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updated and corrections / mise à jour et corrections: 26 October 2005

by / par ©François Lareau, 2002-, Ottawa, Canada
First published officially on the internet on 26 October 2002

Selected Bibliography on Provocation
Bibliographie choisie sur la provocation

Part/Partie II: Provocation
Comparative Law-- Authors
Droit Comparé -- Auteurs
see also / voir aussi :

Part II: Provocation -- Comparative Law -- Authors: H-O
Part II: Provocation -- Comparative Law -- Authors P-Z

Part I : Provocation -- Canadian Law / Droit canadien

"...when a man is taken in adultery with another man's wife, if the husband shall stab the adulterer, or knock his brains, this is bare manslaughter: for jealousy is the rage of a man, and adultery is the highest invasion of property" (Regina v. Mawgridge, 84 E.R. 1107, at 1115)

ABDOL-HAMID, Djalili, La provocation en droit français et iranien, thèse, Université de Paris, 1963; titre de thèse noté dans ma recherche mais thèse non consultée; la thèse peut porter sur la provocation dans le sens de complicité ou d'incitation;

ABU-ODEH, Lama, "Comparatively Speaking: the 'Honor' of the 'East' and the 'Passion' of the 'West'. (1997) 2 Utah Law Review 287-307; copy at Ottawa University, KFU 69 .U82, Location: FTX Periodicals; important contribution from a comparative law approach;

___________"Crimes of Honour and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies" in edited by Mai Yamani with additional editorial assistance from Andrew Allen,  Feminism and Islam: Legal and Litterary Perspectives, Berkshire, UK : Published for Centre of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London [by] Ithaca Press, 1996, xii, 385 p. at pp. 141-194, ISBN: 0863722032; also published  in: New York : New York University Press, 1996, xii, 385 p., ISBN: 081479680X and 0814796818 (pbk.), copy at Carleton University, Ottawa, HQ1170.F46;

ALI, Shaukat, Provocation as a Defence to Murder, Thesis (M.A.), University of Leeds (Faculty of Law), 1997, [2], xii, 140 leaves;

ALLDRIDGE, Peter, "The Coherence of Defences", [1983] Criminal Law Review 665-672, see "Provocation" at pp. 669-672; discusses provocation as either a partial justification or partial excuse;

"It may be that two discrete provocation defences are required.  A partial justification is required to give vent to the feelings of the jury that V was 'served right' and it would be much as the defence was before 1957.  The requirement of an unlawful act should be restored, together with the other restrictions discussed above.  A partial excuse is required for the defendant who really does lose self-control, and in this case the requirement of 'reasonable man' or 'reasonable explanation' may be dispensed with." (notes omitted, p. 671)

___________Relocating Criminal Law, Ashgate (England): Dartmouth, 2000, xxvi, 247 p., see "Provocation and Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 94-97 (series; Dartmouth Applied Legal Philosophy), ISBN: 1855212684 (hb);

___________"Self-Induced Provocation in the Court of Appeal", (1991) 55 The Journal of Criminal Law 94-102;

ALLEN, Hilary, "One Law for All Reasonable Persons?", (1988) 16 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 419-432; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa; copy at the University of Ottawa, HV 6001 .I58, Location: MRT Periodicals;

ALLEN, Michael J., "Provocation's Reasonable Man: A Plea for Self-Control", (2000) 64 The Journal of Criminal Law 216-244; Table of Contents: "The history of provocation...216; The reasonable man after 1957...220; The case law...222; Camplin in the Commonwealth - New Zealand...225; Canada...226; Australia...228; Camplin in English courts: a developing confusion...231; Luc in the Court of Appeal...236; Conclusions...238";

"The defence of provocation has come a long way since its genesis in the 12th to 16th centuries.  The tests for provocation are constantly being refined but with each refinement comes added complexity." (pp. 238-239).

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments), Part II - Definitions of Specific Crimes Provisions §§ 210.0 to 213.6, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1980, xliv, 439 p., see § 210.3, "Manslaughter", at pp. 43-80;

"This provision [subsection (1)(b)] includes the common-law doctrine of provocation but is not so limited in its scope." (pp. 53-54)

___________Model Penal Code: Proposed Official Draft, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1962, xxii, 346 p., see Section 210.3 "Manalaughter" at  p. 126;

"Section 210.3 Manslaughter.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:

    (a) it is commiited recklessly; or

    (b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committted under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasoanble explanation or excuse.  The reasonablesness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.

(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree." (p. 126).

___________Model Penal Code: Tentative Draft No. 9, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1959, xvi, 220, [84] p.; see "Section 201.3. Manslaughter" at pp. 40-49; draft section 201.3 reads the same as the adopted section 210.3;
"We say that there must be a 'reasoanble explanation or excuse' for the extreme disturbance of the actor; and that the reasonabless of any explanation or excuse 'shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.'  There will be room, of course, for interpretation of the breadth of meaning carried by the word 'situation', precisely the room needed in our view.  There will be room for argument as to the reasonablesness of the explanations or excuses offered; we think again that argument is needed in these terms.  The question in the end will be whether the actor's loss of self-control can be understood in terms that arouse sympathy enough to call for mitigation in the sentence.  That seems to us the issue to be faced." (p. 48)

ANCEL,  Marc, "Le crime passionnel", (1957) 73 The Law Quarterly Review 36-47; title in French but article in English; "This article embodies the substance of the sixth biennial lecture which Monsieur Marc Ancel, Judge of the Supreme Court of France, delivered on October 19, 1956, at the University of Cambridge on the invitation of the Department of Criminal Science" (p. 36); important contribution in law and criminology;  Prof. Ancel, one of the great French jurist and comparative law expert;

    "...these judicial decisions seem to lend support to the conclusions I have drawn from recent trends in criminal science and from penal legislation.  During the last century there was a tendency to forbear from punishing crime passionnel; this attitude seemed to be reinforced by the positivist school of criminal law, which provided it with its first scientific analysis.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, criminal legislation seemed to be moving in the direction of according the délinquant passionnel special and mitigated treatment.  But one after another the scholar, the legislator, and ultimately public opinion itself, revolted against this too facile solution.  The scholar traced the crime passionnel back to its fundamental causes, which proved it to be no longer radically different from ordinary crime.  The legislator, in his turn, admits cautiously certain mitigations of the ordinary penalty, but within defined limits.  Finally, the criminel passionnel is on the way to losing his glamour in the public regard.

    Perhaps in the second half of he twentieth century there may emerge in the fields of both criminal science and criminal law a new conception of crime passionnel which will make it possible to repress it with greater effectiveness." (p. 47)

___________"Le crime passionnel: état actuel de la question", (1958) 47 L'Hygiène mentale 153-168;  copie du périodique à CISTI, Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical Information, Ottawa / ICIST, Institut canadien de l'information scientifique et technique, Ottawa,  SER  RA790 A1 H99;

ANGEL, Marina, "Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills 'Jury of Her Peers' who Appreciate Trifles", (1996) 33 American Criminal Law Review 229-348,  see "Substantive Criminal Law" at pp. 312-329;

AQUINAS, St. Thomas, 1225-1274, The Summa Theologica: First Complete American Edition in Three Volumes, Litterally Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Volume One Containing First Part, QQ. 1-119 and First Part of the Second Part, QQ 1-114, New York: Benziger, 1947-1948; copy at St-Paul University, Ottawa, BQ 6838 E5B45 1947-1948; for the French text, pour le texte français, voir Thomas D'Aquin (Saint), infra;

Whether Passion Excuses Sin Altogether?
    I answer that, An act  which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary.  Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does not excuse entirely.  In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary either in itself, as when the will tends towards it directly; or in its cause, when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. -- Secondly, we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary directly or indirectly; directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did not.

    Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness.  If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin.  Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 9): wherefore such a passion does not excuse from sin altogether." (pp. 939-940, Q. 77 Art. 7)

ARISTOTE, 384-322 av. J.-C., Éthique de Nicomaque, Traduction, préface et notes par Jean Voilquin, Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1965, 310, [3] p.;
"8.  Quand nous agissons en toute connaissance de cause, mais sans réflexion préalable, nous commettons une injustice, par exemple chaque fois que nous obéissons à la colère et aux autres passions qui ont dans l'homme un caractère nécessaire ou naturel; en infligeant à autrui des dommages de cette sorte, ou en commettant des fautes semblables, on pratique l'injustice et ces actes sont bien injustes; toutefois leurs auteurs ne sont pas pour autant injustes ni méchants, car le dommage n'a pas sa source dans la perversité de l'agent.  9.  Par contre, si le choix est délibéré, l'auteur de l'acte est injuste et pervers.  Aussi fait-on bien de ne pas juger prémédités les actes inspirés par la colère.  Car le responsable n'est pas alors celui qui agit par colère, mais celui qui a provoqué la colère.  Ajoutons que, dans ce cas, la discussion ne porte pas sur la question de fait, mais sur la question de droit, car ce sont les apparences de l'injuste qui provoquent la colère." (Livre V, [La justice], chapitre 8, p. 141, note omise)

ARISTOTLE, 384-322 B.C.,  The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics,  Translated by J.A.K. Thomson, Revised with notes and Appendices by Hugh Tredennick, Introduction and Bibliography by Jonathan Barnes,  Harmondsworth (England): Penguin Books, rev. ed. 1976 (1978 reprint), 383 p.;

"Grades of misconduct
When the agent acts knowingly but without premeditation it is an Injury; such are all acts due to temper or any other of the unavoidable and natural feelings to which human beings are liable.  For those who commit these injuries and mistakes are doing wrong, and their acts are injuries; but this does not of itself make them unjust or wicked men, because the harm that they did was not due to malice; it is when a man does a wrong on purpose that he is unjust and wicked.

Acts done under provocation; and a note on ignorance

Hence acts prompted by temper are rightly judged to be unpremeditated, because the aggressor is not the man who acts in a temper but the person who made him angry.  Further, the point at issue is not whether the act was done or not, but whether there was justification; because the ground of the anger is an apparent injustice." (Book V, Justice, viii, pp. 192-193)

___________Bywater, Ingram, 1840-1914, tr., Roberts, W. Rhys, (William Rhys), 1858-1929, tr., and, Solmsen, Friedrich, 1904- ed., Rhetoric / translated by W. Rhys Roberts. Poetics; translated by Ingram Bywater. Introd. by Friedrich Solmsen, New York, Modern Library [c1954], xxii, 289 p.; see on anger, the Rhetoric, Book II, chapter 2, translation of Rhys available at http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/Rhetoric/index.html;

"Anger may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one's friends. If this is a proper definition of anger, it must always be felt towards some particular individual, e.g. Cleon, and not "man" in general. [1378b] It must be felt because the other has done or intended to do something to him or one of his friends. It must always be attended by a certain pleasure -- that which arises from the expectation of revenge. For since nobody aims at what he thinks he cannot attain, the angry man is aiming at what he can attain, and the belief that you will attain your aim is pleasant."
(see  http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/Rhetoric/rhet2-2.html)

ARJAVA, Antti, Women and Law in Late Antiquity, Oxford [England] : Clarendon Press, 1996, xi, 304 p., see "Sexual Relations outside Mariage" at pp. 193-205, ISBN: 0198150334; copy at Bibliothèque University Saint Paul Library - Collection générale -General collection, KJC 1019 A75W65 1996; see  contents;

"But it seems that by the early sixth century governments in the west gave in, and Roman husbands regained their archaic right to retribution.  It was permitted in Italy under the Ostrogothic government, and the Roman Law of Burgundy stated the same thing explicitly in the title 'De adulteriis'.  It is found in the Breviarium ..." (p. 199)

ARMITAGE, A.L., "The Homicide Act 1957", [1957] Cambridge Law Journal 183-193, see "Provocation" at pp. 190-191;

ASHWORTH, Andrew J., "The Doctrine of Provocation", (1976) 35 The Cambridge Law Journal 292-320; contents: I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE DEFENCE...292; II. THE MODERN LAW OF PROVOCATION...297; (a) The Reasonable Man...298; (b) Proportionality...302; III. THE OBJECTIVE CONDITION...307; IV. THE SUBJECTIVE CONDITION...314; V. CONCLUSIONS...317;

___________"Self-Induced Provocation and the Homicide Act", [1973] The Criminal Law Review  483-492;

"Cases in which an accused seeks to rely on provocative conduct which was either self-induced or legally justifiable may well be infrequent, although probably not as infrequent as the law reports suggest.  At common law the courts could and did provide for such unusual cases, but section 3 [of the Homicide Act 1957] has rendered the judges impotent in this respect.  That section prevents them from withdrawing the defence of provocation from the jury, and on some views they may not lay down rules of law to the jury.  That leaves the unwelcome alternative of complete jury discretion, possibly aided by observations from the judge on certain considerations which may or may not commend themselves to the jury.  Is this really a satisfactory way for a legal system to distinguish between murder and manslaughter?" (p. 492)

___________"Sentencing in Provocation Cases", [1975] The Criminal Law Review 553-563; contents: Assessing the gravity of the offence...555; (i) Seriousness of Provocation...555; (ii) Suddenness of provocation...556; (iii) Suddenness of Retaliation...559; Mitigating factors...559; Determining the sentence...560; Conclusions...562;

ATTENBOROUGH, Frederick Levi, 1887-, ed. and translated by, The laws of the earliest English kings, Cambridge [Eng.]: at the University Press, 1922, xii, 256 p., see Alfred, cap. 42.§ 7; reprint in New York : AMS Press, 1974,   ISBN:  040456545X; notes: Anglo-Saxon and modern English versions, with Latin when the original Anglo-Saxon is lost; copy at at Carleton University, Ottawa, KD542.A88; see also Cherry, infra, Robertson, infra and Downer, infra, for old laws, infra;

Alfred the Great (king from 871.  Died in 900)
"CAP. 42.  Also we enjoin, that a man who knows his adversary to be residing at home, shall not have recourse to violence before demanding justice of him.
§ 7. A man may fight, without becoming liable to vendetta, if he finds another [man] with his wedded wife, within closed doors or under the same blanket; or [if he finds another man] with his legitimate daughter [or sister]; or with his mother, if she has been given in lawful wedlock to his father." (p. 85)

AUBRY, Gérard, La jurisprudence criminelle du Chatelet de Paris sous le règne de Louis XVI, Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1971, 273 p., voir "Excuse de Provocation" aux pp. 243-245;

     "L'étude des lettres de rémission semble lui [à Muyart de Vouglans] donner raison : Un ancien gendarme fut grâcié alors qu'il avait tué un particulier, celui-ci, l'ayant injurié au moment où il était ivre-mort (34).
    Si l'accusé avait répondu à des injures verbales par des violences physiques, voire par le meurtre du provocateur, il devait être reconnu coupable pour avoir agi dans un dessein de vengeance.  Toutefois selon l'opinion commune, le juge ne prononçait pas contre lui la peine ordinaire de l'infraction commise, mais une peine inférieure :

    'Lorsque la disproportion est encore plus considérable entre l'offense et la réplique, comme dans le cas où une personne que l'on aurait injuriée verbalement, viendrait à tuer l'agresseur sur le champ et dans le premier mouvement de colère, quelque atroce que soit cette vengeance, néanmoins elle devient en quelque sorte excusable par l'agression.  Ainsi quelques auteurs prétendent que dans ce cas l'homicide ne pouvait être puni de mort, mais d'une autre peine moindre mais qu'il fallait alors obtenir la grâce du Prince' (36).

    En fait, dans la plupart des cas on constate, non pas une diminution , mais une annulation de la peine: les lettres de rémission étant facilement accordées à ceux qui pouvaient alléguer l'excuse de provocation.


    En 1775, Auguste La Fleur, natif de Saint-Pierre de la Martinique, alors qu'il passait rue St-Antoine, fut appelé 'Mal blanchi' par le dénommé Carre :

    'A quoi le suppliant répondit qu'il était assez malheureux d'être comme il était, sans qu'on l'insultât encore.  De nouveau injurié le noir porte un coup de bâton sur la tête du dénommé Carre qui en mourut' (39)." (pp. 243-244)
"(34) Arch. nat. Y 10.391.
(36) Jousse, op. cit., Tome III, p. 516.
(39) Arch. nat. Y 10.356." (pp. 243-244)

AUSTIN, J.L. (John Langshaw), 1911-1960, "A Plea for Excuses", (1956-57) 57 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1-30;  also published in:  Herbert Morris, 1928-, ed., Freedom  and Responsibility: Readings in Philosophy and Law, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, [1961], ix, 547 p. at  pp. 6-19; in Alan R. White, ed., The Philosophy of Action, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, [4], 172 p. at pp. 19-42 (series; Oxford Readings in Philosophy); in Michael Louis Corrado, ed., Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law: A Collection of Essays, New York: Garland Pub., 1994, pp. 3-30, (series; Garland Reference Library of Social Science; vol. 831;  Garland Studies in Applied Ehics; vol. 1);  in Peter A. French, ed., The Spectrum of Responsibility, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, 327 p., at pp. 39-61, ISBN: 0312034962; in J.L. Austin - Philosophical Papers, edited by J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, vi, [ii], 306 p., essay 8 at pp. 175-204, ISBN: 0198246277 and 019283021X (pbk);  in Jules L. Coleman, ed., Crimes and Punishments, New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1994, xxiv, 560 p. at pp. 1-30 (series; Philosophy of Law), ISBN: 0815314000; and in V.C. Chappell, ed., Ordinary Language: Essays in Philosophical Method, Englewood Cliffs (New Jersey):  Prentice-Hall, 1964, viii, 115 p. at pp. 40-63;  translated in French / traduit en français : sous le titre "Plaidoyer pour les excuses" dans J.L. Austin, Écrits philosophiques, traduits de l'anglais par Lou Aubert et Anne-Lise Hacker, introduction de Lou Aubert, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994, [250] p., aux pp. 136-170, ISBN: 2020129566;

"It is arguable that we do not use the terms justification and excuse as carefully as we might; a miscellany of even less clear terms, such as 'extenuation', 'paliation', 'mitigation', hovers uneasily between partial justification and partial excuse; and when we plead, say, provocation, there is genuine uncertainty or ambiguity as to what we mean -- is he partly responsible, because he roused a violent impulse or passion in me, so that it wasn't truly or merely me acting 'of my own accord' (excuse)?  Or is it rather that, he having done me such injury, I was entitled to retaliate (justification)?  Such doubts merely make it more urgent to clear up the usage of these various terms.  But that the defenses I have for convenience labeled 'justification' and 'excuse' are in principle distinct can scarcely be doubted." (pp. 6-7, in H. Moris, ed., Freedom and Responsibility)

AUSTRALIA, see, in addition, under: Commonwealth, Australian Capital Terrirory (ACT), New South Wales, Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia

AUSTRALIA, Model Criminal Code Officers, Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorne-General, Model Criminal Code, Chapter 5: Fatal Offences against the Person,  [Canberra : The Committee], 1998,  ix, 234 p., see on provocation, pp. 69-107, ISBN: 0642209448; very important contribution; summary of arguments for and against the abolition of provocation; available at  http://www.ag.gov.au/publications/model%5Fcriminal%5Fcode/fatal.pdf

"The provocation defence suffers from a number of conceptual problems which stem from its lack of satisfactory doctrinal base.  Most notably, the long-standing debate about the fate of the objective test has failed to realise a satisfactory outcome.  Indeed, it has served to highlight that an entirely satisfactory result is not possible: a fully objective test operates harshly; a fully subjective test produces unacceptable results; a hybrid test incorporating both subjective and objective elements is internally incoherent and unacceptably complex." (p. 103)

____________[Australian] Law Reform Commission,  Aboriginal Customary Law and the Substantive Criminal Law,  1982, x, 123 p.(series; research paper; number 6); microfiche copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY, Crimes Act 1900, see section 13 at  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/act/consol_act/ca190082/s13.html;

 "13. Trial for murder-provocation
(1) Where, on a trial for murder:
(a)  it appears that the act or omission causing death occurred under provocation; and
(b)  but for this subsection and the provocation, the jury would have found the accused guilty of murder; the jury shall acquit the accused of murder and find him or her guilty of manslaughter.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an act or omission causing death shall be taken to have occurred under provocation where:
(a)  the act or omission was the result of the accused's loss of self-control induced by any conduct of the deceased (including grossly  insulting words or gestures) towards or affecting the accused; and
(b)  the conduct of the deceased was such as could have induced an ordinary person in the position of the accused to have so far lost self-control:

(i) as to have formed an intent to kill the deceased; or
(ii)   as to be recklessly indifferent to the probability of causing the deceased's death; whether that conduct of the deceased occurred immediately before the act or omission causing death or at any previous time.
(3) For the purpose of determining whether an act or omission causing death occurred under provocation, there is no rule of law that provocation is negatived if:
(a)  there was not a reasonable proportion between the act or omission causing death and the conduct of the deceased that induced the act or omission;
(b)  the act or omission causing death did not occur suddenly; or
(c)  the act or omission causing death occurred with any intent to take life or inflict grievous bodily harm.

(4) Where, on a trial for murder, there is evidence that the act or omission causing death occurred under provocation, the onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the act or omission did not occur under provocation lies on the prosecution.

(5) This section does not exclude or limit any defence to a charge of murder."

AUTRICHE, Code pénal autrichien, traduction de Yvonne Marx et de Pierre Chenut dans Les nouveaux codes pénaux de langue allemande: Autriche (1974), République démocratique allemande (1968) et République fédérale d'Allemagne (1975), Paris: La  Documentation française avec le concours du Centre français de droit comparé, 1981, 565 p., aux pp. 10-160 (pour le code), voir l'article 34 sur les circonstances atténuantes spéciales aux pp. 28-29 et l'article 76, "Coups et blessures ayant entraîné la mort" (Collection des codes pénaux européens du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international du Ministère de la Justice, sous la direction de Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx; tome 5);

"Titre Quatre - MESURE DE LA PEINE [...]

