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Updated and corrections / mise à jour et corrections: 4 November 2013

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- Pour le bénéfice de tous, n'hésitez pas à suggérer des ajouts aux bibliographies.  Merci.

by / par ©François Lareau, 2007-, Ottawa, Canada

Selected Bibliography: Harm Principle,
Rechtsgut and Bien Protégé par la Loi

Bibliographie choisie: Principe du préjudice, Rechtsgut et bien protégé par la loi

"If the 'elusive dimension' of crime consists of incriminating acts, we can hardly avoid the question:
What makes these acts incriminating?"  (Fletcher, "The Unmet Challenge of Criminal Theory", infra)

I - Canadian Criminal Law /
     Droit pénal canadien

ACORN, Annalise, "Harm, Community Tolerance, and the Indecent: A Discussion of  R. v. Mara", (1997-98) 36 Alberta Law Review 258-272;

BENEDET, Janine, "Hierarchies of Harm in Canadian Criminal Law: The Marijuana Triology and the Forcible 'Correction' of Children", (2004) 24 The Supreme Court Law Review (2nd ed.) 217-241;

BOYCE,  see infra;

BOWAL, Peter and Benjamin Law, "The Contours of what is Criminal", (June/July 2005) 29(6) Law Now 8; see http://carl-abrc-oai.lib.sfu.ca/index.php/record/view/123406   and https://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/48039/1/Bowal_Contours2005_LawNow.pdf (accessed on 27 November 2011);

BURSTEIN, Paul, "What's the Harm in Having a 'Harm Principle' Enshrined in Section 7 of the Charter?", (2004) 24 The Supreme Court Law Review (2nd ed.) 159-194;

CAMERON, Jamie, "Abstract Principle v. Contextual Conceptions of Harm: A Comment on R. v. Butler", (1992) 37 McGill Law Review 1135-1157; available at http://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/abs/vol37/4camer.html (accessed on 3 April 2008);

COLVIN, Eric, 1945 and Sanjeev Anand, Principles of Criminal Law, 3rd ed., Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2007, li, 599 p., and see "The 'Harm' Principle" at pp. 42-44, ISBN: 978 0779813247;

"The dissenting minority in
Labaye, at para. 104, contended that Malmo-Levine had rejected the existence of harm as a prerequisite for criminalization and that the majority's demand for harm in relation to indecency was therefore wrong.  Malmo-Levine did not, however, reject any harm principle; it merely rejected the harm principle in the narrow version espoused by Mill." (p. 44, note 42)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence: A Consultation paper,
[Ottawa] : Dept. of Justice Canada, 2002, available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/voy/index.html (accessed on 11 November 2009); the consultation paper contains a suggested rationale for offences, an important aspect of criminal law theory.  There has been much discussion in Europe about the protection of legal interests (part of the definitional elements of an offence);  also published in French / aussi publié en français: MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE CANADA, Voyeurisme-- Une infraction criminelle: Document de consultation, [Ottawa]: Ministère de la Justice , 2002, disponible à http://www.justice.gc.ca/fra/cons/voy/index.html (vérifié le 11 novembre 2009);

DESJARDINS, Tristan, Les infractions d'ordre moral en droit criminel canadien, Markham (Ontario): LexisNexis Canada, 2007, xviii, 259 p., ISBN: 9780433454410; copie à la Biobliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, KF9434 D47 2007;

EPSTEIN, Richard A., "The Harm Principle -- And How it Grew", (1995) 45 University of Toronto Law Journal 369-417;

GOFF, Colin H., 1949-, Criminal Justice in Canada, 4th ed., Scarborough, Ont. : Thomson Nelson, 2007, xxii, 409 p., ISBN; 9780176252694 and 017625269X ;


An important element in our legal system is that conduct is criminal only if it is harmful.  This idea is 'reflected in the notion of due process, which holds that a criminal statute is unconstitutional if it bears no reasonable relationship to the matter of injury to the public' (Territo et al. 1995, 33-34).  This means there has to be a victim for the action to be harmful.  Others argue that if the offence is a 'victimless' crime -- for example, gambling, abortion, prostitution--it is not the law's business' (Geis 1974).  The basis for this view is that victimless crimes violate morality, not the law, and that making them illegal doesn't contribute to the good of society.

    Criminal harm may result in physical injury, but such harm is by no means restricted to physical injury.  For example, physical injury is not inflicted when perjury is committed, yet perjury is still considered harmful.  This is because the criminal law has to deal with intangibles, such as harm to public institutions and the harm that results from fear for one's own well-being. …(p. 47; the reference to Territo is Territo, L., J.B. Halsted, and M.L. Bromley. 1995. 
Crime and Justice in America, 4th ed. Minneapolis, NM: West; and the reference to Geis is Geis, G. 1974, Not the Law's Business, New York: Schocken)

GUILBAULT, Marie-Élaine, "Les valeurs de la communauté et la justification de l'action gouvernementale en matière criminelle et pénale", (Printemps 2009) 68 La Revue du Barreau du Québec1-62; disponible à http://www.barreau.qc.ca/publications/revue/index.html (vérifié le 6 juin 2009);

HUGHES, Jula, "Restraint and Proliferation in Criminal Law", (2010) 15(1) Review of Constitutional Studies,; available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1738957 (accessed on 26 Jukly 2011);

LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA,  Crimes against the Environment, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985, [ix], 75 p., (series; Working Paper; 44), ISBN: 0662539907; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, COMMISSION DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA, Les crimes contre l'environnement, Ottawa: Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1985, [ix], 85 p., (Collection; Document de travail; 44), ISBN: 0662539907;

___________Limits of Criminal Law: Obscenity: A Test Case, [Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada], 1975, [vii], 49 p., (series; Working Paper; 10); pdf conversion finished on 25 October 2006; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, COMMISSION DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA,  Les confins du droit pénal: leur détermination à partir de l'obscénité, [Ottawa: Commission de réforme du droit du Canada], 1975, [vii], 59 p., (Collection; Document de travail; 10);

LEVINE, Roslyn J., "In Harm's Way: The Limits to Legislating Criminal Law",
(2004) 24 The Supreme Court Law Review (2nd ed.) 195-216;

RAMSAY, Mark, “The Harm Principle and Canadian Law: Reconciling Malmo-Levine &Caine with Labaye” Canadian Section of the IVR annual meeting (Learneds, Toronto, Ontario, June 2nd 2006);  title noted in my research but article not consulted (19 September 2007);

R. v. Kouri, 2005 SCC 81 (CanLII), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2005/2005scc81/2005scc81.htm (accessed on 14 September 2007);

R. v. Labaye, 2005 SCC 80 (CanLII), available at  http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2005/2005scc80/2005scc80.html (accessed on 14 September 2007);

R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, 2003 SCC 74 (CanLII), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2003/2003scc74/2003scc74.html  (accessed on 17 September 2007);

R. v. Malmo-Levine et al., 2000 BCCA 335 (CanLII), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/2000/2000bcca335/2000bcca335.html  (accessed on 11 October 2007);  contains an excellent review of the concept of harm; important contribution;

SMITH, Ian R., "Developments in Criminal Law: The 2005-2006 Term", (2006) 35 The Supreme Court Law Review 141-200, and see "Indecent Acts R. v. Labaye; R. v. Kouri", at pp. 149-159;

STUART, Don, 1943-,
Charter justice in Canadian criminal law, 4th ed., Toronto : Thomson Carswell, 2005, lxiv, 604 p., and see on the harm principle at pp. 63-65; deals with the R. v. Malmo-Levine; case, supra;

WEEKS, Carly, "Federal security breach policy 'backwards'.  'Large loopholes' created if firms decide when to notify public",  The Ottawa Citizen, Monday, 5 November 2007, p. A3;

"The debate over [security] breach notification has become a major focus of Industry Canada's ongoing review of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act ...

