a public duty include not only government employees and appointees but also private parties officially appointed to do the work of government. While the former group is easily circumscribed, the latter is not, and greater problems could arise from a definition covering too many private parties. Government practices vary enormously in the ways that powers are delegated to private parties. Appointments are made by many governmental parties including lower level government employees or appointees by various instruments and procedures including even oral communications.

86. See Model Penal Code, supra, note 56, art. 240 and following.

Appointees may be natural or artificial persons (for example corporations) and the latter may in turn appoint persons within its own organization. There are, then, various means for deployment and control of private activities undertaken for public purposes, many of which are conducted outside the supervision or direct control of government. But the perennial difficulty of separating private and public functions counsels caution as to the scope of our proposed definition of "public official," which we limit in the interests of operational efficiency to those appointed by official governmental action and do not extend to those possibly covered through confusion over the distinction between what is public and what is private.

The definition of "public proceedings" in clause 1(2) is taken from the definition of "judicial proceeding" in section 107 of the Criminal Code. That term, however, is extended artificially by that section to cover legislative proceedings. To avoid such artificiality the new Code uses the more accurate term "public proceedings." This new term does not cover executive proceedings of a less formal nature, for example Cabinet meetings, which are not specially protected by present criminal law and are not therefore dealt with by the new Code. It does, however, cover proceedings in the Senate, House of Commons and provincial assemblies. It also covers proceedings in courts and other bodies exercising judicial functions. Committees of legislative bodies, non-judicial tribunals and fact-finding bodies are covered to the extent that they are authorized to take evidence by way of solemn statement. Reference to "solemn statement" (Chapter 24) replaces reference to "under oath" in section 107.

"Solemn statement" as defined in clause 1(2) covers the three ways of making a solemn averment recognized in sections 13, 14 and 38 of the Canada Evidence Act. The new Code rejects the recommendation in Report 1, Evidence, that the oath should be abolished. It prefers the minority view of Commissioner La Forest, as he then was, for the reasons given by him:

I would retain the oath. I am convinced that a substantial number of people are more likely to tell the truth, at least the whole truth, if they take the oath. To those who take the oath seriously (and this covers a great many people) the certain demands of conscience are more likely to elicit the exact truth than the highly uncertain threat of a prosecution for perjury. Moreover, one cannot neatly separate man the citizen from the moral man. The Commission has on numerous occasions reiterated that the criminal law should be used to protect the core values of society. These core values are ultimately grounded in the values of the individuals comprising that society. Why should those individual values not be used to buttress society's core values so long as this does not become oppressive?

The minor invasion of privacy is surely outweighed by the need to obtain the truth. Witnesses on the stand must daily reveal far more sensitive matters. And I cannot believe that in this day and age the danger that the testimony of a person who, on the ground of conscientious scruple, refuses to take the oath may be met with skepticism is sufficiently general to outweigh the argument for retaining the oath.


89. LRCC, Evidence (Report 1) (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975) at 86-87.
Chapter 23: Corrupting Public Administration

Comment

Good government is incompatible with bribery and corruption. Good government means taking decisions — by ministers, officials, judges and so on — fairly, impartially and disinterestedly. Bribery means basically paying such people to take decisions not impartially but in the interest of those giving the bribe. It clearly, therefore, needs the sanctions of the criminal law.

Such sanctions are found currently in Part III of the present Criminal Code. Section 108 deals with bribery of judicial officers, section 109 with bribery of officers generally, section 110 with frauds upon the government, section 111 with breach of trust by a public officer, section 112 with municipal corruption, section 113 with selling or purchasing office, and section 114 with influencing or negotiating appointments or dealing in offices. These sections are lengthy, complex and overlapping.

The new Code simplifies the law in two respects. First, by amalgamating offences against government and offences against justice, it avoids the need for separate crimes for judicial officers and for officers generally. Second, it reduces the various forms of corruption to two: bribery and breach of trust.

23(1) Bribery. Everyone commits a crime who confers or agrees to confer a benefit on another person for the purpose of corruptly influencing the course of public administration.

23(2) Accepting Bribes. Everyone commits a crime who accepts or agrees to accept a benefit given for the purpose of corruptly influencing the course of public administration.

Comment

These two clauses replace sections 108 to 110 and 112 to 114 of the present Criminal Code. "[Agrees to confer] is added because of a problem that has arisen regarding drug trafficking. 90 While normally a person who agrees to do something with another will commit conspiracy, case-law has held that people agreeing to sell drugs do not conspire with the proposed buyers unless they know of the buyers' intention to resell. To make the position absolutely clear and to avoid problems with reliance on the furthering provisions, clause 23(1) specifically criminalizes the mere agreement to confer a benefit.

"Benefit" covers any kind of favour. It covers the usual sort of benefit which will clearly be financial. It will obviously also cover non-pecuniary alternatives — promotion, additional vacation, nomination to a prestigious club and so forth. But it will not cover the common courtesies of ordinary civilized behaviour — offering the

90. See Bruce A. MacFarlane, Drug Offences in Canada, 2d ed. (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1986) at 255.
visiting official a cup of coffee, giving the judge a ride from the court to the airport and so on.

Unlike the present Criminal Code the new Code avoids specifying the different kinds of persons that may not have a benefit conferred on them. These include not only those actually taking the decision but others near or dear to them — you can bribe an official by giving a "sweetener" to his wife, his family or anyone with influence on him. Accordingly the new Code simply prohibits conferring a benefit "on another person ...."

On the other hand there is nothing wrong in trying honestly to advance one's cause and influence the course of public administration by putting forward arguments through the services of a lawyer or lobbyist. Nor is there anything wrong in paying for such services. For this reason clauses 23(1) and 23(2) specify that a crime is committed only when the benefit is conferred or accepted for the purpose of "corruptly influencing the course of public administration" [Emphasis added]. In this respect bribery under clauses 23(1) and 23(2) parallels bribery under clauses 15(1) and 15(2).

23(3) Breach of Public Trust. Every public official commits a crime who abuses his public powers.

Comment

This clause replaces section 111 of the Criminal Code. Like that section it relates only to public officials and concerns only acts done by them in connection with their office. "Breach of public trust," following existing case-law, relates to abuse of public trust — improper use by a public official of his public office for personal ends.91 It would include, for instance, unjustified preferment for private reasons. It also covers willful misconduct of officers executing process, presently covered specifically by section 117 of the Criminal Code.

Unlike clauses 23(1) and 23(2), which concern acts done between public officials and others, clause 23(3) relates to acts done by officials themselves regardless of any arrangement with others. By virtue of the General Part provisions the conduct and culpability requirements are act and purpose.

Chapter 24: Misleading Public Administration

Comment

Crucial to good decision making, whether in government or in the courts, is accurate information. Assessment must be made, before reaching decisions, of all the relevant facts and evidence. As hard as such assessment is in any event, it becomes doubly so in the face of deliberate lying and misleading. Hence the need to criminalize perjury, impersonation and related crimes.

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Such crimes under the present law are mostly to be found in Part III of the Criminal Code, entitled "Offences against the Administration of Law and Justice" and more specifically under the heading "Misleading Justice." This title itself, however, misleads because while most of the offences grouped under it relate to "judicial proceedings," that term is extended by section 107 to cover various other proceedings (see p. 108 above). The crimes listed under that heading are perjury (section 120), false statements in extrajudicial proceedings (section 122.1), witnesses giving contradictory evidence (section 124), fabricating evidence (section 125), offences relating to affidavits (section 126) and public mischief (section 128).

A related offence contained outside that heading is that of personating a peace officer (section 119). This is one of four personation offences known to the present Criminal Code, the others being personation with intent to gain an advantage, obtain property or cause another a disadvantage (section 361), personation at an examination (section 362), and acknowledgement of an instrument in a false name (section 363).

The new Code largely retains the present law but in a modified form. Perjury, false statements in extrajudicial proceedings and contradictory statements fall under clauses 24(1) and 24(2), fabricating evidence and using such evidence under clauses 24(3) and 24(4), impersonation to influence public administration, replacing section 119, under clause 24(5) and public mischief under clause 24(7) (misleading public officer). In addition there is a new crime in clause 24(6) of withholding information when applying for authority to execute process. On the other hand there is no special crime in the new Code to replace that of falsifying registers or other public records (section 366) because the crime of forgery of public documents defined by clause 14(1) includes forgery of public records, as defined in clause 1(2).

24(1) Perjury. Everyone commits a crime who makes a false solemn statement in a public proceeding for the purpose of influencing the outcome of such proceeding.

24(2) Other False Statements. Everyone commits a crime who, when required by law to make a solemn statement, makes a false solemn statement outside a public proceeding for the purpose of defeating the objective for which it is required.

Comment

Clauses 24(1) and 24(2) replace and basically repeat sections 120 to 124 of the Criminal Code. First, by virtue of the definition of "false solemn statement" in clause 1(2), they amalgamate the crimes of giving false evidence and giving contradictory evidence. Second, however, they extend the crime of giving contradictory evidence to evidence given outside judicial proceedings instead of restricting it artificially to such proceedings as does section 124. Matters of punishment (section 121) and corroborations (section 122) are left to the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Clause 24(1) replaces section 120 but substitutes the more accurate term "public proceedings" for the artificially extended term "judicial proceeding." Clause 24(2) replaces sections 122 and 122.1 but restricts perjury outside judicial proceedings to
persons required by law to make statements in the form of a solemn statement. Persons not so required may commit fraud by lying but will not commit perjury. Those not required by law to make a solemn statement should not be susceptible to exposition by police and other officers to the perjury sanctions of the criminal law.

By virtue of the General Part provisions the required conduct is an act. The culpability required is the purpose specified, that is, as in section 120 of the Criminal Code, to mislead.

24(3) Forging Documents or Fabricating Evidence. Everyone commits a crime who for the purpose of influencing the course of public administration:

(a) forges, destroys or conceals any document;
(b) fabricates, alters, destroys or conceals any real evidence; or
(c) in applying for a certificate of citizenship, passport, permit or other licence required pursuant to a federal or provincial statute, makes a false statement or withholds relevant information.

24(4) Using Forged Documents, Fabricated Evidence. Everyone commits a crime who for the purpose of influencing the course of public administration uses a forged document, a fabricated or altered item of real evidence, or a document listed in, and obtained in the circumstances described in, clause 24(3)(c).

Comment

Clause 24(3) replaces sections 125 and 126 and subsection 58(2) of the Criminal Code. Clause 24(4) supplements clause 24(3) by making it a crime to use fabricated evidence whether the accused is the fabricator or not. This makes clauses 24(3) and 24(4) parallel to the proposed and present law on forgery (see clause 14(2) and sections 324 (forgery) and 326 (uttering forged document) of the Criminal Code). “Forges,” a word only applying to documents, is defined in clause 1(2). “Fabricates” and “alters” have their ordinary meanings of “makes” and “changes.” “Real evidence” means any physical object other than a document. Because one cannot use a destroyed or concealed document, clause 24(4) restricts itself to the use of fabricated and altered documents. Clause 24(3)(c) replaces subsection 58(2) and section 59 of the Criminal Code but is wide enough to cover wrongly obtaining not only certificates of citizenship and passports but also permits and other licences. Clause 24(4) covers the wrongful use of such wrongly obtained documents.

In accordance with the General Part provisions, the required conduct is a positive act, except that the term “withholds” in clause 24(3)(c) creates a specific crime of omission. The purpose is that expressly specified.

24(5) Impersonation. Everyone commits a crime who impersonates another person, whether living, dead or fictitious, for the purpose of influencing the course of public administration.
Comment

The present *Criminal Code* has four impersonation offences: personation of a peace officer (section 119), personation with intent to defraud (section 361), personation at an examination (section 362) and acknowledging an instrument in a false name (section 363). Under the new Code, personation with intent to defraud being in effect an attempt to defraud by implied false representations, is covered by clause 13(3) on fraud together with clause 4(3) on attempt. Personation at an examination is omitted as being below the threshold of criminality unless it influences public administration (for example getting a driver's licence through impersonation, which is then covered by clause 24(5)). Personating a police officer and acknowledging an instrument in a false name are covered by clause 24(5). Clause 24(5), however, is wider than section 119 in that it applies to impersonation not only of peace officers but of anyone. It is wider than section 363 in that it would cover impersonation by other means than acknowledging an instrument in a false name. The words “living, dead or fictitious” are added because clause 1(2) restricts the meaning of a “person” generally to persons already born. In accordance with the General Part the conduct required is a positive act. The culpability required is the purpose specified in the clause itself.

24(6) Withholding Information. Everyone commits a crime who when applying for authority to execute process under the Code of Criminal Procedure withholds information for the purpose of obtaining that authority.

Comment

Clause 24(6) creates a new crime. A person giving false information on oath when applying for authority to execute process commits perjury. But a person who gives true information but withholds relevant information commits no crime. Clause 24(6) closes this gap. The new crime is therefore one of omission. By virtue of clause 24(4)(d) the culpability is purpose.

The crime defined in section 117 of the *Criminal Code* of peace officers’ misconducting themselves in the execution of process or making a false return to the process relates to actual execution and is covered by the general crime of breach of public trust defined by clause 23(3).

24(7) Misleading Public Officer.

(a) General Rule. Everyone commits a crime who misleads a public officer into beginning, continuing or ceasing an investigation into a crime or a federal or provincial infraction.

Comment

This clause replaces section 128 of the *Criminal Code* (public mischief). It differs from that section, however, in two ways. First, whereas the section details various ways of trying to mislead the peace officer, clause 24(7)(a) focuses on the effect on the
officer — causing him to begin, continue or cease an investigation into a crime or a federal or provincial infraction when in the public interest he should not so have done. Second, whereas section 128 focuses only on causing the officer to enter on or continue an investigation, clause 24(7)(a) extends its ambit to causing him to cease from it. By virtue of the General Part, the culpability required is purpose and the conduct required, a positive act. The positive act requirement rules out the need for a special provision to protect the common law right to silence. Refusal to answer police questions in general and refusal to admit guilt in particular does not constitute the crime of misleading a peace officer.

(b) Exception. This provision does not apply to a person who merely denies guilt.

Comment

At common law the extent of the right to silence is unclear. In principle it should cover mere denials of guilt — the entitlement to say “not guilty” in court should parallel a similar entitlement outside the court. It should in practice as well or else the right to silence is reduced to the vanishing point — in many cases keeping quiet is so suspicious as to amount to an admission of guilt.

On this point, however, common law authorities conflict. The Australian case of Kataja held that denial of guilt even accompanied by corroborative detail is not a crime. The English case of Robinson held the contrary. Meanwhile Glanville Williams suggests that it would accord better with the spirit of the law to hold that nothing said by an accused in answer to the charge against him counts as public mischief.

Under Canadian law, however, by virtue of section 128 of the Criminal Code, every one commits public mischief who, with intent to mislead, causes a peace officer to enter on or continue an investigation by doing one of four different things. These are: (a) making a false statement accusing another of committing an offence; (b) doing anything intended to cause some other person to be suspected or to divert suspicion from oneself; (c) reporting that an offence has been committed when it has not; and (d) falsely reporting that someone has died.

Accordingly the law in Canada as to denial of guilt is unclear. Arguably all false denials of guilt fall under the second head above contained in paragraph 128(1)(b) because they divert suspicion from the real offender. Equally arguably, however, they do not fall thereunder for the following reasons. First, false statements are dealt with specifically by paragraph 128(1)(a) whereas paragraph 128(1)(b) only deals with acts (“doing anything” [Emphasis added]). Second, if paragraph 128(1)(b) covered statements as well as acts it would automatically cover false accusations against others. These would then need no special paragraph of their own, and, contrary to the canon

94. See Williams, supra, note 32 at 417.
of interpretation that each section in a statute has a separate meaning, paragraph 128(1)(a) would be otiose.

Clause 24(7)(b) clarifies the law by providing that denials of guilt by themselves do not constitute the crime of misleading a peace officer.

Chapter 25: Obstructing Public Administration

Comment

This chapter deals with crimes against public administration involving neither bribery nor deceit but simply obstruction. They are mostly contained in present law but found in different places. Disobeying a lawful order of a court (section 116 of the Criminal Code) and obstructing a public officer (section 118), are listed under "Corruption and Disobedience." Obstructing the course of justice (section 127) falls under the heading "Misleading Justice." Escape and being at large (section 133), are located under the heading "Escapes and Rescues." Finally, bringing justice into contempt is left to common law. By virtue of their common characteristic, obstructiveness, they are placed in one and the same chapter of the new Code.

In addition, the present Criminal Code contains numerous crimes of improper publication scattered throughout it. In our recent Working Paper 56, Public and Media Access to the Criminal Process, we proposed that the present law be narrowed considerably in order to reinforce the longstanding common law principle of openness of legal proceedings. Working Paper 56 expressed our tentative views on this subject. Our final views will form part of our forthcoming Code of Criminal Procedure. For completeness we here set out the crimes corresponding to that paper's recommendations. These may be changed after we receive public responses to them.

In Working Paper 56 we identified the precise limits to the principle of openness that are needed for the proper functioning of the criminal process. We suggested including two types of publication bans in the Criminal Code — those provided by statute, which would take effect upon the commencement of criminal proceedings, and those that could be imposed by courts in accordance with clearly circumscribed powers set out in the procedural part of the Criminal Code. Since both are necessary for the administration of justice, failure to comply with them should be a crime. Clauses 25(4)(a) and 25(5) contain the crimes corresponding to these two categories of publication bans. Clause 25(6)(a) sets out the related crime of sub judice contempt of court.

The new Code omits two crimes existing under present law. It omits disobeying a federal statute (section 115 of the Criminal Code), on the ground that criminal liability should be explicit — statutes meaning to create crimes should do so expressly and not impliedly by reliance on such catch-all provisions. It also omits misconduct by peace


96. See, for example, Recommendation 7(1) (publication ban on identification of victims of sexual crimes) and Recommendation 7(3) (giving a general discretion to a court to prohibit publication of the identities of victims and witnesses), ibid. at 50.
officers and coroners (section 117) as being arbitrarily narrow (Why peace officers and coroners only?) and as being already covered by breach of public trust (clause 23(3)).

25(1) **Obstructing Public Officers.** Everyone commits a crime who by physical interference or breach of legal duty obstructs a public officer in the lawful execution of his duty.

**Comment**

This clause replaces paragraph 118(a) of the Criminal Code. The terms “public officer” and “peace officer” are defined in clause 1(2). Peace officers form a subcategory of public officers.

By virtue of the General Part provisions this crime can only be committed by a positive act. So, for example, omitting to help the police in general, even when asked to, is therefore not a crime. The specific omission to assist a peace officer arresting someone (paragraph 118(b)) is dealt with explicitly in clause 25(3). By virtue of clause 2(4)(d) the culpability required is purpose.

The limits of “obstruction” — a question arising mostly in connection with peace officers — are difficult to define. Obviously the meaning suggested in *Hinchliffe v. Sheldon* — “making it more difficult for the police to carry out their duties” — is far too wide. For one thing, obstruction will not include omissions unless there is a specific duty to act (clause 2(3)(b)). For another, it will not include doing something which one has a lawful right to do and which the peace officer has no right to forbid: mere “disobedience” is not obstruction — without making an arrest a peace officer cannot lawfully prevent a citizen from leaving the scene and going about his business. Nor does it include telling the police a false story since this is sufficiently covered by clause 24(7)(a) (misleading public officer), or helping someone to escape detection or arrest since this is covered by clause 25(11) (obstructing the course of justice). For this reason, clause 25(1), like article 242.1 of the Model Penal Code, is restricted to physical interference (for example putting physical obstacles in the officer’s way) and breach of legal duty (for example failure to answer questions when there is a legal duty to do so). Where the physical interference involves violence, it constitutes the more serious crime of assault and will be aggravated if done for the purpose of preparing, facilitating or concealing a crime or furthering an offender’s escape from detection, arrest or conviction (clause 10(10)(c)).