Circonstances atténuantes spéciales
ARTICLE 34(1) -- Il y a circonstance atténuante spéciale, notamment si le coupable [...]
8.  s'il s'est laissé aller à commettre l'acte sous le coup d'un violent mouvement d'humeur, compréhensible pour tous"


"PARTIE SPÉCIALE - Titre Premier -

Coups et blessures ayant entraîné la mort
ARTICLE 76 -- Quiconque se laisse entraîner, sous le coup d'une violente émotion, compréhensible selon l'opinion commune, à tuer une autre personne est puni d'une peine privative de liberté de cinq à dix ans."


[Texte allemand/German text]
"Vierter Abschnitt - Strafbemessung [...]

§ 34 Besondere Milderungsgründe
(1) Ein Milderungsgrund ist es insbesondere, wenn der Täter  [...]
8. sich in einer allgemein begreiflichen heftigen Gemütsbewegung zur Tat hat hinreißen lassen"

"Besonderer Teil
Erster Abschnitt
Strafbare Handlungen gegen Leib und Leben [...]

§ 76 Totschlag
Wer sich in einer allgemein begreiflichen heftigen Gemütsbewegung dazu hinreißen läßt, einen anderen zu töten, ist mit Freiheitsstrafe von fünf bis zu zehn Jahren zu bestrafen."

BAGNALL, Robert G., Patrick C. Gallagher and Joni L. Goldstein, "Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody and Anonymous Parties”, (1984) 19 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 499-559, see "The Homosexual Panic Defense" at pp. 498-515; comments on origin of the defence and case-law which is about mental disorder rather than provocation; was it an evolution of the defence?; copy at the University of Ottawa, law library, FTX periodicals, KF 4742 .H357;

BAKER, J.H., An Introduction to English Legal History, 3rd ed., London: Butterworths, 1990, xlix, 673 p., see "Homicide" at pp. 600-603, ISBN: 0406531013;

"In a case of 1600 a shopkeeper became so incensed by a customer who had 'flirted' him on the nose and made faces at him from the street that he came out of his shop and hit him so hard that he died.  He was indicted and convicted of manslaughter; but the widow brought an appeal and the judges held it to be murder, because there was insufficient cause to start a quarrel.46  After this, the doctrine of chance medley faded away and the test of manslaughter in such cases came to be, not the hot bloodedness, but the presence or absence of 'provocation'.47  This development was facilitated by a statute of 1604 which took away benefit of clergy for killing by stabbing, where the deceased had no weapon drawn, even where at common law the killing amounted only to manslaughter.48
46 Watts v. Brains (1600) Cro. Eliz. 778; Noy 171; BL MS. Add. 25203, fo. 216v.  Cf. R. v. Huggett (1666) Kel. 59.
47  R. v. Royley (1612) Cro. Jac. 296; 12 Co. Rep. 87; Godb. 182; R. v. Mawgridge (1707) Kel. 119.
48  Statute of Stabbing 1603, 1 Jac. I, c. 8.  See R. v. Lord Morley (1666) Kel. 54." (pp. 602-603)

BANDALLI, Suzanne Lorraine, "Provocation - A Cautionary Note", (1995) 22 Journal of Law & Society 398-409; Table of Contents: "Introduction...398; Provocation as a concept for husbands - origins and development...399; cultural judgments - focusing on the wife's matrimonial behaviour...401; the judge's perception...402; Notes and references...405";

__________"Provocation from the Home Office", [1992] The Criminal Law Review 716-720;

__________Women, spousal homicide and the doctrine of provocation in English criminal law, LL.M. Thesis, York University (Ontario, Canada), 1993, vii, 166 leaves;

BANDES, Susan A., 1951-, ed., The passions of law, New York : New York University Press, c1999, xv, 367 p. (series; Critical America),  ISBN: 081471305X; tile noted in my research but book not consulted yet; no copy of this book in the Ottawa area libraries (as of 7 July 2002); see contents;

BARRY, The Honourable Mr. Justice, "The Defence of Provocation", (1948-50) 4 Res Judicata 129-143; the article indicates that Mr. Barry is a judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia;

    "In his memorandum to the Attorney-General, dated 29th July, 1897, Sir Samuel Griffith, then Chief Justice of Queensland, wrote, 'With respect... to provocation as an excuse for an assault I have ventured to submit a rule' (now sections 268 and 269 of the Queensland Criminal Code) 'which is not to be found in the Draft Code of 1879, nor, so far as I know, in a concrete form in any English book.  At common law an assault is regarded as an offence committed not against the individual person assaulted, but against the peace of Our Lady the Queen, Her Crown and Dignity.  It is not, therefore, excused by anything short of the necessity for self-defence against actual violence, or some other positive conditions justifying the application of force.  Provocation may, however, operate as a practical, if not in all cases as a fornmal, answer to a civil action for assault.  There is no doubt that in actual life some such rule as that stated in (section 269) is assumed to exist, although it is probably not recognised by law.  The subject of provocation as reducing the guilt of homicide committed under its influence from murder to manslaughter is covered by authority, but I apprehend that it is of at least equal importance as applied to other cases of personal violence.'20

    These observations may not command universal assent; it may be felt by some that it would be unwise to admit provocation as a defence generally because to do so might result in recourse to violence in cases where the common law denial of such a defence has, presumably, a restraining effect. Sir Samuel Griffith's proposal has been the law in Queensland for half a century and for over thirty years in Western Australia, however, and it may be inferred that it has not had any marked undesirable consequences." (pp. 134-135)
20.  Criminal Code of Queensland, Introduction, p. xiv., By Authority, Brisbane, 1901.

BARTHOLOMEW, Allen A., "Psychopathy, Sex, Chromosome, Abnormalities, and the Criminal Law", (1971-72) 4 The Adelaide Law Review 273-293, see "Provocation" at pp. 290-291;

BENJAMIN,  Arlin James, Jr., The moderating influence of individual differences on the provocation-aggression relationship: A meta-analytic review of the literature, Ph.D. thesis, University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000,  119 p.; thesis advisor: B. Ann Bettencourt;

"The present meta-analysis examined the potential moderating role of individual differences in aggressive disposition on the relationship between provocation and aggression. Convergent evidence shows that although provocation is related to aggression, this relationship is attenuated by level of personality trait. Overall, provocation-difference effects are stronger for high trait individuals than for low trait individuals. However, this interaction effect appears to be primarily related to traits measuring susceptibility to provocation, but not to personality traits measuring a general proneness to behave aggressively. Traits related to aggression-proneness tap into individual variations in aggression-related knowledge structures, whereas traits related to susceptibility to provocation tap into individual variations in reactivity to threats to self-concept or self-regulation difficulties. Since highly aggression-prone individuals tend to have chronically accessible aggression-related cognitive structures, they tend to react aggressively even in situations where there is not a clear provocation, thus explaining the main effects often found in studies using such traits as predictors of aggression. Individuals who are susceptible to provocation, on the other hand, only respond aggressively to provocations that threaten their self-concepts. The findings support theoretical models that include individual differences as potential antecedents of aggressive behavior, and suggest the two distinct classes of individual trait differences will lead to different predictions regarding their potential to moderate the relationship between provocation and aggression." (DAI-B 61/12, p. 6757, Jun 2001, see Theses Search: UMI Disserion Services)

BENNUM, M.E., "Provocation -- The New Law", (1978) 41 The Modern Law Review 722-725;

BENTHAM, Jeremy, 1748-1832, "Essay on the Promulgation of Laws and The Reasons Thereof; with Specimen of a Penal Code", in The works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the superintendence of his executor, John Bowring, New York: Russell & Russell, 1962, volume 1; note: "Reproduced from the Bowring edition of 1838-1843"; copy at St-Paul University, Ottawa, B1574 B3B68; research note: Bentham deals with provocation as an extenuating circumstance in his "Specimen of a Penal Code";

___________Theory of legislation / by Jeremy Bantham; translated from the French of Etienne Dumont by R. Hildreth, London : Trübner, 1876, 472 p., see Chapter XI, "Effect of the Delinquent's Character upon Alarm", pp. 258-264; note: translation of Traité de législation civile et pénale; copy at the University of Ottawa, law library, FTX General, K 334 .B4513 1876;

Effect of the Delinquent's Character upon Alarm.
The character of the delinquent will be presumed from the nature of the offence, especially from the magnitude of the evil of the first order, which is the most apparent part of it.  Other presumptions will be furnished by circumstances and details attending the perpetration of the offence.

    The character of a man will appear more or less dangerous, according as the tutelary motives appear to have more or less empire over him, as compared with the seductive motives.

    There are two reasons why character ought to exert an influence upon the choice and the quantity of the punishment; first, because it augments or diminishes the alarm; secondly, because it furnishes an index of sensibility.  There is no need of employing such strong means to restrain a character, weak, but good at bottom, as would be necessary in case of an opposite temperament.

    The grounds of aggravation which may be derived from this source are as follows....

    Let us now pass to the extenuations, which may be derived from the same source of character, and which should have an effect to diminish punishment.  I give this name to circumstances which furnish a favourable indication with respect to the character of the delinquent, and which tend in consequence to lessen the alarm.  They may be reduced to nine: --

1st.  Absence of bad intention.
2nd. Self-preservation.
3rd. Provocation.
4th. Preservation of some near friend.
5th. Transgression of the limit of self-defence.
6th  Submission to menaces.
7th  Submission to authority.
8th  Drunkenness.
9th. Childhood.

    It is a point common to these circumstances, except the two last, that the offence does not originate in the will of the delinquent.  The primary cause is the act of another, the will of another, or some physical accident.  Aside from that event, the offender would not have dreamed of the offence; he would have remained entirely innocent; and, even though he should not be punished, his future conduct would still be as good as if he had not committed the offence.

    Each of the circumstances above enumerated demands details and explanations; but I shall confine myself here to the observation that the judge must be allowed a great latitude in appreciating the validity and extent of these different grounds of extenuation.

    Does the question relate to a provocation?  A provocation, to deserve indulgence, must be recent; it must have been received in the course of the same quarrel.  But what constitutes the same quarrel?  What ought to be looked upon as a recent injury?  It is necessary to trace lines of demarcation.  Let not the sun go down upon your wrath, is the precept of Scripture.  Sleep ought to calm the transport of the passsions, the fever of the senses, and prepare the mind for the influence of the tutelary motives.  In the case of homicide, this natural period might serve to distinguish what is premedidated and what is the effect of sudden passion. " (pp. 258 and 261-262)

BENTLEY, Jo, Case and Comment, "Murder -- Common  Law -- Gravity of provocation and objective test -- 'Ordinary man' -- Relevance of mental illness", (1996) 10 Criminal Law Journal 188-190;

BÉRAUD, Roger, «La provocation et les infractions non-intentionnelles» dans L'évolution du droit criminel contemporain: Recueil d'études à la mémoire de Jean Lebret, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968, 218 p. aux pp. 27-41;

    "Les textes qui prévoient une excuse légale de provocation étant d'une portée limitée et donc d'interprétation limitative, la question se pose de savoir si la circonstance atténuante judiciaire de provocation bénéficie aux coupables d'infractions involontaires.

    C'est une question que les criminalistes italiens ont examinée depuis longtemps.  L'illustre Manzini avait imaginé (2) l'hypothèse du garde-barrière, persécuté par les injures, quelquefois par les jets de pierres de jeunes voyous et qui, exaspéré, se lance un jour à leur poursuite, laissant ouverte la barrière du passage à niveau... et un train vient écraser une voiture sur la voie." (p. 29)
(2) MANZINI, Trattato, II, 206.

BERGELSON, Vera, "Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative Liability in Criminal Law", (2005) 8(2) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 385-487; this article and the others relating to it will eventualy be available in a few months at  http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclr.htm#issues (6 July 2005);  the related articles published in (2005) 8(2) Buffalo Criminal Law Review in connection with Bergelson's main article are:

- HAREL, Alon, "Victims and Perpetrators: The Case against a Unified Theory of Comparative Liability in Criminal Law", at pp. 489-502;
- HURD, Heidi M., "Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal That Criminal Law Recognize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility", at pp. 503-522;
- HUSAK, Douglas, "Comparative Fault in Criminal Law: Conceptual and Normative  Perplexities", at pp. 523-540;
- SIMONS, Kenneth W., "The Relevance of Victim Conduct in Tort and Criminal Law", at pp. 541-565;
- BERGELSON, Vera, "Conditional Rights and Comparative Wrongs: More on the Theory and Application of Comparative Criminal Liability", at pp. 567-597;

BERMAN, Harold Joseph, 1918-, Law and revolution, II : the impact of the Protestant reformations on the Western legal tradition, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2004, xii, 522 p.,  Chapter 10, "The Transformation of English Criminal Law", at pp. 306-329, with notes at pp. 487-497, ISBN: 0674011953;

    "With the submergence of the Romanist courts, the dramatic increase in the number of common law crimes, both felonies and misdemeanors, and the adoption of the felony-murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter rules, the Court of King's Bench was confronted with the need to find new ways of distinguishing between different kinds of homicide.  It held in a series of cases that defendants charged with murder should be convicted of manslaughter, and punished for the first offense by only a year's imprisonment and/or a fine, if it appeared that they were 'provoked' to kill the victim under circumstances that diminished their guilt.  The new doctrine of provocation was not elaborated systematically but was gradually amplified case by case.  Ultimately it was summarized by William Hawkins who concluded that one who commits homicide in 'heated blood,' that is, in a state of extreme anger or agitation, is guilty not of murder but of manslaughter.71" (pp. 325-326)

"71. William Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 1716-1721, vol. 1 (London, 1716), pp. 80-82.  See also Graeme Coss, 'God is a Righteous Judge Strong and Patint: and God is provoked Every Day': A Brief History of the Doctrine of Provocation in England," Sydney Law Review 13 (1991), 570-577." (p. 495)

BESSE, Susan K., "Crimes of passion: the campaign against wife killing in Brazil, 1910-1940", (1988-89) 22 Journal of Social History 653-666; copy at the University of Ottawa, HN 1 .J6  Location: MRT Periodicals;

BIBLE, La Sainte Bible traduite en français sous la direction de l'École biblique de Jérusalem, Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1961, xv, 1669 p.;

"Adultère et fornication
  22Si l'on prend sur le fait un homme couchant avec une femme mariée, tous deux mouront; l'homme qui a couché avec la femme et la femme elle-même.  Tu feras disparaître d'Israël le mal." (L'Ancien Testament,Le Deutéronome, Autour du mariage, 22: 22, à la p. 198)

BIGGERMAN, Mark W., Case notes, "State v. Shane: Confessions of Infidelity as Reasonable Provocation for Voluntary Manslaughter", (1993) 19 Ohio Northern University Law Review 977-986; copy at Ottawa University, KFO 69 .O34, Location: FTX Periodicals;

BLAIS, Gerard, Petit traité pratique des passions humaines, Sherbrooke (Province de Québec): Apostolat de la Presse, 1952, 254 p., copie à l'Université d'Ottawa,  MRT General, BF 562 .B43 1952;

"Causes de la colère
a) L'injustice
  La première cause de colère est tout ce qui est fait ou dit ou omis, perçu comme une injustice.  La colère porte sur la vindicte, qui ne saurait se concevoir sans injustice préalable, que ce soit une injustice réelle ou simplement estimée.  Elle cherche, en effet, à causer du détriment au prochain, dans la mesure où ce détriment prend figure de peine méritée, ajustée à un délit.  Elle ne cherche la vengeance que dans la proportion où elle est juste, selon le jugement de celui qui entre en colère.  Pour que la vengeance soit ainsi juste, elle suppose une injustice au moins estimée.  Voilà pourquoi ce qui provoque la colère est toujours quelque chose qui prend l'aspect d'une injustice: qui viole le droit des autres perd le sien du même ordre. [...] " (p. 236)

BONGERT, Yvonne, Cours d'histoire du droit pénal, Paris, Les Cours de droit, 1973, 2 volumes (1. Le Droit pénal français médiéval de la seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle à l'ordonnance de 1493, 389 p.; 2. Le Droit pénal français de la fin du XVe siècle à l'ordonnance criminelle de 1670, 378 p.); voir vol. 1, "l'excuse de provocation" aux pp. 378-381;

"Le droit médiéval ne paraît avoir admis que la provocation résultant de l'adultère de la femme à l'exclusion de la provocation par injures connue, à côté de la précédente, par le droit postérieur(1)"
"(1) Voir A. Laingui, op. cit. [voir Laingui, infra, cette bibliographie], pp. 296-302." (p. 378)

BOYANOWSKY, Ehor, "Violence and Aggression in the Heat of Passion and in Cold Blood", (1999) 22(3-4) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 257-271;

BRADFIELD, Rebecca, Criminal Cases in the High Court of Australia: Provocation, "Ordinary person test -- Homosexual advance defence -- Crimes Act (NSW) s 23: GREEN v The QUEEN, High Court of Australia: Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ, 7 November 1997, (1998) 72 ALJR 19", (1998) 22 Criminal Law Journal 296-303;

__________"Domestic Homicide and the Defence of  Provocation: A Perspective on the Jealous Husband and the Battered Wife", (2000) 19(1) University of Tasmania Law Review 5-37;

___________"Provocation and Non-violent Homosexual Advances: Lessons from Australia", (2001) 65(1) The Journal of Criminal Law 76-84;

BRAZIER, Rodney, "The Reasonable Relationship 'Rule' ", (1973) 36 The Modern Law Review 217-220;

BRETT, Peter, "The Psysiology of Provocation", [1970] The Criminal Law Review 634-640;

    "It would be perverse for the law to ignore these teachings of science, and absurd for it to doubt their validity.  But if we pay attention to them, it at once becomes clear that the reasonable man of provocation law is a figment of the imagination.

    Plainly we cannot sensibly talk of the ordinary man in any meaningful way.  There is a whole range of types of men, and it would be pointless and cruel to penalise a particular man merely because his type occurs nearer to one or other end of the range than to the centre of it.  The all-or-none quality of the reaction makes it alike pointless to draw distinctions of nicety between different types of provocative act.  So, too, it demonstrates the folly of demanding a reasonable proportion between the provocative act and the reaction." (pp. 637-638)

BRISSET, Jacqueline, Variétés, "Le stoïcisme et la vengeance", (1980) 58 Revue historique de droit français et étranger 57-68; ne traite pas directement de la provocation;

BROADBENT, Graeme, "Provocation -- Does Patria Add Anything Useful?", (June 2004) 68(3) The Journal of Criminal Law 244-252; about Patria v The State, [2003] UKPC 36, (2003) 62 WIR 471; Privy Council Appeal number 42#2002, on appeal from Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal;

BRONITT, Simon, and Kumaralingam Amirthalingam,"Cultural blindness: Criminal law in multicultural Australia", (April 1996) Alternative Law Journal 56; available at  http://law.anu.edu.au/criminet/tart2.html#prov (accessed 20 May 2002);

BROOKBANKS, W.J. (Warren), "Provocation -- Defining the Limits of Characteristics", (1986) 10 Criminal Law Journal 411-418; contents: Introduction...411; Leilua's Case...412; History of Provocation...413; Current Approaches to 'Characteristics'...415; Provocation and Diminished Responsibility...417;

___________"Status in New Zealand of defences of provocation, diminished Responsibility and excessive self-defence with regard to domestic violence", being Appendix D in The Law Commission, Overseas Studies, which is part of the Appendices to the consultation paper, Partial Defences to Murder, 31 October 2003, xiii, 249 p. (series; consultation paper; number 173); this study by Brookbanks, at pp. 125-150, is available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173apps.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005); see also Appendix G, "Relevant Statutory Provisions and Proposed Provisions";

BROWN, Bernard J., "The Demise of Chance Medley and the Recognition of Provocation as a Defence to Murder in English Law", (1963) 7 American Journal of Legal History 310-318; Table of Contents: "The Emergence of provocation as a Palliative Defence...312; The Demise of Chance Medley...313; The 'Resurrection of Chance Medley'...315";

"THE COMMON LAW DEFENCE OF PROVOCATION owed its origin to the growth by the late sixteenth century of a consciousness that different modes of inflicting death reflected different shades of moral culpability, and that for each of these forms of killing there was prescribed an appropriate punishment.1  Chance medley,2 which was one of these, may be regarded as the direct progenitor of provocation.  The subsequent uncharity of the child in swallowing up the parent is best understood in historical terms." (p. 310)
"1For a more detailed discussion of this question see Brown, 'The Emergence of the Psychical Test of Guilt in Homicide, 1200-1550.' Tasmanian Univ. L.R., Vol. 1, No. 2, at p. 231 et seq.  For later developments in the field of justifiable homicide see R. v. Semini [1949], 1 K.B. 405, at p. 407.