Although Industry Canada has acknowledged the threat posed by security breaches, it says the issue of public notification is 'complex' and should only be required in certain situations, when there is a high risk that individuals could suffer direct harm as a result."

YOUNG, Alan N., "Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental Justice and The Minimum Content of Criminal Law” in Jamie Cameron and James Stribopoulos, eds., The Charter and Criminal Justice Twenty-Five Years Later, Markham: LexisNexis, 2008, lxix, 759 p., at pp. 441-511, ISBN:  978-0-433-45803-6;

II - Comparative Criminal Law /
      Droit pénal comparé

ALLEMAGNE, Code civil allemand (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch ou BGB), disponible à http://fr.jurispedia.org/index.php/Articles_du_Code_civil_%28de%29 

"§ 823 Obligation d'indemnisation

1. Celui qui, agissant intentionnellement ou par négligence, porte atteinte illicitement à la vie, l'intégrité corporelle, la santé, la liberté, la propriété ou à un autre droit similaire d'autrui, est tenu à réparation du dommage qui en est résulté.

2. La même obligation vise celui qui contrevient à la protection d'une autre loi protectrice. Si une violation de la loi en question est possible sans qu'une faute ne soit nécessaire, le devoir de réparer le dommage n'intervient qu'en cas de faute."

Al Qudah, Mouaid, Individual autonomy as a basis of criminal complicity in New South Wales and Jordan : a comparative study, dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Western Sydney, 2005, xi, 281 p.; see pp. 25-36; available at http://arrow.uws.edu.au:8080/vital/access/manager/Repository/uws:3625 (accessed on 2 September 2009);

AMBOS, Kai,  "Toward a Universal System of Crime: Comments on George Fletcher's Grammar of Criminal Law", (2007) 28 Cardozo Law Review 2647-2673;

"The harm doctrine and the parallel doctrine of the Rechtsgut do not predetermine the question of the correct structure of crime; they, importantly enough, try to limit the application of the criminal law but it is increasingly controversial if they are able to do so adequately. (p. 2655; note omitted)

APONTE, Luis Ernesto Chiesa, "Normative Gaps in the Criminal Law: A Reasons Theory of Wrongdoing", (2007) 10(1) New Criminal Law Review 102-141, and see "The Political Theory of Wrongdoing, Legal Goods, and the Harm Principle", at pp. 128-136; abstract available at http://caliber.ucpress.net/doi/abs/10.1525/nclr.2007.10.1.102?journalCode=nclr (accessed on 15 April 2008);

Articles in (1994) 5 The Journal of Contemporary  Legal Issues;

ASHWORTH, Andrew, "Concepts of Overcriminalization",  (Spring 2008) 5(2) Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 407-425; available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/Articles/Volume5_2/Ashworth-PDF.pdf (accessed on 25 March 2008);

___________"Defining Criminal Offences without Harm" in P. Smith, ed.,
Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of J.C. Smith, London: Butterworths, 1987, xxvii, 234 p. at pp. 7-23, ISBN: 0406501106;

ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL  (AIDP) (International Association of Penal Law), "Projet de Code pénal international", (1981) 52(1-2) Revue internationale de droit pénal;

"Paragraphe 5. Préjudice

5.0. L'élément de préjudice dépendra de la définition du crime, exceptés les cas où la définition du crime ne requiert pas de préjudice."
"Le cinquième élément, l'élément de préjudice, nécessite une certaine explication et une interprétation particulière par rapport à chaque infraction, telle qu'elle est définie dans la Partie Spéciale. Par conséquent, cet élément doit être interprété en corrélation avec chaque crime spécifique, étant donné que, dans certaines circonstances, la définition du crime ne requiert pas un résultat particulier qui serait considéré comme un préjudice dans le sens de cet Article. Afin d'être sans équivoque sur ce point, ce paragraphe prévoit explicitement que ces éléments constitutifs peuvent être changés par la définition même du crime." (source: http://www.penal.org/pdf/livr-annexe-11.pdf et voir aussi http://www.penal.org/new/activites.php?Doc_zone=ACTIVITE&langage=fr&ID_doc=30; sites vérifiés le 13 novembre 2007)

BAKER, Dennis J., "Constitutionalizing the Harm Principle", (November 12, 2008) 27(2) Criminal Justice Ethics 3; available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1300356  (accessed on 18 November 2008); also available at  http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Constitutionalizing+the+harm+principle.-a0202802800 (accessed on 21 February 2011);

___________" The Impossibility of a Critically Objective Criminal Law", (February 2011) 56(2) McGill Law Journal  349-394;

___________"The Harm Principle vs. Kantian Criteria for Ensuring Fair, Principled and Just Criminalisation", (November 12, 2008) 33(66) Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy; available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1300351 (accessed on 18 November 2008);

___________"The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms", (August 2007) 10(3) New Criminal Law Review 370–391; with thye same title at  SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130052 (accessed on 8 May 2008);

___________The right not to be criminalized : demarcating criminal law's authority, Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT : Ashgate, c2011, xi, 297 p. ; 24 cm. ( Applied legal philosophy); see Hollis catalogue entry http://lms01.harvard.edu/F/6GJEB97JK416ABT976LHEUDA2ELY4SVJYLFT1R6CRMEBF9CYUI-04689?func=full-set-set&set_number=534410&set_entry=000019&format=999 (accessed on 22 October 2011);

BÖLLINGER, Lorenz, "Symbolic Criminal Law without Limits -- Commentary on the Cannabis decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court", available at http://www.drugtext.org/library/articles/94-const.html  (accessed on 17 September 2007);

Bret, "Obscenity and Community Standards", (2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 299-368, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1418684, see http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1418684  (accessed on 29 August 2009);

BRANNIGAN, Augustine,  "Obscenity and Social Harm: A Contested Terrain", (1991) 14 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 1-12;

CADOPPI, Alberto, "Recent Developments in Italian Constitutional-Criminal Law", (1990) 37 Alberta Law Review 425-442, and see "THE HARM PRINCIPLE", at pp. 435-436; contribution importante;