Equally difficult to define is the expression “in the lawful execution of his duty.” Clearly an officer performing an unlawful act is not acting in the lawful execution of his duty. A peace officer making an illegal arrest, for instance, is not so acting. Accordingly, resisting him in such a situation is not a crime under clause 25(1). Equally clearly a peace officer is not necessarily acting in the lawful execution of his duty simply because he happens to be on duty. For instance, drinking a coffee while on duty is not an act done itself in the execution of his duty. Acts done in lawful execution of


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his duty are acts which can be regarded as specifically required or authorized by law.\textsuperscript{99} Just what these acts are can best be worked out by the courts on a case-by-case basis.

The crime of obstructing legal process (paragraph 118(c)) is omitted. If the person obstructed is a public officer, a term which covers bailiff and sheriff’s officers, then the crime of obstructing a public officer is committed (clause 25(1)). Otherwise, short of actual assault, there should, in the Commission’s view, be no criminal liability.

25(2) Disrupting Proceedings. Everyone commits a crime who substantially disrupts public proceedings.

Comment

This crime replaces the second form of contempt of court described above (at 107). Disrupting public proceedings means hindering or obstructing the normal activity of the courtroom, legislature and so on. At common law of course the judge, speaker and so on have inherent power to keep order and exclude disrupters, and these powers will still remain.\textsuperscript{100} But where the disruption is substantial enough to warrant criminal sanction it can also be prosecuted under clause 25(2) as a crime. Whether this should involve the ordinary kind of criminal proceedings or some special type of summary procedure will be considered later in the context of criminal procedure.

By virtue of clause 2(3)(b) this crime can only be committed by a positive act. By virtue of clause 2(4)(d) it can only be committed purposely.

25(3) Failing to Help Public Officers. Everyone commits a crime who fails, when reasonably requested to do so, to take reasonable steps to help a public officer in the execution of his duty to arrest a person.

Comment

Clause 25(3) replaces paragraph 118(b) of the Criminal Code. By virtue of clause 2(4)(d) it creates a purpose crime which, being one of omission, can by virtue of clause 2(4)(b) only be committed by a person who knows the circumstances giving rise to the duty to act or is reckless as to their existence. The defendant must know that he is being requested to help, that the person making the request is a public officer and that he is making an arrest, or else he must recklessly ignore the fact that this may well be so. “[W]ithout reasonable excuse” in paragraph 118(b) of the present Criminal Code is omitted as unnecessary. For since the duty is only to take reasonable steps, a person not helping an officer because of some reasonable excuse cannot be said to fail to take reasonable steps - his behaviour is reasonable. Also omitted are the words “or in preserving the peace” as being too vague to satisfy Charter requirements.

\textsuperscript{99} See clause 3(13) and R. v. O’Donnell, R. v. Cluett, supra, note 40.

\textsuperscript{100} See supra, note 87 at 21-23.

(a) General Rule. Everyone commits a crime who, after proceedings have been initiated in relation to a sexual crime, publishes any information identifying

(i) a victim in the proceedings; or
(ii) a person under the age of eighteen who is a victim or witness in the proceedings.

(b) Exceptions. No one is liable

(i) under clause 25(4)(a) if a court orders that the person’s identity may be published in order to permit the accused to make full answer and defence;
(ii) under clause 25(4)(a)(i) if the victim consents to the publication.

Comment

Clause 25(4)(a) would make it a crime to publish the identities of certain vulnerable individuals once criminal proceedings have been initiated. "Initiated" is defined in clause 1(2). Shielding such people’s identities should at least partially obviate the fear and embarrassment that makes them reluctant to come forward, report these crimes and testify in court.

Special protection should also be given to young persons who are victims or witnesses of sexual crimes. At present their identities are protected in proceedings under the Young Offenders Act, but not in those under the Criminal Code. In Working Paper 56 we recommended greater consistency between the two statutes in this regard. But since openness is necessary to the proper functioning of criminal proceedings, we would confine the publication ban to crimes where public identification is likely to cause greatest harm, namely sexual crimes. A chapter of such crimes has not yet been included in the proposed Code but has been left for later treatment.

Clause 25(4)(b) provides exceptions to clause 25(4)(a). One is where a court allows publication to ensure fair trial for the accused. The other is where an adult victim consents to publication.

25(5) Publication in Violation of a Court Order. Everyone commits a crime who, in violation of a lawful court order, publishes

(a) any information identifying

(i) a victim whose safety is at risk,
(ii) a witness whose safety is at risk, or
(iii) a confidential informant;

102. See supra, note 95, Recommendation 7(1)(b) and at 50 and 52.
103. Ibid. Recommendation 7(4) and at 52 and Recommendation 7(1)(a) and at 50-55 respectively.
(h) evidence, representations, or reasons given at a pretrial motion, judicial interim release hearing or preliminary inquiry;

(c) a notice, evidence, information, or representations given at a hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence concerning the sexual activity of a victim in a sexual crime;

(d) a notice, evidence, information, or representations given during a portion of a trial at which the jury was not present, if it was not sequestered; [or]

(e) the contents of court exhibits .

{ (f) any information identifying an accused, victim or witness in exceptional circumstances where substantial and extraordinary harm would result. }

Comment

Clause 25(5) concerns violating court publication bans. Such bans may be needed to protect the safety of certain individuals, such as witnesses in extortion cases or confidential informants. Or they may be needed to protect the fairness of a criminal trial, proprietary interests, or confidential information within the court's control.

Some members of the Commission would go further and allow courts in exceptional cases to forbid publication where the harm caused would wholly outweigh the public right to know. Hard as it may be to define such a judicial power precisely, the law should surely guard against unreasonable community prejudice arising where minor matters with inflammatory potential are the subject of criminal proceedings.


(a) General Rule. Everyone commits a crime who publishes any of the following matters while a civil or criminal trial is pending:

(i) a party's admission or an accused's statement;

(ii) an accused's criminal record;

(iii) the results of investigative tests or procedures conducted in relation to the proceedings;

(iv) psychological data about a party or an accused; or

(v) opinions about the liability of a party or an accused.

(b) Exceptions. No one is liable under clause 25(6)(a) if the publication:

(i) does not jeopardize the fairness of the trial;

(ii) is a fair and accurate report of the proceedings or the contents of a related court document; or

(iii) is part of a discussion in good faith of matters of public interest and the jeopardy to a fair trial is merely incidental to the discussion.
Comment

Clause 25(6)(a) attempts to codify one of the common law contempt crimes — sub judice contempt of court — and reconcile the two competing objectives of certainty and flexibility. Common law proscription of publication of any matter tending to prejudice the outcome of legal proceedings is obviously too broad. The new Code would replace it by specifying the kinds of information most damaging to a fair trial because of the possibility that prospective jurors will learn these facts and form their views about guilt or liability on their basis rather than solely on the evidence presented in court.

Clause 25(6)(b) contains exceptions to the general prohibition. The first recognizes that in some cases publication will not prejudice a fair trial and need not, therefore, be prohibited on this account. The second, for the sake of the public interest in freedom of the press and information about the justice system, allows publication of the matters listed in the general rule if they come to light in the proceedings themselves or in court documents relating to them unless of course they are subject to a court publication ban under clause 25(5). The third exception, deriving from the common law, permits publication even of prejudicial information so as not to stifle public debate on issues to which such information is relevant, provided that the discussion is in good faith and the jeopardy to a fair trial is merely incidental to it; it would not cover people purposely jeopardizing a fair trial even if they felt it in the public interest so to do.

A special definition of "pending" is included in clause 1(2) applying in cases of publication by public officers or prosecutors. Knowing, as they do, in advance that charges will be laid, such persons should be prohibited from releasing prejudicial information even before a trial is generally considered "pending," if doing so would jeopardize the fairness of the trial.

25(7) Disobeying Lawful Court Order. Everyone commits a crime who fails to:

(a) comply with the terms of an appearance notice, summons or subpoena issued or an undertaking entered into pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure; or

(b) obey a lawful order of a court, judge or justice of the peace other than an order for the payment of money or an order for which a sanction or an enforcement procedure is already expressly provided by law.

104. See Askins v. London Weekend Television Ltd. (1978), [1978] S.L.T. 76 (H.C.J.), in which the defence was not available because of the prominent attention given to a particular pending case in a television broadcast.

Comment

The crime under this clause replaces both the Criminal Code offence defined in subsection 116(1) (disobeying order of court) and the third form described above (at 107) of common law contempt (defiance of judicial authority), but is not intended to remove the court’s inherent coercive power to deal with disobedience.

Clause 25(7) also replaces subsections 133(2) to 133(5) of the Criminal Code. It reformulates subsections 133(2) to 133(5) to accord with the proposals to be advanced in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It also restricts the crime defined by subsection 116(1) to disobeying orders of courts or justices of the peace and omits as being too broad the words in subsection 116(1), “... or by a person or body of persons authorized by any Act to make or give the order, ...” — where Parliament intends disobedience to such orders to be criminal, it should expressly say so in the governing Act. By contrast the judicial system merits general criminal law protection against defiance.

Clause 25(7)(b) excludes two kinds of orders. One is an order for payment of money, since, like the present law, the new Code rules out imprisonment for debt. The second consists of other orders which can be enforced by process like injunctions, specific performance, eviction orders or the sanction of civil contempt. Enforcement of these is left by the new Code, as by the present Criminal Code, to civil law.100

In form, the crime is one of omission though in fact the disobedience could take the form of a positive act. By virtue of clause 2(4)(d) the required mental element is purpose.

25(8) Bringing Justice into Contempt. Everyone commits a crime who publicly brings into contempt a court, a judge in his official capacity or the administration of civil or criminal justice.

Comment

Clause 25(8) codifies the fourth form of contempt of court identified in Working Paper 20, that is, scandalizing the court.107 Because of the conflicting demands of freedom of speech some would object to its inclusion and contend that judges should not remain immune from criticism. But judges do not easily share the ordinary citizen’s access to normal remedies for defamation, while the justice system needs protection against criticism undermining public confidence in it. For that reason a contempt crime has been included in the proposed new Code.

Five points merit notice on clause 25(8). First, the clause affords equal protection to all levels of courts.108 Unlike present law which denies lower courts the power to cite for contempt done outside the court, the new Code puts such contempt on the

same footing no matter what the court. Anyone with reasonable grounds to do so will be able to lay an information in respect of it.

Second, the clause codifies what is at present left to common law. This is in accordance with the objects of the new Code which are to provide a comprehensive statement of the criminal law and to replace the uncertainty of case-law by statutory provisions.

Third, the crime created is a result crime. To be guilty an accused must actually bring a court, judge or administration into contempt. Of course, where an accused’s purpose is to bring a court into contempt but he fails to do so, there may well be criminal liability for an attempt. Apart from this one exception, contempt must actually result; as was said in Kopyto, “if the essence of the charge is, as it must be, that the words spoken do bring the court into contempt, then it would not be unreasonable to require the prosecution to prove that this is in fact the effect of those words.” This is exactly the requirement made by this clause.

In keeping with the principle of restraint in the criminal law, a minority of Commissioners would further restrict this crime by requiring that the resulting contempt create a real and present danger of interference with the proper administration of justice. Adopting the reasoning of Goodman J.A. in Kopyto, the minority would add to clause 25(8) the following words: “and thereby creates a real and present danger of interference with the proper administration of justice.”

Fourth, by virtue of clause 2(4)(d) on culpability, the culpability required by clause 25(8) is purpose: the accused must purposely bring the court into contempt. Whether the accused actually had such a purpose must be assessed in context and in light of all the circumstances. One important aspect of the circumstances relates to the accused’s situation, another to the truth or falsehood of what was said.

As regards the accused’s situation, there is a vast difference between statements made with cold deliberation and those made in the heat of the moment. This difference is noted in the common law of slander by the distinction between slander and mere vulgar abuse. It was also noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal’s characterization of Kopyto’s statement as one made “on behalf of a disgruntled litigant by a disgruntled solicitor who had identified himself with his client.”

With regard to the truth or falsity of the statements made, this too will serve to indicate the true purpose of the accused. Where the statements are untrue and known to be so by the accused, the signs are that he meant to bring the judge into contempt. Where they are true and known to be so by the accused, the inference is that he did not mean to bring the judge into contempt. The difference is between “an intention to vilify [and one] to correct.”

For this reason, no defence of truth was thought necessary for inclusion. As with clause 21(1) on stirring up hatred, it was thought that truth operated as an index of purpose. If, however, it were thought that this leaves the law too uncertain and that

110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
contempt is different from stirring up hatred in that contempt can sometimes be justified but hatred never can be; then an exception for truth could easily be added as follows: "(b) clause 25(8)(a) shall not apply to allegations made directly or indirectly which are true." Such a provision would place an evidentiary burden on the accused to provide some evidence of the allegation's truth but the persuasive burden would remain on the prosecution.

25(9) Jury Offences. Everyone commits a crime who discloses information not revealed in open court regarding the proceedings of a jury in retirement other than for the purpose of:

(a) investigation or trial of a crime committed by a person in his capacity as a juror, or

(b) research concerning juries that has been approved by the Attorney General of the province.

Comment

Clause 25(9) replaces section 576.2 of the Criminal Code. Exception 25(9)(a) combines the two exceptions in section 576.2. The exception in 25(9)(b) is new and is intended to permit jury research at the discretion of the minister provincially responsible for the administration of justice.\(^{112}\) By virtue of clause 2(4)(d) the required mental element is purpose.

25(10) Escape. Everyone commits a crime who

(a) escapes from lawful arrest or imprisonment, or

(b) is at large before the expiration of a term of imprisonment to which he was sentenced.

Comment

The present law on escape contained in sections 132 to 137 of the Criminal Code involves numerous detailed provisions. These relate to breaking into a prison to set someone free (paragraph 132(a)), breaking out of a prison cell (paragraph 132(b)), escaping from lawful custody (paragraph 133(1)(a)), being unlawfully at large (paragraph 133(1)(b)), permitting someone in one's lawful custody to escape (paragraph 134(a)), conveying anything into a prison to facilitate an inmate’s escape (paragraph 134(b)), wrongly directing under colour of pretended authority the discharge of a prisoner (paragraph 134(c)), rescuing someone from lawful custody (paragraph 135(a)), as a peace or prison officer letting someone in one's custody escape (paragraphs 135(b) and 135(c)), and assisting a prisoner of war to escape (section 136).

All these provisions are replaced in the new Code by clause 25(10). The crimes defined by paragraphs 132(b) and 133(1)(a) are covered by clause 25(10)(a), the term

\(^{112}\) See LRCC, The Jury (Report 16) (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1982) at 82.
"custody" being replaced by "lawful arrest or imprisonment." Escape from other
detention, for example compulsory detention as a mentally incompetent, is left to civil
law. The crimes defined by paragraphs 132(a), 134(a), (b) and (c), 135(a), (b) and (c),
and section 136 are covered by the combination of clause 25(10)(a) and the furthering
provisions in Chapter 4 of the new Code. The offence defined in paragraph 133(1)(b)
is covered by clause 25(10)(b) in identical terms except for the omission of the words
"without lawful excuse." A person at large with a lawful excuse would be protected
under the new Code by clause 3(13).

The matters dealt with by subsections 133(2) to 133(11) are dealt with as follows.
Those contained in subsections 133(2) to 133(5) relate to failure to appear, to answer a
summons and so on and are covered by the crime of disobeying a lawful court order
(clause 25(7)). Those contained in subsections 133(6) to 133(11), relate to procedure
and will be dealt with in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

By virtue of the General Part provisions the two crimes in this clause require a
positive act and purpose.

25(11) Obstructing the Course of Justice. Everyone commits a crime who, in
any manner other than those dealt with under Title VI, obstructs, defeats
or perverts the course of justice.

Comment

The definition of obstructing justice given in the Criminal Code is doubly
unsatisfactory. First there is undue specification of the means employed. Sub-
section 127(1) deals with indemnifying a surety and taking an indemnity as a surety,
subsection 127(2) with obstructing justice in any other way, and subsection 127(3) with
dissuading people by threats, bribery or other corrupt means from giving evidence,
influencing a juror by threats, bribes or other corrupt means, and accepting a bribe to
abstain from giving evidence or to do or refrain from doing anything as a juror.
Second, it is unclear whether subsection 127(2) covers conduct already criminalized by
other sections in Part III of the Criminal Code, for example perjury (section 120),
fabricating evidence (section 125), compounding (section 129), and corruptly taking or
offering rewards for recovery of goods (sections 130 and 131).

Clause 25(11) simply prohibits any sort of obstructing justice but clarifies that this
covers only acts other than those already dealt with under Title VI. It does not therefore
cover telling false stories in court or to the police, because these are criminalized by
clauses 24(1) (perjury) and 24(7)(a) (misleading public officer). Nor does it cover
denials of guilt because these are dealt with by the exception in clause 24(7)(b). It
covers such acts as interfering with witnesses, jurors, investigating officers,
indemnifying sureties and compounding crimes, all of which are acts calculated to
distort the course of justice. By virtue of clause 2(3)(b) this crime can only be
committed by a positive act. By virtue of clause 2(4)(d) the mental element is purpose.

Corruptly taking or offering rewards for recovery of goods (sections 130 and 131)
are omitted. If the accused takes a reward for pretending to help another to recover
stolen goods when he is in fact unable to help, he commits fraud. If he takes a reward
for recovery of goods when he can help but when the purpose is to prevent the wrongdoer being brought to justice, he commits the crime of obstructing justice. So too if he advertises a reward with "no questions asked." 

Chapter 26: Crimes against State Security

Comment

Treason and other crimes against State security are some of the most serious offences in our criminal law. Though rarely committed and still more rarely charged, they involve conduct jeopardizing the security and well-being of the whole country. At present they are set out in two places in our law. Treason and related offences against the State are found in Part II of the Criminal Code. Spying and related offences of more recent vintage are contained in the Official Secrets Act.\(^{113}\)

The Criminal Code provisions are set out in sections 46 to 63. Section 46 defines the two primary crimes of high treason and treason. Sections 49 to 63 define the following ancillary crimes: acts intended to alarm Her Majesty (section 49), assisting an alien enemy to leave Canada (paragraph 50(1)(a)), omitting to prevent treason (paragraph 50(1)(b)), intimidating Parliament (section 51), sabotage (section 52), seditious conspiracy (subsection 60(3)), incitement to mutiny (section 53), assisting deserter (section 54), offences in relation to members of the R.C.M.P. (section 57) and offences in relation to military forces (section 63).

The Official Secrets Act also defines primary and ancillary offences. The primary offence of spying is defined at length in sections 3 and 4. Ancillary offences are defined in sections 5 to 9, which relate to unauthorized use of uniforms, falsification of reports, forgery, personation, false documents and unlawful dealing with dies, seals and so on (section 5); interference in a prohibited place with constables (section 6); harbouring spies (section 8); and attempt (section 9).

As recommended by Working Paper 49, Crimes against the State, the new Code substantially retains the present law, simplifies the arrangement by putting the offences in one chapter and streamlines the substance by omitting unnecessary offences.\(^{114}\) Accordingly, Chapter 26 deals with both treason offences and espionage offences. It defines a primary crime of treason and ancillary offences of failing to prevent treason, espionage, unlawful disclosure and sabotage. It omits, as being dealt with elsewhere in the new Code, several offences considered below.