2See the definition provided by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Semini [1949] 1 K.B. 405, at pp. 407, 8; [1949] 1 All E.R. 233, at 234; 33 Cr. App. R. 51, at p. 56, C.C.A." (p.31)

___________"Murderous Intent and the Lesser Offences: Janus in the Maze", [1965] New Zealand Law Journal 537-538 and 540-544;

___________"'The Ordinary Man' in Provocation : Anglo-Saxon Attitudes and the Unreasonable Non-Englishman", (1963) 13 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 203-235; Table of Contents: "I. Reception by the Common Law...208; II. When is a 'Reasonable Man' not Provoked?...207; Consistency and the second mask...210; III. Some 'Unreasonable Non-Englishmen',,,212; IV. A New Zealand Compromise...220; V. The Problem of the 'Provoked' Immigrant...228; VI. Immigrant and 'Backward' Communities: An Attempted Rationalisation of Different Treatments'...226; VII The Objective Test: Concluding Remarks...227; Treatment of the immigrant...228; Criticisms of the test itself...228; Verbal exasperation and the objective test...231; A final criticism...234";

"The purpose of this paper is to examine the efficacy of various standards of an objective nature employed by the legislatures and the courts of England and certain other Commonwealth countries1 to determine the liability of the person charged with murder who alleges that he killed whilst deprived of his self-control by the provocative conduct of his victim.  Several of the systems which will be reviewed demand not only that the accused should run the gauntlet of objectivism before the court decides whether the provocation was sufficient to deprive 'a reasonable man' or 'an ordinary person' of his self-control, but they go on to require the fulfilment of similar tests with regard to the mode by which death was inflicted, and the period of time which might have elapsed between the accused's receipt of the provocation and his retaliatory act.  Considerations of space render it impossible to subject all three aspects of this question to the deatailed investigation which each appears to warrant.  I therefore propose to concentrate on the first aspect, that the 'ordinary man' in relation to the power of self-control, and to refer to the remaining tests only so far as they may be relevant to that issue.2
1 Reference is alo made to judicial attitudes in South Africa, Burma and the Sudan.
2 For a fuller treatment of these 'tests' see Turner, Russell on Crime 11th ed., pp. 610-618.  The extension of the objective criterion to 'lapse of time,' like that to the mode of resentment, was effected on the ground that it would be anomalous for the law to refuse to indulge the acused's idiosyncrasies in relation to the nature of the provocation, yet recognise them as affecting the length of time it takes him to reassert his self-control after receiving the provocation: see Mancini v. D.PP. [1942] A.C. 1 at p. 9 (per Viscount Simon L.C.) "(p. 203)

___________"Provocation: Characteristics, Diminished Responsibility and Reform" in B. Brown, ed., Movements and Markers in Criminal Policy, [Auckland, N.Z.] : Legal Research Foundation, 1984, 82 p. (series; Publication; Legal Research Foundation; University of Auckland;  no. 23); title noted in my research but book not consulted yet; no copy of this publication of this publication in the Ottawa area libraries;

___________"Provocation Re-constructed: The McCarthyization of McGregor",  [1993 Part III] New Zealand Recent Law Review 329-334; copy at Ottawa University, KTC 0 .N4847  Location: FTX Periodicals;

___________"The Subjective Element in Provocation", (1959) 1 University of Malaya Law Review 288-317; copy at Ottawa University, KQB 0 .M342, Location: FTX Periodicals;

BROWN, H., "Provocation as a Defence to Murder: To Abolish or Reform", (1999) 12 The Australian Feminist Law Journal 137-141; title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries;

BUDDELL, Ruth,  Crimes of Passion: Should they be distinguished from the offence of murder in England and Wales?, Master's degree in Criminal Justice Studies, complete thesis on line;

BURCHELL, E.M., Recent Cases, "Provocation and Intoxication", (1959) 76 South African Law Journal 385-387;

___________Recent Cases, "Provocation : Subjective or Objective", (1958) 75 South African Law Journal 246-248;

BURCHELL, Jonathan, "Provocation, Diminished Responsibility and the Use of Excessive Force in Self-Defence in South African Law", being Appendix F in The Law Commission, Overseas Studies, which is part of the Appendices to the consultation paper, Partial Defences to Murder, 31 October 2003, xiii, 249 p. (series; consultation paper; number 173); this study by Professor Burchell, at pp. 184-212, is available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173apps.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005); see also Appendix G, "Relevant Statutory Provisions and Proposed Provisions";

___________"A provocative response to subjectivity in the criminal law", (2003) Acta Juridica 23-47; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;

BURTON, Mandy, "Intimate Homicide and the Provocation Defence - Endangering Women? R. v. Smith", (2001) 9 Feminist Legal Studies 247-258; copy at the University of Ottawa, law library, FTX Periodicals, K644 .A13 F436;

"ABSTRACT.  This case note considers the availability in the United Kingdom of the provocation defence in cases of intimate homicide in the context of the recent House of Lords decision in R. v. Smith [2000] 3 W.L.R. 654.  The note argues that the expansion of the objective component of the defence to encompass the mental infirmities of individual defendants is dangerous for women.  Altghough it has the potential to help some abused women who kill to use the defence, it has, at the same time, exposed women who are abused by sexually possessive, violent men to even greater danger.  It is thus argued that the defence should be restricted in the way envisaged by the minority judgement of Lord Millett so that abused women will still be able to use the defence, but by a non-medical route.  Alternatively, the defence should be abolished and defences which pose no risk of encompassing violent men should be developped to accomodate abused women." (p. 247)
___________"Sentencing Domestic Homicide Upon Provocation: Still `Getting Away with Murder'", (2003) 11(3) Feminist Legal Studies 279-289;

BYRD, B. Sharon, "On Getting the Reasonable person Out of the Courtroom", (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 571-577; available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/issue2_articles/Byrd-PDF-3-17-05.pdf (accessed on 30 April 2005);

CADU, Lydia, La provocation comme cause d'impunité pénale, Mémoire de DEA : Droit pénal et sciences pénales / Paris II ; session de 2000, 82 feuilles; titre noté dans ma recherche; thèse pas encore consultée;

CALISSE, Carlo, 1859-1945, A History of Italian Law, by Carlo Calisse ... Translated by Layton B. Register ... with introductions by Frederick Parker Walton ... and Hessel E. Yntema ..., Boston:  Little, Brown, and company, 1928, lix, 827 p. (series; The Continental legal history series; volume 8); reprint in : South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1969; see "Book II - Criminal Law" at pp. 217-491 ("Part I - Germanic Domination" at pp. 217-348; "Part II - Neo-Roman Period" at pp. 349-448; and "Part III - The Philosophic Period" at pp. 449-491);  see "Anger" at pp. 362-363;

CAMPBELL, Kenneth, "Objective Standards in Provocation and Duress", (1996-97) 7 King's College Law Journal 75-89;

CANTARELLA, E., "Homicides of Honor: The Development of Italian Adultery Law over Two millennia" in David I. Kertzer, 1948-, and Richard P. Saller, eds., The Family in Italy from Antiquity to the Present, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, xiii, 399 p. at pp. 229-244, ISBN: 0300050372; covers Roman, Italian and canonical law; copy at Ottawa University, MRT General, HQ 629 .F36 1991;  copy at Carleton University, Ottawa, HQ 629 .F36;

CASEY, Juliette, Legal defences for battered women who kill : the battered woman syndrome, expert testimony and law reform, Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1999; title noted in my research but thesis not consulted yet;

CATO, Charles,  "Violent Offending and the Crimes Bill 1989: A Criticism",  [1989] New Zealand Law Journal 246-252, see "Abolition of the provocation defence" at pp. 248-249;

CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN LAW (CIMEL) and the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights                             (INTERIGHTS), "Bibliography on Crimes of Honour" available at  http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/bibliog/honour.html#americas (accessed on 10 July 2002);

CHALMERS, James, "Collapsing the Structure of Criminal Law: Drury v HM Advocate", (2001) Scots Law Times (News) 241-245; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;

___________"Merging Provocation and Diminished Responsibility: Some Reasons for Scepticism", [2004] Criminal Law Review 198-212;

"Summary: In an earlier article in the Review, Professors Mackay and Mitchell  argued that the pleas of provocation and diminished responsibilitu should be merged into one single partial defence, 'building upon' the plea of 'extreme mental or emotional disturbance' found in the Model Penal Code.  This article argues that it is wrong to interpret the Model Code's partial defence as a 'merged' plea, and that there are various reasons to reject any proposal to merge the two pleas in English law." (p. 198) [Note: the article is R.D. Mackay and B.J. Mitchell, "Provoking Diminished Responsibility: Two Pleas Merging into One", (2003) The Criminal law Review 745]

CHALMERS, James, Christopher Gane, Fiona Leverick, "Partial Defences to Homicide in the Law of Scotland", being Appendix E in The Law Commission, Overseas Studies, which is part of the Appendices to the consultation paper, Partial Defences to Murder, 31 October 2003, xiii, 249 p. (series; consultation paper; number 173); this study of Scottish jurists, at pp. 151-183, is available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173apps.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005); see also Appendix G, "Relevant Statutory Provisions and Proposed Provisions";

CHAN, Wendy, 1966-, "A Feminist Critique of Self-Defense and Provocation in Battered Women's Cases in England and Wales", (1994) 6(1) Women and Criminal Justice 39-65; copy at the University of Ottawa, HV 7231 .W65  Location: MRT Periodicals;

___________Women, murder, and justice, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, [England] ; New York : Palgrave, 2001, x, 244 p., ISBN: 0333760786; see  Table of Contents; title noted in my research but book not consulted yet; no copy of this book in the Ottawa area libaries;

CHAROLLOIS, Charles, La provocation en droit pénal, Mémoire D.E.A.: droit pénal et sci. crim., Bordeaux 4, 1999, 60 feuilles; titre de thèse noté dans ma recherche mais thèse non consultée; la thèse peut porter sur la provocation dans le sens de complicité ou d'incitation;

CHAUVEAU, Adolphe, et Faustin Hélie, 1799-1884, Théorie du code pénal, 3e édition, Paris: Imprimerie et Librairie générale de jurisprudence, 1852, voir le tome quatre, voir le Chapitre XLVII, "De l'excuse de la provocation" aux pp. 101-145 et le chapitre XLVIII, "De l'Homicide légal et de l'homicide légitime" aux pp. 146-177; copie disponible de ce tome à la bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, section des livres non catalogués (cependant la bibliothèque n'a pas la collection complète); la bibliothèque de  l'Université de Montréal possède une collection complète des six volumes de la 2e éd., Paris: E. Legrand, 1843,  HAFD C511t 1843; le tome premier: Paris : Cosse, Marchal et Billard, 1872, 611 p. est disponible à  http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?E=0&O=N076982;

[p. 102]
    "L'homicide et les coups et blessures, lorsqu'ils ont été précédés d'une provocation, sont excusables dans les quatre cas suivants:

    1o  Lorsqu'ils ont été provoqués par des coups ou violences graves envers les personnes;
    2o  Lorsqu'ils ont été provoqués par un violent outrage à la pudeur;
    3o  Lorsqu'ils ont été commis en repoussant, pendant le jour, l'exacalade ou l'effraction des murs, des clôtures ou de l'entrée d'une maison;
    4o  Enfin, lorsqu'ils ont été commis par l'époux sur son épouse surprise en flagrant délit d'adultère.

 Ces différentes hypothèseas vont faire l'objet de quatre sections distinctes.

  § 1erDe la provocation par coups ou violences.

   La principale difficulté de cette matière est de déterminer les faits auxquels la loi a voul attribuer le caract d'une provocation; elle les énonce sans les caractériser, elle admet l'excuse sans la définir.

    La provocation, même lorsqu'elle se manifeste par des voies de fait et des violences, n'est, en général, qu'une injure, une

[p. 103]
insulte, un outrage; les violences qui l'accompagnent n'en changent point le caractère, elles ne font que l'aggraver.  Si elle cessait d'avoir ce caractère, elle dégénérerait nécessairement en une véritable attaque, elle menacerait ou la vie, ou du moins la sûreté personnelle de celui qui en est l'objet, et ne serait plus alors une simple provocation; il y aurait nécessité pour la personne attaquée de se défendre; l'homicide ne serait pas seulement excusable, il serait justifié.

    C'est, en effet, de la nature de l'attaque que doit dériver la nature du droit de la défense : si la personne qui en est l'objet a de justes motifs de craindre pour sa sûreté personnelle, la loi n'a pu la priver du droit naturel de repousser la force par la force.  Mais si l'attaque ne se propose qu'un outrage, si elle ne menace ni sa sûreté, ni sa vie, son droit se modifie, et les voies de fait auxquelles elle se livre elle-même trouvent encore dans cet outrage une excuse, mais non plus une cause de justification; en effet, si la personne outragée n'écoutait que la voix de la raison, elle ne se ferait point justice elle-même, elle aurait recours à la protection des lois.  Dans une société régulière il n'est permis à la personne de repousser un outrage par un outrage, une voie de fait par une voie de fait : l'individu ne doit pas se venger, il ne lui est permis que de se défendre,  C'est à la justice à réparer les injures qui ont pu l'atteindre; c'est au pouvoir social à substituer la puissance du juge aux querelles privées, le glaive de la loi aux vengeances des citoyens.

    Celui qui venge lui-même l'injure qu'il a reçue est donc coupable aux yeux de la loi comme aux yeux de la morale; car il usurpe la puissance sociale, il demande à la force une réparation qu'il devait attendre de la justice; il règle lui-même, dans l'élan de la passion, le taux de cette réparation; enfin, il devient agresseur au moment où il excède la mesure des violences qui ont été exercées sur sa personne.  Néanmoins sa culpabilité n'et pas la même que si son action n'avait pas été précédée d'une insulte;

[p. 104]
car il n'a point agi avec préméditation et même avec sang-froid; il a frappé dans l'émotion de la colère, et cette colère n'était pas dénuée de motifs : il est donc coupable, mais à un moindre degré; l'injure ne le justifie pas, mais elle l'excuse.  Or, cette modification de la culpabilité, qui s'affaiblit sans cesser d'exister, atteste la règle que nous avons posée tout à l'heure, à savoir que le caractère principal de la provocation est celui d'un outrage, car la criminalité cesserait entièrement au moment où l'agent lèverait le bras, non pour se venger, mais pour se défendre.

    Toutefois, même pour admettre cette atténuation de la peine, on conçoit que la provocation doit avoir un caractère grave: toute injure ne serait pas suffisante pour servir d'excuse à l'agent.  Cette excuse prend sa source dans l'émotion qui maîtrise ses sens et le précipite vers une action iréfléchie.  Il faut donc que la provocation soit de nature à produire une vive impression sur son esprit, à jeter la perturbation dans sa pensée, à lui ôter sa liberté de réflexion.

    La loi civile ne reconnaît également à la violence le caractère légal qu'autant qu'elle est de nature à faire impression sur une personne raisonnable, et qu'elle peut lui inspirer la crainte d'exposer sa personne ou sa fortune à un mal considérable et présent.  On a égard, en cette matière, à l'âge, au sexe et à la condition des personnes (art. 1112 du cod. civ.).

    Tel est aussi le principe adopté par le code pénal.  L'orateur du gouvernement s'exprimait, dans l'exposé des motifs, en ces termes : ' Le code n'admet pas l'excuse sans une provocation violente, et d'une violence telle que le coupable n'ait pas eu, au moment de l'action qui lui est reprochée, la liberté nécessaire pour agir avec une mûre réflexion.  Sans doute il a commis une action blâmable, une action que la loi ne peut se dispenser de punir; mais il peut être, aux yeux de la loi, tout à fait aussi coupable que si la provocation qui l'a entraîné n'eût pas existé. '  Telle est la doctrine que l'article 321 a formulée, mais

[p. 105]
essayer néanmoins de définir avec précision le carctère et le degré de gravité des faits auxquels est attachée l'excuse de la provocation.  Cet article est ainsi conçu : 'Le meurtre, aini que les blessures et les coups, sont excusables s'ils ont été provoqués par des coups ou des violences graves envers les personnes.'  Essayons de déterminer le sens et les limites de cette disposition.

    Le premier élément de la provocation légale est que l'attaque, dont elle se forme, ait consisté en coups ou violences physiques.  Sur ce point, la loi n'a voulu laisser aucun doute: non-seulement elle place sur un même plan, et comme des faits semblables, les violences et les coups, mais elle exige que celles-là comme ceux-ci soient exercés envers les personnes.

    Ainsi l'injure et l'outrage par paroles ne peuvent constituer des faits d'excuse.  En général, l'injure verbale ne saurait justifier les voies de fait1, car il n'est pas permis de repousser une injure par une voie de fait : l'injure n'excuse que l'injure; injuriam nihi illatam, aliâ injuriâ propulsare possum2; les voies de fait sont un excès de la défense, elles deviennent une agression; car l'injure, quels que soient ses emportements, ne peut être considérée comme une violence personnelle.  La cour de cassation a donc eu raison de décider : 'qu'une imputaion injurieuse n'est pas une violence, et encore moins une violence grave; qu'une telle imputation n'a reçu de la loi d'autre qualification que celle de calomnie, si elle est fausse; que les juges ne peuvent admettre pour excuse que les faits qui sont admis comme tels par la loi, et qu'ils violent les articles 504 et 521 du code pénal en admettant pour excuse, sur une accusation de meurtre, l'imputation d'un délit faite verbalement à l'accusé3.'

    Cependant, si la loi a dû repousser l'injure verbale comme
1 L. 3, Dig. de justitiâ et jure; 1. 52,  § 1, Dig. ad legem Aquiliam.
2 Farinacius, quaest. 125,
3 Arr. cass. 27 fév. 1813 (Bull. no 40; Devill. et Car. Coll. nouv., p. 203).

[p. 106]
excuse d'un crime grave, il est impossible que le juge ne tienne pas compte, à quelque degré, de l'impression que cette injure a produit sur l'agent.  Il n'est point excusable, parce qu'une simple injure n'a pu complétement altérer la liberté de son esprit; mais l'impression qu'il a ressentie a pu néanmoins être assez vive pour que la gravité de son action soit atténuée.

    L'injure devient alors non pas une excuse, mais une circonstance atténuante; le crime ne change pas de caractère, mais la peine doit être réduite.  Telle était aussi la décision des docteurs : Licet non licitum sit percutere eum qui verbalem injuriam infert, et si quis percutiat, aut vulneret, aut occidat, puniatur, sed non poenâ ordinariâ propter provocationem1.

    La même décision doit s'appliquer aux menaces verbales, quand elles ne sont point accompagnées de voies de fait.  Mais la question devient fort grave lorsque ces menaces se produisent avec des actes matériels qui peuvent faire croire à leur exécution immédiate : supposons par exemple, qu'un individu marche vers l'agent, armé d'une canne et le bras levé, en le menaçant de le frapper; assurément il est difficille, nous l'avons déjà décidé au sujet du délit de rébellion2, de ne pas voir dans cet acte une voie de fait, une violence, lors même que celui qui en a été l'objet n'a pas été frappé ni blessé.  C'est aussi dans ce sens que la cour de cassation a déclaré : 'que la provocation violente peut exister sans blessure effectuée, mais par la seule menace avec une arme meurtrière approchée du corps3. '  Il y aurait même raison de décider dans le cas où l'agresseur armé d'un fusil menacerait de faire feu sur celui à qui il defendrait de passer4.  En effet, le caractère principal de la provocation légale est, suivant l'expression du législateur, qu'elle ait été de nature à troubler la
1 Farinacius, quaest. 125, num. 98.
2 Voy. notre tome 3, p. 81 et 82.
3 Arr. cass. 15 mess. an XIII (Devill. et Car. Col. nouv. 2, p. 134; Journ. du palais, nouv, édit., tom. 4, p. 639).
4 Voyez infra notre chapitre 48, pour les cas de légitime défense.

[p. 107]
liberté d'esprit nécessaire pour agir avec une mûre réflexion; or, quel acte plus capable de faire une vive impression, que la menace d'un coup accompagnée d'un geste qui semble le porter?

    Les anciens auteurs, si habiles à discerner les nuances de la criminalité des actions, n'hésitaient pas à déclarer l'homicide excusable, toutes les fois que la menace avait paru prête à s'effectuer: Dummodo minans sit in actu vulnerandi vel occidendi, vel quando periculum est in expectatione et appareat in minante aliqua signa offendendi1.

    L'article 321 veut que les coups et les violences aient été exercés envers les personnes.  Ces expressions qui, nous l'avons déjà dit, indiquent la nature physique des violences que la loi avait en vue, servent à caractériser ces violences, et deviennent dès lors l'un des éléments de l'excuse.  Il en résulte d'abord que toute violence, même physique, qui n'a pas été commise sur les personnes elles-mêmes, n'est pas constitutive de l'excuse; ainsi la cour de cassation a dû juger que des coups donnés à des animaux ne pouvaient excuser les blessures faites par le propriétaire de ces animaux2.  Une autre conséquence de la même règle est que l'excuse n'est pas admissible, s'il n'est pas déclaré que les violences ont été commises envers des personnes.  Ce point a encore été reconnu par la cour de cassation : 'attendu qu'après avoir déclaré l'accusé coupable de la tentative de meurtre dont il était prévenu, la cour de Florence l'a déclaré excusable, et s'est bornée à en donner pour motif qu'il avait été excité par des violences graves précédentes; qu'une telle déclaration de laquelle il ne résulte que des faits insignifiants, puisqu'elle laisse ignorer si ce sont des personnes qui ont été l'objet des violences exercées, et si, conséquemment, la provocation présentait le caractère déter-
1 Farinacius, quaest 125, no 70.
2 Arr. cass. 7 fév. 1814 (Journ. du palais, 3e édit., tom. 10, p. 106).

[p. 108]
miné par l'article 321, n'a pu servir de base légale à la commutation de la peine1. '

    On peut déduire encore des mêmes termes une autre conséquence.  La loi n'exige point, en effet, que les coups aient été portés ou les violences faites à la personne même qui s'est rendue coupable de l'homicide ou des blessures, il suffit que ces violences aient été exercées envers des personnes.  Ainsi la provocation subsiste non moins puissante, l'excuse non moins efficace, lorsque les coups ou violences se sont portés, non sur l'agent lui-même, mais sur un tiers.  Cette décision se fonde sur une saine intelligence du coeur humain.  Supposons, d'abord, que les violences aient été exercées sur le père, sur le fils, sur la femme de l'agent; l'injure serait-elle moins grave que si lui-même en avait été l'objet?  N'est-ce pas le cas de répéter cette maxime: Injuria uni facta, alteri facta censetur?  Sera-t-il plus maître de ses sens, son ressentiment n'éclatera-t-il pas au même degré?  Les docteurs à cet égard n'avaient conçu aucun doute; ils étendaient l'excuse à tous les faits provoqués par une attaque envers un parent, un ami, un voisin2; il leur semblait que, dans ce cas, l'auteur de l'homicide ou des blessures n'avait fait que céder à un sentiment irrésistible et presque à un devoir.  Nous n'hésitons point à dopter cette opinion.  Souvent l'outrage exercé envers une personne que nous affectionnons nous est plus sensible que s'il était dirigé contre nous: nous pouvons trouver en nous-mêmes la force de dédaigner une insulte; nous croirions commettre une lâcheté en laissant insulter celui qui nous est cher; son danger nous semble réel; le venger, c'est à nos yeux voler à sa défense.