    "The harm principle was developed, in the Anglo-American legal-philosophical tradition, by John Stuart Mill; in a modern context it has been further developedby the work of the American scholar Joel Feinberg.   In Italy, this idea has been sharpened in the last century, prompted by the work of the German scholar, Birbaum.  He wrote about  the 'legal good'  (Rechtsgut; bene giuridico), which constitutes an 'interest' which has to be protected by the criminal law.  It is only permissible to punish behaviour if it causes harm to a 'legal good'.  The concept of the legal good replaced the concept of right, which was considered to be the only legitimate subject of legal protection up to the first half of the nineteenth century.  The change from the notion of 'right' to the notion of 'legal good' was important because it permitted the punishment of behaviour which offended interests not belonging to individuals, but to society at large. The concept of 'legal good' is still fashionable in the criminal law context, and this topic continues to generate scholarly works in continental Europe.  But it is still difficult to identify with sufficient precision the scope of this notion.  Can a 'legal good' be a vague 'feeling' of the community?  Can it include the common notion of public (or even private) morality?  Can it be the devotion to a particular religion? ..."

CHIESA, Luis E., "Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish? - Harm, Victimhood and the Structure of Anti-Cruelty Offenses", 9 March 2008, 85 p., available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104494
(accessed on 15 March 2008);

"Criminal Law Theory", and see the part "Liberalism and the Harm Principle", web article available at http://law.anu.edu.au/criminet/tclt.html  (accessed on 30 January 2008);

"Criminalization -- from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia", available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criminalization (accessed on 27 February 2008);

DAN-COHEN, Meir, "Thinking Criminal Law", (2007) 28 Cardozo Law Review 2419-2426;

DARGENTAS, Emmanuel,  "La norme pénale et la recherche autonome des valeurs dignes de la protection pénale.  Essai sur la théorie générale du droit pénal", (1971) 95 Revue pénitentiaire et de droit pénal 411-; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, FTX, KJJ 0 .R487;  title noted in my research but article not consulted yet (21 September 2007);

DONOHUE, Brian, "Rhetoric, Harm, and the Personification of Progress in Mill's On Liberty ", (June 2007) 20(2) Ratio Juris 196–212; abstract at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=988574  (accessed on 18 September 2007); title noted in my research but article not consulted yet (19 September 2007);

DRESSLER, Joshua, Understanding Criminal Law, 2nd ed., New York : Matthew Bender/Irwin, 1995, xli, 556 p., and see "§ 9.10 Social Harm: General principles", at pp. 95-99  (series; legal text series), ISBN: 0256193193; there is now a 4th ed.: Newark(NJ): LexisNexis, c2006, xxxiv, 649, [32] p. (series; the understanding series), ISBN: 082057001X;

"Social Harm: Constitutional Limits
    Various constitutional provisions limit the extent to which a legislature may proscribe harmful conduct.  For example, the First Amendment bars a state from making it an offence to deface an American flag in a manner that the actor knows 'will seriously offend one or more persons,' or to place on property a Nazi swastika, burning cross, or other symbol that the actor should know 'arouses anger, alram or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.'  By these and other rulings, the Supreme Court is not suggesting  that social harm does not occur in the circumstances under consideration, but rather is saying that constitutional rights -- here, freedom of speech -- outweigh the society's interest in preventing the harm." (2nd ed., pp. 98-99; notes omitted)

DRIPPS, Donald A., "The Liberal Critique of the Harm Principle," (Summer/Fall, 1998) 17 Criminal Justice Ethics 3-18; available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+Liberal+Critique+of+the+Harm+Principle.-a054480132 (accessed on 21 February 2011);

DUBBER, Markus Dirk,
"Theories of Crime and Punishment in German Criminal Law” (2006) 53 American Journal of Comparative Law 679; also at Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2005-02 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=829226; important contribution to the subject;

DUFF, Antony, "Harms and Wrongs", (2001) 5(1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 13-45, available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclrarticles/5%281%29/Duff.pdf.pdf (accessed on 9 October 2007);  issue 5(1) of the Buffalo Criminal Law Review " is dedicated to a careful reconsideration of Joel Feinberg's pathbreaking four-volume study on "The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law" by philosophers and legal scholars from several countries/, available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclr.htm  (accessed on 9 October 2007);

___________"Theories of Criminal Law", in Edward N. Zalta, ed.,
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Winter 2002 edition, at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/criminal-law/  (accessed on 17 September 2007);

DUFF, R.A, Lindsay Farmer, S.E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo and Victor Tadros, "Introduction: The Boundaries of the Criminal Law", in  R.A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, S.E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo and Victor Tadros, eds., The Boundaries of the Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, x, 267 p., at pp. 1-26, ISBN: 978-0-19-960055-7;

DWORKIN, Gerald, "Devlin was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality", (1999) 40 William and Mary Law Review 927-946;

ESER, Albin, "The Principle of 'Harm' in the Crime Concept: A Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests", (1965-1966) 4 Duquesne University Law Review 345-417; available at http://www.freidok.uni-freiburg.de/volltexte/3655/pdf/Eser_The_Principle_of_harm.pdf (accessed on 26 January 2008); with the same title M.C.J. thesis, New York University, 1962; important contribution to the subject

"Based on the dualistic, integrative structure of legal interests and the three-steps process of their sociological recognition, harm and legal interest can be defined as follows.  A 'legal interest' worthy of criminal protection may be any factual interest or good of an individual, of a social group, or of the state if it is socially recognized and in harmony with the spirit and value order as established by the Constitution.  Consequently, 'criminal harm,' in its most general sense, is the negation, endangering, or destruction of an individual, group, or state interest which was deemed socially valuable, in harmony with the Constitution and, therefore, protected by a criminal sanction.  In shorthand, 'criminal harm' is the actual or potential prejudice to socially and constitutionally recognized and criminally sanctioned factual interest." (p. 413)

FEINBERG, Joel, 1926-, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, and see vol. 1,  Harm to Others, and vol. 4, Harmless Wrongdoing  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1984;

FINKELSTEIN, Claire, "Positivism and the Notion of an Offense",  (2000) 88(2) California Law Review 335-394;

FLETCHER, George P., The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative, and International, Volume 1 : Foundations, Oxford/New York:  Oxford University Press,  2007, xxv, 366 p.,  and see 1.3.2. "Harm", ISBN: 978 0195103106; see Table of Contents at http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0620/2006030367.html (accessed on 30 July 2007);