The term "armed hostilities" is defined in clause 1(2), to cover war and other armed hostilities. Paragraphs 46(1)(b) and 46(1)(c) of the Criminal Code refer to "lev[i]ng] war against Canada," "assisting an enemy at war with Canada," and "assist[ing] ... any armed forces against whom Canadian Forces are engaged in hostilities whether or not a state of war exists ...." "War" has not been judicially defined but would probably, suggest Mewett and Manning in Criminal Law, be


\(^{114}\) LRCC, Crimes against the State (Working Paper 49); (Ottawa: LRCC, 1986) at 41 and following [hereinafter Working Paper 49].
construed, following East, to mean, "not war so declared in the international law sense, but the use of armed forces by a large number of people against the lawful Government of Canada in order to achieve some public or general, as opposed to private, objective." 115 "Armed hostilities" then covers war in both this and the international sense.

Under the Official Secrets Act, espionage and unlawful communication relate to various kinds of information but leave a good deal of uncertainty. It is not clear whether only secret and official information is involved. It is not clear whether an offender acting for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State must himself know his purpose is prejudicial. And it is not clear whether its prejudicial nature must be determined as a matter of fact by the jury or as a matter of policy by Crown prerogative.

Clauses 26(3) and 26(4) restrict the crimes of espionage and unlawful disclosure to classified information. On the other hand they remove the need for prejudicial purpose and simply criminalize gathering or disclosing which will injure the national interest. Deciding which information is classified and not to be revealed is left, subject to an exception discussed in clause 26(5), to be determined by the executive. The new crimes of espionage and unlawful disclosure, then, are predicated on a clear and uniform system of classification.

As we stated in Working Paper 49, with regard to such a classification scheme we can only suggest some general principles. 116 First, to avoid arbitrariness the new scheme should be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny. Second, each of the various classifications should be clearly defined so as to avoid uncertainty of application. Third, uniform procedures would be necessary for classifying, authorizing disclosure of, and declassifying information. Fourth, to ensure compliance with such procedures particular classifications should be judicially reviewable. Finally, wherever possible, classified information should be clearly marked to give adequate notice to those handling it.

26(1) Treason. Every Canadian citizen and everyone benefitting from the protection of Canada commits a crime who

(a) engages in armed hostilities against Canada;
(b) helps a State engaged in armed hostilities against Canada;
(c) helps any armed forces against whom Canadian Forces are engaged in armed hostilities;
(d) overthrows by force the constitutional Government of Canada or a province.

115. Supra. note 25 at 434.
116. Supra. note 114 at 49.
Comment

Clause 26(1) replaces sections 46 to 57 of the Criminal Code. As to application the law remains unchanged. While subsection 46(3) of the Criminal Code provides that treason can be committed by Canadian citizens or persons owing allegiance to Canada, clause 26(1) provides that treason can be committed by Canadian citizens or other persons benefiting from Canada's protection. These include landed immigrants, temporary residents and visitors but not invading enemy soldiers because these enjoy no such protection. Clause 5(2)(f) on jurisdiction provides that, subject to diplomatic and other immunity under the law, our courts have jurisdiction over treason and other crimes against State security wherever committed if committed by Canadian citizens or by others who benefit from the protection of Canada. Accordingly, like the present law, the new Code bases the application of the law of treason on the reciprocal obligations between individuals and their State.

As to substance the law is simplified considerably. Section 46 of the Criminal Code defines two crimes: high treason and treason. As defined in subsection 46(1), high treason is committed by anyone who

(a) kills or attempts to kill Her Majesty, or does her any bodily harm tending to death or destruction, maims or wounds her, or imprisons or restrains her,

(b) levies war against Canada or does any act preparatory thereto; or

(c) assists an enemy at war with Canada, or any armed forces against whom Canadian Forces are engaged in hostilities whether or not a state of war exists between Canada and the country whose forces they are.

Treason, as defined in subsection 46(2), is committed by anyone who

(a) uses force or violence for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Canada or a province;

(b) without lawful authority, communicates or makes available to an agent of a state other than Canada, military or scientific information or any sketch, plan, model, article, note or document of a military or scientific character that he knows or ought to know may be used by that state for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or defence of Canada;

(c) conspires with any person to commit high treason or to do anything mentioned in paragraph (a);

(d) forms an intention to do anything that is high treason or that is mentioned in paragraph (a) and manifests that intention by an overt act; or

(e) conspires with any person to do anything mentioned in paragraph (b) or forms an intention to do anything mentioned in paragraph (b) and manifests that intention by an overt act.

By contrast clause 26(1) defines one crime of treason only and lists four ways of committing it. Clause 26(1)(a) states that it can be committed by engaging in armed hostilities against Canada and thus replaces paragraph 46(1)(b) of the Criminal Code (“levies war against Canada ...”). No special provision is made regarding “any act preparatory thereto” on the ground that, as with other crimes, liability should be for attempt and not mere preparation. Clause 26(1)(b) prohibits helping a State engaged in armed hostilities against Canada and thus replaces paragraph 46(1)(c) (“assists an
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(c) assists an enemy at war with Canada, or any armed forces against whom Canadian Forces are engaged in hostilities whether or not a state of war exists between Canada and the country whose forces they are.

Treason, as defined in subsection 46(2), is committed by anyone who

(a) uses force or violence for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Canada or a province;

(b) without lawful authority, communicates or makes available to an agent of a state other than Canada, military or scientific information or any sketch, plan, model, article, note or document of a military or scientific character that he knows or ought to know may be used by that state for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or defence of Canada;

(c) conspires with any person to commit high treason or to do anything mentioned in paragraph (a);

(d) forms an intention to do anything that is high treason or that is mentioned in paragraph (a) and manifests that intention by an overt act; or

(e) conspires with any person to do anything mentioned in paragraph (b) or forms an intention to do anything mentioned in paragraph (b) and manifests that intention by an overt act.

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enemy at war with Canada . . .”). Clause 26(1)(c) prohibits helping armed forces against whom Canadian Forces are engaged in armed hostilities and thus replaces paragraph 46(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (“assists ... any armed forces against whom Canadian Forces are engaged in hostilities ...”). This last provision would cover the case of Canadian citizens, for example, who help North Korean forces against a United Nations contingent including Canadian Forces and assisting South Korea.

Clause 26(1)(d) prohibits violent revolution and thus replaces paragraph 46(2)(a) ("uses force or violence for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Canada or a province"). While strictly speaking such use of force is already covered by clauses 6 to 9 in the Title on "Crimes against the Person," clause 26(1)(d) retains a special provision to focus on the overthrow rather than the use of force, and to reflect the traditional view that revolution amounted to "compassing the king’s death" and "levying war against the king in his realm."

By virtue of the General Part provisions the conduct and culpability required are act and purpose.

26(2) Failing to Prevent Treason.

(a) General Rule. Everyone commits a crime who fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the commission of treason or to inform a peace officer that treason has been committed.

Comment

So seriously was treason viewed by common law that it was the crime of misprision not to report a treason which one knew had been committed and also probably not to prevent a treason which one knew was about to be committed. Under existing law it is a crime not to make reasonable efforts to prevent treason which one knows is about to be committed: paragraph 50(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. Clause 26(2)(a) replaces paragraph 50(1)(b) but also covers, in view of the seriousness of treason, failure to report a treason which has been committed. Failing to prevent is of course a specific crime of omission. The culpability required is purpose but by virtue of clause 2(4)(b) it suffices if the accused knew, or was reckless as to, the circumstances giving rise to the duty to act (for example that treason is about to be, or has been, committed).

(b) Exception. Clause 26(2)(a) does not apply where the person cannot take such reasonable steps without risk of death or serious harm to himself or another person or where he has some other valid reason for not doing so.

Comment

This clause provides a parallel exception to that provided by clause 10(2)(b) of the new Code to the new crime of failure to rescue.

26(3) Espionage. Everyone commits a crime who gathers classified information for, or makes it available to, another State not engaged in armed hostilities with Canada.

Comment

Clause 26(3) replaces both paragraph 46(2)(b) of the Criminal Code and section 3 of the Official Secrets Act. Espionage committed for a State engaged in armed hostilities against Canada constitutes helping that State and is already covered by clause 26(1)(b). The lesser crime of gathering information for, or giving it to, a State not so engaged in armed hostilities against Canada is what is covered by clause 26(3). "Classified information" is defined in clause 1(2). The conduct and culpability required are act and purpose.

26(4) Gathering and Disclosing Information. Everyone commits a crime who gathers classified information for, or makes it available to, any person not authorized to receive it.

Comment

Clause 26(4) replaces section 4 of the Official Secrets Act (wrongful communication). In Working Paper 49 we recommended that while espionage should relate only to "classified national security information," unlawful disclosure should relate to "classified national security information" gathered for, or given to, anyone other than a foreign State or its agent and to "classified personal or government information" gathered for, or given to, anyone other than a foreign State or its agent.118 Clauses 26(3) and 26(4) draw no distinction between the two types of classified information on the grounds that disclosure of both sorts of information can cause serious injury to the national interest. The conduct and culpability required are act and purpose.

26(5) Exception. Clauses 26(3) and 26(4) do not apply where the information subject of the charge was improperly classified.

Comment

Clause 26(5) allows the defence to raise evidence that the information was improperly classified. Absent such evidence, the Crown would not need to prove the propriety of the classification. Given such evidence, it should be open to a court to...

118. Supra, note 114 at 47-48 and 54-55.
review the executive’s view and allow improper classification as a defence, as was
done by a Provincial Court Judge in R. v. Toronto Sun Publishing Ltd. 119 and as was
proposed by Recommendation 10 of the MacDonald Commission. 120

26(6) Sabotage. Everyone commits a crime who by damaging property or data
jeopardizes the security of Canada or of the forces of a foreign State
lawfully present in Canada.

Comment

Sabotage has two main aspects. In one sense it is just an offence against property,
with the additional feature of jeopardizing the safety of the State, and as such might be
dealt with under property crimes as an aggravated form of vandalism. In another sense
it is primarily an offence of jeopardizing the safety of the State, it being only of
secondary importance that the means used is damaging property. Viewed in this sense
it should be treated as a crime against the State, as is done by the present Criminal
Code and as is here proposed. The conduct and culpability required are act and
purpose.

Omitted from Chapter 26 are many offences listed under present law. Killing Her
Majesty (paragraph 46(1)(a)) and acts intended to alarm Her Majesty (section 49) are
omitted as already adequately covered by Title II on “Crimes against the Person,”
which makes political motive an aggravating factor. Conspiracies to commit treason are
omitted in view of the general provisions in Chapter 4 on “Involvement in Crime.”
Assisting an alien enemy to leave Canada (section 50) is covered by clause 26(1)(b) in
so far as this assists an enemy State and is left uncriminalized in so far as it does not.
Intimidating Parliament (section 51) is covered by Chapter 8, “Crimes against
Psychological Integrity,” together with the aggravating factor of political motive (clause
10(10)(d)). Doing a prohibited act for a purpose prejudicial to “the safety, security or
defence of Canada” (paragraph 52(1)(a)) is adequately covered by clauses 26(1), (3),
(4) and (6). Doing such an act for a purpose prejudicial to the safety of foreign forces
in Canada is dealt with in clause 26(6). Inciting to mutiny (section 53), assisting
deserter (section 54), offences in relation to the R.C.M.P. (section 57) and interfering
with discipline in military forces (section 63) are too special in nature for inclusion in
a general Criminal Code and should be dealt with, if at all, in acts relating to the forces
and the R.C.M.P. Crimes relating to passports and citizenship certificates are dealt
with elsewhere under clause 14(1), “ Forgery of Public Documents.” Seditious offences
(sections 60 to 62) are omitted partly as being unwarranted restrictions on freedom of
expression and partly as being already covered by the new Code’s general provisions in
Chapter 4 on “Involvement in Crime” and by the crimes of stirring up hatred (clauses
21(1) and 22(2)). No attempt is made to replace section 71 (unlawful drilling) first
because it is not a crime-creating section but rather a section empowering the Governor
General to make orders prohibiting unlawful drilling and second because to the best of
our knowledge no such orders have ever been made. Nor does the new Code try to

120. Commission of Inquiry concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Security
criminalize peaceful secession by a province, for whether or not this fell within the traditional ambit of treason, it is a matter to be solved not in law courts but in the political forum.

Finally, the new Code also omits any provisions to replace subsections 47(3) and 47(4) and sections 48 and 51 of the Criminal Code. The provision in subsection 47(3) on the need for corroboration is omitted from clause 26(1) as being a rule of evidence not substance. That in subsection 48(1) setting out a special period of limitation for treason is omitted partly as being a rule of procedure not substance and partly as being archaic and lacking any rationale. That in subsection 48(2) requiring an overt act is omitted as unnecessary given the specific definitions in clause 1(2) and the general rules on conduct in Chapter 2 of the new Code.

International Crimes

In many Criminal Codes and textbooks there is a separate chapter about international crimes. These include piracy, foreign enlistment, crimes against internationally protected persons, hijacking and war crimes. Some, but not all, of these are found in the Canadian Criminal Code, which puts them not in a separate chapter but in Part II, "Offences against Public Order," along with treason, sedition and prize fights.

Clearly the chief difference between ordinary and international crimes relates to jurisdiction. In general, ordinary offences fall under the territorial principle, which holds that only crimes committed within States' territory fall under their jurisdiction. International crimes fall under other principles, which confer jurisdiction on States over crimes committed outside their territory. The best known example is piracy, to which the universality principle applies. According to that principle a person charged with piracy

may be tried and punished by any nation into whose jurisdiction he may come. (Piracy) is an offence against the law of nations; and as the scene of the pirate’s operations is the high seas, which it is not the right or duty of any nation to police, he is denied the protection of the flag which he may carry, and is treated as an outlaw, as the enemy of all mankind — hostis humani generis — whom any nation may in the interest of all capture and punish.\textsuperscript{122}

A survey of Canada’s criminal law provisions with international ramifications reveals the following. First, in the Criminal Code there are the following international crimes: piracy, crimes concerning counterfeit money, crimes relating to nuclear material, crimes against internationally protected persons, hostage taking, endangering the safety of ships and aircraft, and hijacking. Second, outside the Criminal Code there are the following international crimes: crimes against the Combines Investigation Act, the Foreign Enlistment Act and the Geneva Conventions Act.\textsuperscript{122} Third, the following statutes have international aspects: the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, the Canadian Citizenship Act, the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, the National Defence Act.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[121.] S.S. "Lotus" (1927), P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 10 at 70.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the Official Secrets Act, the R.C.M.P. Act and the Canada Shipping Act. In short, there are seven international crimes in the Criminal Code, three outside it and seven statutes with jurisdictional provisions.

The Code Crimes

Under the new proposed Code the seven Criminal Code crimes are covered mainly by means of special jurisdictional provisions linked to the ordinary crimes of the Special Part. Piracy is dealt with by clause 5(2)(h) which gives our courts jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by those on board private ships and aircraft outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State, for example on the high seas. Such crimes are

(i) crimes against personal safety and liberty of those on board other ships or aircraft;
(ii) theft, vandalism or arson of another ship or aircraft; or
(iii) theft, vandalism or arson of the property of those on board other ships or aircraft.

Crimes relating to counterfeit money are covered by clauses 5(2)(j) and 14(1)(a). Clause 5(2)(j) in accordance with Recommendation 40 of Working Paper 37, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, brings our criminal law in line with the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency and confers jurisdiction over crimes of forgery committed anywhere by anyone against Canadian currency. Clause 14(1)(a) criminalizes the forgery of currency.

Crimes relating to nuclear material are dealt with by clause 5(2)(k). This clause confers jurisdiction over certain crimes committed outside Canada by Canadian citizens or persons present in Canada after their commission. Such crimes are "(i) crimes against personal safety and liberty by means of nuclear material, (ii) theft of nuclear material, or (iii) vandalism or arson of, or by means of, nuclear material; ...."

Crimes against internationally protected persons are dealt with by clause 5(2)(l). This clause confers jurisdiction over crimes against the personal safety and liberty of internationally protected persons committed outside Canada in two situations. One is where the crime is committed by Canadian citizens or persons present in Canada after their commission. The second is where it is committed by anyone against a victim who was exercising functions on behalf of Canada. "Internationally protected person" is defined in clause 1(2) in roughly the same terms as section 2 of the Criminal Code and in line with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.

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Hostage taking is dealt with by clauses 5(2)(m) and 9(2). Clause 5(2)(m) confers jurisdiction over kidnapping where (i) the alleged offender is a Canadian citizen or is present in Canada after commission, or (ii) the person kidnapped is a Canadian citizen, or (iii) the crime is committed to influence the Government of Canada or a province, and clause 9(2) defines kidnapping as confining someone to compel him or someone else to do or not do something.

Finally endangering the safety of ships and aircraft and hijacking are covered by clause 5(2)(n). This clause gives jurisdiction given one of three conditions over two kinds of crimes committed outside Canada by anyone. One kind consists of crimes against personal safety and liberty of those on board ships and aircraft. The other consists in interfering with transportation facilities contrary to clause 10(9) where the facility in question is a ship or aircraft. The conditions are that (i) it be a Canadian ship or aircraft, (ii) which arrives in Canada with the alleged offender on board, or (iii) the alleged offender is present in Canada after commission of the offence.

The Non-Code Crimes

The three non-Code international crimes are dealt with as follows. Crimes against the 
Investigation Act,\textsuperscript{127} being of a specialized nature, are left to that Act and not dealt with in the new Code. Crimes against the Foreign Enlistment Act\textsuperscript{128} are on account of their specialized nature left to that particular statute. Finally, crimes against the Geneva Conventions Act\textsuperscript{129} (genocide and war crimes), are the subject of the Deschênes Royal Commission's recent report and hence omitted for the present.\textsuperscript{130}

The Seven Statutes

The other seven statutes fall into two groups. Three deal with special matters, the others with matters covered by the new Code. The National Defence Act, the R.C.M.P. Act and the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act\textsuperscript{131} are of too specialized a nature to warrant inclusion in a general Criminal Code. The remaining four deal with matters to be covered as follows. Arctic waters are covered by amending clause 1(2) in accordance with Recommendation 2 of Working Paper 37, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction,\textsuperscript{132} so as to define “Canada” as including the Canadian Arctic. Clause 14(1)(f) covers forgery of certificates of citizenship and clause 5(2)(i) gives jurisdiction over crimes committed outside Canada by anyone against certificates of Canadian citizenship. Official secrets offences fall under Chapter 26 which defines crimes against State security and clause 5(2)(f) giving extraterritorial jurisdiction over them. Lastly, crimes committed on

\textsuperscript{127} Supra., note 62.
\textsuperscript{128} Supra., note 122.
\textsuperscript{129} Supra., note 122.
\textsuperscript{131} Supra., note 123.
\textsuperscript{132} Supra., note 124 at 17.
Canadian ships and in special zones under Canadian sovereignty fall under Canada’s jurisdiction by virtue of clause 5(2)(a) which defines Canada to include Canadian ships and aircraft and clause 5(2)(e) which confers jurisdiction over crimes committed in special zones in which Canada has sovereign rights.