    La solution doit-elle se modifier lorsque l'agent, témoin des violences exercées envers un tiers qui lui est inconnu, s'est révolté de ces mauvais traitements, et dans l'élan de son indigna-
1 Même arrêt.
2 Farinacius, quaest. 125, num. 289 et seq.; Damhouderius, cap. 80, num. 1 et seq.; Bartole, in l. 3 au Dig. de justitia et jure.

[p. 109]
tion a blessé ou tué leur auteur?  La décision des docteurs était la même : ils regardaient que les actes qui avaient eu pour but de défendre un homme injustement opprimé, quel que fût cet homme, étaient avoués par l'humanité, et ne pouvaient  constituer des crimes:  Cuivis homini jra permittunt defendere ac citra crimen omne protegere confractem suum, etiam ignotissimum, ab altero graviter oppressum1.  Le Digeste en donnait pour raison que la nature a établi entre les hommes une sorte de parenté, cum inter nos cognationem quamdan natura constituerit2.  La véritable raison se puise dans la nature même de l'excuse.  La loi n'a atténué les peines, en cas de provocation, que parce que la criminalité de l'agent se modifie.  Or cette modification de la criminalité n'existe-t-elle pas quand l'agent n'a commis le crime que pour repousser l'injuste agression dont un tiers était l'objet?  Cette agression dont il a été le témoin n'a-t-elle pas été une légitime provocation à le défendre?  La loi aurait-elle prétendu imposer à chaque citoyen le rôle égoïste de spectateur impassible des outrages adressées à un autre homme?  Comment distinguer si cet homme vous appartient par quelque lien, ou s'il vous est inconnu?  Qu'importe que vous ayez été entraîné par l'affection ou par un sentiment d'humanité?  Ce que la loi veut pour admettre l'excuse, c'est une juste cause de trouble chez l'agent, c'est que ce trouble prenne sa source dans des violences commises sur des personnes; elle n'a point exigé que ces personnes fussent ou l'agent lui-même, ou sa famille, ou ses amis;  elle n'a fait aucune distinction, et son texte interdit d'en faire.  La provocation peut donc en général résulter des violences exercées, soit sur l'auteur même du crime, soit sur des personnes de sa famille, soit sur des tiers qui lui sont étrangers.  Toutes les fois qu'il est prouvé que ces violences ont pu exciter spontanément sa colère, et qu'aucun autre motif ne l'a-
1 Damhouderius, Praxis crim., cap. 80, no1; Farinacius, quaest. 125, no 287.
2  L. 3. Dig. de justitiâ et jure.

[p. 110]
nimait, son action change de nature, et la provocation voile en partie sa criminalité.

  Le deuxième élément de cette excuse dérive du plus ou du moins de gravité des coups ou des violences.   Le degré de cette intensité n'est point déterminé par la loi; elle se contente d'exiger que ces violences soient graves.  M. Faure a expliqué cette expression, dans l'exposé des motifs du code, dans les termes suivants: 'Le code n'admet point l'excuse sans une provocation violente et d'une violence telle, que le coupable n'ait pas eu, au moment même de l'action qui lui est reprochée, toute la liberté nécessaire pour agir avec une mûre réflexion.  Cette provocation, nous ne pouvons trop le redire, doit être de nature à faire la plus vive impression sur l'esprit le plus fort.'  M. Monseignat, rapporteur de la commission du corps législatif, a senti qu'aucune règle ne pouvait être invariablement posée en cette matière: 'Il est difficile de déterminer avec précision ce moyen de défense; il doit varier suivant l'isolement, la position, la qualité physique ou morale du coupable, de ces violences, et de la personne qui les éprouve.'

   Il suit de là que la gravité des violences ne doit pas se mesurer uniquement sur leur résultat matériel, et qu'il faut considérer aussi la position de celui sur lequel ont été exercées, et l'influence morale qu'elles ont dû produire.  Ainsi les violences sont graves quand il a dû en résulter une vive impression sur la personne qui en a été l'objet, soit à raison de son âge, soit à raison de sa faiblesse, ou de sa position sociale.  La loi ne demande pas qu'elles aient été une maladie ou des blessures, elle ne s'occupe pas de leur résultat matériel; elle fait dépendre leur gravité du sentiment d'irritation qu'elles ont dû exciter, de la gravité de l'outrage qu'elles renfermaient.

    On pourrait peut-être distinguer entre les coups et les violences, et n'appliquer qu'à celles-ci la qualification qui les suit.  Cette distinction, que semble d'ailleurs repousser le texte n'aurait au-

[p. 111]
cune utilité.  Les coups, de même que les violences, puisent leur gravité non-seulement dans leur intensité matérielles, mais dans l'intention qui les dirige, dans la position sociale des personnes qui en sont l'objet, dans les parties du corps qu'ils atteignent.  Un soufflet est quelquefois un coup léger; il constitue preque toujours une violence grave, car il porte avec lui l'insulte et forme la plus énergique provocation.  Nous le répétons: pour apprécier la gravité de la violence, il faut apprécier la gravité de l'offense; et pour déterminer l'influence de celle-ci, il faut se rendre compte de la position de l'agent, de son éducation, de ses habitudes, de ses préjugés, de ses passions, de la force ou de la faiblesse de son esprit, du calme ou de l'irascibilité de son caractère.

    Le troisième élément de l'excuse est que la provocation soit née d'une attaque injuste ou paraissant telle; car, lorsque l'attaque est légitime, la défense cesse de l'être : ubi offensio est licita, ibidem defensio est illicita1.   Si les violences sont commandées par la loi ou par la nécessité, elles ne constituent plus une offense, elles ne forment plus une provocation qui puisse excuser l'homicide.  Ainsi, lorsque des huissiers ou des gendarmes procèdent régulièrement à l'arrestation d'un malfaiteur, ou lorsque la force publique reçoit l'ordre de disperser un rassemblement séditieux, les violences qu'ils commettent ne peuvent être une excuse des violences qui sont exercées contre eux; car ils sont dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, et leurs actes sont légitimes, en supposant d'ailleurs que les violences qu'ils ont employées n'étaient qu'un moyen nécessaire pour accomplir la mission légale dont ils étaient chargés.  Ces voies de fait, exercées au nom de la loi, ne peuvent devenir une juste cause de représailles; elles ne renferment aucun outrage personnel, elles ne sont que la manifestation de la force publique; et quand la seule résistance aux actes dont elles assurent l'exécution serait un délit, comment pourraient-elles fonder une excuse en faveur de celui
1 Farinacius, quaest. 125, no112.

[p. 112]
qui non-seulement aurait résisté, mais qui se serait rendu coupable de blessures ou d'homicide sur les agents de l'autorité?

    La question s'élève et devient plus difficile, lorsque les officiers publics, bien qu'agissant dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, ont commis, sans nécessité et par abus de leur autorité, des violences graves; ces violences peuvent-elles alors constituer l'excuse de la provocation vis-à-vis de celui qui, irrité de ces excès, a blessé ou tué l'un des agents?  Nous avons traité de cette question avec tous les développements qu'elle mérite, dans le  § 2 de notre chapitre 31, relatif aux violences commises envers les fonctionnaires publics; nous ne pouvons qu'y renvoyer nos lecteurs1.

    Tels sont donc les trois éléments essentiels de l'excuse : il faut que la provocation résulte de coups ou de violences sur les personnes; que ces coups ou blessures soient graves, soit par leur intensité matérielle, soit par l'insulte dont ils sont l'expression; enfin que ces violences soient le produit d'une attaque injuste ou paraissant du moins avoir ce caractère.  La provocation ne constitue une excuse légale de l'homicide volontaire ou de coups et blessures, que lorsque ces trois circonstances distinctes coïncident et se trouvent réunies dans le même fait.

  A côté de ces trois éléments de l'excuse, vient encore se placer une dernière circonstance qui n'est point essentielle à son existence, mais qui dérive de sa nature même : nous voulons parler de la simultanéité d'action qui doit rapprocher, en général, le fait de la provocation et le fait de l'homicide.  En effet, quel est le principe de l'excuse?  Il se puise dans l'excitation, dans la colère, dans la passion que soulève une provocation violente, et qui précipite l'agent, presque à son corps défendant, dans le crime; il est coupable de céder à cette passion qu'il eût dû surmonter; mais il est excusable parce qu'il a agi sans réflexion, et sous l'empire d'un mouvement impétieux qui l'a surpris.  Or, placez maintenant un intervalle entre la provocation et le crime,
1 Voy. notre tome 3, p. 143 et suiv.

[p. 113]
étendez cet intervalle assez pour que la réflexion ait pu surgir et se faire entendre; la provocation aura-t-elle exercé la même puissance, faut-il lui reconnaître les mêmes effets?  Non, car l'action qui tout à l'heure aurait été commise dans un premier élan, ne le serait maintenant qu'après une sorte de délibération, et lorsque l'agent aurait repris une partie de son sang-froid; la criminalité de l'action s'aggrave de toute la réflexion qui a pu la mûrir; l'excuse s'affaiblit à mesure que la provocation s'éloigne.

    Mais la loi, toutefois, n'a point considéré cette simultanéité des deux actes comme une circonstance essentielle pour l'admission de l'excuse; aucun de ses termes ne le suppose; son texte est muet; cette circonstance n'est donc point un caractère légal de la provocation, mais elle doit servir à l'apprécier en fait.  Il suffit de constater la coïncidence des deux actions dans le même espace de temps, pour que l'on doive conclure l'influence du fait provocateur, et l'espèce de fatalité qui a entraîné l'agent; dans le cas contraire, il est nécessaire que celui-ci prouve que son émotion ne s'était point refroidie, qu'il n'avait point diverti à d'autres actes, non deverterit ad extraneos actus, et qu'il agissait encore sous l'empire d'une première impression.

    Néanmoins, ici encore il importe de ne pas confondre les caractères de la légitime défense et ceux de la provocation : dans le premier cas; l'homicide, qui n'est justifié que parce qu'il est un acte nécessité par la défense de soi-même, doit suivre l'attaque immédiatement, incontinenti et non in intervallo; il faut qu'il ait eu pour objet de la repousser, inflagranti rixâ et in ipso actu offensionis; car l'attaque cessée, l'homicide ne serait plus un acte de défense.  Mais la provocation ne restreint pas ses effets dans d'aussi étroites limites; elle dure aussi longtemps que peut se prolonger chez un homme raisonnable la colère qu'elle a causée.  Ainsi Farinacius, après avoir posé, comme nous l'avons fait plus haut, le principe que la provocation et l'homicide doivent être presque simultanés pour que ce dernier fait soit excusable,

[p. 114]
ajoute Crederem incontinenti dici etiam post rixam, dummodo cessante calore rixae et irae offensus non diverterit ad extraneos actus1.  Baïardus étend cette règle beaucoup plus loin: Propulsatio injuriae dicitur facta incontinenti si die sequenti facta fuerit2.  Nous n'acceptons pas cette dernière opinion.  La vengeance qui s'exerce le lendemain de l'outrage n'est plus cet acte impétueux que la volonté est impuissante à retenir; la réflexion l'a mûrie; l'entraînement a cessé.  Nous admettons seulement que quelque intervalle peut séparer les deux actes, que cet intervalle peut se prolonger aussi longtemps que l'émotion reste violente et que la réflexion peut se faire entendre, aussi longtemps que durent la chaleur de la colère et la fougue de la passion.  Il est impossible de préciser les degrés de cet intervalle; il ne nous semble pas que, dans la plupart des cas, il puisse s'étendre au delà de quelques instants3.
1 Farinacius, quaest. 125, num. 342.
2 Ad Julium Clarum,  § homicidium, num. 113.  Boerius, dec. 168, num. 6.
3 Jousse cite comme un cas où la réplique de l'offense, quoique faite quelque temps après, est censée faite sur-le-champ, celui où une personne restée étourdie d'un coup sur la tête, n'aurait repris ses sens que longtemps après, et apercevant son ennemi, se serait jetée sur lui et l'aurait blessé ou tué dans un mouvement de colère. (Traité de la justice ., t. 3 p. 513.)

[p. 154]
Une autre question également controversée dans l'ancien droit, est de savoir si l'outrage fait à l'honneur suffit pour placer la personne outragée en état de légitime défense.  Il faut, pour la résoudre, considérer la nature de l'outrage.  Ainsi, nous avons établi dans le chapitre précédent que les simples injures verbales ne formaient pas une provocation suffisante pour servir d'excuse à l'homicide ou aux blessures qui les ont suivies; à plus forte raison ne peuvent-elles les justifier.  Les injures réelles, telles, par exemple, qu'une voie de fait, un soufflet, constituent au contraire une provocation qui atténue l'homicide ou les blessures; mais elles ne les justifient pas, parce que l'agent reste coupable d'avoir cédé à l'entraînement de la colère, parce que son action n'était pas commandée par la nécessité de défendre sa personne1.  Cette question fut soulevée au sein du conseil d'État, lors de la rédaction du code, et M. Faure répondit : 'que le citoyen qui repousse un outrage grave n'est pas mis, comme celui dont parle l'article, dans la nécessité d'opposer la force à la force; s'il frappe, s'il blesse, s'il tue, ce n'est que pour venger une injure, et punir l'homme qui l'a offensé.  Or le droit de punir ne peut être confié qu'à l'autorité publique, et, en tous cas, il serait contre toutes les règles de laisser l'offensé se constituer juge dans sa propre cause.  Les tribunaux lui sont ouverts; c'est là qu'il doit demander la réparation qui lui est due2.'
1 Puffendorf, 1. 2, ch. 5,  § 12; Perezius ad leg. Corn. de sicariis, Cod.,  §40.
2 Procès-verbaux di cons. d'État, séance du 8 nov. 1808.

CHEONG, Chan Wing, "The Burden of Proof of Provocation in Murder: Vasquez v R; O'Neil v R", [1995]¸ Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 229-235;

___________"The Present and Future of Provocation as a Defence to Murder in Singapore", [2001] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 453-474;

CHEN, Christina Pei-Li, "Provocation's Privileged Desire: The Provocation Doctrine, 'Homosexual Panic' and the Non-Violent Unwanted Sexual Defense", (2000) 10(1) Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 195-235; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries;

CHERMACK, Stephen T., Mitchell Berman, Stuart P. Taylor, "Effects of provocation on emotions and aggression in males", (1995) 23(1) Aggressive Behavior 1-10;

CHERRY, Richard R. (Richard Robert), 1859-1923, Lectures on the Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Communities, London and New York: MacMillan, 1890, xi, 123 p.; research note: on the laws of Alfred, see Attenborough, supra;

"We have in Modern English Law one rule which is probably a survival of the right of private revenge.  One of the cases mentioned by Alfred in which private vengeance was justifiable, was where a husband found a man with his wife under circumstances which would justify him in supposing that they were together for the purpose of committing adultery.  'A man may fight 'orwige' [i.e. without committing war] if he find another with his lawful wife within closed doors, or under one covering, or with his lawfully born daughter, or with his lawfully born sister, or with his mother, who was given to his father as his lawful wife' (Laws of Alfred, § 42).  Modern Law recognizes the provocation in this case to a certain extent.  It treats the killing of an adulterer taken in the act in the same way as if he had been killed in a quarrel.  The killing is not indeed held to be justifiable, but it is laid down that the provocation reduces the crime from murder to manslaughter. (Hale, Pleas of the Crown, i. 486, R. v. Kelly, 2 C. & K. 814.)  This is, I believe, the only case in which provocation, other than by actual blows, is considered sufficient to reduce homicide to manslaughter, if the killing be effected with a deadly weapon." (pp. 82-83)

CHRISTIE, Sarah, "Provocation -- Pushing the Reasonable Man Too Far?", (2000) 64 The Journal of Criminal Law 409-415; Table of Contents: "English law...409; Australian law...413; The future of the reasonable man test...414";

"The future of the reasonable man test
It seems sensible to identify two separate aspects to the rule that the provocation must be such as would make the reasonable man lose self-control.  The first step in any decision must be to measure the level or gravity of that provocation.  It further seems sensible to assess the gravity subjectively.  The overall tenor of the test is objective -- the law requires a certain degree of self-control from everyone -- but this should not be followed too slavishly so as to exclude all subjective assessments." (p. 414)

CIMEL AND INTERIGHTS, "Materials and Resources [on Crimes of Honour]", available at  http://www.soas.ac.uk/honourcrimes/Materials.htm (accessed on 26 October 2005);

CLIVE, Eric (from CBE, Edinburgh), Pamela Ferguson (from Dundee), Christopher Gane and Alexander McCall Smith presented A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland with commentary to the Minister of Justice in August 2003, see section 38, "Culpable homicide"; available at  http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/Code%20and%20Commentary%2030%20July%202003%20as%20submitted.pdf, accessed on 13 October 2003;

Code de droit canonique, Texte officiel et traduction française par La société internationale de droit canonique et de législations religieuses comparées avec le concours des Faculté de droit canonique de l'Université Saint-Paul d'Ottawa, Faculté de droit canonique de l'Institut catholique de Paris, Ottawa:  Service des Éditions de la Conférence des Évêques catholiques du Canada (C.E.C.C.), 1984, xxxii, 363 p., ISBN: 0889970971; see
Le Code de droit canonique - Anglais / Français / Latin / Espagnol à http://www.prairienet.org/nrpcatholic/cicmenu.html;

"Can. 1324 - § 1. L'auteur d'une violation n'est pas exempt de peine, mais la peine prévue par la loi ou le précepte doit être tempérée, ou encore une pénitence doit lui être substituée, si le délit a été accompli: [...]

3o   par qui a agi sous le feu d'une passion violente qui n'aurait cependant pas devancé et empêché toute délibération de l'esprit et tout consentement de la volonté, et à condition que cette passion n'ait pas été excitée ou nourrie volontairement;
7o contre l'auteur d'une grave et injuste provocation" (p. 229)


"Can. 1325 - L'ignorance crasse ou supine ou affectée ne peut jamais être prise en considération dans l'application des dispositions des cann. 1323 et 1324; il en est de même pour l'ébriété ou les auttres toubles mentaux, s'ils ont été recherchés volontairement pour accomplir le délit ou l'excuser, ou pour la passion qui aurait été volontairement excitée ou nourrie." (p. 230)


"Can. 1345 - Chaque fois qu'un délinquant ne jouit que d'un usage imparfait de la raison, ou qu'il aura commis un délit par crainte, ou par nécessité, ou dans le feu de la passion, ou en état d'ébriété, ou de tout autre trouble mental similaire, le juge peut s'abstenir d'infliger une punition quelconque, s'il pense qu'il peut y avoir une meilleure façon de pourvoir à l'amendement du coupable."  (p. 234)

The Code of Canon Law in English translation Prepared by The Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland in association with The Canon Law Society of Australia and New Zealand and The Canadian Canon Law Society,  London (England): Collins, 1983, xv, 319 p.,  ISBN: 000599750X (cased) and 0005997577 (limp); see The Code of Canon Law - English / French / Latin / Spanish at http://www.prairienet.org/nrpcatholic/cicmenu.html;

"Can. 1324  § 1.  The perpretrator of a violation is not exempted from penalty, but the penalty prescribed in the law or precept must be diminished, or a penance substituted in its place, if the offence was committed by ...

3one who acted in the heat of passion which, while serious, nevertheless did not precede or hinder all mental deliberation and consent of the will, provided that the passion itself had not been deliberately stimulated or nourished
7 one who acted against another person who was gravely and unjustly provocative;"  (p. 234)


"Can. 1325  Ignorance which is crass or supine or affected can never be taken into account when applying the provisions of cann. 1323 and 1324.  Likewise, drunkenness or other mental disturbances cannot be taken into account if these have been deliberately sought so as to commit the offence or to excuse it; nor can passion which has been deliberately stimulated or nourished." (p. 235)


"Can. 1345  Whenever the offender had only an imperfect use of reason, or committed the offence out of fear or necessity or in the heat of passion or with a mind disturbed by drunkenness or a similar cause, the judge can refrain from inflicting any punishment if he considers that the person's reform may be better accomplished in some other way." (p. 239)

Code pénal -- 1791 --25 Septembre; premier Code pénal français, après l'Ancien régime, période de la Révolution française; une partie du code a été publiée récemment dans Yves Jeanclos, La législation pénale de la France du XVIe au XIXe siècle : Textes principaux, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996, 128 p. aux pp. 79-96 (Collection; Que sais-je; numéro 3128), ISBN: 2130477070;

SECTION Ire -- Crimes et attentats contre les personnes

8. L'homicide commis sans préméditation sera qualifié meurtre, et puni de la peine de vingt années de fers.

9.  Lorsque le meurtre sera la suite d'une provocation violente, sans toutefois que le fait puisse être qualifié homicide légitime, il pourra être déclaré excusable, et la peine sera de dix années de gêne.

    La provocation par injures verbales ne pourra, en aucun cas, être admise comme excuse de meurtre.