___________Rethinking Criminal Law, Boston : Little, Brown, c1978, xxviii, 898 p.;

"There are in fact numerous distinctions among types of harm, and so these should be worked out before we seek to erect a proposition about harm in the criminal law.  What is true about secular destruction (homicide, arson) might not be true about cases in which the 'harm' consists in a legally prescribed result without destruction (the taking in larceny, the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy in treason).31
31  It is useful to distinguish, as in German theory, between the 'result' (Erfolg) and 'encroachment on a legally protected  interest' (Beeinträchtigung des geschützten Rechsguts), see Jescheck 198.  If an offense requires a particular result (larceny as well as homicide, but not offenses of risk-creation), proof of the result is necessary for liability.  The latter question of the protected legal interest and its encroachment is a jurisprudential issue, analyzed independently of the criteria for liability.  Cf. the Soviet concept, 'object of the offense,' Kurs (GP 1970) at 111 (maintaining that every offense has an 'object,' i.e., it infringes on the 'social relations of a socialist society').  Part of the problem in the analysis of 'harm' is that it oscillates between these two concepts -- the positive concept of 'result' and the jurisprudential concept of 'encroaching on a legal interest."  (p. 405)

"The Unmet Challenge of Criminal Theory",  (Summer 1987) 33(4) The Wayne Law Review 1439-

GRAVEN, Philippe, L'infraction pénale punissable, Berne: Éditions  Staemplfi, 1993, xv, 346 p., (Collection; Précis de droit Staempfli), ISBN: 372720978X;

"Toute infraction porte par définition atteinte à un intérêt pénalement protégé; cette atteinte (Rechtsgutverletzung) ne doit pas être considérée comme un 'résultat' [...]

La majorité des incriminations visent une atteinte effective à un bien juridique: le meurtrier détruit une vie  [...]

Plus la valeur d'un bien juridique est élevée, plus est large la protection dont il jouit.  Aussi la loi réprime-t-elle souvent, par le biais de ces 'délits-obstacles' que sont les infractions de mise en danger (Gefährdungsdelikte), la création d'un risque de lésion pour les intérêts les plus précieux, notamment la vie et l'intégrité corporelle.  Il s'agit donc alors d'intervenir pénalement avant qu'une atteinte effective survienne, de manière à l'empêcher si possible; la répression de la tentative (art. 21 [du Code pénal suisse], de certains actes préparatoires [...] obéit d'ailleurs à des considérations comparables [...]

Toute infraction suppose un comportement dirigé contre un objet concret dans lequel l'intérêt protégé s'incarne ou se matérialise [...]

La majorité des incriminations décrivent un comportement actif ou passif dirigé contre un seul bien juridique, dont la nature fournit le critère de regroupement des infractions par espèces [...]" (pp. 82, 84 et 90)

GUR-ARYE, Miriam, "The Nature of Crime: A Synthesis, Following the Three Perspectives Offered in The Grammar of Criminal Law", (Winter/Spring 2008) 27(1) Criminal Justice Ethics  91-98, and see "III The Basic Meaning of Criminal Harm" at pp. 92-93; available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+nature+of+crime%3a+a+synthesis%2c+following+the+three+perspectives...-a0202802821 (accessed on 21 February 2011);

HALL, Jerome, General Principles of Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961, xii, 642 p., and see Chapter 7, "Harm" at pp. 212-246;

HAMILTON, Marci A., God vs. The Gavel: religion and the rule of law, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, xii, 414 p., ISBN: 13:97805218530 40 and 10: 05218530044; see chapter 9, "The Decline of the Special Treatment of Religious Entities and the Rise of the No-Harm Rule", at pp. 238 to 272 with notes at pp. 371-389; copy at the Library of Parliament;

HAQUE, Adil Ahmad, "Lawrence v. Texas and the Limits of the Criminal Law", (2007) 42(1) Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review; available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=616942 (accessed on 18 September 2007);

HARCOURT, Bernard E., 1963-, "The Collapse of the Harm Principle", (1999) 90 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 109-200; see abstract at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=232124  (accessed on 17 September 2007); Also published in his book: Illusion of order : the false promise of broken windows policing,  Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 2001, x, 294 p., ISBN: 0674004728; important contribution to the subject;

HEFENDEHL, Roland, Andrew von Hirsch, and Wolfgang Wohlers (Hrsg/eds.), Die Rechtsgutstheorie: Legitimationsbasis des Strafrechts oder dogmatisches Glasperlenspiel?, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003, 167 p., ISBN:3832919333; (links accessed on 17 September 2007);

"The Centre's second German-language project concerns 'mediating' principles that restrict the criminalisation of harmful or offensive conduct. A colloquium on this subject was held in Basel, Switzerland in December 2004, in which a number of leading German criminal-law theorists attended. Themes discussed included 'subsidiarity' and the ultima-ratio principle; tolerance as reason for limiting criminalisation; the Verhältnismäßigkeit principle (proportionality of intervention to the importance of its objectives); and questions of reducing punishments in situations involving numerous responsible actors." (source: http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/research/cpt/criminalisation ; see also  http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/research/cpt/, accessed on 17 September 2007);

HIRSCH, Andrew von, "Der Rechtsgutsbegriff und das 'Harm Principle'" (2002) 149 Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht 2-14;

___________“Extending the Harm Principle:  ‘Remote’ Harms and Fair Imputation”in  A. P. Simester and A. T. H. Smith, eds.,
Harm and Culpability, Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1996,  at pp. 259-276, ISBN: 0198260571;

HIRSCH, Andrew von and Neils Jareborg, "Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis", (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1-38;

HIRSCH, Andrew von and AP Simester, "Penalising Offensive Behaviour: Constitutive and Mediating Principles", in Andrew von Hirsch and AP Simester, eds., Incivilities: Regulating Offensive Behaviour, Oxford/Portland (OR) : Hart, 2006, 293 p., at pp. 115-131 (series; Studies in penal theory and penal ethics), ISBN:  1841134996 and  9781841134994; copy at the University of Ottawa, KD1968 .I53 2006;

HÖRNLE, Tatjana, "Legal Regulation of Offence", in in Andrew von Hirsch and AP Simester, eds., Incivilities: Regulating Offensive Behaviour, Oxford/Portland (OR) : Hart, 2006, 293 p., at pp. 133-148 (series; Studies in penal theory and penal ethics), ISBN:  1841134996 and  9781841134994; copy at the University of Ottawa, KD1968 .I53 2006;

___________"Offensive Behavior and German Penal Law", (2001) 5(1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 255-278, available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclrarticles/5%281%29/Hornle.pdf.pdf  (accessed on 9 October 2007);  issue 5(1) of the Buffalo Criminal Law Review " is dedicated to a careful reconsideration of Joel Feinberg's pathbreaking four-volume study on "The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law" by philosophers and legal scholars from several countries/, available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclr.htm  (accessed on 9 October 2007);

Droit pénal -- Partie générale, 1: Notions fondamentales et loi pénale, Fribourg: Éditions universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1991, xlii, 223 p., voir "Violation d'un bien juridique et violation d'un devoir d'agir conformément à l'ordre juridique", aux pp. 10-13, ISBN: 2827105624; note: il y  a une deuxième édition en 1997; importante contribution au sujet;