Accordingly the new Code contains no separate crimes of an international nature.
APPENDIX A

Summary of Recommendations

[PREAMBLE

WHEREAS the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms enshrined in the Constitution guarantees all Canadians their individual rights and freedoms subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society;

AND WHEREAS the criminal law is designed to reinforce fundamental social values, to maintain social order and to protect individual rights and freedoms;

AND WHEREAS the criminal law should fulfil this function by prohibiting and punishing culpable conduct which causes or threatens serious harm, while at the same time allowing excuses, justifications and exemptions consistent with fundamental social values;

AND WHEREAS it is desirable that the criminal law of Canada should now be set out in a new, systematic, understandable, restrained and comprehensive Code made in Canada by Canadians for Canadians;

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

This Code is based upon the following principles:

(a) the criminal law should be used only in circumstances where other means of social control are inadequate or inappropriate;

(b) the criminal law should be used in a manner which interferes no more than necessary with individual rights and freedoms;

(c) the criminal law should set out clearly and understandably

(i) what conduct is declared criminal, and

(ii) what culpability is required for a finding of criminal liability.]
THE GENERAL PART

TITLE I. General Principles

Chapter 1: Principles of General Application and Interpretation

1(1) Title. This Act may be cited as the Criminal Code.

1(2) Definitions.

"Agent" includes an employee.

"Animal" means any living non-human vertebrate.

"Another's premises" means premises in the lawful occupation of that other person.

"Another's property" means property that another owns or has any legally protected interest in.

"Appropriate" means to take, borrow, use or convert.

"Armed hostilities" means use of armed forces by a large number of people to achieve some general or public objective.

"Canada" includes the land territory, the Canadian Arctic, the internal and inland waters, the territorial sea of Canada, the airspace above the territory and the seabed and subsoil below it.

"Canadian aircraft" means an aircraft registered in Canada under the Aeronautics Act or an aircraft of the Canadian Forces.

"Canadian ship" means a ship registered in Canada under the Canada Shipping Act or a vessel of the Canadian Forces.

"Captive" means an animal caged, bound or confined outside its natural habitat.

"Classified information" means information that has been marked or otherwise identified in accordance with the federal government classification scheme as reasonably likely, if disclosed, to cause serious injury to the national interest.

"Consent" means consent given by a competent person and not obtained by force, threat or deceit.

"Criminal rate" means an annual rate of interest exceeding sixty per cent on the principal advanced.

"Document" means any writing, recording or marking capable of being read or understood by people or machines.
“Dwelling-house” means:

(a) premises used as a residence;
(b) a building communicating with or connected to such premises; or
(c) a mobile unit used as a residence.

“Enters.” A person “enters” as soon as any part of his body or any part of an instrument that he uses is within anything that is being entered.


“Explosive substance” means any substance capable of causing, and anything capable of being used with such a substance, to cause an explosion.

“False solemn statement” includes one which contradicts a solemn statement previously made by the same person in a public proceeding or as required by law.

“Firearm” means any barrelled weapon which can discharge a bullet or other missile, or any imitation of such a weapon.

“Fishing zones of Canada” means the fishing zones of Canada as defined in section 4 of the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act.

“Forge” means:

(a) to make a document purport to be made by a person who did not exist or did not make it or did not authorize it to be made; or
(b) to tamper with a document by making some material alteration, addition, erasure or obliteration.

“Harm” means to impair the body or its functions permanently or temporarily.

“Hurt” means to inflict physical pain.

“Identifiable” means identifiable by race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.

“Initiated.” Criminal proceedings are “initiated” by the issuance of compulsory process, the laying of a charge, or an arrest.

“Inland waters” are the rivers, lakes and other fresh waters in Canada and include the St. Lawrence River as far seaward as the straight lines drawn:

(a) from Cap-des-Rosiers to the westernmost point of Anticosti Island; and
(b) from Anticosti Island to the north shore of the St. Lawrence River along the meridian of longitude sixty-three degrees west.

"Internal waters of Canada" include any areas of the sea that are on the landward side of the baselines of the territorial sea of Canada and any areas of the sea other than the territorial sea, in respect of which Canada has an historic or other title of sovereignty.

"Internationally protected person" means:

(a) any head of State, head of government or minister of foreign affairs outside the jurisdiction of his own State;

(b) any member of the family of a person listed in (a) accompanying such a person;

(c) any representative or official of a State or international organization who is entitled at international law to special protection; and

(d) any member of the family of a person listed in (c) who forms part of his household.

"Non-disclosure" means failure to perform a duty to disclose arising from:

(a) a special relationship entitling the victim to rely on the defendant; or

(b) conduct by the defendant or another person acting with him creating or reinforcing a false impression in the victim's mind or preventing him from acquiring information.

"Nuclear material" means:

(a) plutonium, except plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding eighty per cent;

(b) uranium-233;

(c) uranium containing uranium-233 or uranium-235 or both in such an amount that the abundance ratio of the sum of those isotopes to the isotope uranium-238 is greater than 0.72 per cent;

(d) uranium with an isotopic concentration equal to that occurring in nature; and

(e) any substance containing anything described in clauses (a) to (d), but does not include uranium in the form of ore or ore-residue.

"Optical device" means any device or mechanism capable of permitting surreptitious viewing of persons, things or places.

"Peace officer" includes:

(a) a sheriff, deputy sheriff, sheriff's officer and justice of the peace;

(b) a warden, deputy warden, instructor, keeper, gaoler, guard and any other officer or permanent employee of a prison;
(c) a police officer, police constable, bailiff, constable, or other person employed for the preservation and maintenance of the public peace or for the service or execution of civil process;

(d) an officer or person having the powers of a customs or excise officer when performing any duty in the administration of the Customs Act or the Excise Act;

(e) a person appointed or designated as a fishery officer under the Fisheries Act when performing any of his duties or functions pursuant to that Act;

(f) officers and non-commissioned members of the Canadian Forces who are

(i) appointed for the purposes of section 134 of the National Defence Act, or

(ii) employed on duties that the Governor in Council, in regulations made under the National Defence Act for the purposes of this clause, has prescribed to be of such a kind as to necessitate that the officers and non-commissioned members performing them have the powers of peace officers;

(g) the pilot in command of an aircraft

(i) registered in Canada under regulations made under the Aeronautics Act, or

(ii) leased without crew and operated by a person who is qualified under regulations made under the Aeronautics Act to be registered as owner of an aircraft registered in Canada under those regulations, while the aircraft is in flight.

"Pending" means:

(a) in a criminal case, from the time at which criminal proceedings have been initiated by the issuance of compulsory process, the laying of a charge, or an arrest, until their determination by discharge, stay, verdict, or other disposition whether formal or informal;

(b) in a civil case, from the time at which a trial date is set until determination of the proceedings by abandonment, adjudication or other disposition;

(c) in relation to publication by public officers or prosecutors, from the time the officer or prosecutor has reasonable grounds to justify the initiation of criminal proceedings until their determination in accordance with (a).

"Person" means a person already born by having completely proceeded in a living state from the mother's body, or a corporation.
“Premises” means:

(a) any building or part thereof; or

(b) any part of a structure, vehicle, vessel or aircraft used
   (i) for overnight accommodation, or
   (ii) for business.

“Private communication” means any oral communication or any telecommunication made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for any party to it to expect that it will not be intercepted by any surveillance device.

“Prohibited weapon” means:

(a) any knife with an automatically opening blade;

(b) any machine gun;

(c) any sawn-off rifle or shotgun with a barrel less than 457 mm in length or with an overall length of less than 660 mm; or

(d) a silencer.

“Property” includes electricity, gas, water, and telephone, telecommunication and computer services.

“Public administration” means:

(a) the administration of justice;

(b) the administration of federal, provincial or local government; and

(c) the proceedings in Parliament or in a provincial legislature or in the council of a local authority.

“Public officer” means:

(a) a peace officer, or

(b) any officer engaged in enforcing the law relating to revenue, trade or navigation.

“Public official” means a person who

(a) holds a public office, or

(b) is appointed to perform a public duty.

“Public proceedings” means proceedings before Parliament, any provincial legislature, a court or judge, or any federal, provincial or municipal body exercising powers to investigate or inquire for which such body is authorized by law to take evidence by way of solemn statement.

“Public record” means any document or records kept:

(a) under the authority of a court, judicial officer or tribunal;
(b) as forming part of proceedings in Parliament; or

(c) in a public system required or authorized by law to be maintained in the public interest.

"Regulated weapon"

(a) means any firearm other than a prohibited weapon which:

(i) is designed to be fired with one hand,

(ii) has a barrel of less than 470 mm in length or an overall length of less than 660 mm and is capable of producing semi-automatic fire,

(iii) is designed to be fired when reduced to length less than 660 mm by folding or telescoping, or

(iv) is a machine gun forming part of the collection of a collector in good faith;

(b) does not include:

(i) a flare gun,

(ii) a firearm exclusively used for:

(A) firing blanks,

(B) slaughtering domestic animals or tranquillizing animals,

(C) discharging projectiles attached to lines, or

(D) firing bullets or other missiles with a velocity less than 152.4 m per second, or

(iii) antique firearms other than machine guns.

"Representation" means a representation whether express or implied (including impersonation) as to a past, present or future fact, but does not include exaggerated statements of opinion concerning the attributes or quality of anything.

"Solemn statement" means a statement made orally or in writing on oath, solemn affirmation or solemn declaration.

"Surveillance device" means a device or apparatus capable of being used to intercept a private communication.

"Territorial sea of Canada" means the territorial sea of Canada as determined in accordance with the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act.

"Valuable security" means any order or security giving title or evidence of title to property.

"Weapon" means any instrument including a firearm, capable of being used to inflict harm.
1(3) Interpretation.

(a) The provisions of this Code shall be interpreted and applied according to the ordinary meaning of the words used read in the context of the Code.

(b) Where a provision of this Code is unclear and is capable of more than one interpretation it shall be interpreted in favour of the accused.

1(4) Application in Law.

(a) This title applies to any crime defined by this Code or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada.

(b) An offence defined by any other Act of the Parliament of Canada is a crime if the person who committed it is liable to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment as punishment.

Chapter 2: Principles of Liability

2(1) Principle of Legality. No one is liable except for conduct defined at the time of its occurrence as a crime by this Code or by some other Act of the Parliament of Canada.

2(2) Conduct and Culpability. No one is liable for a crime without engaging in the conduct and having the level of culpability specified by its definition.

2(3) Conduct.

(a) General Rule. Unless otherwise provided in the definition of a crime, a person is only liable for an act or omission performed by that person.

(b) Omissions. No one is liable for an omission unless:

(i) it is defined as a crime by this Code or by some other Act of the Parliament of Canada; or

(ii) it consists of a failure to perform a duty specified in this clause.

(c) Duties. Everyone has a duty to take reasonable steps, where failure to do so endangers life, to:

(i) provide necessaries to

(A) his spouse,

(B) his children under eighteen years of age,

(C) other family members living in the same household, or

(D) anyone under his care

if such person is unable to provide himself with necessaries of life;

(ii) carry out an undertaking he has given or assumed;
(iii) assist those in a shared hazardous and lawful enterprise with him; and
(iv) rectify dangers of his own creation or within his control.

(d) Medical Treatment Exception. No one has a duty to provide or continue medical treatment which is therapeutically useless or for which informed consent is expressly refused or withdrawn.

2(4) Requirements for Culpability.

(a) General Requirements as to Level of Culpability. Unless otherwise provided:

(i) where the definition of a crime requires purpose, no one is liable unless as concerns its elements he acts
   (A) purposely as to the conduct specified by that definition,
   (B) purposely as to the consequences, if any, so specified, and
   (C) knowingly or recklessly as to the circumstances, if any, so specified;

(ii) where the definition of a crime requires recklessness, no one is liable unless as concerns its elements he acts
   (A) purposely as to the conduct specified by that definition,
   (B) recklessly as to the consequences, if any, so specified, and
   (C) recklessly as to the circumstances, whether specified or not;

(iii) where the definition of a crime requires negligence, no one is liable unless as concerns its elements he acts
   (A) negligently as to the conduct specified by that definition,
   (B) negligently as to the consequences, if any, so specified, and
   (C) negligently as to the circumstances, whether specified or not.

(b) Definitions.

"Purposely."

(i) A person acts purposely as to conduct if he means to engage in such conduct, and, in the case of an omission, if he also knows the circumstances giving rise to the duty to act or is reckless as to their existence.

(ii) A person acts purposely as to a consequence if he acts in order to effect:
   (A) that consequence; or
   (B) another consequence which he knows involves that consequence.

"Recklessly." A person is reckless as to consequences or circumstances if, in acting as he does, he is conscious that such consequences will probably result or that such circumstances probably obtain.
Alternative

"Recklessly." A person is reckless as to consequences or circumstances if, in acting as he does, he consciously takes a risk, which in the circumstances known to him is highly unreasonable to take, that such consequences may result or that such circumstances may obtain.

"Negligently." A person is negligent as to conduct, circumstances or consequences if it is a marked departure from the ordinary standard of reasonable care to engage in such conduct, to take the risk (conscious or otherwise) that such consequences will result, or to take the risk (conscious or otherwise) that such circumstances obtain.

(c) Greater Culpability Requirement Satisfies Lesser.

(i) Where the definition of a crime requires negligence, a person may be liable if he acts, or omits to act, purposely or recklessly as to one or more of the elements in that definition.

(ii) Where the definition of a crime requires recklessness, a person may be liable if he acts, or omits to act, purposely as to one or more of the elements in that definition.

(d) Residual Rule. Where the definition of a crime does not explicitly specify the requisite level of culpability, it shall be interpreted as requiring purpose.

2(5) Corporate Liability.

(a) With respect to crimes requiring purpose or recklessness, a corporation is liable for conduct committed on its behalf by its directors, officers or employees acting within the scope of their authority and identifiable as persons with authority over the formulation or implementation of corporate policy.

(b) With respect to crimes requiring negligence a corporation is liable as above, notwithstanding that no director, officer or employee may be held individually liable for the same offence.

Alternative

2(5) Corporate Liability. A corporation is liable for conduct committed on its behalf by its directors, officers or employees acting within the scope of their authority and identifiable as persons with authority over the formulation or implementation of corporate policy, notwithstanding that no director, officer or employee may be held individually liable for the same offence.

2(6) Causation. Everyone causes a result when his conduct substantially contributes to its occurrence and no other unforeseen and unforeseeable cause supersedes it.
Chapter 3: Defences

Absence of Conduct or State of Mind Necessary for Culpability

3(1) Lack of Control.

(a) Compulsion, Impossibility, Automatism. No one is liable for conduct which is beyond his control by reason of:

(i) physical compulsion by another person;

(ii) in the case of an omission, physical impossibility to perform the act required; or

(iii) factors, other than loss of temper or mental disorder, which would similarly affect an ordinary person in the circumstances.

(b) Exception: Negligence. This clause shall not apply as a defence to a crime that can be committed by negligence where the lack of control is due to the defendant's negligence.

3(2) Lack of Knowledge.

(a) Mistake of Fact. No one is liable for a crime committed through lack of knowledge which is due to mistake or ignorance as to the relevant circumstances; but where on the facts as he believed them he would have committed an included crime or a different crime from that charged, he shall be liable for committing that included crime or attempting that different crime.

(b) Exception: Recklessness and Negligence. This clause shall not apply as a defence to crimes that can be committed by recklessness or negligence where the lack of knowledge is due to the defendant's recklessness or negligence as the case may be.

3(3) Intoxication.

(a) General Rule. No one is liable for a crime for which, by reason of intoxication, he fails to satisfy the culpability requirements specified by its definition.

(b) Proviso: Criminal Intoxication. Notwithstanding clauses 2(2) and 3(3)(a), unless the intoxication is due to fraud, duress, compulsion or reasonable mistake,

(i) everyone falling under clause 3(3)(a) who satisfies all the other elements in the definition of a crime is liable, except in the case of causing death, for committing that crime while intoxicated; and

(ii) everyone falling under clause 3(3)(a) who causes the death of another is liable for manslaughter while intoxicated and subject to the same penalty as for manslaughter.
Alternative

3(3) Intoxication.

(a) General Rule. No one is liable for a crime for which, by reason of intoxication, he fails to satisfy the culpability requirements specified by its definition.

(b) Exception. This clause shall not apply as a defence to a crime that can be committed through negligence unless the intoxication arose through fraud, duress, compulsion or reasonable mistake.

Exemptions

3(4) Immaturity. No one is liable for conduct committed when he was under twelve years of age.

3(5) Unfitness to Plead. Any person who, at any stage of the proceedings, is incapable of understanding the nature, object or consequences of the proceedings against him, or of communicating with counsel owing to disease or defect of the mind which renders him unfit to stand trial, shall not be tried until declared fit.

3(6) Mental Disorder. No one is liable for his conduct if, through disease or defect of the mind, he was at the time incapable of appreciating the nature, consequences or legal wrongfulness of such conduct [or believed what he was doing was morally right].

Justifications and Excuses

3(7) Mistake or Ignorance of Law. No one is liable for a crime committed by reason of mistake or ignorance of law:

(a) concerning private rights relevant to that crime; or

(b) reasonably resulting from

(i) non-publication of the law in question,
(ii) reliance on a decision of a court of appeal in the province having jurisdiction over the crime charged, or
(iii) reliance on competent administrative authority.

3(8) Duress. No one is liable for committing a crime in reasonable response to threats of immediate serious harm to himself or another person unless he himself purposely causes the death of, or seriously harms, another person.

3(9) Necessity.

(a) General Rule. No one is liable if:

(i) he acted to avoid immediate harm to the person or immediate serious damage to property;
(ii) such harm or damage substantially outweighed the harm or
damage resulting from that crime; and
(iii) such harm or damage could not effectively have been avoided by
any lesser means.

(b) Exception. This clause does not apply to anyone who himself
purposely causes the death of, or seriously harms, another person.

3(10) Defence of the Person.

(a) General Rule. No one is liable if he acted as he did to protect himself
or another person against unlawful force by using such force as was
reasonably necessary to avoid the harm or hurt apprehended.

(b) Exception: Law Enforcement. This clause does not apply to anyone
who uses force against a person reasonably identifiable as a peace
officer executing a warrant of arrest or anyone present acting under
his authority.

3(11) Protection of Movable Property. No one in peaceable possession of
movable property is liable for using such force, not amounting to purposely
causing the death of, or seriously harming, as is reasonably necessary to
prevent another person from unlawfully taking it or to recover it from
another person who has just unlawfully taken it.

3(12) Protection of Immovable Property.

(a) General Rule. No one in peaceable possession of immovable property
is liable for using such force, not amounting to purposely causing the
death of, or seriously harming, as is reasonably necessary to prevent
trespass, to remove a trespasser or to defend the property against
another person unlawfully taking possession of it.

(b) Exception. This clause does not apply to a peaceable possessor
without a claim of right who uses force against a person who he knows
is legally entitled to possession and who enters peaceably to take
possession of that property.

3(13) Protection of Persons Acting under Legal Authority.

(a) General Rule. No one is liable for performing an act required or
authorized by or under federal or provincial statute or for using such
force, short of force meant to cause death or serious harm to another
person, as is reasonably necessary to do so and as is reasonable in the
circumstances;

(b) Force Used by Peace Officers. No peace officer is liable for using
such force as is reasonably necessary and as is reasonable in the
circumstances to arrest, recapture or prevent the escape of a suspect
or offender.
3(14) Authority over Children. No one is liable who, being a parent, foster-parent or guardian or having the express permission of such a person, touches, hurts, threatens to hurt or confines a person under eighteen years of age in his custody in the reasonable exercise of authority over such person.

[Alternative — A minority of Commissioners would not provide for such a defence.]

3(15) Superior Orders. No one bound by military law is liable for anything done out of obedience to his superior officer's orders unless those orders are manifestly unlawful.

3(16) Lawful Assistance. No one is liable who helps, advises, encourages, urges or incites another person, or acts under the authority or on behalf of another person, if that other person has a defence under clauses 3(1) or 3(8) to 3(15).

3(17) Mistaken Belief as to Defence.