10.  Si le meurtre est commis dans la personne du père ou de la mère légitimes ou naturels, ou de tout autre ascendant légitime du coupable, le parricide sera puni de mort; et l'exception portée au précédant article ne sera point admissible."
(p. 89)

COHEN, David, "The Augustan Law on Adultery: The Social and Cultural Context"  in David I. Kertzer, 1948-, and Richard P. Saller, eds., The Family in Italy from Antiquity to the Present, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, xiii, 399 p. at pp. 109-126, ISBN: 0300050372; covers Roman, Italian and canonical law; copy at Ottawa University, MRT General, HQ 629 .F36 1991;  copy at Carleton University, Ottawa, HQ 629 .F36;

COKE, Edward, 1552-1634, The third part of the Institutes of the laws of England: concerning high treason, and other pleas of the crown, and criminal causes, London: Printed by M. Flesher, for W. Lee, and D. Pakeman, 1644, [12], 243 p.; other editions: 1648, 1660, 1669, 1670, 1671, 1680, 1681, 1797, 1809, 1817; the Supreme Court of Canada Library, Ottawa  has a copy of the 1817 edition; reprint: Union (New Jersey): The Lawbook Exchange, 2001,  ISBN: 1584772018;

"Some manslaughters be voluntary, and not of malice forethought, upon some sudden falling out.  Delinquens per iram provocatus puniri debet mitius.  And this for distinction sake is called manslaughter.  There is no difference between murder, and manslaughter; but that the one is upon malice forethought, and the other upon a sudden occasion: and therefore is called chance-medley.  As if two meet together, and striving for the wall the one kill the other, this is manslaughter and felony.  And so it is, if they had upon that sudden occasion gone into the fields and fought, and the one had killed the other: this (as hatch been said) had been but manslaughter, and no murder; because all that followed, was but a continuance of the first sudden occasion, and the heat of the blood kindled by ire was never cooled, till the blow was given, et fic de fimilibus." (pp. 54-55, 1817 edition).

COKER, Donna K., "Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill", (1992) 2 Southern California Review of Law and Women's Studies 71-130; titre noté dans ma recherche mais pas encore consulté; je n'ai trouvé aucune bibliothèque dans la région d'Ottawa possédant ce périodique;

COLDIRON, W.H., "Historical Development of Manslaughter", (1950) 38 Kentucky Law Journal 527-550;

"Thus we see that by the middle of the seventeenth century, manslaughter has emerged as a separate branch of the law of homicide. At this time manslaughter was the killing of one upon sudden provocation, provocation apparently limited to sudden affray or chance medley, before there had been sufficient time for the blood to cool.  It was a clergyable felony for which the prescribed punishment was the branding of the letter 'M' on the thumb and imprisonment for one year.55 ...

COLEMAN, Doriane Lambelet, "Culture, Cloaked in Mens Rea"(October 2001) 100(4) South Atlantic Quarterly 981-1004;

COLVIN, Eric, "Exculpatory Defences in Criminal Law",  (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 381-407, see provocation at p. 403;

"Provocation is a defence which resists easy classification in theoretical schemes.  For example there has been debate about its position within the framework of justifications and excuses.  Within the framework advanced in the present article, it can be viewed as having historically drawn upon the model of permission as well as the model of impairment. ...." (p. 403, footnote omitted)

___________"Ordinary and Reasonable People: The Design of Objective Tests of Criminal Responsibility", (2001) 27(2) Monash University Law Review 197-228; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .M65, Location: FTX Periodicals;

Comment, "Manslaughter: The Resting Place of Several Former Statutes", (1976) 30 Arkansas Law Review 213; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy of this periodical volume in the Ottawa area libraries;

Comments, "Recognition of the Honor Defense Under the Insanity Plea", (1933-34) 43 Yale Law Journal 809-814;

COMMONWEALTH (Australia), Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law (Australia),Interim report - principles of criminal responsibility and other matters Reviewof Commonwealth Criminal Law, Attorney-General's Department,  Canberra : Australian Govt. Pub. Service, 1990, vii, 491, [42] p., see "Provocation" at pp. 173-179 and 180 (series; report; number 3), ISBN: 0644127244; Committee's members: The Right Honourable Sir Harry Gibbs, chairman; The Honourable Justice R.S. Watson, member; and Mr. A.C.C. Menzies, member;

"13.55 If provocation is to be defined in the criminal law it should have the essential elements recognised both by the common law (as discussed in such cases as Johnson v. The Queen and Moffa v. The Queen and the statutory provisions which do not differ from the common law in essentials.  If provocation is defined in the proposed consolidating law it should be provided that provocation consists of conduct (possibly including words alone) which actually caused the accused suddenly to lose self-control and which would be likely to cause an ordinary person (that is, a person possessing ordinary powers of self-control), but otherwise possessing the same personal characteristics as the accused) to lose the power of self-control.  It would not be necessary to require that the actions of the accused should have been in reasonable proportion to the provocation, although that would be a matter relevant to the two essential elements.  It should not be required that the provocation should have been provided by the person who actually suffered from the attack or that it should have been directed to the accused.

13.56  However, the Review Committee has reached the conclusion that for the purposes of Commonwealth law provocation should not be relevant, except in mitigation of punishment.  It has long been recognised that the doctrine represents a concession to human frailty.  This concession was particularly necessary when the punishment for murder was mandatory and especially so when the punishment for murder was death.  In respect of offences other than murder to which the defence has been held to be applicable it is quite clear that the concession to human frailty could satisfactorily have been made by mitigating the punishment to take account of the fact that the offence was committed under provocation.  The Review Committee considers that under Commonwealth law there should not be a mandatory penalty for any offence and it considers that it is no longer necessary to admit provocation as a defence.  It agrees with the New Zealand approach.

13.57  The Review Committee recommends that the proposed consolidating law should contain a provision that the fact that a person has acted under provocation shall not be a defence to a charge of any offence, but may be taken into account on the question of penalty." (pp. 177-178; notes omitted)


A BILL FOR An Act to amend the Crimes Act 1914
Division 12 - Provocation not a defence
Provocation not a defence
    '3Z. (1) The fact that a person acted under provocation is irrelevant in determining whether the person is guilty of an offence, but may be taken into account in determining the level of any penalty.' " (pp. 1 and 14, at the end of the book)

COMSTOCK, Gary David, "Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defence", (1992) 2 Law and Sexuality 81-102; copy at the University of Ottawa, KF 4754.5 .A15 L39  Location: FTX Periodicals;

COOK, Kate, "Killing in desperation -- Kate Cook explores recent proposals to change the laws of murder", (16 January 2004) 154 New Law Journal 64-65; issue number 7111; see "Provocation" at pp. 64-65;

COOPER, Simon, "Provocation and the Evidential Burden", [1997] 2 Web JCLI available at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1997/issue2/cooper2.html#bibliography (accessed on 21 March 2002); deals with the case of R v Acott [1997] 1 All ER 706 (House of Lords) available at  http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199697/ldjudgmt/jd970220/acott01.htm (accessed on 21 March 2002);

COSHOW, William W., "Clarification of Homicide Law in California From Recent Decision", (1949) 1 Hastings Law Journal 32-41, see "What is Provocation" at pp. 39-40; copy at University of Ottawa, MRT Storage, KF 292 .H3 H367a v.1-19 1949-1967 on microfilm (reel);

COSS, Greame, Editorial, "Provocation, Law Reform and the MEDEA Syndrome", (June 2004) 28(3) Criminal Law Journal 133-140;

__________" 'God is a righteous judge, stong and patient: and God is provoked every day': A Brief History of the Doctrine of Provocation in England", (1991) 13 Sydney Law Review 570-604; Table of Contents: "Introduction...570; Origins...570; Enter the Writers...572; Enter the Judicial Statements...574; The 18th Century -- Mawgridge, Orneby and Foster...577; The 19th Century --The Principles are Confirmed...579; The Reasonable Man [sic] is Born...582; The 20th Century -- The Erosion of Compassion Begins...583; The Erosion Takes Hold -- Mancini, Holmes and Semini...585; Bedder -- The Erosion is Complete...588; The Birth of Reforms...589; The Complexities Prevail...590; The New Broom: Camplin...592; The Dilemma Intensifies: Newell...597; The Inevitable Reform Demands...599; Conclusion 604";

Our analysis of the courts' attempts to struggle with the doctrine has unearthed striking inconsistencies.  Irregularities in terminology abound.  The 'reasonable' person has also materialised as ordinary, prudent, average -- indeed any combination of expressions.  Such a person would/might/is liable to/is likely to kill.  As to loss of control, reason may have been dethroned, but sometimes rather than a blind fury, only a partial loss of control seems required.  Either was it somehow must produce a reasonable retaliation, if that is possible.  Although each describtion has a subtly different connotation, the courts have appeared oblivious to the distinctions.  And as we have seen, the problems are in no way limited to terminology.  The developments on the whole leave one feeling hugely dissatisfied." (p. 604)

___________A history of the doctrine of provocation as a defence to murder, LL.M. thesis, University of Sydney, 1988, [vii], 175, [4] leaves; title noted in my research but thesis not consulted; no copy of this thesis in the Canadian libraries covered by the AMICUS catalogue of the Library and Archives Canada, verification of 9 July 2004;

___________Associate Editor, Editorial, "Lethal Violence by Men", (1996) 20 The Criminal Law Journal 305-309;

"I want to talk about men who kill, in particular men who kill gay men, and men who kill  women.  The need for the former is conveniently prompted by the publication of a New South Wales Attorney-General's Discussion Paper, 'Review of the 'Homosexual Advance Defence' (August 1996).  The need for the latter is prompted by impatience." (p. 305, note omitted)

___________“A Reply to Tom Molomby”, (1998) 22 Criminal Law Journal 119-121;  reply to Molomby, “Revisiting Lethal Violence by Men – A Reply”, infra; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735  Location, FTX Periodicals;

___________“Revisiting Lethal Violence by Men”, (1998) 22 Criminal Law Journal 5-9; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735  Location, FTX Periodicals;

Court of Appeal, "Murder: Direction on Provocation and Lies: R v Tinker (Donna Marie) 5 December 2002", (2003) 67(3) The Journal of Criminal Law 207-209  with commentary at 208-209;

COURTIS, Helie, Étude médico-légale des crimes passionnels, Thèse : Méd. : Toulouse : 1909-1910, 169 p.; titre noté dans ma recherche mais thèse pas encore consultée; j'ai noté ce titre au catalogue de la bibliothèque nationale de France; aucune copie au Canada;

COUTTS, J.A., "Standard of Self-control of the Reasonable Man: R v Smith [2000] 1 WLR 654 [House of Lords]", (2001) 65(2) Journal of Criminal Law 130-133 with commentary by Professor Coutts at pp. 132-133;

DAN-COHEN, Meir, "Responsibilities and the Boundaries of the Self", (1991-92) 105 Harvard Law Review 959-1003, see "Involuntariness, Provocation and Bodily Distance" at pp. 990-997; copy at Ottawa University, KFM 2469 .H457  Location: FTX Periodicals;

DARESTE de la Chavanne, Rodolphe, 1824-1911, La science du droit en Grèce - Platon, Aristote, Théophraste, Paris: Librarie du Recueil Général des lois et des arrêts, 1893, 319 p.; réimpression: Amsterdam: Éditions Rodopi, 1968; sur le droit criminel, voir le chapitre 6, "Droit criminel" aux pp. 83-105 et le chapitre 9, "Droit criminel (suite et fin)" aux pp. 131-141;  le meurtre par colère est traité aux pp. 93-94; copie aux universités Ottawa, St-Paul, et à la Cour suprême du Canada (KL 4121 D 37 1968);

"Après le meurtre involontaire, il semble que la loi devrait parler du meutre volontaire, mais, comme nous l'avons vu, Platon admet une catégorie intermédiaire, celle du meurtre commis sous l'empire de la colère [ici Dareste emploi un mot en caractère grec].  Cette distinction, étrangère aux lois positives, appartient plutôt à la théorie.2  C'est au juge qu'il appartient de tenir compte des circonstances, et nous allons voir qu'en voulant légiférer sur ce point, Platon a été entraîné à des redites et à une complication inutile. [...]
2 Cette théorie a été acceptée par les juristes romains : ' Delinquitur, dit Marcien, aut proposito, aut impetu, aut casu ' (L. 11, § 2, D. De poenis, XLVIII, 19).  Mais elle n'a point passé dans les lois romaines." (p. 93)

DAVIES, Mitchell C., "Leaving Provocation to the Jury: A Homicidal Muddle?", (1998) 62 Journal of Criminal Law 374-388; contents: Leaving provocation to the jury pre-Homicide Act 1957...375; Leaving provocation to the jury post-Homicide Act 1957...377; The judicial duty to raise provocation: nothing ventured, nothing lost?...380; A judicial duty to marshall the evidence? ...382;  The subjective limb as an exclusionary mechanism...384;  Conclusion...387;  copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .J653  Location: FTX Periodicals;

DEAN, W.H.B.,  Provocation, its role as a defence in the determination of criminal liability in English and South African law, Ph. D. thesis, London 1968, 2 volumes; title noted in my research but thesis not consulted yet;

DE GREEFF, Étienne, 1898-, see infra, under/ voir infra, sous: GREEF, Étienne de;

DE PASQUALE, Santo, "Provocation and the Homosexual Advance Defence: The Deployment of Culture as a Defence Strategy", (2002) 26(1) Melbourne University Law Review 110 to approx.143; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .M454;  Location: FTX Periodicals; as on 18 July 2002 not on the shelves yet of the library; to verify later;

DESJARDINS, Arthur, "Des excuses en droit criminel", (1859) Tome XIV -- 9me année Revue Critique de Législation et de Jurisprudence 517-526 et le Tome XV -- 9me année 312-334;

DETMOLD, M.J. (Michael J.), "Provocation to Murder: Sovereignty and Multiculture", (1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 5-31; Contents: 1. Introduction...5; 2. Subjectivities...5; 3. Sovereignty and Multiculture...7; 4. Rights...10; 5. Objectivity as Relational...11; 6. Narratives...17; 7. Sexual Relations: the Tyranny of the Private (Non-Relational)...18; 8. The Two Questions...20; 9. Self-Control...22; 10. Patriarchy...25; 11. Mental Conditions...27; 12. A Direction...29; Postscript 1: Law Reform Agencies...29; Postscript 2 Land Rights for Bankers...30; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;

"Developments - Sexual Orientation and the Law", (1989) 102 Harvard Law Review 1508-1671, see "Gay Men and Lesbians as Victims in the Criminal Justice System" at pp. 1541-1551;

DICKEY, John Sloan, "Culpable Homicides in Resisting Arrest", (1932-33) 18 Cornell Law Quarterly 373390; copy at Ottawa University,  KFN 5069 .C676  Location,  FTX Periodicals;

DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, H., Traité de droit criminel et de législation pénale comparée, Paris : Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1947, xvii, 1059 p.,

"Son fondement juridique. -- Pour expliquer l'atténuation de la peine dont bénéficie le provoqué, on a proposé deux explications :

1o  Au point de vue subjectif, on a fait observer que l'agent a subi l'influence de l'irritation, de la colère, qui a diminué son jugement et sa responsabilité.  D'autre part, celui qui a commis un crime sous l'influence d'une provocation paraît moins dangereux que le malfaiteur ordinaire;

2o D'un point de vue objectif, on a fait intervenir l'idée de compensation des fautes.  Le premier coupable, a-t-on dit, est l'auteur de la provocation .  La faute qu'il a commise doit venir en déduction de celle qui est reprochée à l'inculpé.

Ces deux idées ne s'excluent pas nécessairement; il est permis de les combiner.  Le législateur, en faisant bénéficier d'une réduction de peine l'individu provoqué, a tenu compte de l'altération de ses facultés, mais aussi du fait qu'il n'était pas seul dans son tort.  Ce double point de vue nous aidera à déterminer les conditions et les effets de l'excuse." (p. 443)

DONOVAN, Dolores A. and Stephanie M. Wildman, "Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation", (1980-81) 14 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review  435-468; contents: I. OVERVIEW OF HOMICIDE, SELF-DEFENSE, AND PROVOCATION...439; A. The Modern Law of Homicide...439; B. The Early Development of the Law of Homicide...440; C. The Development of the Doctrine of Self-Defense...442; D. The Development of the Doctrine of Provocation...446;  II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MENS REA AND THE REASONABLE MAN...450; A. Mens Rea as a Prerequisite to Criminal Liability...451; B. The Reasonable Man: An Objective Test for Personal Culpability...456;  III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SOCIAL REALITY AND LEGAL REALITY...462; IV. CONCLUSION: PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS...467;

DORJAHN, Alfred P., "Extenuating Circumstances in Athenian Courts", (April 1930) 25(2) Classical philology 162-172, see "Anger and Various Passions" at pp. 164-165; copy at the University of Ottawa, PA 1 .C5  Location: MRT Periodicals;

  If it is impossible to refute a charge, Anaximenes of Lampsacus2 advises first to attempt to show that the act in question is in keeping with the customs of the multitude.  If this plea is not feasible, he urges to have recourse to the plea of misfortune and ignorance, and to dwell on the fact that better judgment is often subverted by human passions, such as love, anger, and ambition.  Aristotle4 states that little or no resentment is felt toward an act committed in anger. ..." (p. 164)
"3 Ars. rhet. ad Alexandrum 8.
4 Ars rhet. ii 3." (p. 164)

DOWNER, L.J., edited, commented and translated by, Leges Henrici primi, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1972, vi, 460 p., see Leg. Henr. 82, § 8 at pp. 254-255, 258-259 with commentary at p. 404; copy at Carletion University, Ottawa, KD544.L4; note: see also for old laws: Attenborough, supra and Robertson, infra;

"c. 82 De aliquibus inimicis ad inuicem. ...
82, 8   Similiter pugnare potest homo contra eum quem cum desponsata sibi uxore post secundam et tertiam prohibitionem clausis hostiis uel sub una coopertura inueniet, siue cum filia sua quam de sponsa genuuerit, siue cum sonore sua que de sponsa sit, siue cum matre sua que patri suo fuerit desponsata." (pp. 254 and 258)
c. 82 Concerning persons who are mutual enemies. ...
82, 8   In the same way a man may fight against a person whom he finds with his wedded wife, after the second and third prohibition, behind closed doors or under the one covering, or with his daughter whom he begot on his wife, or with his sister who was legitimately born, or with his mother who was lawfully wedded to his father." (pp. 255 and 259)



82, 8  Source: Af 42, 7.  See Introduction, 27.
    post ... tertiam prohibitionem.  Liebermann, GA, i. 599, n. e. gives Roman law via the canon law as the source of this provision, and cites Ivo, Decretum viii. III quem postquam ter prohibuerit cum uxore sua in una domo inuenerit." (p. 404)

DOYLE, M.W., "Criminal Law Reform: New Proposals for Culpable Homicide", [1977]  New Zealand Recent Law 93-96, see "Provocation" at p. 94; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;

DRESSLER, Joshua, "Criminal Law, Moral Theory, and Feminism: Some Reflections on the Subject and on the Fun (and Value) of Courting Controversy", (2004) 48(4) Saint Louis University Law Journal 1143-1166, on provocation, see pp. 1152-1156;

___________"Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?", (1988) 51 The Modern Law Review 467-480; comments on McAuley, "Anticipating the Past: The Defence of Provocation in Irish Law", infra;

"Confusion surrounds the provocation defense.  On the one hand, the defense is a concession to human weakness; the requirement that the defendant act in sudden heat of passion finds its roots in excuse theory.  On the other hand, the wrongful conduct requirement may be, and certainly some decisions based on that element are, justificatory in character.  It is likely that some of the confusion surrounding the defense is inherent to the situation, but its also probably true that the English and American courts were insufficiently concerned about the justification-excuse distinctions while the law developed.