"La doctrine, abandonnant l'idée selon laquelle toute infraction représente la violation de droits subjectifs au profit d'une conception de l'infraction en tant que lésion ou mise en danger de biens juridiques, déploya des efforts considérables pour définir cette notion de bien juridique.  Sa tâche a été  rendue plus ardue par la nécessité de prendre en considération, à côté des biens juridiques individuels (Individualrechtsgüter, par exemple vie, santé, patrimoine, liberté...), les biens collectifs (Universalrechtsgüter, par exemple paix publique paix publique, Etat, administration de la justice, écologie, sécurité publique...), dont la notion et les limites sont nettement plus difficiles à cerner.
Si l'idée de bien juridique n'était pas complètement ignorée au siècle de Lumières, elle a a été surtout développée à l'époque moderne par la doctrine allemande.
Dans une perspective statique, les biens juridques constituent soit des intérêts reconnus par l'ensemble ou la majeure partie de la société, soit des conditions essentielles dans lesquelles se concrétisent les éléments préalables et indispensables pour l'existence communautaire.  Dans une perspective dynamique, par contre, ce ne sont plus tellement les intérêts, les états de fait ou les choses qui comptent pour cerner la notion de 'bien juridique', mais plutôt  la fonction sociale dont ils ne sont que le support.  Autrement dit, ne devraient être considérés comme biens juridiques que les intérêts propres à atteindre un but utile pour la société ou une partie de celle-ci.

Malgré tous les efforts entrepris par la doctrine, la notion de bien juridque demeure obscure et discutée.  Cependant. il faut reconnaître que l'on n'a pas encore trouvé de critère pouvant lui être substitué; même imprécise, elle accomplit un rôle primordial dans la théorie de l'infraction." (pp. 10-11; notes omises)

___________Droit pénal - Partie générale, 2, Zurich: Schulthness Polygraphischer Verlag, 2002, xli, 396 p., ISBN: 3725544700;

"Le bien juridique constitue à la fois le fondement et le point de départ de l'élaboration de l'énoncé de fait légal puisque l'acte délictueux vise précisément à le léser ou à le mettre en danger.  Son rôle central s'explique par le fait que le législateur, pour décrire l'action incriminée, se réfère à des circonstances y relatives.  Savoir quel est le bien juridique atteint et en déterminer la portée représentent donc des moyens utiles pour interpréter l'énoncé du fait légal.  Par ailleurs, le bien juridique rend également plus aisée la classification des infractions dans la partie spéciale du Code pénal (infraction contre la vie, le patrimoine, l'honneur, etc.).
La protection du bien juridique intervient par le renforcement, au travers d'une concrétisation dans des énoncés de fait légaux, de standards culturels qui portent sur l'interdiction ou le commandement de certains comportements.  Par exemple, l'art. 111 [du Code pénal suisse] prévoit implicitement la norme 'tu ne tueras point' ou l'art. 128 'tu prêteras assistance à autrui'.  Ainsi, l'action qui viole cette norme constitue le fondement matériel de l'illicéité.  Cette conception est actuellement mise en question par une partie de la doctrine qui affirme que l'ordre juridique, en particulier le droit pénal, protège plutôt les expectatives à conserver leurs biens juridiques." (p. 27; notes omises)

HUSAK,  Douglas N., 1948-, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, x, 231 p., ISBN:  9780195328714; see excerpt, "External constraints on criminalization",  at http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/phrobins/conversations/papers/HusakOvercriminalization.PDF (accessed on 25 March 2008);  "Contents : The amount of criminal law -- Too much punishment, too many crimes -- How more crimes produce injustice -- The content of new offenses -- An example of overcriminalization -- Internal constraints on criminalization -- The "general part" of criminal law -- From punishment to criminalization -- A right not to be punished? -- Malum prohibitum -- External constraints on criminalization -- Infringing the right not to be punished -- The devil in the details -- Crimes of risk prevention -- Alternative theories of criminalization -- Law and economics -- Utilitarianism -- Legal moralism." (Hollis catalogue);

JAREBORG, Nils,  "Criminalization as Last Resort (
Ultima Ratio)", (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 521-533, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/Articles/Volume2_2/Symposium/Jareborg-PDF-3-17-05.pdf (accessed on 17 September 2007);

"Roxin argues that the criminal law is not the only appropriate means by which to pursue the proper end of protecting legitimate values and interests (

6 In German legal scholarship, ideas and doctrines about Rechtsgüter have played a central role in the discussion of the legitimacy and limits of criminal law. Personally, I see the doctrines concerning Rechtsgüter as a blind alley; something must be wrong when almost 200 years of intensive intellectual activity seem to have resulted in more confusion than clarity. The literature is enormous." (pp. 524-525).

KEY WORDS FOR RESEARCH / TERMINOLOGIE UTILE POUR LA RECHERCHE: biens juridiques, biens juridiques protégés, bien protégé par la loi, intérêt pénalement protégé; Rechtsgut, Rechtsgutstheorie, Schutzgut; law goods, legal goods, legal interest, harm principle, legitimate values and interests; legally accepted good; legally protected interest; bien jurídico protegido; bene giuridico;

KILLIAS, Martin, Précis de droit pénal général, Berne: Éditions Staempfli, 1998, xlv, 300 p. (Collection; Précis de droit Staempfli), ISBN: 3727209895;

"Avec la Révolution française, le droit pénal fut réduit aux infractions qui portaient atteinte aux intérêts d'autrui ou aux intérêts publics --une formule issue de la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen [de 1789, art. 5] qui laissait une belle marge d'appréciation au législateur, mais qui -- en tant que programme législatif -- a marqué la politique criminelle jusqu''a nos jours.

Au cours des discussions postérieures sur l'opportunité de décriminaliser certains comportements notamment sexuels, BIRNBAUM introduisit en 1834 le terme de Rechtsgut ('bien juridique').  D'après cette formule, le législateur serait appelé à n'incriminer que les comportements qui mettent en danger de tels biens; de plus, l'interprétation (surtout téléologique) d'une disposition pénale devrait chercher d'abord à identifier le bien juridique que cette norme est censée protéger.  Si ce terme d'avère parfois utile en matière d'interprétation, il n'offre guère de critère efficace au législateur, puisqu'on peut discuter sans fin sur l'existence d'un bien juridique digne de protection.