(a) General Rule. No one is liable if on the facts as he believed them he would have had a defence under clauses 3(1) or 3(8) to 3(16).

(b) Exception. This clause does not apply where the accused is charged with a crime that can be committed through negligence and the mistaken belief arose through his negligence.

Chapter 4: Involvement in Crime

Involvement in Complete Crimes

4(1) Committing. A crime may be committed:

(a) solely, where the committer is the only person doing the conduct defined as that crime; or

(b) jointly, where the committer and another person (or other persons) together do the conduct so defined.

4(2) Furthering. Everyone is liable for furthering a crime and is subject to the penalty for it if he helps, advises, encourages, urges, incites or uses another person to commit that crime and that person completely performs the conduct specified by its definition.

Involvement in Incomplete Crimes

4(3) Attempt. Everyone is liable for attempt who, going beyond mere preparation, attempts to commit a crime, and is subject to half the penalty for it.
4(4) Attempted Furthering. Everyone is liable for attempted furthering of a crime and is subject to half the penalty for that crime if he helps, advises, encourages, urges, incites or uses another person to commit that crime and that other person does not completely perform the conduct specified by its definition.

4(5) Conspiracy. Everyone is liable for conspiracy who agrees with another person to commit a crime and is subject to half the penalty for it.

4(6) Different Crime Committed from That Furthered.

(a) General Rule. No one is liable for furthering or attempting to further any crime which is different from the crime he meant to further.

(b) Exception. Clause 4(5)(a) does not apply where the crime differs only as to the victim's identity or the degree of harm or damage involved.

(c) Qualification. A person who agrees with another person to commit a crime and who also otherwise furtheres it, is liable not only for the crime he agrees to commit and intends to further, but also for any crime which he knows is a probable consequence of such agreement or furthering.

4(7) Alternative Convictions.

(a) Committing. Everyone charged with committing a crime may, on appropriate evidence, be convicted of furthering it, of attempting to commit it or of attempted furthering of it.

(b) Furthering. Everyone charged with furthering a crime may, on appropriate evidence, be convicted of committing it, of attempting to commit it or of attempted furthering of it.

(c) Attempting. Everyone charged with attempting to commit a crime may, on appropriate evidence, be convicted of attempted furthering of it, and, where the evidence shows that he committed or furthered it, may nevertheless be convicted of attempting to commit it.

(d) Attempted Furthering. Everyone charged with attempted furthering of a crime may, on appropriate evidence, be convicted of attempting to commit it, and, where the evidence shows that he committed or furthered it, may nevertheless be convicted of attempted furthering of it.

(e) Unclear Cases.

(f) Where two or more persons are involved in committing a crime but it is unclear which of them committed it and which of them furthered it, all may be convicted of furthering.
(ii) Where two or more persons are involved in attempting to commit a crime but it is unclear which of them attempted to commit it and which of them attempted to further it, all may be convicted of attempted furthering.

Chapter 5: Territorial Jurisdiction

5(1) General Rule. Subject to clause 5(2), no person shall be convicted in Canada for a crime committed wholly outside Canada.

5(2) Jurisdiction Rules. Subject to diplomatic and other immunity under the law, the Code applies to, and the Canadian courts have jurisdiction over:

(a) crimes committed wholly inside Canada (including on Canadian ships and aircraft);

(b) crimes where one of the elements (including the direct resulting harm or damage) occurs in Canada and that element establishes a real and substantial link with Canada;

(c) conduct engaged in outside Canada which constitutes either

(i) a conspiracy to commit a crime in Canada,

(ii) attempting to commit a crime in Canada, or

(iii) furthering or attempting to further a crime in Canada, where the conduct took place on the high seas or in a State where the crime in question is also a crime in that State;

(d) conduct engaged in inside Canada which constitutes either

(i) a conspiracy to commit a crime outside Canada,

(ii) attempting to commit a crime outside Canada, or

(iii) furthering or attempting to further the commission of a crime outside Canada, if the crime in question is a crime both in Canada and in the place where the crime is to be committed;

(e) crimes committed in "special zones" in which Canada has sovereign rights and either the offender or the victim is present in such zone for the purpose of engaging in an activity over which Canadian sovereign rights extend, this rule being applicable to crimes committed

(i) within a fishing zone or exclusive economic zone of Canada,

(ii) on, under or within a distance to be determined by regulation of any artificial island, installation or structure

(A) in a fishing zone or exclusive economic zone of Canada, or

(B) on or over the continental shelf of Canada, or

(C) (other than a ship of non-Canadian registry) under the administration and control of the Government of Canada;
(f) crimes against State security committed outside Canada by Canadian citizens and others who benefit from the protection of Canada and, where the crime involves classified government information, by persons who were Canadian citizens or benefitted from the protection of Canada when such information was obtained;

(g) crimes committed outside Canada where the crime in question is a crime both in Canada and in the place where it was committed by

(i) persons subject to the Code of Service Discipline under the National Defence Act when serving abroad,

(ii) Government of Canada employees serving abroad and members of their families forming part of their households who are Canadian citizens or who benefit from the protection of Canada, and

(iii) R.C.M.P. members serving abroad and members of their families forming part of their households who are Canadian citizens or who benefit from the protection of Canada;

(h) crimes committed by those on board private ships or aircraft outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State and consisting of:

(i) crimes against personal safety and liberty of those on board other ships or aircraft;

(ii) theft, vandalism or arson of another ship or aircraft; or

(iii) theft, vandalism or arson of the property of those on board other ships or aircraft;

(i) crimes committed outside Canada by anyone consisting of:

(i) theft of,

(ii) forgery of,

(iii) making false applications for,

(iv) possession of or use of when stolen or forged, or

(v) unauthorized use of

Canadian passports or certificates of Canadian citizenship;

(j) crimes committed outside Canada by anyone and consisting of:

(i) forgery of Canadian currency, and

(ii) using forged Canadian currency;

(k) crimes committed outside Canada by Canadian citizens or by persons present in Canada after their commission and consisting of:

(i) crimes against personal safety and liberty by means of nuclear material,

(ii) theft of nuclear material, or

(iii) vandalism or arson of, or by means of, nuclear material;
(l) crimes against personal safety and liberty of internationally protected persons committed outside Canada by:

(i) Canadian citizens or persons present in Canada after their commission, and
(ii) anyone if the victim was exercising functions on behalf of Canada;

(m) kidnapping committed outside Canada where

(i) the alleged offender is a Canadian citizen, is a stateless person ordinarily resident in Canada, or is present in Canada after the commission of the offence,
(ii) the person kidnapped is a Canadian citizen, or
(iii) the crime is committed in order to influence the actions of the Government of Canada or a province;

(n) crimes committed outside Canada by anyone consisting of crimes against personal safety and liberty of those on board an aircraft or ship or of interfering with transportation facilities consisting of an aircraft or ship where the aircraft or ship in question is

(i) a Canadian aircraft or ship, or an aircraft or ship leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of business or, if the lessee has no such place of business, his permanent residence in Canada,
(ii) the aircraft or ship in question arrives in Canada with the alleged offender on board, or
(iii) the alleged offender is present in Canada after the commission of the offence.

THE SPECIAL PART

TITLE II. Crimes against the Person

Part 1: Crimes against Personal Safety and Liberty

Chapter 6: Crimes against Life

6(1) Negligent Homicide. Everyone commits a crime who negligently causes the death of another person.

6(2) Manslaughter. Everyone commits a crime who recklessly causes the death of another person.

6(3) Murder. Everyone commits a crime who purposely causes the death of another person.
6(3) Murder. Everyone commits a crime who:

(a) purposely causes the death of another person; or

(b) causes the death of another person by purposely causing him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause death and is reckless whether death ensues or not.

6(4) First Degree Murder. Murder is first degree murder if committed:

(a) pursuant to an agreement for valuable consideration;

(b) with torture;

(c) for the purpose of preparing, facilitating or concealing a crime or furthering an offender's escape from detection, arrest or conviction;

(d) for terrorist or political motives;

(e) during the course of robbery, confinement, sexual assault or interference with transport facilities consisting of aircraft and ships;

(f) by means which the accused knows will cause the death of more than one person; or

(g) by premeditation in terms of a calculated and carefully considered plan other than for the purpose of mercy killing.

[Alternative]

6(4) First Degree Murder. Murder is first degree murder if the offender deliberately subordinates the victim's life to his own further purpose of:

(a) advancing terrorist or political objectives;

(b) influencing the course of justice;

(c) preparing, facilitating or concealing a crime or furthering an offender's escape from detection, arrest or conviction;

(d) obtaining financial gain; or

(e) obtaining consideration pursuant to an agreement to cause the death of another person.

[Alternative]

Homicide. Everyone commits a crime who causes the death of another person:

(a) purposely;

(b) recklessly; or

(c) through negligence.
6(5) Furthering Suicide. Everyone commits a crime who helps, advises, encourages, urges or incites another person to commit suicide whether suicide results or not.

6(6) Palliative Care. Clauses 6(1) to 6(5) do not apply to the administration of palliative care appropriate in the circumstances for the control or elimination of a person's pain and suffering even if such care shortens his life expectancy, unless the patient refuses such care.

Chapter 7: Crimes against Bodily Integrity

7(1) Assault by Touching or Hurting. Everyone commits a crime who, [offensively] touches or hurts another person without that other's consent.

7(2) Assault by Harming. Everyone commits a crime who harms another person:
(a) purposely;
(b) recklessly; or
(c) through negligence.

7(3) Exceptions.
(a) Medical Treatment. Clauses 7(2)(a) and 7(2)(b) do not apply to the administration of treatment with the patient's informed consent for therapeutic purposes, or for purposes of medical research, involving risk of harm not disproportionate to the expected benefits.
(b) Sporting Activities. Clauses 7(2)(a) and 7(2)(b) do not apply to injuries inflicted during the course of, and in accordance with, the rules of a lawful sporting activity.

Chapter 8: Crimes against Psychological Integrity

8(1) Harassment. Everyone commits a crime who harasses and thereby frightens another person.

8(2) Threatening. Everyone commits a crime who threatens to hurt, harm or kill another person or to damage his property.

8(3) Immediate Threatening. Everyone commits a crime who threatens another person with immediate hurt, harm or death.

8(4) Extortion. Everyone commits a crime who threatens:
(a) to harm another person's reputation;
(b) to hurt, harm or kill another person or to damage his property; or
(c) to inflict on another person immediate hurt, harm or death.
for the purpose of making someone, whether the person threatened or not, do or refrain from doing some act.

Chapter 9: Crimes against Personal Liberty

9(1) Confinement. Everyone commits a crime who confines another person without that other's consent.

9(2) Kidnapping. Everyone commits a crime who confines another person, without that other's consent, for the purpose of making him or some other person do or refrain from doing some act.

9(3) Child Abduction. Everyone commits a crime who takes or keeps a person under fourteen years of age, whether that person consents or not, for the purpose of depriving a parent, guardian or person who has lawful care or charge of that person of the possession of that person.

Chapter 10: Crimes Causing Danger

10(1) Endangering. Everyone commits a crime who causes a risk of death or serious harm to another person:
   (a) purposely;  
   (b) recklessly; or  
   (c) through negligence.

10(2) Failure to Rescue.
   (a) General Rule. Everyone commits a crime who, perceiving another person in immediate danger of death or serious harm, does not take reasonable steps to assist him.
   (b) Exception. Clause 10(2)(a) does not apply where the person cannot take reasonable steps to assist without risk of death or serious harm to himself or another person or where he has some other valid reason for not doing so.

10(3) Impeding Rescue. Everyone commits a crime who impedes the rescue of another person in danger of death or serious harm.

10(4) Endangering by Motor Vehicle, Etc. Everyone commits a crime who purposely, recklessly or negligently operates a means of transportation (other than one humanly powered) in such a way, or in such condition of disrepair, as to cause a risk of death or serious harm to another person.

10(5) Impaired or with More than Eighty Milligrams of Alcohol in One Hundred Millilitres of Blood. Everyone commits a crime who operates or has care and control of a means of transportation (other than one humanly powered)
when he knows or ought to know that his ability is impaired by alcohol or a drug, or that he has more than eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood (see Code of Criminal Procedure).

10(6) Failure or Refusal to Provide Sample.

(a) General Rule. Everyone commits a crime who, after operating or having care and control of a means of transportation (other than one manually powered), fails or refuses to comply with a request made pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure for a breath or blood sample suitable for determining the concentration of alcohol in the blood.

(b) Exception. No one is liable under this clause who has a reasonable excuse for failing or refusing to provide a proper sample.

10(7) Failure to Stop at Scene of Accident. Everyone commits a crime who, while operating or having care and control of a means of transportation (other than one manually powered), is involved in an accident with another person or another's property and leaves the scene of the accident for the purpose of escaping civil or criminal liability.

10(8) Driving a Motor Vehicle While Disqualified. Everyone commits a crime who operates a means of transportation knowing that he is disqualified from driving on account of having committed a crime under this Code.

10(9) Interfering with Transportation Facilities. Everyone commits a crime who interferes with anything used for, or in connection with, or anyone engaged in, transportation, and thereby causes risk of death or serious harm to another person.

10(10) Aggravating Factors. The crimes in Chapters 7 to 10 are aggravated where appropriate if committed:

(a) pursuant to an agreement for valuable consideration;

(b) with torture;

(c) for the purpose of preparing, facilitating or concealing a crime or furthering an offender's escape from detection, arrest or conviction;

(d) for terrorist or political motives;

(e) with a weapon;

(f) by means which the accused knowingly or recklessly uses to harm more than one person; or

(g) knowingly against the offender's spouse, child, grandchild, parent or grandparent.
Part 2: Crimes against Personal Security and Privacy

Chapter 11: Unlawful Surveillance

11(1) Auditory Surveillance.

(a) General Rule. Everyone commits a crime who, without the consent of at least one of the parties to the communication, intercepts a private communication by means of a surveillance device.

(b) Exception. This clause does not apply to anyone engaged in providing a telephone, telegraph or other communication service to the public who intercepts a private communication where it is a necessary incident of providing the service.

11(2) Unauthorized Entry of Private Premises. Everyone commits a crime who, without the consent of the owner or occupier, enters private premises for the purpose of installing, servicing or removing a surveillance or optical device.

11(3) Unauthorized Search of Private Premises. Everyone commits a crime who, being authorized to enter private premises for the purpose of installing, servicing or removing a surveillance or optical device, searches the premises.

11(4) Use of Force to Gain Entry. Notwithstanding clause 3(13), everyone commits a crime who uses force against a person for the purpose of gaining entry into private premises to install, remove or service a surveillance or optical device, or for the purpose of exiting from such premises.

11(5) Disclosure of Private Communications.

(a) General Rule. Everyone commits a crime who, without the consent of at least one of the parties to a private communication that has been intercepted by a surveillance device:

(i) discloses or threatens to disclose the existence or the contents of the communication; or
(ii) uses the contents of the communication.

(b) Exceptions. No one is liable under clause 11(5)(a) if the disclosure is:

(i) in the course of, or for the purpose of, giving evidence in a judicial proceeding where the private communication is admissible;
(ii) in the course of, or for the purpose of, any criminal investigation if the private communication was lawfully intercepted;
(iii) to a peace officer or to the Attorney General or his agent, if it is in the interests of the administration of justice;
(iv) for the purpose of giving notice or furnishing particulars in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(v) to an employee of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, if it is for the purpose of enabling the Service to perform its duties and functions;
(vi) in the course of the operation of a communication service; or
(vii) to an investigative or law enforcement officer in a foreign jurisdiction, if it tends to reveal a past, ongoing or prospective crime in such jurisdiction.

Chapter 12: Criminal Intrusion

12(1) Criminal Intrusion. Everyone commits a crime who enters or remains in another's premises without that other's consent:
(a) for the purpose of committing a crime; or
(b) does so and commits a crime.

12(2) Aggravated Criminal Intrusion. The crime defined in clause 12(1) is aggravated if:
(a) the premises are a dwelling-house;
(b) the accused is reckless as to the presence of people in the premises; or
(c) a weapon is carried.

TITLE III. Crimes against Property

Part 1: Crimes of Dishonesty

Chapter 13: Theft and Related Crimes

[Alternative 1]

13(1) Theft. Everyone commits a crime who dishonestly appropriates another's property without his consent.

13(2) Obtaining Services. Everyone commits a crime who dishonestly obtains for himself or another person services from a third party without full payment for them.

13(3) Fraud. Everyone commits a crime who dishonestly, by false representation or by non-disclosure, induces another person to suffer an economic loss or risk thereof.

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13(1) Theft. Everyone commits a crime who appropriates another’s property without his consent and without any right to do so.

13(2) Obtaining Services. Everyone commits a crime who, without any right to do so, obtains for himself or another person services from a third party without fully paying for them.

13(3) Fraud. Everyone commits a crime who, without any right to do so, by dishonest representation or dishonest non-disclosure induces another person to suffer an economic loss or risk thereof.

Chapter 14: Forgery and Related Crimes

14(1) Forgery of Public Documents. Everyone commits a crime who forges or uses a forged:

(a) item of currency;
(b) stamp;
(c) public seal;
(d) exchequer bill;
(e) passport;
(f) certificate of citizenship;
(g) proclamation, order, regulation or appointment or notice thereof purporting to have been printed by the Queen’s Printer for Canada or for a province; or
(h) public record.

14(2) Forgery of Other Documents. Everyone commits a crime who for the purpose of fraud, forges or uses a forged document, other than one falling within clause 14(1).

14(3) Fraudulent Documentary Misrepresentation. Everyone commits a crime who for the purpose of fraud:

(a) makes a document or valuable security that misrepresents such facts as it refers to; or
(b) uses such document or valuable security.

14(4) Obliteration of Identifying Marks. Everyone commits a crime who for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a crime, obliterates, simulates or applies any identifying mark.
Chapter 15: Commercial Frauds and Related Matters

15(1) Bribery of Agent. Everyone commits a crime who confers or agrees to confer a benefit on an agent for the purpose of corruptly influencing him in the performance of his functions as agent.

15(2) Agent Accepting Bribe. Everyone commits a crime who, being an agent, accepts or agrees to accept a benefit given in order to corruptly influence him in the performance of his functions as agent.

15(3) Disposal of Property to Defraud Creditors. Everyone commits a crime who transfers, conceals or disposes of his property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors.

15(4) Receipt of Property to Defraud Creditors. Everyone commits a crime who, for the purpose of defrauding creditors, receives property that has been transferred, concealed or disposed of for such purpose.

15(5) Criminal Lending. Everyone commits a crime who:

(a) enters into an agreement or arrangement to receive interest at a criminal rate; or

(b) receives a payment or partial payment of interest at a criminal rate.

Part 2: Crimes of Violence and Damage

Chapter 16: Robbery

16(1) Robbery. Everyone commits a crime who, for the purpose of, or in the course of, theft uses immediate violence or threat of immediate violence to person or property.

16(2) Aggravated Robbery. The crime in clause 16(1) is aggravated if committed with a weapon.

Chapter 17: Criminal Damage

17(1) Vandalism. Everyone commits a crime who, without another person's consent, damages that other's property or by physical interference renders it useless or inoperative:

(a) purposely; or

(b) recklessly.

17(2) Arson. Everyone commits a crime who, without another person's consent, causes a fire or explosion damaging or destroying that other's property:

(a) purposely; or

(b) recklessly.
Part 3: Crimes of Possession

Chapter 18: Miscellaneous Property Crimes

18(1) Possession of Things in Suspicious Circumstances. Everyone commits a crime who possesses

(a) a device or instrument in such circumstances that the reasonable inference is that he used it or means to use it to commit:

(i) theft;
(ii) criminal intrusion;
(iii) forgery; or

(b) a weapon or explosive substance in such circumstances that the reasonable inference is that he used, or means to use it, to commit a crime against personal safety and liberty.