    ....I submit that the defense is more easily and satisfactorily explained in terms of excuse, on the grounds that an actor's (partial loss) of self-control (partially) excuses his homicidal action." (p. 480)

___________"Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code", (1988) 19 Rutgers Law Journal 671-716; see "Extreme Mental and Emotional Disturbance (EMED)" at pp.704-705; copy at Ottawa University, KFN 1869 .R87  Location: FTX Periodicals;

___________"Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale", (1982) 73 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 421-470; contents: I. INTRODUCTION...421; II. THE DOCTRINE'S ORIGINS AND PARAMETERS...425;  A. Origins of the Provocation Defense...425; B. English Case Law and Statutory Modification...427;  C. United States Case Law and Statutory Modification...429; III. SEARCHING FOR A RATIONALE...432; A. Inconsistent Language in the Cases...432; B. A Provocation Rationale -- The Basics...434; D. Effects of Statutes on Doctrinal Analysis ...443; E. The Importance of Distinguishing Justification from Excuses...444; IV. FINDING THE PROPER RATIONALE...450; A. Heat of Passion as a Justification...450; B. Heat of Passion as an Excuse...459; C. Drafting the Defense...467; V. CONCLUSION...470;

___________"When 'Heterosexual' Men Kill 'Homosexual' Men: Reflections on Provocation Laws, Sexual Advances, and the 'Reasonable Man' Standard", (1995) 85 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 726-763;

___________"Why Keep the Provocation Defence?:  Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject", (2002) 86 Minnesota Law Review 959-1002; copy at Ottawa University, KFM 5469 .M55,  Location: FTX Periodicals; Contents: [Introduction]...959; I. PROVOCATION AND UTILITARIANISM...963; II. PROVOCATION AS A JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE;  III.PROVOCATION: WHY WE PARTIALLY EXCUSE HOMICIDE...971; IV. FEMINIST CHALLENGES TO THE DEFENSE...975;  A. The Abolitionist Argument...975; B. Narrowing the Defense: Professor Nourse's Proposal...979;  V. WHERE DO WE GO NOW?...984;  A. Model Penal Code...984;  B. Subjectivizing the Doctrine: The Model Penal Code...990;  C. Subjectivizing the Doctrine: My Own Thoughts...994;  D. My Proposal 997; CONCLUSION...1001;

DUGARD, C.J.R., "Provocation: No More Rides on the Sea Point Bus", (1966) 83 South African Law Journal 261-266; copy at Ottawa University, KR 0 .S69  Location: FTX Periodicals;

DUPARC, Pierre, Origines de la grâce dans le droit pénal romain et français, du Bas-Empire à la Renaissance, Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1942, 193 p.; copie à l'Université de Montréal, L.S.H., KJA 3642 D87 1942;

"Tableau des lettres de rémission accordées par Charles VI du 1er janvier au 1er mai 1399, d'après un registre de la Chancellerie (Arch. Nat. JJ 154), et rangées par crime ou délit.
Homicide pour cause d'adultère (1)
119. mars  no 147 fol. 87.
120. avril   no 176 fol. 104.
121.  "       no 242 fol. 152 152 v.
(1) Il n'y a pas de rémission pour homicide en cas de flagrant délit." (Appendice, pp. 175-179)

DU PLESSIS, J.R., "The extension of the ambit of ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid to the defence of provocation -- a strafregwetenskap-like development of doubtful practical value", (1987) 104 South Africa Law Journal 539-550;

DUPUY, Joëlle, La provocation en droit pénal, thèse de Doctorat d'État, droit pénal Université de Limoges (France), 1978, 432 p.; directeur de thèse: Pierre Couvrat; titre noté dans ma recherche; thèse pas encore consulté; thèse non disponible dans les bibliothèques de la région d'Ottawa;

EAMES, Geoffrey M., "Aboriginal Homicide: Customary Law Defences or Customary Lawyers' Defences?" in Heather Strang and Sally-Ann Gerull, eds., Homicide: Patterns, Prevention and control: proceedings of a conference held 12-14 May 1992, Canberra, ACT: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1993, 284 p., at pp. 149-165  (series; conference proceedings series; number 17), ISBN: 0642185832; copy at Solicitor General Canada, Ministry Library and Reference Centre/Solliciteur général Canada, Bibliothèque ministérielle et centre de référence, Ottawa, HV 6535.A8 H6 1992;

EAST,  Edward Hyde, 1764-1847, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 2 vols., London: Butterworth, 1803, lxiv, 1126  p., see "Of Homicide from Transport of Passion, or Heat of Blood", vol. 1, at pp. 232-255;

    "[General principles and division of subject.] Herein is to be considered under what circumstances it may be presumed that the act done, though intentional of death or great bodily harm, was not the result of a cool deliberate judgment and previous malignity of heart, but imputable to human infirmity alone.

    Upon this head it is principally to be observed, that whenever death ensues from sudden transport of passion or heat of blood, if upon a reasonable provocation and without malice, or if upon sudden combat, it will be manslaughter : if without such provocation, or the blood has had reasonable time or opportunity to cool, or there be evidence of express malice, it will be murder.  [Ante, f. 12.  Oneby's case, 2 Ld. Ray 1490.]  For let it be again observed, that in no instance can the party killing alleviate his case by referring to a previous provocation, if it appear by any means that he acted upon express malice.  It becomes then material to consider,

    I. What is a sufficient provocation, and up to what extent, to extunuate the guilt of homicide.  2. How far the law regards heat of blood in mitigation of homicide, independent of the question of reasonable provocation; as in cases of mutual combat.  3. What cases are affected by the Statute 1 Jac. c. 8, commonly called the statute of stabbing.  4. How long the law will allow for the blood being heated under the circumstances, and what shall be considered as evidence of its having cooled, before the mortal blow given." (vol. 1, p. 232; the text in brackets corresponds to the marginal notes)

EBURN, Michael, "A New Model of Provocation in New South Wales", (2001) 25(4) Criminal Law Journal 206-214;

"This article outlines the law of provocation that currently applies in New South Wales and then develops a new model that explains the relationship between the accused and the ordinary person.  This new model is based on the provisiobns of s. 23 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and the High Cort's decision in Green.  It involves a simpler objective test and focuses on the question of the accused's loss of self-conrol rather than the conduct of the deceased.  It is less complex than the traditional model but remains consistent with judicial pronouncements on the role of the ordinary person in provocation." (p. 206)

EDDY, J.P., "The New Provocation: Ruth Ellis and Ernest Jan Fantle - A Study in Contrast", [1958] Criminal Law Review 778-785;

EDITORIAL, "Gender-specific response patterns in criminal defences", (1996), 20 Criminal Law Journal 185-188;

EDITORIAL, "Provocation", (1982) 6 Criminal Law Journal 117-118; discusses the proposed amendments to the New South Wales Crimes Act regarding the sentence for murder and provocation provision;

EDITORIAL, "Provocation - The Need for Radical Reform", (17 July 1980) 130 New Law Journal 618 (1 page only), issue number 5959; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .N49  Location, FTX Periodicals;

EDITORIAL, "Sentencing for manslaughter by provocation revisited", [July 2005] The Criminal Law Review 509-510;

EDWARDS, J. Ll. J., "The Doctrine of Provocation", (1953) 69 The Law Quarterly Review 547-550; copy at the University of Ottawa, KD 322 .L37, Location:  FTX Periodicals;

____________"Provocation and the Reasonable Man -- Another View", [1954] The Criminal Law Review 898; Contents: Factors contributing towards the objective standard in provocation...899; Authenticity of the judicial portrait of the reasonable man...900; Extenuating circumstances and the prerogative of mercy...901; Sight of adultery...902; Confession of adultery...903; Mode and degree of retaliation...904; Mental or physical peculiarities...905; Conclusion...906; copy at the University of Ottawa, KD 7862 .C734, Location: FTX Periodicals;

EDWARDS, Susan S.M., "Abolishing Provocation and Reframing Self-Defence -- the Law Commission's Options for Reform", [2004] The Criminal Law Review 181-197;

"Summary: In October 2003, the Law Commission ("LC") published a detailed Consultation Paper, Partial Defence to Murder,1 reviewing the present law and proposing a series of possible options for reform.  In responding to the LC's invitation, this article recommends that provocation be abolished and self-defence be reframed in order to take into account the inherent 'inequality of arms' between the sexes which requires radical rethinking of the immediacy and proportionality requirements so as to allow women, although not exclusively women, the opportunity for an effective self-defence.  The reasoning is set out in the body of this article, which reviews the law and practice of provocation and self-defence and the obstacles these defenses pose for women, especially battered women who kill.
1 Law Com. No. 173, Partial Defences to Murder, Consultation Paper (October 31, 2003). (p. 181)

___________"Ascribing Intention: The Neglected Role of Modus Operandi -- Implications for Gender", [1999/2000] Contemporary Issues in Law 235-256, see "Modus operandi and provocation" at pp. 245-248;

___________"Battered woman who kill", (5 October 1990) 140 New Law Journal 1380-1381 and 1392;

___________"The erosion of the objective test in provocation: leaving it to the jury? R v Smith: Towards a just law of provocation?", (2001) 23 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 227-238;

___________"Provoking Their Own Demise: From Common Assault to Homicide" in Jalna Hammer and Mary Maynard, 1950-, eds., Women, Violence and Social Control, Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1987,  xi, 213 p. at pp. 152-168, ISBN: 0333417909; 0333417917 (pbk); 0391035150 (pbk.); 0391035142; copy at Ottawa University, HQ 1593 .W65 1987 MRT;

ELLIOTT, Catherine, Comment, "The Partial Defence of Provocation: The House of Lords Decision in Smith", (2000) 64 The Journal of Criminal Law 594-601;

___________"What Future for Volontary Manslaughter?", (June 2004) 68(3) The Journal of Criminal Law 253-263, see "The problem with provocation", at pp. 253-257 and "Provocation: abolition or redefinition?", at pp. 260-261; note: the article examines the Law Commission's Consultation Paper: Partial Defences to Murder, June 2003;

ENGLISH, Peter, Crime, "New Developments in the Law of Provocation I and II", (2 March 1979) 123(9) The Solicitor's. Journal 119-121 and 139-140;

___________"Offences Against the Person - The Criminal Law Revision Committee's Working Paper -- (2) Homicides Other Than Murder", [1977] The Criminal Law Review 79-90, see "Provocation" at pp. 80-83; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;

____________“Provocation and Attempted Murder”, [1973] The Criminal Law Review 727-736; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;

___________"What DID Section Three do to the Law of Provocation?", [1970] The Criminal Law Review 249-267; contents: The legislature's intent in section 3...250; (1) Provocation at common law...256; (2) Decisions involving a consideration of section 3...258; (3) Other provocation cases...259; Walker...261; Phillips v. The Queen...262; The merits of the Mancini rule...264;

ESCOFFIER, Escoffier, Paul-Henri, Cour d'appel d'Orléans. Audience solennelle de rentrée (16 octobre 1891). Les Crimes passionnels devant le jury, discours prononcé par M.  Paul Escoffier, Orléans : impr. de G. Jacob, 1891, 24 p.; titre noté dans ma recherche; non-consulté; ne semble pas disponible dans les bibliothèques canadiennes;

ESMEIN, A. (Adhémar), 1848-1913, "Le délit d'adultère à Rome et la loi Julia de Adulteriis" dans Mélanges d'histoire du droit et de critique: droit romain, Paris: L. Larose et Forcel, 1886, ii, 420 p. aux pp. 395-442; réimpression dans: Scientia Verlag AAlen, 1970; copie à l'Université McGill, Montréal; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, bibliothèque de droit, KJA 190 .E75 1886A; aussi dans (1878) 2 Nouvelle Revue historique de droit français et étranger 1-35 et 397-442, disponible au site Gallica de la Bibliothèque nationale de France à http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?E=0&O=n015814.htm (visionné le 24 janvier 2003);

ESTONIA, Penal Code, 1992, translation, see chapter 4 (offences against the person), § 103, "Homicide in provoked case";

"§ 103.  Homicide in provoked case
Homicide committed in a provoked state which is inflicted suddenly as a result of violence or grave insult by the victim is punishable by up to four years of imprisonment."

FAIRALL, Paul Ames, "The Objective Test in Provocation", (1983) 7 Criminal Law Journal 141-147;

The objective test has been watered down in recent cases, and the 'ordinary person' may now be imbued with many of the offender's personal characteristics.  However, there is a point beyond which the courts will not go.  Identifying that point remains problematic.  The judge's power to withdraw provocation for want of evidence has been the subject of criticism.  However, recent decisions indicate judicial sensivity to the complex problems in this area of law." (p. 142)

FARRIER, David, "The Criminal Law Revision Committee Working Paper on Offences Against the Person", (1977) 40 The Modern Law Review 206-215, see on provocation, pp. 210-211; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .M62  Location: FTX Periodicals;

FEINBERG, Joel, 1926-, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, volume 2, Offense to Others, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, xix, 328 p., see Chapter 14, "Obscene Words and their Functions, II",  at pp. 218-248 with notes at pp. 313-316, ISBN: 019503449X and 0195052153 (pbk.);

FELTOE, G., "Criminal law policy in relation to the defence of provocation", (1983-84) 1-2 Zimbabwe Law Review 140-157; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries; copy at McGill University, Nahum Gelber Law Library/Université McGill, Bibliothèque de droit Nahum Gelber;

FERRERO, G., "Le crime d'adultère: son passé, son avenir", (1894) 9 Archives d'Anthropologie criminelle 392; titre noté dans ma recherche mais article pas encore consulté; aucune copie de ce périodique dans la région d'Ottawa; selon mes recherches, on retrouverait une copie de ce volume numéro 9 à : University of Alberta, Cameron Library;

FINKEL, Norman J., "Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, and Hamlet Brooding: On the Story of the Murder/Manslaughter Distinction", (1995) 74 Nebraska Law Review 742-803; copy at Ottawa University, KFN 69 .N42  Location: FTX Periodicals;

FITZGERALD, P.J. (Patrick John), Criminal Law and Punishment, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962, xi, 279 p., see "Provocation" at pp. 127-129  (series; Clarendon Law Series); copy at the University of Ottawa,  FTX General, KD 7869 .F5 1962;

    "Provocation is not strictly a defence.  It is a mitigating factor to be taken into account when the accused is sentenced.  In murder, however, where the penalty is fixed, provocation cannot be taken into account in this way, and special rules were developed... ." (p. 127)

"The difficulty is to evolve a test to exclude certain characteristics like hot temper, irritability, and drunkenness, things which the accused must fight against and for which he may be responsible, and yet to allow in certain physical or mental idiosyncrasies in fairness to the accused.  At the present the law would seem to be that the jury can put the reasonable man into the shoes but not into the skin of the accused." (p. 129)

FITZPATRICK, Ben and Alan Reed, "Provocation: A Controlled Response", (1999) 12(2) Transnational Lawyer 393-402; also with the same title in (2000) 32 Bracton Law Journal 66-74; copy of the Bracton Law Journal at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;

__________"Sound of Mind and Body: Psychological Characteristics and the Reasonable Man Test in Provocation", (1999) 63 The Journal of Criminal Law 365-370;

FLETCHER, George P., "The Individualization of Excusing Conditions", (1974) 47 Southern California Law Review 1269-1309, on provocation, see footnotes 71-72 at pp. 1291-1292; also published in Michael Louis Corrado, ed., Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law: A Collection of Essays, New York, Garland Pub., 1994, pp. 53-94, ISBN: 0815308256 (series; vol. 831,  Garland  Reference Library of Social Science; vol. 1, Garland Studies in Applied Ehics); also published in Jules L. Coleman, ed., Crimes and Punishments, New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1994, xxiv, 560 p. at pp. 137-177 (series; Philosophy of Law), ISBN: 0815314000;

"The intriguing implication is that where the issue is mitigation, rather than excuse, the common law courts are prepared to move to a relatively more individualized standard." (p. 1292, note 71)

___________Rethinking Criminal Law, Boston: Little, Brown, 1978, xxviii, 898 p., see pp. 242-250 and 513-514; reprint in: Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, ISBN: 0195136950;

     "The primary source of difficulty in the analysis of provocation derives from the failure of the courts and commentators to face the underlying normative issue whether the accused may be fairly expected to control an impulse to kill under the circumstances.  Obviously, there are some impulses such as anger and even mercy (as in the case of the father who killed his neglected child) that we do not expect people to control.  ...  The basic moral question in the law of homicide is distinguishing between those impulses to kill as to which we as a society demand self-control, and those as to which we relax our inhibitions." (pp. 246-247)

___________"The Right and the Reasonable", (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 949-982; also published in in A. Eser et al., eds., Justification and Excuse: Comparative Perspectives, vol. 1, Dobbs Ferry (New York), Transnational Juris Publications, 1987, ISBN: 0929179226, p. 67;

"We lawyers should listen to the way we talk.  If we paused to listen to our pattern of speech, we would be surprised by some of its distinguishing features.  One of the most striking particularities of our discourse is its pervasive reliance on the term 'reasonable.'  We routinely refer to reasonable time, reasonable delay, reasonable reliance, and reasonable care.  In criminal law, we talk incessantly of reasonable provocation, reasonable mistake, reasonable force, and reasonable risk.  Within these idioms pulse the sensibilities of the reasonable person.  For all the supposed concretness of the common law, we can hardly function without this hypothetical figure at the center of legal debate.  We cannot even begin to argue about most issues of responsibility and liability without first asking what a hypothetical reasonable person would do under the circumstances." (p. 949; footnote omitted)
___________"What Is Punishment Imposed For?", (1994) 5 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 101-111;
    "The significant feature of culpability, as it bears on punishment, is that it comes in degrees. The person who kills under provocation or while suffering from diminished capacity acts with partial culpability. In sentencing, the presumptively reduced culpability of those who are contrite or who have made amends has the impact of reducing punishment. This, as I pointed out earlier, is the feature that renders criminal liability different from tort liability.

    The intersection of two factors, then, determines the level of punishment that justly fits the crime. One is the scale of the wrongdoing; the other is the degree of culpability. They come together in this formula devised by Robert Nozick: P = r.H. The level of punishment equals the degree of responsibility (varying from 0 to 1) times the scale of wrongdoing. Causing rather than just risking harm increases the scale of the wrongdoing. Bringing about the harm negligently rather than intentionally reduces the "r" factor.

    Punishment is imposed, therefore, for wrongdoing as reduced by the extent to which culpability is diminished. This way of understanding punishment is lost on those who think of culpability as an independent factor or even as the central factor in structuring criminal liability." (p. 109)

FORELL, Caroline, "Homicide and the Uunreasonable Man [Book Review of: Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom) ", (2003-2004) 72 George Washington Law Review 597-620;

FORELL, Caroline A. and Donna M. Matthews,  A law of her own : the reasonable woman as a measure of man, New York : New York University Press, 2000, xxii,  260 p., ISBN: 0585331987 (electronic bk.) and 0814726763; contents include: " 'Provoked' intimate homicide"; copy at the net Library, Ottawa University; copy at Carleton University, Ottawa, KF9325.F67 (on loan, due 18-07-02); book not consulted yet;

FOSTER, Michael, Sir, 1689-1763, A report of some proceedings on the commission of Oyer  and terminer and goal delivery; for the trial of the  rebels in the year 1746 in the county of Surry, and of crown cases. To which are added discourses upon a  few branches of the crown law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1762, 412 p., see Chapter 5, "Manslaughter" at pp. 290-297; with the same title, reprint in : Abingdon (Oxon): Professional Books Limited, 1982, ISBN: 0862051363;

"[p. 290]



I NOW proceed to that Species of Felonious Homicide which we call Manslaughter, which, as I before observed, the Benignity of our Law as it standeth at present imputeth to Human Infirmity.  To Infirmity which though in the Eye of the Law Criminal, yet is considered as incident to the Frailty of the Human Frame.

    The Cases falling under the Denomination of Manslaughter, where Death ensueth from Actions in themselves Unlawful, but not proceeding  from a Felonious Intention, or from Actions in themselves Lawful, but done without due Care and Circumspection for preventing Mischief, have been already considered under the Title of Accidental Death.  And the Distinction between Manslaughter and Excusable Self-Defence hath been attempted in it's proper Place.

    The Cases falling under the Head of Manslaughter which most frequently occur are those where Death ensueth upon a sudden Affray and in Heat of blood, upon some Provocation given or conceived.

    I have already premised, that whoever would shelter himself under the Plea of Provocation must prove his Case to the Satisfaction of his Jury. The Presumption of Law is against Him, 'till that Presumption is repelled by contrary Evidence.  What degree of Provocation, and under what circumstances Heat of Blood, the Furor brevis, will or will not avail the Defendant is now to be considered.

    [SECT. I.]   SECT. I.   WORDS of Reproach, how grievous soever, are not a Provocation sufficient to free the Party Killing from the Guilt of Murder.  Nor are indecent provoking Actions or Gestures expressive of Contempt or Reproach, without an Assault upon the Person.

    This Rule will, I conceive, govern every Case where the Party Killing upon such Provocation maketh use of a deadly Weapon, or otherwise manifesteth an Intention to

[p. 291]
Kill, or to do some great bodily Harm.  But if He had given the Other a Box on the Ear, or had struck Him with a [Keil. 130. 131] Stick or other Weapon not likely to kill, and had Unluckily and against his Intention Killed, it had been but Manslaughter.

    THE Difference between the Cases is plainly this.  In the Former the Malitia, the Wicked Vindictive Disposition already mentioned, evidently appeareth: in the Latter it is as evidently Wanting.  The Party in the First Transport of his Passion intended to chastise for a Piece of Insolence which few Spirits can bear.  In this Case the Benignity of the Law interposeth in Favour of Human Frailty; in the Other it's Justice regardeth and punisheth the apparent Malignity of the Heart.

    [SECT. 2.]   SECT. 2.  AND it ought to be remembered, that in all other Cases of Homicide upon slight Provocation, if it may be reasonably collected from the Weapon made use of, or from any other Circumstance, that the Party intended to Kill, or to do some great bodily Harm, such Homicide will be Murder.  The Mischief done is irreparable, and the Outrage is considered as flowing rather from brutal Rage or diabolical Malignity than from Human Frailty.  And it is to Human Frailty, and to that Alone, the Law indulgeth in every Case of Felonious Homicide.
        A few Instances may serve for Illustration.
    [I. Hale 473.] A. finding a Trespasser upon his Land in the first Transport of his passion beateth Him, and unluckily happeneth to Kill; this hath been held to be Manslaughter.  But it must be understood, that He beat him, not with a mischievous Intention, but meerly to Chastise for the Trespass, and to deter him from committing the like.  [Keil. 132]  For if He had knocked his Brains out with a Bill or Hedgestake, or had given Him an outragious Beating with an ordinary Cudgel beyond the Bounds of a sudden resentment, whereof He had died, it had been Murder.  For these Circumstances are some of the genuine Symtoms of the Mala Mens, the Heart bent upon Mischief, which, as I have already shewn, enter into the true Notion of Malice in the legal Sense of the Word.

[p. 292]
[Cro. Car. 131. Palm. 545. Jones (W.) 198.] A Parker found a Boy stealing Wood in his Master's Ground, He bound him to his Horse's Tail and beat him.  The Horse took a Fright and ran away, and dragged the Boy on the Ground so that he Died.  This was held to be murder.* For it was a deliberate Act and favoured of Cruelty.

    [Old Bayly Apr. 1704.  MSS. Tracy and Denton.]  THERE being an Affray in the Street, one Stedman a Foot-Soldier ran hastily towards the Combatans. A Woman seeing Him run in that Manner cried out, 'You will not murder the Man will you?'  Stedman replied, 'What is that to You, you Bitch?'  the Woman thereupon gave Him a Box on the Ear, and Stedman struck Her on the Breast with the Pommel of his Sword.  The Woman then Fled, and Stedman pursuing Her stabbed Her in the Back.  Holt was at first of Opinion that this was Murder, a single Box on the Ear from a Woman not being a sufficient Provocation to Kill in this Manner, after He had given Her a Blow in return for the Box on the Ear.  And it was proposed to have the Matter found Special.  But it afterwards appearing in the Progress of the Trial, that the Woman struck the Soldier in the Face with an Iron Patten, and drew a great Deal of Blood, it was held clearly to be no more than Manslaughter.