Certes, cette conception dite libérale permet de faire certaines délimitations.  Un tel exemple en sont les infractions sans victime, telles que les rapports homosexuels entre partenaires adultes consentants, la pornographie ou la prostitution.  Dans lesdits domaines, la plupart des pays occidentaux ont procédé à une large décriminalisation.  En même temps, les législateurs se sont montrés de plus en plus sensibles aux infractions mettant en cause la liberté d'action de personnes plus vulnérables.  Ainsi, le législateur suisse a renforcé, aux art. 191-193 CP notamment, mais aussi aux art. 123 ch. 2 al. 2 et 126 al. 2 CP, la protection de personnes moins à même de se défendre.  Ces exemples suisses s'insèrent dans une tendance commune à la politique criminelle des pays occidentaux, don’t le dénominateur commun est une sensibilité accrue aux souffrances individuelles, sensibilité qui se substitue progressivement aux valeurs morales communément partagées autrefois." (pp. 23-24; notes omises)

John, "Crime and the Concept of Harm," (1978) 15 American Philosophical Quarterly 27-36; (title noted in my research on 21 February 2011 but article not read yet);

, Raymond, "Swingers: Morality Legislation and the Limits of State Police Power", (1999) 12  St. Thomas Law Review 1- to aprox 38; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy in trhe Ottawa area libraries according to my verification of the AMICUS catalogue (19 September 2007);

LAUTERWEIN, Carl Constantin, 
The limits of criminal law : a comparative analysis of approaches to legal theorizing, Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT : Ashgate Pub., c2010, x, 146 p., ISBN: 9780754679462 and  9780754698852 (ebook); note: The limits of criminal law – an analysis of the Australian perspective in comparison to the German Rechtsgutstheorie, LL.M. thesis, University of Sydney, 2008;

This book compares the civil and common law approach to analyze the question 'What sorts of conduct may the state legitimately make criminal?'. Through a comparative focus on an Australian and German context, this book utilizes interviews with Australian criminal law experts and contrasts them with the German model based on 'Rechtsgutstheorie'. By comparing the largely descriptive, criminology-based Australian approach with the more sophisticated German legal theory model the author finds the Australian approach to be suffering from a 'normative flaw', illustrated by the distinction of different approaches to the offences of incest, bestiality and possession of illicit drugs. Carl Constantin Lauterwein discovers that while there is strength in the common law approach of describing the possible reasons for criminalizing certain conduct, the approach could be significantly improved by scrutinizing the legitimacy of those reasons. (source: http://books.google.com/books?id=bTtnPgAACAAJ&source=gbs_ViewAPI, accessed on 20 July 2010)

Contents : Law, limits and legitimacy : Germany and Australia -- The German Rechtsgutstheorie -- The approach to the problem : a problem itself -- The discussion in Australia -- Incest, bestiality, and drugs : legitimately criminalised? -- Conclusions.

LAW COMMISSION, THE, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts: A Consultation Paper, London, x, 244 p., 2010, and see "Criminal wrongdoing and harm" at pp. 70-78, available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp195_web.pdf (accessed on 24 November 2010);

LAW COMMISSION (of  New Zealand), Maximum Penalties for Criminal Offences, (series; Study paper  21); available at  http://sp21.publications.lawcom.govt.nz/ (accessed on 4 November 2013);

MELANDER, Sakari, "Principles of criminalisation and European criminal law", in NSfK’s Research Seminar 2003 ”Crime and Crime Control in an Integrating Europe” 27-30 August 2003, Helsinki, at 191-199; available at http://www.nsfk.org/downloads/seminarreports/researchsem_no45.pdf (accessed on 24 February 2008);

MILL, John Stuart, 1806-1873, On Liberty, London : J.W. Parker, 1859, 207 p.; available at  http://books.google.com/books?id=qCQCAAAAQAAJ&dq=intitle:on+intitle:liberty+inauthor:mill&as_brr=1 (accessed on 17 September 2007);

"The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion.  That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.  That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. . . .  The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others.  In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.  Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." (pp. 21-22)

MOOHR, Geraldine Szott, "The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory", available at http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/gmoohr/Criminal.pdf   (accessed on 3 August 2007);
"In addition to this inherent indeterminancy, the concept of harm is necessarily elastic. For one thing, community values necessarily inform specific conceptions of harm.  This means that what is regarded as harmful is not static; definitions of harm may change over time and conditions. This elasticity permits broad, speculative conceptions of harm, such as harm to
government authority or harm from bypassing the market. The malleability of the harm principle is at once a great strength and a great weakness. The concept of social harm allows the
government to protect important national interests. On the other hand, the absence of an objective measurement of detriment to public policy makes it difficult to evaluate when
criminalization is necessary or appropriate.

Another complicating factor in identifying and evaluating societal harm is that the principle is more useful in protecting established interests than it is in ascertaining when harm to some new interest merits criminal sanctions.  With no guidance beyond the general requirement of some societal harm, the power of the legislature to define harm and to justify criminalization is thus both unconstrained and biased toward protecting existing interests. This insight is illustrated by criminal copyright legislation, in which legislators were forced to choose
between the present interests of existing copyright holders and the nascent interests of the public in utilizing technology, accessing information, and creating new information products. In these circumstances, as George Fletcher predicted, harm may be anything the government says it is, and any act can be made a crime. A careful analysis of the harm at issue, which would include a consideration of the principle’s limiting axioms and the effect of criminalization on other interests, may avoid this outcome." (pp. 66-68; footnotes omitted)

NESTLER, Cornelius, "
Constitutional Principles, Criminal Law Principles, and German Drug Law", (1997-98) 1 Buffalo Criminal law Review 661-690;

NUOTIO, Kimmo, "Theories of Criminalization and the Limits of Criminal Law: A Legal Cultural Approach", in  R.A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, S.E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo and Victor Tadros, eds.,
The Boundaries of the Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, x, 267 p., at pp. 238-261, ISBN: 978-0-19-960055-7;

PERSAK, Nina, Criminalising Harmful Conduct: The Harm Principle, Its Limits and Continental Counterparts,
Springer, 2007, 176 p., ISBN-10: 0387464034; ISBN-13: 978-0387464039; see  table of Contentsimportant contribution to the subject;

PUIG, Santiago Mir, "Legal Goods Protected by the Law and Legal Goods Protected by the Criminal Law as Limits to the State's Power to Criminalize Conduct", (August 2008) 11(3) New Criminal Law Review 409–418; title noted in my research but document not consulted yet (3 September 2009);

RAZ, Joseph Raz, "Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle," in Ruth Gavison, ed., Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of H. L. A. Hart, Oxford (UK): Clarendon, 1987, at pp. 313-333; (title noted in my research on 21 February 2011 but article not read yet);

RENZO,  Massimo, "A Criticism of the International Harm Principle", (2010) 4 Criminal Law and Philosophy 267-282;

RIPSTEIN, Arthur, "Beyond the Harm Principle", (June 2006) 34(3) Philosophy and Public Affairs 215-243; also available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/berkeley_gala/fall2004/3/  and http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=berkeley_gala  (accessed on 17 September 2007);

ROMANIA, Penal Code, available at http://www.legislationline.org/legislations.php?jid=30&ltid=15 (accessed on 24 September 2007);

"The purpose of criminal law

          Art.1 – The criminal law defends, against criminal offences, Romania, the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and indivisibility of the state, the person, its rights and liberties, the property and the rule of law.

[ ...]

Essential features of offences

          Art.17 - (1) An offence is an act provided in the criminal law, manifesting a social peril and committed in guilt.

(2) Offences are the only grounds for criminal liability.