18(2) Possession of Prohibited Things. Everyone commits a crime who possesses:

(a) any exchequer bill paper, revenue paper or paper used to make bank notes; or

(b) any device capable of being used to intercept a private communication.

18(3) Possession of Things Dangerous in Themselves. Everyone commits a crime who possesses:

(a) a prohibited weapon, or

(b) an unregistered regulated weapon.

18(4) Possession of Forgeries. Everyone commits a crime who:

(a) possesses a forged public document falling under clause 14(1), or

(b) possesses for the purpose of fraud any other forged document.

18(5) Unauthorized Use of Canadian Passports and Certificates of Citizenship. Everyone commits a crime who uses as his own another person's Canadian passport or certificate of Canadian citizenship.

18(6) Possession of Things Obtained by Crime. Everyone commits a crime who has possession of any property or thing, or the proceeds of any property or thing, obtained by a crime committed in Canada or committed anywhere, if it would have been a crime in Canada.

18(7) Criminal Dealing. Everyone commits a crime who carries on a business of dealing in prohibited or unregistered regulated weapons or in things obtained by crime anywhere, if the crime would have been a crime in Canada.
TITLE IV. Crimes against the Natural Order

Chapter 19: Crimes against the Environment

19(1) Disastrous Damage to the Environment. Everyone commits a crime who recklessly causes disastrous damage to the environment.

[19(2) Non-compliance. Everyone commits a crime who persistently refuses or fails to comply with federal regulations for environmental protection.]

Chapter 20: Crimes against Animals

20(1) Cruelty to Animals. Everyone commits a crime who unnecessarily causes injury or serious physical pain to an animal.

20(2) Exceptions: Necessary Measures. For the purpose of clause 20(1), no injury or serious physical pain is caused unnecessarily if it is a reasonably necessary means of achieving any of the following purposes:

(a) identification, medical treatment, spaying or neutering;
(b) provision of food or other animal products;
(c) hunting, trapping, fishing, and other sporting activities conducted in accordance with the lawful rules relating to them;
(d) pest, predator or disease control;
(e) protection of persons or property;
(f) scientific research unless the risk of injury or serious physical pain is disproportionate to the benefit expected from the research; and
(g) disciplining or training of an animal.

20(3) Sporting Events. Everyone commits a crime who organizes, facilitates or participates in any meeting, competition, exhibition, pastime or display involving baiting animals, combat between animals or killing captive animals.

20(4) Animal Neglect. Everyone commits a crime who fails to take reasonable steps to provide necessaries of life to an animal under his care and unable to provide itself with necessaries and thereby causes it injury or serious physical pain.
Chapter 21: Crimes against Social Harmony

21(1) Stirring up Hatred. Everyone commits a crime who publicly stirs up hatred against any identifiable group.

21(2) Inciting Genocide. Everyone commits a crime who advocates, promotes or incites the destruction of any identifiable group.

21(3) Stirring up Hatred in Public Place. Everyone commits a crime who publicly stirs up hatred against any identifiable group in a public place so as to cause risk of harm to the person or of serious damage to property.

Chapter 22: Crimes against Public Order

22(1) Disturbing Public Order. Everyone commits a crime who so behaves in public as to make others in the vicinity reasonably fear harm to the person or serious damage to property.

22(2) Disturbing Public Order by Hatred. Everyone commits a crime who publicly stirs up hatred against any identifiable group in a public place so as to cause risk of harm to the person or serious damage to property.

22(3) Unlawful Assembly. Everyone commits a crime who jointly with two or more persons so behaves in public as to make others in the vicinity reasonably fear harm to the person or serious damage to property.

22(4) Riot. Everyone commits a crime who jointly with two or more persons so behaves in public as to make others in the vicinity reasonably fear harm to the person or serious damage to property and as to bring about such harm or serious damage.

22(5) Failure to Disperse. Everyone committing unlawful assembly or riot commits a crime who fails to disperse when lawfully ordered to do so.

22(6) Raising False Alarm. Everyone commits a crime who falsely alarms the public.

22(7) Public Nuisance. Everyone commits a crime who in a public place substantially and unreasonably either obstructs or inconveniences those exercising rights common to all members of the public.

22(8) Loitering. Everyone commits a crime who prowls or loafers at night on another's property near a dwelling-house on that property.
TITLE VI. Crimes against the Governmental Order

Chapter 23: Corrupting Public Administration

23(1) Bribery. Everyone commits a crime who confers or agrees to confer a benefit on another person for the purpose of corruptly influencing the course of public administration.

23(2) Accepting Bribes. Everyone commits a crime who accepts or agrees to accept a benefit given for the purpose of corruptly influencing the course of public administration.

23(3) Breach of Public Trust. Every public official commits a crime who abuses his public powers.

Chapter 24: Misleading Public Administration

24(1) Perjury. Everyone commits a crime who makes a false solemn statement in a public proceeding for the purpose of influencing the outcome of such proceeding.

24(2) Other False Statements. Everyone commits a crime who, when required by law to make a solemn statement, makes a false solemn statement outside a public proceeding for the purpose of defeating the objective for which it is required.

24(3) Forging Documents or Fabricating Evidence. Everyone commits a crime who for the purpose of influencing the course of public administration:
   (a) forges, destroys or conceals any document;
   (b) fabricates, alters, destroys or conceals any real evidence; or
   (c) in applying for a certificate of citizenship, passport, permit or other licence required pursuant to a federal or provincial statute, makes a false statement or withholds relevant information.

24(4) Using Forged Documents, Fabricated Evidence. Everyone commits a crime who for the purpose of influencing the course of public administration uses a forged document, a fabricated or altered item of real evidence, or a document listed in, and obtained in the circumstances described in, clause 24(3)(c).

24(5) Impersonation. Everyone commits a crime who impersonates another person, whether living, dead or fictitious, for the purpose of influencing the course of public administration.
24(6) Withholding Information. Everyone commits a crime who when applying for authority to execute process under the Code of Criminal Procedure withholds information for the purpose of obtaining that authority.

24(7) Misleading Public Officer.
   (a) General Rule. Everyone commits a crime who misleads a public officer into beginning, continuing or ceasing an investigation into a crime or a federal or provincial infraction.
   (b) Exception. This provision does not apply to a person who merely denies guilt.

Chapter 25: Obstructing Public Administration

25(1) Obstructing Public Officers. Everyone commits a crime who by physical interference or breach of legal duty obstructs a public officer in the lawful execution of his duty.

25(2) Disrupting Proceedings. Everyone commits a crime who substantially disrupts public proceedings.

25(3) Failing to Help Public Officers. Everyone commits a crime who fails, when reasonably requested to do so, to take reasonable steps to help a public officer in the execution of his duty to arrest a person.

   (a) General Rule. Everyone commits a crime who, after proceedings have been initiated in relation to a sexual crime, publishes any information identifying
      (i) a victim in the proceedings; or
      (ii) a person under the age of eighteen who is a victim or witness in the proceedings.
   (b) Exceptions. No one is liable
      (i) under clause 25(4)(a) if a court orders that the person's identity may be published in order to permit the accused to make full answer and defence;
      (ii) under clause 25(4)(a)(i) if the victim consents to the publication.

25(5) Publication in Violation of a Court Order. Everyone commits a crime who, in violation of a lawful court order, publishes
   (a) any information identifying
      (i) a victim whose safety is at risk,
      (ii) a witness whose safety is at risk, or
      (iii) a confidential informant;
(b) evidence, representations, or reasons given at a pretrial motion, judicial interim release hearing or preliminary inquiry;

(c) a notice, evidence, information, or representations given at a hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence concerning the sexual activity of a victim in a sexual crime;

(d) a notice, evidence, information, or representations given during a portion of a trial at which the jury was not present, if it was not sequestered; [or]

(e) the contents of court exhibits [;]

(f) any information identifying an accused, victim or witness in exceptional circumstances where substantial and extraordinary harm would result.)


(a) General Rule. Everyone commits a crime who publishes any of the following matters while a civil or criminal trial is pending:

(i) a party's admission or an accused's statement;

(ii) an accused's criminal record;

(iii) the results of investigative tests or procedures conducted in relation to the proceedings;

(iv) psychological data about a party or an accused; or

(v) opinions about the liability of a party or an accused.

(b) Exceptions. No one is liable under clause 25(6)(a) if the publication:

(i) does not jeopardize the fairness of the trial;

(ii) is a fair and accurate report of the proceedings or the contents of a related court document; or

(iii) is part of a discussion in good faith of matters of public interest and the jeopardy to a fair trial is merely incidental to the discussion.

25(7) Disobeying Lawful Court Order. Everyone commits a crime who fails to:

(a) comply with the terms of an appearance notice, summons or subpoena issued or an undertaking entered into pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure; or

(b) obey a lawful order of a court, judge or justice of the peace other than an order for the payment of money or an order for which a sanction or an enforcement procedure is already expressly provided by law.

25(8) Bringing Justice into Contempt. Everyone commits a crime who publicly brings into contempt a court, a judge in his official capacity or the administration of civil or criminal justice.
25(9) Jury Offences. Everyone commits a crime who discloses information not revealed in open court regarding the proceedings of a jury in retirement other than for the purpose of:
   (a) investigation or trial of a crime committed by a person in his capacity as a juror, or
   (b) research concerning juries that has been approved by the Attorney General of the province.

25(10) Escape. Everyone commits a crime who
   (a) escapes from lawful arrest or imprisonment, or
   (b) is at large before the expiration of a term of imprisonment to which he was sentenced.

25(11) Obstructing the Course of Justice. Everyone commits a crime who, in any manner other than those dealt with under Title VI, obstructs, defeats or perverts the course of justice.

Chapter 26: Crimes against State Security

26(1) Treason. Every Canadian citizen and everyone benefitting from the protection of Canada commits a crime who
   (a) engages in armed hostilities against Canada;
   (b) helps a State engaged in armed hostilities against Canada;
   (c) helps any armed forces against whom Canadian Forces are engaged in armed hostilities;
   (d) overthrows by force the constitutional Government of Canada or a province.

26(2) Failing to Prevent Treason.
   (a) General Rule. Everyone commits a crime who fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the commission of treason or to inform a peace officer that treason has been committed.
   (b) Exception. Clause 26(2)(a) does not apply where the person cannot take such reasonable steps without risk of death or serious harm to himself or another person or where he has some other valid reason for not doing so.

26(3) Espionage. Everyone commits a crime who gathers classified information for, or makes it available to, another State not engaged in armed hostilities with Canada.
26(4) Gathering and Disclosing Information. Everyone commits a crime who

gathers classified information for, or makes it available to, any person not

authorized to receive it.

26(5) Exception. Clauses 26(3) and 26(4) do not apply where the information

subject of the charge was improperly classified.

26(6) Sabotage. Everyone commits a crime who by damaging property or data

jeopardizes the security of Canada or of the forces of a foreign State

lawfully present in Canada.
APPENDIX B

Illustrative Draft Legislation

An Act to revise and codify the criminal law

SHORT TITLE

1. This Act may be cited as the Criminal Code.

INTERPRETATION

2. (1) In this Code,

"another's property" means property that another owns or in which he has a legally protected interest;

"appropriate" means to take, borrow, use or convert;

"conduct", in relation to a crime, means an act or omission that is specified in the provision of this Code or another Act of Parliament that defines the crime;

"crime" means an offence that is liable to be punished by imprisonment, otherwise than on default of payment of a fine;

"document" means any writing, recording or marking capable of being read or understood by a person or read by a machine;

"firearm" means any barrelled weapon that is capable of discharging a bullet or other missile;

"harm" means any impairment of the body or of its functions;

"hurt" means to inflict physical pain;

"identifiable group" means any group of persons identifiable by race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability;

"internationally protected person" means

(a) a head of state, a head of a government or a minister of foreign affairs where such person is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state he represents,
(b) an accompanying member of the family of a person described in paragraph (a),

(c) a representative or official of a state or an international organization who is entitled, pursuant to international law, to special protection, or

(d) a member of the family of a person described in paragraph (c) who forms part of the household of the person;

"nuclear material" means:

(a) plutonium, except plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding eighty per cent;

(b) uranium-233;

(c) uranium containing uranium-233 or uranium-235 or both in such an amount that the abundance ratio of the sum of those isotopes to the isotope uranium-238 is greater than 0.72 per cent;

(d) uranium with an isotopic concentration equal to that occurring in nature; and

(e) any substance containing anything described in clauses (a) to (d), but does not include uranium in the form of ore or ore-residue;

"peace officer" includes

(a) a sheriff, deputy sheriff, sheriff’s officer and justice of the peace,

(b) a warden, deputy warden, instructor, keeper, gaoler, guard and any other officer or permanent employee of a prison,

(c) a police officer, police constable, bailiff, constable or other person employed for the preservation and maintenance of the public peace or for the service or execution of civil process,

(d) an officer or person having the powers of a customs or excise officer when performing any duty in the administration of the Customs Act or Excise Act;

(e) a person appointed or designated as a fishery officer under the Fisheries Act when performing any of his duties or functions pursuant to that Act,

(f) the pilot in command of an aircraft
(i) registered in Canada under regulations made under the Aeronautics Act, or
(ii) leased without crew and operated by a person who is qualified under regulations made under the Aeronautics Act to be registered as owner of an aircraft registered in Canada under those regulations, while the aircraft is in flight, and

(g) officers and non-commissioned members of the Canadian Forces who are
(i) appointed for the purposes of section 134 of the National Defence Act, or
(ii) employed on duties that the Governor in Council, in regulations made under the National Defence Act for the purposes of this paragraph, has prescribed to be of such a kind as to necessitate that the officers and non-commissioned members performing them have the powers of peace officers;

"person" means a corporate body or a physical person and in the latter case means a person already born by having completely proceeded in a living state from the mother's body;

"prohibited weapon" means
(a) a knife that has a blade that opens automatically,
(b) a machine gun,
(c) a sawn-off rifle or shotgun that has a barrel that is less than 457 mm in length or that is less than 660 mm in overall length, or
(d) a device designed or intended to muffle or stop the sound or report of a firearm.

"property" includes electricity, gas and water and telephone, telecommunication and computer services;

"public administration" means
(a) the administration of justice,
(b) the administration of a federal, provincial or local government,
(c) the parliamentary proceedings in Parliament or in the legislature of a province, or
(d) proceedings in the council of a local government authority;

"public officer" means
(a) a peace officer, or
"public official" means a person who holds a public office or is appointed to perform a public duty;

"public proceeding" means a proceeding before
(a) Parliament,
(b) the legislature of a province,
(c) a court or a judge, or
(d) a federal, provincial or municipal body that is conducting an investigation or inquiry where the body is authorized by law to take evidence by solemn statement;

"public record" means any document or record that
(a) is kept under the authority of a court, a judicial officer or a tribunal,
(b) is part of a proceeding in Parliament or in the legislature of a province, or
(c) is part of a public record system that is required or authorized by an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province to be maintained in the public interest;

"regulated weapon" means any firearm other than a prohibited weapon which:
(i) is designed to be fired with one hand,
(ii) has a barrel of less than 470 mm in length or an overall length of less than 660 mm and is capable of producing semi-automatic fire,
(iii) is designed to be fired when reduced to length less than 660 mm by folding or telescoping, or
(iv) is a machine gun forming part of the collection of a collector in good faith;

(b) does not include:
(i) a flare gun,
(ii) a firearm exclusively used for:
(A) firing blanks,
(B) slaughtering domestic animals or tranquillizing animals,
(C) discharging projectiles attached to lines, or
(D) firing bullets or other missiles with a velocity less than 152.4 m per second, or
(iii) antique firearms other than machine guns.
"solemn statement" means an oral or written statement made under oath, solemn affirmation or solemn declaration, before a person authorized by an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province to take the statement;

"valuable security" means any order or security giving title or evidence of title to property;

"weapon" means any instrument, including a firearm or an imitation thereof, that is capable of being used to inflict harm;

(2) The provisions of this Code shall be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the words used when read in the context of this Code.

(3) The provisions of this Code that are susceptible of more than one interpretation shall be interpreted in favour of the accused.

(4) To be valid, consent must be given by a person who is competent to give consent and must be freely given and informed; consent obtained by fraud, violence or threats is not valid.

PART 1

THE GENERAL PART

Division I

PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

3. No person is criminally liable for conduct that, at the time of the conduct, was not defined by the Code or another Act of Parliament to be a crime.

4. A person is only criminally liable for conduct engaged in by that person unless otherwise provided in this Code or another Act of Parliament.

5. A person is criminally liable only by engaging in the relevant conduct with the state of mind specified in the definition of the crime or section 8.

Physical Element

Omissions

6. (1) A person is criminally liable for an omission only if
(a) the omission is specified in the definition of the crime; or

(b) the omission endangers human life and consists of a failure by the person to take reasonable steps

(i) to provide the necessaries of life to his spouse, his child, any other member of his family who lives in the same household or anyone under his care, if such person is unable to provide himself with the necessaries of life,

(ii) to do that which he undertook to do,

(iii) to assist those joining with him in a lawful and hazardous enterprise, or

(iv) to remedy a dangerous situation created by him or within his control.

(2) No person is criminally liable for an omission to provide or continue medical treatment that is therapeutically useless or medical treatment for which consent is expressly refused or withdrawn.

7. A person causes a result only if the conduct of the person substantially contributes to its occurrence and no other subsequent unforeseeable cause supersedes the conduct.

Mental Element

8. Where the definition of a crime specifies purpose as the relevant state of mind, or where the definition does not specify the relevant state of mind, a person has the relevant state of mind, if

(a) the person purposely engages in the conduct specified in the definition of the crime;

(b) the conduct is engaged in purposely in respect of any result so specified; and

(c) the person knows of any circumstance so specified when he engages in the conduct or is reckless as to whether the circumstance exists or not.

9. Where the definition of a crime specifies recklessness as the relevant state of mind, a person has the relevant state of mind if

(a) the person purposely engages in the conduct, and
(b) the conduct is engaged in recklessly in respect of any result so specified or any circumstance whether specified or not.

10. Where the definition of a crime specifies negligence as the relevant state of mind, a person has the relevant state of mind if

(a) the person negligently engages in the conduct; and

(b) the conduct is engaged negligently in respect of any result so specified or any circumstance whether specified or not.

11. For the purposes of this Code and the provisions of other Acts of Parliament that define crimes,

(a) a person purposely engages in conduct if the person means to engage in the conduct and if, in the case of an omission, the person knows of the circumstances giving rise to the duty to act or is reckless as to the existence of those circumstances;

(b) conduct is engaged in purposely in respect of a result if the person engages in the conduct for the purpose of bringing about the result or a result that the person knows must bring about that result;

(c) conduct is engaged in recklessly in respect of a result or circumstance including, in the case of an omission, a circumstance giving rise to the duty to act, if the person is aware that the result will probably come about or that the circumstance probably exists;

(d) a person negligently engages in conduct if the conduct is a marked departure from the ordinary standard of reasonable care, and

(e) conduct is engaged in negligently in respect of a result or circumstance if it is a marked departure from the ordinary standard of reasonable care to take the risk that the result will come about or that the circumstance exists.

12. (1) Proof of purpose satisfies a requirement of recklessness or negligence.

(2) Proof of recklessness satisfies a requirement of negligence.
Exemptions

13. A person is not criminally liable for conduct engaged in by him while he was under twelve years of age.

14. A person is not criminally liable if, at the time of the relevant conduct, the person, by reason of mental disorder, is incapable of appreciating the nature or consequences of the conduct or of appreciating that the conduct constitutes a crime.