    The Smart of the Man's Wound, and the Effusion of Blood might possibly keep his Indignation boiling to the Moment of the Fact.

   [Stra. 499. R. v. Tranter and Reason.]  MR. Lutterel being Arrested for a small Debt prevailed on one of the Officers to go with Him to his Lodgings, while the Other was sent to fetch the Attorney's Bill, in order, as Lutterel pretended, to have the Debt and Costs paid. Words arose at the Lodgings about Civility Money, which Lutterel refused to give; and went up Stairs pretending to fetch Money for the Payment of the Debt and Costs, leaving the Officer below.  He soon returned with a Brace of loaded Pistols in his Bosom, which at the Importunity of his Servant He laid down on the Table, saying, He did not intend to hurt the Officers, but he would not be ill-used.
* The cases of immoderate Correction, mentioned already under the Head of Accidental Death, carry this Rule much further than these do.  For Correction with Moderation is certainly Lawful.  But in these Cases the least Blow would have been Unjustifiable.

[p. 293]
The Officer who had been sent for the Attorney's Bill soon returned to his Companion at the Lodgins; and Words of Anger arising Lutterel struck one of the officers on the Face with a Walking-Cane, and drew a little Blood.  Whereupon Both of them fell upon Him.  One stabbed him in nine Places, He all the while on the Ground begging for Mercy and unable to resist them.  And One of them fired one of the Pistols at him while on the Ground, and gave him his Death's Wound.  This is Reported to have been held Manslaughter by Reason of the first Assault with the Cane.

    This is the Case as Reported by Sir John Strange; and an extraordinary Case it is, that all these Circumstances of Aggravation, Two to One, He helpless and on the Ground begging for Mercy, stabbed in nine Places and then dispatched with a Pistol; [See Holt's Opinion in the last Case.] that all these Circumstances, plain Indications of a deadly Revenge or Diabolical Fury, should not outwigh a slight Stroke with a Cane.

    [6. St. Tri. 195] I. MR. Lutterel had a Sword by his Side, which, after the Affray was over, was found Drawn and Broken.  How that happened did not appear in Evidence; for Part of the Affray was at a Time when no Witness was present, Nobody spoke to the Whole.

    2.  WHEN Lutterel laid the Pistols on the Table, He declared that He brought them down, because He would not be forced out of his Lodgings.

    3. HE threatened the Officers several Times.

    4. ONE of the Officers appeared to have been wounded in the Hand with a Pistol-Shot, (for Both the Pistols were Discharged in the Affray) and slightly on the Wrist with some sharp-pointed Weapon: and the Other was slightly Wounded in the Hand with a like Weapon.

     5.  THE Evidence touching Lutterel's begging for Mercy was not that He was on the Ground begging for Mercy; but that on the Ground He held up his Hands AS IF He was begging for Mercy.

    THE Chief-Justice directed the Jury, that if They believed Mr. Lutterel endeavoured to rescue Himself, which

[p. 294]
He seems to think was the Case, and very probably was the Case, it would be Justifiable Homicide in the Officers.  However, as Mr. Lutterel gave the First Blow accompanied with Menaces to the Officers, and the Circumstances of producing loaded Pistols to prevent their taking from his Lodgings, which it would have been their Duty to have done, if the Debt had not been paid or Bail given, He declared IT COULD BE NO MORE than Manslaughter.

    THIS Direction of the Chief Justice the Reporter hath totally omitted.  And therefore I have taken the Liberty to state the Case more largely than otherwise I should have done.  And I cannot help saying, that the Circumstances omitted in the Report are too Material, and enter too far into the true Merits of the Case to have been dropped by a Gentleman of Sir John Strange's Abilities and Known Candour, if He had not been over-studious of Brevity.

    IMPERFECT Reports of Facts and Circumstances, especially in Cases where every Circumstance weigheth something in the Scale of Justice, are the Bane of all Science that dependeth upon the Precedents and Examples of former Times.

    I have always thought Rowly's Case a very extraordinary one [12. Rep. 87.], as it is Reported by Coke, from whom Hale cites it [1. Hale 453.]  The Son fights with another Boy and is beaten; He runs Home to his Father all bloody; the Father takes a Staff, runs three Quarters of a Mile, and beats the other Boy, who dieth of this Beating.  This is said to have been ruled Manslaughter, because done in sudden Heat and Passion.

    SURELY the Provocation was not very grievous.  The Boy had fought with one who happened to be an Overmatch for him, and was worsted; a Disaster slight enough, and very frequent among Boys.

    IF upon this Provocation the Father, after running three Quarters of a Mile, had set his Strength against the Child, had dispatched him with an Hedgestake or any other deadly Weapon, or by repeated Blows with his Cudgel, it must, in My Opinion, have been Murder; since Any of these Circumstances would have been a plain Indication of the Malitia, the Mischievious Vindictive Motive before explained.  But with regard to these Circumstances, with what wea-

[p. 295]
pon or to what Degree the Child was beaten, Coke is totally silent.

    [Cro. Jac. 296.]  BUT Croke setteth the Case in a much clearer Light, and at the same Time leadeth his Readers into the true Grounds of the Judgment.  His words are, 'Rowly struck the Child with a small Cudgel,* of which Stroke He afterwards died.'

    I think it may be fairly collected from Croke's Manner of speaking, that the Accident happened by a single Stroke with a Cudgel, not likely to destroy and that Death did not immediately ensue.  The Stroke was given in Heat of Blood, and not with any of the Circumstances which import the Malitia, the Malignity of Heart attending the Fact already explained, and therefore Manslaughter.  I observe that Lord Raymond [Lord Raym. 1498] layeth great Stress on this Circumstance, that the Stroke was with a Cudgel not likely to Kill.

    [SECT. 3.]   SECT. 3.   THE Rule laid down in the first Section will not hold in Cases where from Words or Actions of Reproach or Contempt, or indeed upon any other sudden Provocation, the Parties come to Blows, no undue Advantage being sought or taken on either Side.

    [1. Hale 456.] A. useth provoking Language or Behaviour towards BB. striketh Him, upon which a Combat ensueth, in which A. is Killed.  This is held to be Manslaughter, for it was a sudden Affray and They fought upon equal Terms. And in such Combats upon sudden Quarrels is mattereth not Who gave the first Blow.

    BUT if B. had drawn his Sword and made a Pass at A. his Sword then undrawn; and thereupon A. had drawn and a Combat had ensued, in which A. had been Killed, this would have been Murder.  For B. by making his Pass, his Adversary's Sword undrawn, shewed that He fought his Blood; and A's Endeavour to defend himself, which He had a Right to do, will not excuse B.  But if B. had first drawn and forborn 'till his Adversary had drawn too, it had been no more than Manslaughter.

    MAWGRIDGE whose Case hath been already mentioned upon another Occasion, upon Words of Anger threw a
  *Godbolt 182. calleth it a Rod, Meaning I suppose a small Wand.

[p. 296]
Bottle with great force at the Head of Mr.Cope, and immediately drew his Sword; Mr. Cope returned a Bottle at the Head of Mawgridge, and wounded Him.  Whereupon Mawgridge stabbed Cope.  This was ruled to be Murder.  For Mawgridge in throwing the Bottle shewed an Intention to do some great Mischief; and his Drawing immediately shewed that He intended to follow his Blow.  And it was Lawful for Mr. Cope being so assaulted to return the Bottle.*  [Lord Raym. 1489.]  The Judgment in this Case was held to be good Law by All the Judges of England at a Conference in the Case of Major Oneby.

    To what I have offered with regard to sudden Recounters let Me add, that the Blood, already too much Heated, kindleth afrest at every Pass or Blow.  And in the Tumult of the Passions, in which meer Instinct Self-Preservation, hath no inconsiderable Share, the Voice of Reason is not heard.  And therefore the Law in Condescension to the Infirmities of Flesh and Blood hath extenuated the Offence.

    [SECT. 4.]    SECT. 4.   BUT in these, and indeed in every other Case of Homicide upon Provocation how great soever it be, if there is sufficient Time for Passion to subside, and for Reason to interpose, such Homicide will be Murder.

    A. findeth a Man in the Act of Adultery with his Wife and in the first Transport of Passion killeth Him; this is no more than Manslaughter.  But had He Killed the Adulterer deliberately and upon Revenge after the Fact and sufficient cooling Time, it had been undoubtedly Murder.  For let it be observed, that in all possible Cases deliberate Homicide upon a Principle of Revenge is Murder.  No Man under the Protection of the Law is to be the Avenger of his own Wrongs.  If they are of such a Nature for which the Laws of Society will give Him an adequate Remedy, thither He ought to resort.  But be they of what Nature soever, He ought to bear his Lot with Patience and remember, that Vengeance belongeth only to the Most High.
        * See Lord Holt's Report of Mawgridge's Case Keil. 119.  The learned Judge in this Case, after a short Introductory Discourse wherein I cannot totally agree with Him, entereth with great Learning and found Reason into the Point upon which the Case turned.  He doth so likewise in the Case of The King and Plummer.

[p. 297]
    [SECT. 5.]   SECT. 5.   UPON this Principle, deliberate Duelling if Death ensueth, is in the Eye of the Law Murder.  For Duels are generally founded in deep Revenge.  And though a Person should be drawn into a Duel, not upon a Motive so criminal, but meerly upon the Punctilio of what the Swordsmen falsly call Honour, That will not Excuse.  For He that Deliberately seeketh the Blood of another upon a private Quarrel acteth in Defiance of all Laws Human and Divine, whatever his Motive may be.

    BUT if, as I said before, upon a sudden Quarrel the Parties fight upon the Spot, or if they presently fetch their Weapons and go into the Field and fight, and One of them falleth, it will be but Manslaughter; because it may be presumed the Blood never cooled.

    IT will be Otherwise if they appoint to fight the next Day, or even upon the same Day at such an Interval as [Keil. 27.] that the Passion might have subsided: or if from any Circumstances attending the Case it may be reasonably concluded, that their Judgment had actually controuled the First Transports of Passion before they engaged.  The same Rule will hold if [Oneby's Case. Stra. 773. Lord Raym. 1489] after a Quarrel they fall into other Discourse or Diversions, and continue so engaged a reasonable Time for cooling."

FREEMAN, C.D., "Restoring Order To The Reasonable Person Test in the Defence of Provocation", (1999) 10 King's College Law Journal 26-47;

FROST, J., "Provocation under the Criminal Code", (1964) 1 Nigerian Law Journal 10; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy in the Ottawa area libraries;

GARÇON, Maurice, 1889-1967, Histoire de la justice sous la IIIe République, Paris : A. Fayard, [1957], 3 volumes, voir le volume 3,  La fin du Régime, 347 p., chapitre III, "Les crimes passionnels" aux pp. 105-135; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General, KJV 3721 .G364 1957 v.3;

"C'est particulièrement sous l'influence d'Alexandre Dumas, fils, que cette transformation s'est opérée et que notamment, pour donner plus de piquant aux intrigues, l'exaltation de la passion poussée jusqu'au droit de tuer, a été vantée et légitimée. [...]  Les auteurs depuis n'ont fait que renchérir et l'art cinématographique n'a rien fait pour apporter un peu de bon sens dans ces divagations de talent.

    Il ne faudrait pas croire par ce développement, que nous attribuons entièrement cet état de chose au théâtre.  Il y aurait là une exagération certaine et qui ne serait pas raisonnable, disons seulement que la littérature porte une très grande part de responsabilté.  Par elle les prétendues théories du 'droit à l'amour' et de 'vivre sa vie' ont pris droit de cité, bousculant les règles banalement admises d'une vie morale plus paisible et, posant des problèmes exceptionnels, les écrivains les ont résolus selon leur humeur imaginative et de la manière la plus propre à faciliter un dénouement ingénieux et commode.  Quelques-uns de ces dénouements ont été portés aux assises et les jurés perdant la notion de l'artificiel ont absous le meurtrier comme ils applaudissent le jeune premier avantageux à la fin du troisième acte.  Ce qu'ils ont oublié un peu trop c'est qu'au théâtre la victime se relève pour saluer en même temps que l'assassin, et qu'aux assises, l'infortuné sur lequel on a tiré et dont généralement on insulte la mémoire a disparu pour toujours de la scène du monde." (pp. 108-109)

GARDNER, John and Timothy Macklem, "Compassion without Respect? Nine Fallacies in  R. v. Smith", [2001] Criminal Law Review 623-635;
"Summary: We argue that the House of Lords' decision on the law of provocation in the recent case of Smith was mistaken in at least nine respects.  In its excusatory doctrines, the criminal law admittedly needs to forge an intelligent response to human diversity in general and social pluralism in particular.  But this decision is not it." (p. 623)
___________"No Provocation without Responsibility: A Reply to Mackay and Mitchell", [2004] The Criminal Law Review 213-218; note: see R.D. Mackay and B.J. Mitchell, "Provoking Diminished Respoonsibility: Two Pleas Merging into One?", [2003] The Criminal Law Review 745;

GARDNER, John, "The mysterious case of the reasonable person", (2001) 51(3) University of Toronto Law Journal 273-308; book review of Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility and the Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998;

___________"The Mark of Responsibility", (2003) 23(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 157-171;

GASSIN, Raymond, Criminologie, deuxième édition, Paris : Dalloz, 1990, xxvii, 766 p. (Collection; Précis Dalloz), ISBN: 2247011713;  copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General, HV 6025 .G28 1990 et à la bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, Ottawa, HV 6026 G37 1990;

GEGAN, Bernard E., "Criminal Homicide in the Revised New York Penal Law", (1966) 12 New York Law Forum 565-592 B, see "Voluntary Manslaughter" at pp. 569-577; copy at Ottawa University, KFN 69 .N49, Location: FTX Periodiocals;

GERMANY/ALLEMAGNE, German Penal Code / Code pénal allemand / Strafgesetzbuch (StGB);

"§ 46.  Principles for the determination of punishment
    (1) The guilt of the offender is the basis for the determination of the punishment.  Consideration must be given to the anticipated effect of punishment on the future life of the offender in society.

    (2) In making its determination, a court shall take into account all the circumstances, both mitigating and aggravating.  In doing so, the following factors shall be examined:

  the motives and aims of the offender;
  the state of mind which may be inferred from the crime, and the exercise of volition involved;
  the extent of breach of duty;
  the manner of perpetration and the wrongfully caused effects of the act;
  the prior life of the offender, his individual and economic circumstances, as well as
  his conduct after the crime, especially his attempts to make restitution.

    (3) Circumstances which already represent the statutory constituent elements of the crime may not be taken into account.

§ 213.  Less serious case of manslaughter
     If the person committing manslaughter, through no fault of his own, had been aroused to anger by the abuse of his own person or of a relative of his or by the grossly insulting behavior of the victim, and committed the homicide while in a state of passion, or the circumstances otherwise indicate the existence of a less serious case, imprisonment from six months to five years shall be imposed."

[The Penal code of the Federal Republic of Germany [of 1975], Translated  by Joseph J. Darby With an Introduction by Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Littleton (Colorado):  F.B. Rothman and London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987, xxvi, 257 p., at pp. 64-65 for § 46 and pp. 176-177 for § 213 (series; The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes; vol. 28), ISBN: 0837700485; Research Note/Note de recherche: available on the internet /disponible sur l'internet Buffalo Criminal Law Center (and click on "Criminal Law Resources on the Internet")].

Principes régissant le calcul de la peine
(1)  La culpabilité de l'auteur est le fondement du calcul de la peine.  Les effets de la peine sur la vie future de l'auteur en société, auxquels on peut s'attendre, doivent être pris en considération.

(2) Lorsqu'il calcule la peine, le tribunal prend en considération les circonstances favorables et défavorables à l'auteur, les unes par rapport aux autres.  Entrent en ligne de compte à cet égard notamment :

- les mobiles et les buts recherchés par l'auteur;
- l'état d'esprit que dénote l'acte délictueux et la volonté qu'il traduit;
- le degré du manquement à ses obligations;
- le mode d'exécution et les effets repréhensibles résultant de l'infraction;
- les antécédents de l'auteur, sa situation personnelle et pécuniaire, ainsi que
- son comportement après l'acte, et plus spécialement ses effiorts pour réparer le dommage.

(3) Les situations, qui font déjà partie de la définition légale de l'infraction ne doivent pas être prises en considération.

Cas d'homicide moins grave
Si celui qui est coupable d'homicide a, sans culpabilité de sa part, été incité à la colère par de mauvais traitements ou une injure grave, infligés à lui-même ou à un de ses proches par la personne tuée, et qu'il a été ainsi entraîné à agir sur le champ, ou s'il s'agit autrement d'un cas moins grave, la peine privative de liberté peut aller de six moins à cinq ans."

[Traduction de Pierre Franck et d'Agnès Guérin-Salem, sous la direction d'Yvonne Marx dans Les nouveaux codes pénaux de langue allemande: Autriche (1974), République démocratique allemande (1968) et République fédérale d'Allemagne (1975), Paris: La  Documentation française avec le concours du Centre français de droit comparé, 1981, 565 p., aux pp. 317-565 (pour le code pénal allemand), et à la p. 346 pour l'art. 46 et à la p. 473, pour l'art. 213 (Collection des codes pénaux européens du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international du Ministère de la Justice, sous la direction de Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx; tome 5), ISBN: 2110006579;

"§ 46. Grundsätze der Strafzumessung. (1) Die Schuld des Täters ist Grundlage für die Zumessung der Strafe. Die Wirkungen, die von der Strafe für das künftige Leben des Täters in der Gesellschaft zu erwarten sind, sind zu berücksichtigen.

(2) Bei der Zumessung wägt das Gericht die Umstände, die für und gegen den Täter sprechen, gegeneinander ab. Dabei kommen namentlich in Betracht:
die Beweggründe und die Ziele des Täters,
die Gesinnung, die aus der Tat spricht, und der bei der Tat aufgewendete Wille,
das Maß der Pflichtwidrigkeit,
die Art der Ausführung und die verschuldeten Auswirkungen der Tat,
das Vorleben des Täters, seine persönlichen und wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse
sowie sein Verhalten nach der Tat, besonders sein Bemühen, den Schaden wiedergutzumachen, sowie das Bemühen des Täters, einen Ausgleich mit dem Verletzten zu erreichen.

(3) Umstände, die schon Merkmale des gesetzlichen Tatbestandes sind, dürfen nicht berücksichtigt werden.