The social peril

         Art.18  - An act represeting a social peril according to the criminal law is any action or inaction through which one of the values provided in article 1 is damaged and for which the application of a penalty is necessary.

Acts that do not manifest a social peril

      Art.19 – (1) If the act provided in the criminal law damages insignificantly one of the values protected by the law and by its concrete content, is obviously lacking importance, therefore not manifesting a social peril, the above said act does not constitute an offence.

(2) For the determination of the concrete social peril, it shall be taken into account the manner and the means by which the act was committed, the purpose of the act, the circumstances in which the act was committed, the result which was caused or which could have been caused, as well as the person and the behaviour of the perpetrator.

(3) In case of perpetration of an act provided by this article, the prosecutor or the court applies one of the following administrative sanctions:

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, Criminal code of the Russian Federation, Transl. by William E. Butler. Introd. by William E. Butler and Maryann E. Gashi-Butler, 3rd ed., London: Simmonds & Hill; The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer International, 1999, xxvi, 224 p., ISBN: 1898029407 (Simmonds and Hill) and 9041195025 (Kluwer Law International);

"Article 14.  Concept of Crime

1. A socially dangerous act committed guiltily which is prohibited by the present Code under threat of punishment shall be deemed to be a crime.

2.  An action (or failure to act), although formally also containing the indicia of any act provided for by the present Code but by virtue of insignificance does not represent a social danger, shall not be a crime [as amended 25 June 1998]." (p. 6)

SCHÜNEMANN, Bernd, "The System of Criminal Wrongs: The Concept of Legal Goods and Victim-based Jurisprudence as a Bridge between the General and Special Parts of the Criminal
Code", (2003-2004) 7 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 551-582; available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclrarticles/7/2/schuenemann.pdf (accessed on 15 April 2008);

SERBIA and MONTENEGRO, Criminal Code, 2005, available at  http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/dc/a9/576c23dc41967e427086bf4c2b45.pdf (accessed on 5 July 2006);

"Basis and Scope of Criminal Law Compulsion
Article 3
Protection of a human being and other fundamental social values constitute the basis and scope for defining of criminal acts, imposing of criminal sanctions and their enforcement to a
degree necessary for suppression of these offences."

SIMESTER, A.P. and Andrew Von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011, xix, 237 p.ISBN: 9781841139401; copy at University of Ottawa, Fauteux, K5018.S56 2011;

____________"Remote Harms and non-constitute crimes" (May 2009) 28 Criminal Justice Ethics 89; available at  http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Remote+harms+and+non-constitutive+crimes.-a0203954809 (accessed 21 February 2011);

SMITH, Steven Douglas, "The Hollowness of the Harm Principle" (September 2004). University of San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-07, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=591327 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.591327(accessed on 15 September 2007);

___________"Is the Harm principle Illiberal?", (2006) 51 American Journal of Jurisprudence 1-42; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet (3 September 2009);#

STEEL, Alex, "The Harms and Wrongs of Stealing: The Harm Principle and Dishonesty in Theft", (2008) 31(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 712-737; 
UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2008-65. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1402453; see http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1402453 (accessed on 16 May 2009);

STEWART, Hamish, "The Limits of the Harm Principle", (2009) Criminal law and Philosophy;

SUISSE, Code pénal, art. 17, "État de nécessité licite" et art. 18 "État de nécessité excusable"; disponible à http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/c311_0.html (consulté le 22 septembre 2007);

"État de nécessité licite
Art. 17
Quiconque commet un acte punissable pour préserver d’un danger imminent et impossible à détourner autrement un bien juridique lui appartenant ou appartenant à un tiers agit de manière licite s’il sauvegarde ainsi des intérêts prépondérants.

"État de nécessité excusable
Art. 18
1 Si l’auteur commet un acte punissable pour se préserver ou préserver autrui d’un danger imminent et impossible à détourner autrement menaçant la vie, l’intégrité corporelle, la liberté, l’honneur, le patrimoine ou d’autres biens essentiels, le juge atténue la peine si le sacrifice du bien menacé pouvait être raisonnablement exigé de lui.

2 L’auteur n’agit pas de manière coupable si le sacrifice du bien menacé ne pouvait être raisonnablement exigé de lui."

___________Loi fédérale sur les entraves techniques au commerce (LETC), disponible à http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/9/946.51.fr.pdf  (consulté le 23 septembre 2007);

"But et objet
Art. 1
1 La présente loi établit des règles uniformes applicables dans les domaines où la Confédération est compétente pour légiférer, visant à empêcher la création d’entraves techniques au commerce, à les éliminer ou à les réduire. [...]

Elaboration des prescriptions techniques en général
Art. 4
1 Les prescriptions techniques sont formulées de manière à ne pas engendrer d’entraves techniques au commerce. [...]
3 Des dérogations au principe de l’al. 1 ne sont admissibles que dans la mesure:
a. où elles sont rendues nécessaires par des intérêts publics prépondérants [...]
4 Constituent des intérêts au sens de l’al. 3, let. a:
a. la protection de la morale, de l’ordre et de la sécurité publics;
b. la protection de la vie et de la santé de l’être humain, des animaux et des végétaux;
c. la protection du milieu naturel;
d. la protection de la sécurité au lieu de travail;
e. la protection des consommateurs et de la loyauté dans les transactions commerciales;
f. la protection du patrimoine culturel national;
g. la protection de la propriété."

TAJIKISTA, Republic of, Criminal Code, available at http://www.legislationline.org/legislations.php?jid=50&ltid=15 (accessed on 6 June 2006);

"Article 2. Objectives of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan

(1) The Criminal Code is aimed to defend rights and freedoms of a person and citizen, rights of juridical persons, property, environment, public order, constitutional system, peace and security of humankind from criminal invasions, to bring up citizens in the spirit of observance of the Constitution and laws of the republic and to prevent crimes.

(2) To implement these objectives the present Code consolidates grounds and principles of criminal responsibility , defines which socially dangerous actions are deemed to be crimes and determines sentences and other measures of criminal-legal influence for committing crimes."

TENNEN, Eric, "Is the Constitution in Harm's Way?  Substantive Due Process and Criminal Law", (2004) 8
The Boalt Journal of Criminal Law 3; available at http://www.boalt.org/bjcl/v8/v8tennenprint.htm (accessed on 25 June 2006); name of law review now changed to Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law;

VIETNAM, Code pénal
de la République socialiste du Vietnam, 1990 disponible à  http://www.maisondudroit.org/CodePenal_versionFr/Mdvf.htm (visionné le 9 avril 2004);

"Article 1.  Missions du Code pénal

Le Code pénal a pour mission de protéger le régime socialiste, le droit de maître du peuple, l’égalité entre les communautés ethniques du pays, les intérêts de l’Etat, les droits et intérêts légitimes des particuliers et des groupements, la législation socialiste, de réprimer tous actes délictueux et d’appeler les citoyens au respect de la loi, à la prévention et à la lutte contre la criminalité.