Absence of Physical Element

15. (1) No person who engages in conduct specified in the definition of a crime is guilty of the crime where that conduct was beyond that person's control

   (a) by reason of physical compulsion by another person or, in the case of an omission, the physical impossibility of performing the relevant act; or

   (b) for any other reason, other than loss of temper or mental disorder, that would cause an ordinary person to engage in the same conduct.

   (2) Subsection (1) does not apply where the relevant state of mind is negligence and the conduct was beyond the person's control by reason of his negligence.

Absence of Mental Element

16. (1) No person is guilty of a crime who engages in the conduct specified in the definition of the crime but does not have the relevant state of mind by reason of mistake or ignorance as to the relevant circumstances.

   (2) Notwithstanding section 5, a person who is not guilty of a crime by reason of the application of subsection (1) may be found guilty of an included crime or of attempting to commit a different crime if that person believed he was committing that included or different crime.

   (3) Subsection (1) does not apply where the relevant state of mind is recklessness or negligence and the person's mistake or ignorance results from his recklessness or negligence.
17. (1) No person is guilty of a crime who engages in the conduct specified in the definition of the crime but does not have the relevant state of mind by reason of intoxication resulting from fraud, duress, compulsion or reasonable mistake.

(2) Notwithstanding section 5, a person who engages in conduct specified in the definition of a crime but who does not have the relevant state of mind by reason of intoxication, other than intoxication resulting as described in subsection (1), is guilty of committing the crime while intoxicated.

Division II

JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXCUSES

18. (1) No person is guilty of a crime who engages in the conduct specified in the definition of the crime but does so by reason of a lack of knowledge of or mistake as to the law relating to private rights and those rights are, by reason of the definition of the crime, relevant.

(2) No person is guilty of a crime who engages in the conduct specified in the definition of the crime but does so by reason of a lack of knowledge of or mistake as to the law that reasonably results from

(a) the non-publication of a rule of law; or

(b) his reliance on the decision of an appellate court in the province where the crime is alleged to have been committed or on the opinions or advice of a competent administrative authority in that province.

19. (1) No person is guilty of a crime who engages in the conduct specified in the definition of the crime but does so by reason of a threat of immediate serious harm, whether to himself or to another person.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where engaging in the conduct is not a reasonable reaction to the threat or where the person purposely kills or purposely inflicts serious harm on another person in reaction to the threat.

20. (1) No person is guilty of a crime who engages in the conduct specified in the definition of the crime but does so in order to avoid immediate serious harm to himself or to another person or damage to property where
such harm or damage

(a) substantially outweighs the harm or damage resulting from the conduct; and

(b) could not have been avoided by other means that would have resulted in less harm or damage.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where the person purposely kills or purposely inflicts serious harm on another person.

21. (1) No person who uses force to protect himself or another person from the unlawful use of force is guilty of a crime if the force used is reasonably necessary to avoid the hurt or harm apprehended from that unlawful use of force.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where the person uses force against a peace officer who is executing a warrant of arrest or against a person acting under the authority of a peace officer in the execution of a warrant of arrest, if the peace officer is reasonably identifiable as a peace officer.

22. (1) No person in peaceable possession of property is guilty of a crime if he uses force

(a) to prevent another person from unlawfully taking, or committing a trespass with respect to, the property;

(b) to retake the property from a person who has just unlawfully taken it; or

(c) in the case of property that is land, to remove a trespasser from the land.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where the person

(a) purposely kills or purposely inflicts serious harm on another person; or

(b) uses more force than is reasonably necessary for the purposes described in that subsection.

23. (1) No person is guilty of a crime who

(a) performs any act that is required or authorized to be performed by or under an Act of Parliament or an Act of the legislature of a province; and

(b) uses such force, other than force used for the purpose of killing or inflicting serious harm on another
person, as is reasonably necessary to perform the act and as is reasonable in the circumstances.

(2) No peace officer is guilty of a crime who uses such force as is reasonably necessary and reasonable in the circumstances to effect the arrest or recapture of a person, or to prevent the escape of a person, who is suspected of committing, or who has committed, a crime.

24. No person bound by military law to obey the orders of a superior officer is guilty of a crime by reason of engaging in conduct pursuant to an order of the officer that is not manifestly unlawful.

25. No person is guilty of a crime who helps, advises or incites, or acts under the authority of or on behalf of a person who has a defence under sections 15 or 19 to 24.

25.1 (1) No person is guilty of a crime who engages in the conduct specified in the definition of the crime but mistakenly believes in the existence of a circumstance that, if it existed, would provide a defence under sections 15 or 19 to 25.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where the relevant state of mind is negligence and the mistaken belief is a result of that negligence.

Division III

IN VolvEMENT IN Crime

26. The person who commits a crime is the person who, either solely or jointly with another person, engages in the conduct specified in the definition of the crime.

27. (1) With respect to crimes requiring purpose or recklessness as the relevant state of mind, a corporation is criminally liable for conduct engaged in on its behalf by its directors, officers or employees acting within the scope of their authority and identifiable as persons with authority over the formulation or implementation of corporate policy.

(2) With respect to crimes requiring negligence as the relevant state of mind, a corporation is criminally liable for conduct engaged in on its behalf by its directors, officers or employees acting within the scope of their
authority and identifiable as persons with authority over the formulation or implementation of corporate policy, notwithstanding that no such director, officer or employee may be held individually liable for the same offence.

28. Every one who helps, advises, incites or uses another person to commit a crime is guilty of a crime and is liable to the punishment prescribed for the crime that was so furthered, where the crime intended to be committed was committed or some other crime was committed that involves a similar degree of harm or that differs from the crime intended to be committed by reason only of the identity of the victim.

29. (1) Every one who attempts to commit a crime is guilty of a crime and is liable to one-half the punishment prescribed for the crime that was attempted to be committed.

(2) Mere preparation for a crime does not constitute an attempt to commit that crime.

30. Every one who helps, advises, incites or uses another person to commit a crime is, where that person does not completely perform the conduct specified in the definition of the crime, guilty of a crime and is liable to one-half the punishment prescribed for the crime.

31. Every one who agrees with another person to commit a crime is guilty of a crime and is liable to one-half the punishment prescribed for the crime.

32. Every one who agrees with another person to commit a crime and helps, advises, incites or uses that person to committing the crime is liable to the punishment prescribed for any other crime that

(a) is committed as a result of that conduct; and

(b) is, to his knowledge, a probable consequence of that conduct.

Possible Convictions

33. (1) Every one charged with committing a crime may on appropriate evidence be convicted of committing it, furthering it, attempting to commit it or attempted furthering of it.
(2) Everyone charged with furthering the commission of a crime may on appropriate evidence be convicted of committing it, furthering it, attempting to commit it or attempted furthering of it.

(3) Every one charged with attempting to commit a crime may on appropriate evidence be convicted of attempting to commit it or attempted furthering of it, regardless of whether the evidence shows that he committed the crime or furthered the crime.

(4) Every one charged with attempted furthering of a crime may on appropriate evidence be convicted of attempting to commit it or attempted furthering of it, regardless of whether the evidence shows that he committed the crime or furthered the crime.

(5) Where two or more persons are involved in committing a crime but the evidence does not clearly establish which of them committed the crime and which of them furthered it, all of them may be convicted of furthering the crime.

(6) Where two or more persons are involved in attempting to commit a crime but the evidence does not clearly establish which of them attempted to commit the crime and which of them attempted furtherance of the crime, all of them may be convicted of attempted furthering of the crime.

**Division IV**

**JURISDICTION**

**Definitions**

34. (1) In this Division,

"Canada" includes the following lands and waters, the airspace above them and the seabed and subsoil below them:

(a) the land mass of Canada,

(b) the inland waters, being the rivers, lakes and other fresh waters in Canada and including the St. Lawrence River as far seaward as the straight lines drawn

(j) from Cap-des-Rosiers to the westernmost point of Anticosti Island, and
(ii) from Anticosti Island to the north shore of the
St. Lawrence River along the meridian of longitude
sixty-three degrees west,

c) the internal waters, being any areas of the sea that
are on the landward side of the baselines of the
territorial sea and any areas of the sea, other than the
territorial sea, in respect of which Canada has an
historic or other title of sovereignty,

(d) the territorial sea of Canada as determined in
accordance with the *Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones
Act*, and

(e) the Arctic waters and ice in respect of which
Canada has an historic or other title of sovereignty,

(2) Words and expressions used in this Division and
not otherwise defined have the same meaning as in the
*Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act*.

35. (1) This Code applies to crimes committed in
Canada but, subject to diplomatic and other immunity
under the law, this Code applies to, and Canadian courts
have jurisdiction in respect of, the following crimes:

(a) any crime committed in a place in or above the
continental shelf or in any exclusive economic zone that
is created by the Government of Canada, where the
crime is an offence in that place by virtue of section 5
of the *Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act*;

(b) any crime committed in a fishing zone of Canada as
determined in accordance with the *Territorial Sea and
Fishing Zones Act*;

(c) any crime committed outside Canada on an aircraft
or a ship registered under an Act of Parliament;

(d) any crime committed outside Canada on a vessel or
aircraft of the Canadian Forces;

(e) any crime defined by sections 126 (treason), 127
(failure to prevent etc. treason), 129 (espionage), 130
(gathering etc. classified information) and 132 (sabotage)
committed outside Canada

(i) by a Canadian citizen or a person who benefits
from the protection of Canada, or

(ii) where the crime involves classified information,
by a person who was a Canadian citizen or a person
who benefited from the protection of Canada at the
time he obtained the information,
(f) any act of omission committed outside Canada by a person who is serving abroad in the Armed Forces, working abroad for the Armed Forces or who is subject to the Code of Service Discipline, where the act or omission is a crime in Canada and a crime under the laws of the place where the act or omission is committed;

(g) any act or omission committed outside Canada by an employee of the Government of Canada or a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who is serving or working abroad, where the act or omission is a crime in Canada and a crime under the laws of the place where the act or omission is committed;

(h) any act or omission committed outside Canada by a citizen or a person who benefits from the protection of Canada who is a member of the family of a person described in paragraph (g) and is living in the same household, where the act or omission is a crime in Canada and a crime under the laws of the place where the act or omission is committed;

(i) any crime defined by sections 37 (negligent homicide), 38 (manslaughter), 39 (manslaughter while intoxicated), 40 (murder), 43 (assault), 44 (infliction of harm), 46 (threatening), 47 (threats of immediate harm), 48 (extortion), 49 (confiscation), 50 (kidnapping), 81 (vandalism) and 82 (arson) committed outside Canada by a Canadian citizen or by a person present in Canada after the commission of the crime, where the crime is committed by means of nuclear material;

(j) any crime defined by sections 70 (theft), 81 (vandalism) and 82 (arson) committed outside Canada by a Canadian citizen or by a person present in Canada after the commission of the crime, where the object of the crime is nuclear material;

(k) any crime committed outside Canada in relation to a Canadian passport, a certificate of Canadian citizenship or Canadian currency;

(l) any crime defined by sections 37 (negligent homicide), 38 (manslaughter), 39 (manslaughter while intoxicated), 40 (murder), 43 (assault), 44 (infliction of harm), 46 (threatening), 47 (threats of immediate harm), 48 (extortion), 49 (confiscation), 50 (kidnapping) committed outside Canada against an internationally protected person, where

(i) the accused is a Canadian citizen or is present in Canada after the commission of the crime, or
(ii) the victim is an internationally protected person by virtue of the functions that he exercises on behalf of Canada;

(m) a crime defined by section 50 (kidnapping) committed outside Canada where

(i) the accused is a Canadian citizen, a person who is not a citizen of any state but who is ordinarily resident in Canada or a person who is present in Canada after the commission of the crime,

(ii) the victim is a Canadian citizen, or

(iii) the crime is committed in order to induce the Government of Canada or a province to perform an act or an omission;

(n) any crime defined by sections 37 (negligent homicide), 38 (manslaughter), 39 (manslaughter while intoxicated), 40 (murder), 43 (assault), 44 (infliction of harm), 46 (threatening), 47 (threats of immediate harm), 48 (extortion), 49 (confinement), 50 (kidnapping) committed outside Canada, where the crime is committed against a person on board a private ship or aircraft that is outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state by a person on board another ship or aircraft;

(o) any crime defined by sections 70 (theft), 81 (vandalism) and 82 (arson) committed outside Canada, where the crime is committed against a private ship or aircraft that is outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state or against the property of another person on board the ship or aircraft by a person on board another ship or aircraft;

(p) any crime defined by sections 37 (negligent homicide), 38 (manslaughter), 39 (manslaughter while intoxicated), 40 (murder), 43 (assault), 44 (infliction of harm), 46 (threatening), 47 (threats of immediate harm), 48 (extortion), 49 (confinement), 50 (kidnapping) and 63 (interference with transportation facilities) committed outside Canada where the crime is committed against a person on board a ship or aircraft or, in the case of a crime defined by section 63, committed in relation to a ship or aircraft and

(i) where the ship or aircraft is a ship or aircraft that is registered under an Act of Parliament or is leased without crew to a lessee whose principal place of business is located in Canada or, if the lessee has no principal place of business in Canada, whose permanent residence is located in Canada,

(ii) where the ship or aircraft arrives in Canada with the alleged offender on board, or
(iii) where the alleged offender is present in Canada after the commission of a crime listed in this paragraph.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a crime is committed in Canada if

(a) the act or omission constituting the physical element of the crime is committed wholly in Canada;

(b) the act or omission constituting the physical element of the crime is committed partially in Canada, a result of the crime occurs in Canada or a circumstance that is by reason of the definition of the crime relevant exists in Canada and the result or circumstance establishes a substantial link between Canada and the crime.

36. (1) For the purposes of applying paragraph 35(2)(b) in respect of an act or omission that is described in any of sections 28 to 31,

(a) the fact that the crime mentioned in the relevant section is or was to be committed in Canada is a result that establishes a substantial link between Canada and the conduct; and

(b) there may be a substantial link between Canada and the conduct even though the crime mentioned in the relevant section is not or was not to be committed in Canada.

(2) Paragraph 35(2)(b) only applies in respect of the conduct that is described in any of sections 28 to 31

(a) where the crime mentioned in the relevant section is also an offence that is liable to be punished by imprisonment, otherwise than on default of payment of a fine, under the laws of every place where the parts of the conduct that are not performed in Canada are performed; or

(b) where the conduct took place on the high seas.

PART II

CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON

Division 1

CRIMES AGAINST LIFE

37. Every one commits the crime of negligent homicide who negligently causes the death of another person.
38. Every one commits the crime of manslaughter who recklessly causes the death of another person.

39. Every one commits the crime of manslaughter while intoxicated who causes the death of another person but does not, by reason of intoxication, have the state of mind required for murder.

40. (1) Every one commits the crime of murder who purposely causes the death of another person.

(2) Murder is first degree murder where it is premeditated or where it is

(a) accompanied by torture;

(b) committed pursuant to an agreement for valuable consideration;

(c) committed in preparation to commit a crime or to facilitate the commission of a crime, conceal the commission of a crime or aid in the escape of a criminal from detection, arrest or conviction;

(d) committed for terrorist or political motives;

(e) committed during the commission of a crime contrary to section 49 (confinement), 80 (robbery), or X (sexual assault), or where the crime is committed in relation to a ship or aircraft, contrary to section 63 (interference with transportation facilities); or

(f) committed by means that the person who commits the crime knows will kill more than one person and in fact more than one death results.

(3) Murder is premeditated where the killing is the result of a calculated and carefully considered plan other than a plan to kill a person for a compassionate motive.

(4) Murder that is not first degree murder is second degree murder.

41. Every one commits a crime who helps, advises or incites a person to commit suicide, regardless of whether suicide results or not.

42. Sections 37 to 41 do not apply in respect of the administration of palliative care that is appropriate in the circumstances to control or eliminate the pain and suffering of a person regardless of whether or not the palliative care reduces the life expectancy of that person, unless that person refuses to consent to that care.
Division II

CRIMES AGAINST BODILY INTEGRITY

Assault

43. Every one commits a crime who touches or hurts another person without the consent of that person.

Infliction of harm

44. (1) Every one commits a crime who purposely, recklessly or negligently harms another person.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of harm that is inflicted purposely or recklessly in the course of

(a) medical treatment that is administered with the consent of the patient for therapeutic purposes or for purposes of medical research, unless the risk of harm is disproportionate to the benefits expected from the treatment or the research; or

(b) a lawful sporting activity that is conducted in accordance with the rules governing that activity.

Division III

CRIMES AGAINST PSYCHOLOGICAL INTEGRITY

Harassment

45. Every one commits a crime who harasses another person and thereby frightens him.

Threatening

46. Every one commits a crime who threatens to hurt, harm or kill another person or to damage another’s property.

Threats of immediate harm

47. Every one commits a crime who threatens another person with immediate hurt, harm or death.

Extortion

48. Every one commits a crime who threatens to hurt, harm or kill a person, damage the property of a person or harm the reputation of a person for the purpose of inducing that person or another person to do or to refrain from doing anything.

Division IV

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY

Confinement

49. Every one commits a crime who confines another person without the consent of that person.
50. Every one commits a crime who confines a person for the purpose of inducing that person or another person to do or to refrain from doing anything.

51. Every one commits a crime who takes unlawful custody of a child who is less than fourteen years of age for the purpose of depriving a person who has lawful custody of the child of the use of that right, regardless of whether the child consents or not.

52. Sections 43 and 49 and sections 46 and 47 where threats to hurt only are involved do not apply in respect of reasonable discipline imposed on a child who is less than eighteen years of age by a person who has custody of the child or has access rights in respect of the child pursuant to a court order or an agreement between the parents of the child or by a person whom the custodian has expressly authorized to discipline that child.

Division V

CRIMES CAUSING DANGER

53. Every one commits a crime who negligently creates a risk of death or serious harm to another person.

54. (1) Every one commits a crime who, realizing that a person is in immediate danger of death or serious harm, omits to take reasonable steps to aid that person.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who cannot render aid without incurring a risk of death or serious harm to himself or another person or for any other valid reason.

55. Every one commits a crime who impedes the rescue of another person who faces a risk of death or serious harm.

56. For the purposes of sections 57 to 63, "operate" includes, in respect of a vessel or an aircraft, navigate; "vehicle" means a motor vehicle, train, vessel or aircraft but does not include anything driven by, propelled by or drawn by means of muscular power.
57. Every one commits a crime who negligently operates a vehicle in a manner that creates a risk of death or serious harm to another person.

58. Every one commits a crime who operates a vehicle or has the care or control of a vehicle while he knows or ought to know that his ability to operate that vehicle is impaired by alcohol or drug or that he has in his blood more than eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood.

59. (1) Every one commits a crime who, after operating or having care and control of a vehicle, fails or refuses to comply with a request made pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure to provide a sample of his breath or blood for the purpose of determining the concentration of alcohol in his blood;

(2) No one is liable under subsection (1) who has a reasonable excuse for failing or refusing to provide the sample.

60. Every one commits a crime who operates or has the care or control of a vehicle that is involved in an accident and who leaves the scene of the accident to escape civil or criminal liability.

61. Every one commits a crime who operates a vehicle while he knows that he is prohibited or otherwise disqualified from doing so under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province as a consequence of having committed a crime defined in this Code.

62. Every one commits a crime who, being negligent as to whether or not a vehicle is fit and safe for operation, operates that vehicle and thereby creates a risk of death or serious harm to another person.

63. Everyone commits a crime who interferes with anything used for, or in connection with, or anyone engaged in, transportation, and thereby causes risk of death or serious harm to another person.