Afin de remplir ces missions, le Code pénal détermine les infractions et fixe les peines applicables à leurs auteurs."


Article 8. Définition

1.  Constitue une infraction tout acte dangereux pour la société, défini par le code pénal, commis de façon intentionnelle ou non intentionnelle par une personne ayant la capacité pénale, portant atteinte à l’indépendance, à la souveraineté, à l’unité nationale ou à l’intégrité territoriale, au régime politique, économique ou culturel du pays, à la défense ou à la sûreté nationale, à l’ordre public ou à la sécurité publique, aux droits et intérêts légitimes des groupements, à la vie, à la santé, à l’honneur, à la dignité, à la liberté, aux biens ou aux autres droits et intérêts légitimes des particuliers, ainsi qu’à tous autres domaines protégés par la législation socialiste.

2. Dans le présent code, les infractions sont classées, suivant la nature et la gravité du danger social des actes, en infractions peu graves, infractions graves, infractions très graves et infractions extrêmement graves

3.  Est qualifiée de peu grave toute infraction provoquant un danger social peu grand, pour laquelle le maximum de l’échelle de peines applicable est de trois ans d’emprisonnement. Est qualifiée de grave toute infraction provoquant un grand danger social, pour laquelle le maximum de l’échelle de peines applicable est de sept ans d’emprisonnement. Est qualifiée de très grave toute infraction provoquant un danger social très grand, pour laquelle le maximum de l’échelle de peines applicable est de quinze ans d’emprisonnement. Est qualifiée d'extrêmement grave toute infraction provoquant un danger social extrêmement grand, pour laquelle le maximum de l'échelle de peines applicable est supérieur à quinze ans d'emprisonnement, la réclusion à perpétuité ou la peine de mort.

4. Tout acte réunissant les éléments constitutifs de l’infraction et présentant toutefois un moindre danger social, n'est pas une infraction et encourt une sanction autre que la sanction pénale."

____________Penal Code, available at http://www.worldlii.org/vn/legis/pc66/index.html  (accessed on 24 September 2007);

"Article 1.- The tasks of the Penal Code

The Penal Code has the tasks of protecting the socialist regime, the people’s mastership, equality among people of various nationalities, the interests of the State, the legitimate rights and interests of citizens and organizations, protecting the socialist law order, opposing all acts of criminal offense; at the same time educating people in the sense of law observance and struggle to prevent and combat crime.

In order to carry out such tasks, the Penal Code defines crimes and the penalties for offenders.


Article 8.- Definition of crime

1. A crime is an act dangerous to the society prescribed in the Penal Code, committed intentionally or unintentionally by a person having the penal liability capacity, infringing upon the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Fatherland, infringing upon the political regime, the economic regime, culture, defense, security, social order and safety, the legitimate rights and interests of organizations, infringing upon the life, health, honor, dignity, freedom, property, as well as other legitimate rights and interests of citizens, and infringing upon other socialist legislation.

2. Based on the nature and extent of danger to the society of acts prescribed in this Code, crimes are classified into less serious crimes, serious crimes, very serious crimes and particularly serious crimes.

3. Less serious crimes are crimes which cause no great harm to society and the maximum penalty bracket for such crimes is three years of imprisonment; serious crimes are crimes which cause great harm to society and the maximum penalty bracket for such crimes is seven years of imprisonment; very serious crimes are crimes which cause very great harm to society and the maximum penalty bracket for such crimes is fifteen years of imprisonment; particularly serious crimes are crimes which cause exceptionally great harms to society and the maximum penalty bracket for such crimes shall be over fifteen years of imprisonment, life imprisonment or capital punishment.

4. Acts showing signs of crime but which pose minimal danger to society are not crimes and shall be handled by other measures."

WALLERSTEIN, Shlomit, "Criminalising Remote Harm and the Case of Anti-democratic Activity", (2007) 28 Cardozo Law Review 2697-2737; available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=952175; also available at http://cardozolawreview.com/PastIssues/28.6_wallerstein.pdf  (accessed on 15 January 2009);

WALTHER, Julien, 1970-, L'antijuridicité en droit pénal comparé franco-allemand (contribution à une théorie générale de l'illicéité), Thèse doctorat : Droit pénal : Université de Nancy II, Cotutelle avec l’Université de la Sarre/gemeinsame Betreuung mit der Universität des Saarlandes, 2003,  xvi, 513 p., voir "Les effets de l'antijuridicité matérielle: la référence aux biens juridiques protégés, aux pp. 367-430; Notes: directeurs de thèse:  Jean-François Seuvic et Heike Jung, 1942-; Président du jury: André Vitu; Prix de Thèse de Droit Privé de la Faculté de Droit 2003-; contribution importante au sujet;
"La notion de bien juridique ou 'Rechtsgut' est indissociablement associée à celle de l'injuste dans l'infraction.  Elle est le corollaire du bloc formé par la typicité et l'antijuridicité, c'est-à-dire l'injuste (Unrecht), du droit allemand .  L'atteinte au bien juridique portée par un comportement typique et antijuridique serait la concrétisation de cette contradiction à l'ordre juridique.

La notion de 'Rechtsgut' reste centrale en droit allemand pour ses effets et ses fonctions même si elle n'est pas à l'abri de critiques. M. ROXIN a remis au goût du jour la notion de 'Rechtsgut'  en la réinscrivant dans une perspective constitutionnelle, en l'alignant pour ainsi dire sur la notion de droits fondamentaux.  Il précise que la seule limitation posée au législateur réside dans les principes de la constitution.  Il donne du bien juridique la définition suivante: 'Les biens juridiques sont des objectifs ou faits (données) utiles au libre épanouissement de l'individu dans le cadre d'un système reposant sur cette finalité ou qui seraient utiles au propre fonctionnement de ce système.' " (p. 378)

WESTEN, Peter K., "Why Criminal Harms Matter: Plato's Abiding Insight in the Laws", (April 2007) 1(3) Criminal Law and Philosophy 307-326;
Commentators have contested the role of resulting harm in criminal law since the time of Plato. Unfortunately, they have neglected what may be not only the best discussion of the issue, but also the first - namely, Plato's one-paragraph discussion in the Laws. Plato's discussion succeeds in reconciling two, seemingly irreconcilable viewpoints that till now have been in stalemate. Thus, Plato reconciles the view, that an offender's desert is solely a function of his subjective willingness to act in disregard of the legitimate interests of others, with the view that criminal sentences can appropriately be made to depend upon how indignant, angry, and upset society is at an offender based upon the results of his culpable conduct. In doing so, Plato casts light on retributive theories of punishment by suggesting that an adjudicator can be committed to retribution and yet rightly believe that it is inappropriate to give an offender the full punishment he deserves. He also lays a basis for the view that causation, rather being predicates for the just punishment of offenders toward whom the public is intuitively angry for harm, is the consequence of the public's being intuitively angry at offenders for harm." (source: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008965)