64. The crimes defined by sections 43 (assault), 44 (infliction of harm), 45 (harassment), 46 (threatening), 47 (threats of immediate harm), 48 (extortion), 49 (confine-ment), 50 (kidnapping), 51 (child abduction), 53 (endangerment), 54 (failure to rescue), 55 (impeding
rescue), 57 (dangerous operation of vehicle), 58 (operation of vehicle while impaired), 59 (failure or refusal to provide breath sample), 60 (failure to stop at scene of accident), 61 (operation of vehicle while disqualified), 62 (unsafe vehicle) and 63 (interference with transportation facilities) are aggravated, when applicable, where, to the knowledge of the accused, the victim is his spouse, child, parent, grandparent or grandchild or where the crimes are

(a) accompanied by torture;

(b) committed pursuant to an agreement for valuable consideration;

(c) committed in preparation to commit a crime or to facilitate the commission of a crime, conceal the commission of a crime or aid in the escape of a criminal from detection, arrest or conviction;

(d) committed for terrorist or political motives;

(e) committed by means of a weapon; or

(f) committed by means that, to the knowledge of the accused, could harm more than one person or by means with respect to which the accused was reckless as to whether more than one person could be harmed and in fact more than one person is harmed.

Division VI

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL SECURITY AND PRIVACY

65. For the purposes of sections 66 to 68,

“optical device” means any device capable of permitting surreptitious viewing of persons, places or things;

“private communication” means any oral communication or any telecommunication made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for any party to the communication to expect that it will not be intercepted;

“surveillance device” means any device capable of being used to intercept a private communication.

66. (1) Every one commits a crime who, by means of a surveillance device, intercepts a private communication without the consent of at least one party to the communication.
Exception

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person engaged in providing a telephone, telegraph or other communication service to the public where the interception is a necessary incident to the provision of the service.

Entry to install instrument

Search of premises

(2) Every one commits a crime who, being authorized to enter on the premises of a person for the purpose of installing, servicing or removing a surveillance or optical device, searches the premises while acting under that authority.

Use of force

(3) Notwithstanding section 23, every one commits a crime who uses force against a person for the purpose of gaining entry onto premises to install, remove or service a surveillance or optical device or in an attempt to leave the premises.

Disclosure of private communications

68. (1) Every one commits a crime who, without the consent of at least one of the parties to a private communication,

(a) discloses or threatens to disclose to any other person the existence of or the contents of the communication; or

(b) uses the contents of the communication for any purpose.

Exception

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of a disclosure made

(a) in the course of or for the purpose of giving evidence in a judicial proceeding where the communication is admissible in evidence;

(b) in the course of or for the purpose of any criminal investigation, if the communication was lawfully intercepted;

(c) to a peace officer or to the Attorney General or his agent, if the disclosure is made in the interests of the administration of justice;

(d) for the purpose of giving notice or furnishing particulars in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(e) to an employee of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, if the disclosure is made for the purpose of enabling the Service to perform its duties or exercise its functions;

(f) in the course of the operation of a communication service, if the disclosure is a necessary incidence to the provision of the service;

(g) to a person who is authorized by the originator of the communication or by a person whom the originator intended to receive it to disclose, or use the content of, the communication; or

(h) to an investigative or law enforcement officer of a foreign jurisdiction, if the disclosure is made for the purpose of revealing criminal activity in that jurisdiction.

69. (1) Every one commits a crime who, for the purpose of committing a crime, enters or remains on premises of a person without the consent of the owner or a person in peaceable possession of the premises.

(2) Every one commits a crime who, for the purposes of committing a crime, enters or remains on the premises of a person without the consent of that person and commits a crime on the premises.

(3) A crime defined by subsection (1) or (2) is aggravated where

(a) the premises or any part thereof are used as or connected to a building or structure that is used as a permanent or temporary residence;

(b) the accused was reckless as to the presence of persons on the premises; or

(c) the accused, at the time of the commission of the crime, had a weapon in his possession.

(4) For the purposes of this section, a person enters as soon as any part of his body or of any instrument used by him is within the premises.

(5) In this section, "premises" means

(a) any building or part thereof; and

(b) any part of a structure, motor vehicle, train, vessel or aircraft that is used for overnight accommodation or for commercial purpose.
PART III

CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

Division I

THEFT AND FRAUD

70. Every one commits the crime of theft who dishonestly appropriates another's property without his consent.

71. Every one commits a crime who dishonestly obtains a service for himself or any other person and does not pay for it.

72. (1) Every one commits a crime who by a false representation of fact, whether past, present or future or by an omission to disclose a fact induces another person

(a) to part with his property; or

(b) to incur a financial loss or a risk thereof.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1),

(a) a representation that is no more than an exaggerated statement of opinion concerning the attributes or quality of anything is not a false representation;

(b) an omission to disclose a fact means an omission by which

(i) the accused breaches an obligation to disclose arising from a special relationship between the accused and the victim, or

(ii) the accused or another acting with him has created or reinforced a false impression in the victim's mind or has prevented the victim from acquiring information that the accused knows is likely to affect the belief of the victim concerning the fact.

73. Every one commits a crime who for the purpose of defrauding another person, makes or uses a document or valuable security that misrepresents such facts as it refers to.

74. (1) Every one commits a crime who makes, alters or uses a public document which in whole or in part differs from that which it purports to be.
(2) Everyone commits a crime, who, for the purpose of defrauding another person, makes, alters or uses a private document which in whole or in part differs from that which it purports to be.

(3) Everyone commits a crime, who, for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a crime, defaces or destroys an identifying mark on any thing or applies or adds to any thing any false mark.

(4) For the purposes of this section, "public document" means:

(a) an item or currency;
(b) a stamp;
(c) the official seal of the Government of Canada or a province, of a corporate body or of a court in Canada;
(d) a valuable security issued or guaranteed by Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province;
(e) a passport;
(f) a citizenship certificate;
(g) a proclamation, order, regulation or appointment or notice thereof purporting to have been printed by the Queen's Printer for Canada or for a province;
(h) a public record.

75. Everyone commits a crime who confers, or agrees to confer, a benefit on an employee or an agent of a person for the purpose of corruptly influencing him in the performance of his duties or the exercise of his functions.

76. Everyone commits a crime who, being an employee or agent of a person, accepts, or agrees to accept, a benefit from another person given for the purpose of corruptly influencing him in the performance of his duties or the exercise of his functions.

77. Everyone commits a crime who transfers, conceals or disposes of his property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors.

78. Everyone commits a crime who, for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of any person, receives property that has been transferred, concealed or disposed of for the purpose of defrauding those creditors.
79. (1) Every one commits a crime who enters into an agreement or arrangement to receive interest at a criminal rate or receives a payment of interest at a criminal rate.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a rate of interest is criminal if it exceeds sixty per cent per annum calculated annually on the value of anything actually advanced.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), "interest" means the aggregate of all charges and expenses, whether in the form of a fee, fine, penalty, commission or other similar charge or expense or in any other form, paid or payable for the advancing of credit under an agreement or arrangement, by or on behalf of the person to whom credit is or is to be advanced, irrespective of the person to whom any such charges and expenses are or are to be paid or payable, but does not include any repayment of credit advanced or any insurance charge, official fee, overdraft charge, required deposit balance or, in the case of a mortgage transaction, any amount required to be paid on account of property taxes.

Division II

ROBBERY

80. (1) Every one commits a crime who, while or for the purpose of committing the crime of theft, uses violence or threatens to use violence against another person or against property.

(2) The crime defined by subsection (1) is aggravated if the accused uses a weapon at the time of the commission of the crime.

Division III

CRIMINAL DAMAGE

81. Every one commits a crime who recklessly destroys or damages another's property or renders it useless or inoperative without his consent.
82. Every one commits a crime who recklessly causes a fire or explosion that destroys or damages another's property without his consent.

Division IV

MISCELLANEOUS PROPERTY CRIMES

83. (1) Every one commits a crime who possesses
(a) any device or instrument under circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference that the person used it or means to use it to commit a crime defined by sections 70 (theft), 69 (criminal intrusion) or 74 (forgery); or
(b) a weapon or an explosive under circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference that the person used it or means to use it to commit a crime defined by sections 37 to 42 (crimes against life), 43 to 44 (crimes against bodily integrity), 45 to 48 (crimes against psychological integrity), 49 to 52 (crimes against personal liberty) and 53 to 64 (crimes causing danger).

(2) "Explosive" means any substance capable of causing, and anything capable of being used with such a substance to cause an explosion.

84. Every one commits a crime who possesses
(a) any paper used to make bank notes or used to make valuable securities issued or guaranteed by Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province; or
(b) any device capable of being used to intercept a private communication as defined by section 65.

85. Every one commits a crime who possesses a prohibited weapon or an unregistered regulated weapon.

86. Every one commits a crime who
(a) possesses a forged public document referred to in subsection 74(1); or
(b) for the purpose of defrauding another person, possesses a forged private document referred to in subsection 74(2).

87. Every one commits a crime who possesses anything, or the proceeds of anything, obtained by the commission of a crime in Canada or by the performance of an act or omission that, if performed in Canada, would be a crime and that is a crime in the place where the act or omission is performed.
87.1 Every one commits a crime who uses as his own the Canadian passport or the certificate of Canadian citizenship of another person.

88. Every one commits a crime who deals in

(a) prohibited or unregistered regulated weapons, or

(b) in things obtained by the commission of a crime in Canada or by the performance of an act or omission that, if performed in Canada, would be a crime and that is a crime under the law of the place where the act or omission is performed.

PART IV

CRIMES AGAINST THE NATURAL ORDER

Division I

CRIMES AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT

89. Every one commits a crime who recklessly causes disastrous damage to the environment.

Division II

CRIMES AGAINST ANIMALS

90. In this Division

"animal" means any living non-human vertebrate;

"captive animal" means an animal that is caged, bound or confined outside its natural habitat;

"sporting activity" includes hunting, trapping and fishing.

91. (1) Every one commits a crime who unnecessarily causes injury or serious physical pain to an animal.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of injury or serious pain inflicted as a reasonably necessary means of achieving any of the following purposes:

(a) the identification, medical treatment, spaying or neutering of an animal;

(b) the provision of food or other animal products;
(c) participation in a lawful sporting activity where the sporting activity is conducted in accordance with the rules governing that activity;

(d) the control of pests, predators or disease;

(e) the protection of persons or property;

(f) scientific research unless the risk of injury or serious pain is disproportionate to the benefits expected from the research; and

(g) the disciplining or training of an animal.

92. Every one commits a crime who organizes, facilitates or participates in a meeting, competition, exhibition, pastime or display that involves

(a) the baiting of an animal;

(b) combat between two or more animals; or

(c) the killing of a captive animal.

93. Every one commits a crime who fails to take reasonable steps to provide the necessaries of life to an animal that is under his care and that is unable to provide itself with the necessaries of life, and thereby causes injury or serious physical pain to the animal.

PART V

CRIMES AGAINST SOCIAL ORDER

Division I

CRIMES AGAINST SOCIAL HARMONY

94. Every one commits a crime who publicly stirs up hatred against an identifiable group.

95. Every one commits a crime who advocates, promotes or incites the destruction of an identifiable group.

Division II

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

96. Every one commits a crime who publicly acts in a manner that causes persons in the vicinity to reasonably fear harm to the person or serious damage to property.
97. Every one commits a crime who publicly stirs up hatred against an identifiable group in a public place in a manner that causes a risk of harm to the person or serious damage to property.

98. Every one commits a crime who, jointly with two or more persons, commits the crime defined by section 96 (disturbing public order).

99. Every one commits a crime who commits the crime defined by section 98 (unlawful assembly) and harm to the person or serious damage to property results.

100. Every one commits a crime who, being part of an unlawful assembly or a riot, fails to disperse when lawfully ordered to do so.

101. Every one commits a crime who falsely alarms the public.

102. Every one commits a crime who, in a public place, substantially and unreasonably obstructs or inconveniences persons exercising a right that is common to all members of the public.

103. Every one commits a crime who prowls or loiters at night on another's property near a dwelling house situated on the property.

PART VI

CRIMES AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ORDER

Division I

CORRUPTING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

104. Every one commits a crime who confers, or agrees to confer, a benefit on another person for the purpose of corruptly influencing the course of public administration.

105. Every one commits a crime who accepts, or agrees to accept, a benefit given for the purpose of corruptly influencing the course of public administration.

106. Every one commits a crime who, being a public official, abuses the public powers associated with the duties or functions of his office.
Division II

MISLEADING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

107. For the purposes of sections 108 and 109, “false solemn statement” includes a solemn statement that contradicts a prior solemn statement that has been made by the person in accordance with section 108 or 109.

108. Every one commits a crime who, where required pursuant to an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province to make a solemn statement, makes a false solemn statement, other than in a public proceeding, for the purpose of defeating the objective for which the statement is required.

109. Every one commits a crime who, in a public proceeding, makes a false solemn statement for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the proceeding.

110. Every one commits a crime who, for the purpose of influencing the course of public administration,

(a) forges, destroys or conceals a document;

(b) fabricates, alters, destroys or conceals an item of real evidence; or

(c) in an application for a certificate of citizenship, a passport, or a permit or licence required pursuant to an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province, makes a false statement or withholds relevant information.

111. Every one commits a crime who, for the purpose of influencing the course of public administration, uses

(a) a forged document;

(b) a fabricated or altered item of real evidence; or

(c) a document referred to in paragraph 110(c) that was obtained as a result of a false statement or the withholding of relevant information in the application for the document.

112. Every one commits a crime who impersonates another person, whether living, dead or fictitious, for the purpose of influencing the course of public administration.
113. Every one commits a crime who, in an application for authority to execute process under the Code of Criminal Procedure, withholds information for the purpose of obtaining the authority.

114. (1) Every one commits a crime who misleads a public officer and thereby causes the public officer to begin, continue or cease an investigation into a crime or a federal or provincial infraction.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who merely makes a denial of guilt.

Division III

Obstructing Public Administration

115. Every one commits a crime who, by physical interference or breach of a legal duty, obstructs a public officer in the lawful execution of his duty.

116. Every one commits a crime who seriously disrupts a public proceeding.

117. Every one commits a crime who, when reasonably requested to do so, fails to take reasonable steps to aid a public officer in arresting a person.

118. (1) Every one commits a crime who, where a criminal proceeding in relation to a crime defined by section x or xx (sexual crimes) has been initiated, publishes information that identifies

(a) a victim of the crime charged in the proceeding; or

(b) a child who is less than 18 years of age, and who is a victim of the crime charged, or who appears as a witness, in the proceeding.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where

(a) for the purpose of ensuring that the accused may make full answer and defence, the court makes an order permitting publication of the identity of the victim or child; or

(b) in the case of a person referred to in paragraph (1)(a), the person consents to the publication.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a criminal proceeding is initiated when compulsory process is issued, a charge is laid or an arrest is made.

119. (1) Every one commits a crime who contravenes a lawful order made by a court prohibiting the publication

(a) of any information that identifies

(i) a victim in a criminal proceeding who is in danger of death or serious harm as a result of the publication,

(ii) a witness in a criminal proceeding who is in danger of death or serious harm as a result of the publication, or

(iii) a confidential informant;

(b) of the evidence taken, the representations made or the reasons given in a pre-trial motion, a judicial interim release hearing or a preliminary inquiry;

(c) of a notice given, the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made at a hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence concerning the sexual activity of a victim in a crime defined by section 15 or 15(x) (sexual crimes);

(d) where the jury is not sequestered, of a notice given, the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made during any portion of a trial at which the jury was not present; or

(e) the content of a court exhibit.

120. (1) Every one commits a crime who, while a civil or criminal trial is pending, publishes

(a) an admission made by a party or a statement made by the accused;

(b) any criminal record of the accused;

(c) the results of any investigative test or procedure conducted in relation to the proceeding;

(d) psychological data about a party or the accused; or

(e) an opinion on the liability of a party or the accused.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where the publication

(a) does not jeopardize the fairness of the trial;

(b) is a fair and accurate report of the proceeding or of the content of a court document that relates to the proceeding; or
(c) is part of a discussion in good faith of a matter of public interest and any jeopardy to a fair trial that arises as a result of the publication of the information referred to in paragraphs (1)(a) to (e) is merely incidental to the discussion.

(3) For the purposes of this section,

(a) a criminal trial is pending

(i) in the case of a public officer and a prosecutor, from the time when the public officer or prosecutor has reasonable grounds for initiating a criminal proceeding, and

(ii) in all other cases, from the time when compulsory process is issued, a charge is laid or an arrest is made,

until the time at which a direction is given that the accused be discharged or that the proceeding be stayed, a verdict is given or the proceeding is otherwise determined by another disposition whether formal or informal; and

(b) a civil trial is pending from the time the trial date is set until the time at which the proceeding is abandoned, adjudicated upon or otherwise determined by another disposition.

Disobeying a court order

121. Every one commits a crime who fails to

(a) comply with the terms of

(i) an appearance notice, summons or subpoena issued pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure, or

(ii) an undertaking entered into pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure; or

(b) obey a lawful order of a court, judge or justice of the peace, other than an order for the payment of money or for which a sanction or enforcement procedure is expressly provided by law.

Contempt

122. Every one commits a crime who publicly brings into contempt a court, a judge in his official capacity or the administration of civil or criminal justice.

Disclosure of jury information

123. (1) Every one commits a crime who discloses information that is not revealed in open court regarding the proceedings of a jury while in retirement.

Exception

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of a disclosure made
(a) in the course of or for the purpose of an investigation or trial of a crime committed by a person in his capacity as a juror; or

(b) for the purpose of research concerning juries that has been approved by the Attorney-General of the province.

124. Every one commits a crime who

(a) escapes from lawful arrest or imprisonment; or

(b) is at large prior to the expiration of a term of imprisonment to which the person was sentenced.

125. Every one commits a crime who, by any means other than means defined as a crime in this Part, obstructs, defeats or perverts the course of justice.

Division IV

CRIMES AGAINST STATE SECURITY

126. Every one commits a crime who, being a Canadian citizen or a person who benefits from the protection of Canada,

(a) engages in armed hostilities against Canada;

(b) helps a state engaged in armed hostilities against Canada;

(c) helps any armed forces against whom Canadian Forces are engaged in armed hostilities; or

(d) overthrows by force the constitutional Government of Canada or a province.

127. (1) Every one commits a crime who fails to take reasonable steps

(a) to prevent the commission of the crime defined by section 126 (treason); or

(b) to inform a peace officer that the crime defined by section 126 (treason) has been committed.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who cannot prevent or inform a peace officer of the crime without incurring a risk of death or serious harm to himself or another person or for any other valid reason.
128. For the purposes of sections 129 and 130, "classified information" means information that is marked or otherwise identified in accordance with the classification scheme of the Government of Canada as reasonably likely, if disclosed, to cause serious injury to the national interest.

129. Every one commits a crime who gathers classified information for, or makes classified information available to, another state that is not engaged in armed hostilities against Canada.

130. Every one commits a crime who gathers classified information for, or makes classified information available to, any person who is not authorized to receive it.

131. Sections 129 and 130 do not apply where the information is improperly classified.

132. Every one commits a crime who jeopardizes the security of Canada, or the forces of a foreign state that are lawfully present in Canada, by damaging property or data.
APPENDIX C

Acknowledgements

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Among those who have met with us during the codification exercise, arranged alphabetically under certain categories, are the following:

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The Hon. Mr. Justice J.-C. Angers,
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* Acted as Department of Justice liaison with the Commission and as such participated in project meetings, offering much valuable advice on behalf of his colleagues in the Department.
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