§ 213. Minder schwerer Fall des Totschlags.
War der Totschläger ohne eigene Schuld durch eine ihm oder einem Angehörigen zugefügte Mißhandlung oder schwere Beleidigung von dem getöteten Menschen zum Zorn gereizt und hierdurch auf der Stelle zur Tat hingerissen worden oder liegt sonst ein minder schwerer Fall vor, so ist die Strafe Freiheitsstrafe von einem Jahr bis zu zehn Jahren."
[available on the internet at  http://www.bib.uni-mannheim.de/bib/jura/gesetze/stgb-inh.shtml;

GÈZE, H., De la légitime défense et de ses rapports avec la  provocation.  Étude de droit pénal, thèse, Toulouse, 1904, 166 p.; titre de thèse noté dans ma recherche; thèse non consultée;

GLAZEBROOK, P.R., Case and Comment, "The Bad-tempered but Reasonable'", [1969] Cambridge Law Journal 172-174; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .C329,  Location: FTX Periodicals;

GOLDSTEIN, Matthew A., "The biological roots of heat-of-passion crimes and honor killings", (2002) 21(2) Politics and Life Science 28-37; available at  http://www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/papers/Sprinkle/PUAF_650_Sprinkle/04a_Goldstein.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2004);

"ABSTRACT. 'Heat-of-passion crimes' are committed by jealous men against supposedly unfaithful mates, 'honor killings' by vengeful relatives against female family members who have disgraced them. These terms are imprecise, and they overlap greatly in usage, but they are similarly, and troublingly, guilt-mitigating.  Heat-of-passion crimes and honor killings are universally reported yet vary in incidence culture-to-culture.  While typically among the most violent of domestic attacks, they are to different degrees protected in law.  Nearly every culture has, or until recently has had, defenses to male culpability based on the supposed effects  f provocation. The invention and persistence of these defenses needs explanation. This paper considers a  iological perspective, in which heat-of-passion crimes and honor killings are understood as maladaptive byproducts of an evolved male sexual aggression subject to intensification by external threats to paternal certainty.
Moral and procedural implications of this perspective, as well as its limitations, are discussed." (source: http://www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/papers/Sprinkle/PUAF_650_Sprinkle/04a_Goldstein.pdf, accessed on 17 August 2004)
GOODE, Matthew, "The Abolition of Provocation"  in Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, ed., Partial Excuses to Murder, Leichhardt (N.S.W., Australia):  The Federation Press, 1991, xvii, 287 p. at pp. 37-60, ISBN: 1862870470;
This essay examines the doctrine of provocation with the eventual aim of finding some answer to the question whether the partial defence of provocation should be retained or abolished.  In so doing, it examines the debate about the worth of an objective component in the test for provocation and more generally the arguments for and against the abolition of the defence.  It concludes that the defence of provocation should be abolished." (p. 37)

___________"On Subjectivity and Objectivity in Denial of Criminal Responsibility: Reflections on Reading Radford", (1987) 11 Criminal Law Journal 131-152;

"This article examines the law relating to provocation, automatism and insanity in the context of the recent decision of the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal in Radford.  Particular emphasis is placed on the objective gloss placed on these doctrines by the suggestion that, where the provocation or automatism is 'self-induced', the doctrines will not avail the accused.  In addition, the distinction between insanity and automatism drawn by the phrase 'disease of the mind' is critically analysed." (p. 131)

GOUGH, Stephen, "Taking the Heat out of Provocation", (1999) 19 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 481-493; contents: 1. Proportionality...481; 2. Emotions...484; A. The relevance of emotions...484; B. The effects of emotions...486; C. Grounds for emotions...489; copy at the University of Ottawa, KD 418 .O93  Location: FTX Periodicals;

GOUR, Hari Singh, Sir, 1869-1949, The penal law of India : being an analytical, critical & expository commentary on the Indian penal code (Act No. XLV of 1860), as amended up to date, Diamond Jubilee - 10th ed. / revised by M.C. Desai, Gyanendra Kumar, R.B. Sethi, Allahabad : Law Publishers, 1982-1984, 4 volumes, see Vol. III (Secs. 290 to 367); copy at the Government of India, Information Services, Reference Library, Ottawa;

"It is important to emphasise that the impact of provocation on human frailty is to be judged in the context of the social position and environments of the person concerned.  The restraint which is generally shown by sophisticated persons used to modern living is hardly to be expected in the case of a villager who still regards a wife as his personal property and chattel amenable at all times to his desire for sexual intercourse.5  The law is now well established that Exception 1 to sec.300 can apply only when the accused is shown to have been deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation which is caused by the person whose death is caused.  The test of grave and sudden provocation is whether a reasonable man belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which he was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control and the provocation must be such as would upset not merely a hot-tempered or a highly sensitive person but one of ordinary calmness."
"5. Atma Ram v. State, A.I.R. 1967 Punj. 508 at p. 511."  (p. 2308)


"The statement of law as applicable to India is stated thus by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra6:

'Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of 'grave and sudden' provocation?  No abstract standard can be laid down.  What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values, etc.; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs.  In our vast country there are social groups ranging from the lowest to the highest state of civilisation.  It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with precision; it is for the Court to decide in each case, having regard to the relevant circumstances....'
"6 A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 605 at pp. 629, 630." (pp. 2309-2310)

GRAVEN, Jean, 1899-, "Les problèmes d'application des dispositions légales du 'meurtre par passion' en droit suisse", (1960) Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht/Revue pénale suisse, no. 2, pp. 124-152; titre noté dans ma recherche mais article pas encore consulté; aucune copie dans les bibliothèques de la région d'Ottawa; le professeur Jean Graven est un des grands professeurs de la Suisse qui fut activement impliquement dans l'AIDP (Association internationale de droit pénal);

GRAYCAR, Reg  and Morgan, Jenny,  "Provocation" as seen on 6 November 1998 at: http://uniserve.edu.au/law/pub/teaching_material/genderissues/

GREAT BRITAIN, Criminal Code Bill Commission, Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Consider the Law Relating to Indictable Offences: With an Appendix Containing a Draft Code Embodying the Suggestions of the Commissioners, Command number 2345 in Sessional Papers [British Parliamentary Papers] (1878-79), vol. 20, pp. 169-378 (Chairperson: C.B. Blackburn); also published in Legal Administration Criminal Law, Dublin: Shannon University Press, 1971, pp. 369-579 (series; Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers: Royal Commission Select Committee and Other Reports on the Criminal Law with Proceedings Minutes of Evidence Appendix and Index; vol. 6), ISBN: 0716511428, copy at the University of Ottawa, law library, FTX General, KD 7850 .I75 1968 v.6;  research notes: this code is referred to as the E.D.C. or English Draft Code of 1879; James Fitzjames Stephen, infra,  was one of the members;

"Section 176.
    Culpable homicide, which would otherwise be murder, may be reduced to manslaughter if the person who causes death does so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation.

    Any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control may be provocation, if the offender acts upon it on the sudden and before there has been time for his passion to cool.

    Whether any particular wrongful act or insult, whatever may be its nature, amounts to provocation, and whether the person provoked was actually deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation which he received, shall be questions of fact:  Provided that no one shall be deemed to give provocation to another only by doing that which he had a legal right to do, or by doing anything which the offender incited him to do in order to provide the offender with an excuse for killing or doing bodily harm to any person:

    *Provided also, that an arrest shall not necessarily reduce the offence from murder to manslaughter because the arrest was illegal, but if the illegality was known to the offender it may be evidence of provocation.

    * [marginal note] It is doubtful whether this does not alter the present law.  R. v. Hood, 1 Moo. C.C. 281.  If it does it is the only case in which the Draft Code makes murder which is not murder at present."
(pp. 100-101 of command paper 2345; pp. 268-269 in Sessional Papers)


    "There is no substantial difference between the provisions of the Draft Code and the Bill dealing with provocation, though the language and arrangement differ.  Each introduces an alteration of considerable importance into the common law.  By the existing law the infliction of a blow or the sight by the husband of adultery committed with his wife may amount to provocation which would reduce murder to manslaughter.  It is possible that some other insuffereable outrages might be held to have the same effect.  There is no definite authoritative rule on the subject, but the authorities for saying that words can never amount to a provocation are weighty.  We are of opinion that cases may be imagined where language would give a provocation greater than any ordinary blow.  The question whether any particular act falls or not within this line appears to us to be pre-eminently a matter of degree for the consideration of the jury." (pp. 24-25 of command paper 2345; pp. 192-193 in Sessional Papers)

___________Criminal Law Revision Committee, Working Paper on Offences Against the Person August 1976, London: H.M.S.O. 1976, iv, 74 p., see "Provocation: at pp. 19-23 (paragraphs 48 to 60), (series; working paper;); copy at Carleton University, Ottawa, UK1 HO 700 76.W55; copy at Ottawa University, FTX Location, KD 7876 .A2555 176;

"53.  In this country the law on this matter has ben indirectly effected by the introduction of the defence of diminished responsibility.  It is now possible for a defendant to set up a combined defence of provocation and diminished responsibility, the practical effect being that the jury may return a verdict of manslaughter if they take the view that the defendant suffered from an abnormality of mind and was provoked.  In practice this may mean that a conviction of murder will be ruled out although the provocation was not such as would have moved a person of normal mentality to kill.

54.  We think that the test of provocation should be reformulated so that the accused is judged with due regard to any disability, physical or mental, from which he suffered.  In our view, in place of the reasonable man test there should be a requirement that provocation is sufficient if, on the facts as they appeared to the accused, it constitutes a reasonable excuse for the loss of self-control on his part.  Such a test would be more liberal than the present law.  In particular, it would enable any physical characteristics of the accused to be taken into account.  In a case such as Bedder the jury would be able to have regard to his sexual impotence in deciding whether he had a reasonable excuse for losing his self-control.


57.  By way of restriction of the defence, we think that it should apply only to loss of self-control arising suddenly upon the provoking event, and not to cases where the accused's reaction is greatly delayed.  This would restate the existing law.  However, the jury could continue to take previous provocations into account where the present insult brought the accused to flashpoint." (pp. 21-22; notes omitted)

___________Criminal Law Revision Committee, Report, 14th: Offences against the Person, London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, [1980], viii, 150 p., see "Special Defences to Murder Charges -- provocation and Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 33-44 (series; Command 7844), ISBN:  0101784406;

___________Her Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law, Fourth Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law, command number 168 in Sessional Papers [British Parliamentary Papers] (1839), vol. 29, pp. 233-430; also published in Reports From The Royal Commission On Revising and Consolidating The Criminal Law With Appendices and Index 1834-41, vol. 3, Legal Administration Criminal Law, Dublin, Shannon University Press, 1971, pp. (series; Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers; vol. 3), ISBN: 0716511428;

    "[Provocation] We think it proper to make some observations upon another and very important class of cases, in which the question whether the offence has amounted to murder, or merely to manslaughter, has been said to depend on implied malice, and as such to be a question of law, with a view to show that the question is in truth one of fact and not of law.  We allude to the class of cases where, some degree of provocation having been offered, the question is whether under the circumstances of the return made by the offender his offence shall be accounted murder, or shall be regarded as extenuated by the provocation, and to amount to manslaughter only.

    The law merely ordains that a ferocious excess of violence, far beyond what the occasion called for, and which, therefore, cannot be attributed to mere heat and passion excited by the occasion, shall not be justified, but shall be accounted murder; but the law cannot define or decide generally in what circumstances such excess shall be deemed to consist.  This, we think ought to be treated as matter of fact under the circumstances of each particular case.

    If upon a slight blow given, the party struck returned a moderate blow not likely to prove fatal, and death ensued, it might no doubt be decided as matter of law, on the particular facts proved, that it was not murder.  If, in a similar case, the offended party were for a great length of time to continue his blows, and never to desist until he had ascertained that life was extinguished, here again it might be easy to pronounce that the death resulted not from any sudden heat or passion which the first blow could have occasioned, but that the excess was attributable only to a deliberate intention to kill; yet intermediate cases, lying between these extremes, could only be determined as questions of fact.  A jury having all the circumstances before them might in every case be able to decide whether the limits due to excited passion had been transgressed so as to compel them to attribute the excess to deliberate malice; but they could seldom by their verdict give such a description of the magnitude of the provocation, the force of passion excited, the manner and continuance of the return made, the comparative strength of the parties, which, in a case at all doubtful, would enable a court to decide the question as a matter of law; -- still less would it be possible, à priori, to define by any general rules what should constitute such a clearly malicious excess as would amount to murder.

    The efforts which Mr. Justice Foster makes to reconcile the cases on this subject, and bring them within the scope of a general rule of law, show the difficulty of the undertaking; for although he may have succeeded in proving that in particular cases, correct reports being selected and the circumstances carefully examined, the conclusions were reasonable, this merely shows that they contravened no rule of law, but were such as a jury might reasonably attain to in point of fact; but no rule of law is deducible for judging in other cases which occur under different circumstances, and where inferior degrees of provocation are given, or a more offensive or mortal weapon used in making the return.  The father is decided to have been guilty of manslaughter only, in killing another who had beaten the son, because he used only a small stick and not a cudgel, whence it may be inferred that if he had in fact used a cudgel with the same result, the crime would have amounted to murder; but this seems to afford no rule for judging of intermediate cases where a father, under the like provocation, uses a larger stick or a smaller cudgel.  It is obviously impossible that the law should fix any certain boundary by means of such limits.  The law may pronounce whether any extenuating occasion of provocation existed, but it is for the jury to decide whether the offender acted solely on that provocation, or was guilty of a malicious excess in respect of the instrument used or the manner of using it.

    Where the provocation is apparently slight, and death be immediately inflicted in return with a deadly weapon, it may be said that antecedent malice may be inferred, or that the disproportion between the alleged insult and the return made is too great to allow such an effect to be attributed to so slight a cause.  The question, however, cannot be one of mere presumption or inference independently of inquiry, and, therefore, cannot be a question of law, if it be possible that, in point of fact, the insult offered excited such a state of passion and want of self-control as occasioned the act.  It would be impossible, we think, to prescribe any limits of disproportion beyond which the province of the jury should be excluded, and the question should be treated as a mere question of law.  On the other hand, disproportion in such a case is always an important circumstance for the consideration of the jury, to guide them to the conclusion whether the offender really acted under the influence of passion excited by provocation.

    The cases put by Mr. Justice Foster to illustrate his doctrine, that the question of extenuation is one of law, do not seem to support that position; they are merely extreme cases, in which no doubt can occur; except it be a doubt in point of fact; and the latter instances cited seem clearly to be cases of mere manslaughter, even independently of any provocation given.  He says, 'The rule will, I conceive, govern every case where the party killing, on such provocation, maketh use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise manifesteth an intention to kill, or to do some great bodily harm; but if he had given the other a box on the ear, or had struck him with a stick or other weapon not likely to kill, and had unluckily, against his intention, killed, it had been but manslaughter.'  The latter branch of this observation seems to be wholly independent of the question of provocation; for, supposing no provocation whatsoever to have been given, and that one unlawfully gives another a box on the ear, or strikes with a stick or weapon not likely to kill, and unluckily, and against his intention, kills, it is difficult, on any just principle, to make it wilful murder.  The offender, in fact, neither intends to kill, nor to do great bodily harm, nor voluntarily puts life in peril by using means likely to kill.  In such a case, therefore, there can be no malice express or implied." (pp. 257-258)



ART. 40.
    [When Homicide is extenuated.]  The guilt of the offender is extenuated where the act, being done under the influence of passion from sudden provocation, or of fear, or of alarm, which for the time suspends or weakens the ordinary powers of judgment and self-control, is attributable to transport of passion or defect of judgment so occasioned, and not to a deliberate intention to kill or do great bodily harm.

ART. 41.
    Where passion is excited by any act done, or attempted or threatened to be done, of an injurious or insulting character to the person of the party killing, or of any other person, or by any other grave cause of provocation of the like character offered to the party killing, or any other person, (h) such cause shall be deemed to be sufficient to extenuate the guilt of killing; provided that, in fact, the killing be attributable to heat of blood so occasioned, and not to a deliberate intention to kill or do great bodily harm, regard being especially had to the kind and degree of violence used as compared with the cause of provocation.
    (h) Tooley's Case, 2 Lord Raymond, 1296; 1 East's P.C. 325.  Foster, 291; 1 Hale's P.C. 473; 1 Haw. P.C. cap 31, s. 34; Fray's Case, 1 East's P.C. 236.

ART. 42.
    [Homicide is not extenuated when cause of provocation so slight that the killing cannot be attributed to heat of blood.]  It is otherwise where, in respect of a slight cause of provocation, a return is made so excessive and disproportionate to the cause of provocation that the killing cannot be attributed to mere heat of blood arising from the provocation given.

ART. 43.
    The rule contained in the last preceding Article applies whensoever, upon provocation given by mere words, or gestures of reproach, contempt, or derision, the party provoked uses a deadly weapon or otherwise makes a return wholly disproportionate to the affront offered.(i)

    (i) We have experienced great dificulty in framing these rules respecting provocation.  It is not every trivial cause of provocation which ought to be considered as an extenuation of the crime, even although a violent and irascible person was, in fact, excited by that cause to a pitch of passion which, had it arisen from a just cause, might, by reason of the temporary suspension of the judgment, have properly extenuated the offence.  To allow this in respect of every trivial causes of affront would, if it did not encourage sudden outbreaks of ungovernable passion, at least weaken a salutary check, and withold a signal mark of dispprobation stamped by the authority of the law.  In this respect the Bavarian and several other German codes, by admitting generally as an extenuation of homicide the existence of passion, however caused, have introduced a dangerous latitude into the law on this subject.  On the other hand, as a necessary allowance for human infirmity, and the actual subjugation of the judgment to uncontrollable passion are the grounds of extenuation, it is manifest that to punish a man as a murderer by virtue of any peremptory rule limiting the cause of provocation, may be in effect to inflict punishment not so much in respect of the particular act of deliberate malice, as of a want of habitual control over a mind naturally impetuous and ready to break forth on slight occasions.  We have framed the above Article as nearly as we could in conformity with the authorities, which, whilst they, in many instances, recognize very slight causes of extenuation, do not extend an express negative beyond the limits of our rule.  It seems to us, however, to be very questionable whether this rule, large as it may seem, is strickly in accordance with principle, for words or gestures may often be infinitely more irritating and provoking than a personal injury of a trivial nature.  It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to define all the causes of provocation which ought to extenuate homicide, and we do not see any mode by which the object of the law can be satisfactorily accomplished, unless it be by making the existence of reasonable provocation, within certain limits, a matter of fact to be decided by a jury.  In France, the difficulty has been in a great degree evaded by the law introduced in 1832, enabling juries to find 'attenuating circumstances;'  and though we think a general law of this kind is liable to serious objection, the occasional introduction of a similar principle, where precise definition is impracticable, might perhaps be desirable.  The following remarks of a distinguished foreign jurist upon this subject appear to us to be just. 'Le même fait ne produit pas toujours une provocation également intense, ni une excuse également légitime.  Un fait négligé par la loi peut devenir, dans des circonstances données, une provocation violente, irrésistible, et légitimer l'atténuation plus encore qu'un fait matériellement plus grave.  S'il y a des cas où la provocation doive exempter de toute peine, il peut être utile que ces cas soient déterminés par la loi, comme il est utile que la loi elle-même détermine quels sont les crimes que nulle provocation ne peut rendre excusables.  Mais une fois le principe d'excuse par la provocation étant admis, c'est organiser une justice bien grossière et souvent bien embarrassante pour les juges que de tracer à l'avance le cercle où ils devront nécessairement se renfermer dans une matière sujette a [sic] tant de variations et de nuances diverses.'  Rossi, Traité de Droit Pénal, liv. ii, chap 21.

ART. 44.
    [When an intrerval occurs between the provocation and the killing, it is a question of fact if the killing is to be attributed to provocation.]  If an interval occur between the provocation given and the act done, it is a question of fact whether the passion excited by such provocation had subsided or still continued, and if it continued, whether the act was attributable to transport of passion or defect of judgment so occasioned, and not to a deliberate intention to kill or do great bodily harm. (k)

    (k) This seems to be properly a question of fact in any doubtful case; it is impossible to lay down any rules of law for determining whether the influence of passion has or not ceased to operate, -- still less to precribe any positive interval as 'a reasonable time for cooling.'   In Major Oneby's Case, 1 East's P.C. 253, after a quarrel and mutual violence between the prisoner and the deceased, somewhat more than an hour had elapsed.  When the company separated, the parties fought with swords, and the deceased recieved his death wound.  The judges were of opinion that under the circumstances there was reasonable time for cooling.  It is remarkable that, in coming to this conclusion, some circumstances were relied on which seem rather to have tended to raise the opposite inference.  It would be a vain attempt to ascertain the subsidence of passion by any technical rules.  Time itself, one of the most important circumstances for judging, can be of little value as a rule, independently of the nature of the provocation; the intensity of passion which it was likely to occasion depending on a multitude of circumstances which set any attempt at enumeration or definition at defiance.  The following, which have been suggested by learned writers as some of the tests for deciding on the question as matter of law, are in truth nothing more than ordinary evidence, such as is proper to be offered to a jury to decide on matter of fact; --'If, between the provocation offered and stroke given, he (the prisoner) fall into other discourse or diversions, and continue so engaged a reasonable time for cooling, or if he take up and pursue any other business or design not connected with the immediate object of his passion nor subservient thereto, so that it may reasonably be supposed that his intention was once called from the subject of provocation.' -- 1 East's P.C., 252.  If upon a provocation received, one party deliberately and advisedly denounce vengeance against the other, as by declaring that he will 'have his blood,' or the like, and afterwards carry his design into execution, he will be guilty of murder, although the death happened so recently after the provocation, as that the law might, apart from such evidence of express malice, have imputed the act to unadvised passion.  But where fresh provocation intervenes between preconceived malice and the death, it ought clearly to appear that the killing was upon the antecedent malice;  which it may be difficult in some cases to show satisfactorily if the new provocation were a grievous one.  In such cases, says Hawkins, it shall not be presumed that they fought on the old grudge, unless it appears by the whole circumstances of the fact. -- 1 Haw. P.C., b. 1, cap. 31, s. 30.

ART. 45.
    [The plea of provocation is available if a stranger be accidentally killed.]  The plea of provocation is available, although the offender by accident kill not the party who offered the provocation, but some other person. (l)

    (l) Fost. Disc. II. c. s. 3.  For the intention of the offender is no more criminal than if he had killed the party guilty of provocation.  See also 1 East's P.C. 231, 245.

ART. 46.
    [When not available.] The plea of provocation is not available where the offender either seeks the provocation as a pretext for killing or doing great bodily harm, or endeavours to kill or do great bodily harm before provocation given. (m)

    (m) See the Prefatory Remarks, p. 16." (pp. 269-271)

___________Her Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law, Seventh Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law, command number 448 in Sessional Papers [British Parliamentary Papers] (1843), vol. 19, pp. 1; also published in Reports From The Royal Commission On The Criminal Law With Appendices and Index 1843-45, vol. 4, Legal Administration Criminal Law, Dublin, Shannon University Press, 1971, pp. 9-295 (series; Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers; vol. 4), ISBN: 0716511428;

___________Home Office, Advisory Council on the Penal System, Sentences of Imprisonment: A Review of Maximum Penalties.  Report of the Advisory Council on the Penal System, London : H.M. Stationery Office, 1978, viii, 255 p.; note: the Advisory Council took the position that the mandatory punishment for murder should be abolished; copy at the library of Parliament, Ottawa, Br. B, HV 8713 G73 A 35;

"244.  Although murder has been traditionally and distinctively considered the most serious crime, it is not a homogeneous offence but a crime of considerable variety. It ranges from deliberate cold-blooded killing in pursuit of purely selfish ends to what is commonly referred to as 'mercy killing'.  Instead of automatically applying a single sentence to such an offence, we believe that sentences for murder should reflect this variety with correspondingly variable terms of imprisonment or, in the exceptional case, even with a non-custodial penalty.  This is primarily because we do not think that anyone should, without the most specific justification, be subjected to the disadvantages which we see in indeterminate sentencing (see paragraph 226).  It is also because we cannot believe that the problems of predicting future behaviour at the time of conviction are inherently more difficult in a murder case than in any other case where there is a measure of instability, or that judges are any less able to make predictions or to assess degrees of culpability in murder cases than in any others.  But it is also because efforts to alleviate the harshness of the mandatory penalty have led to complications in legal proceedings for which we believe there can be no proper justification.

245.  The efforts at alleviation to which we refer are, first of all, the two special defences of provocation and diminished responsibility which, if successful, reduce the conviction to manslaughter.  Although a conviction for manslaughter may be considered less of a stigma than a conviction for murder, to the offender the importance difference often is that the lesser conviction avoids the mandatory penalty.  The jurisprudence that has developed out of this defence demonstrates the conceptual difficulties of seeking to mitigate a penal consequence via the substantive law.  Provocation may be a factor in any crime; it can and does properly affect the sentence passed on the offender, but only in this one case does it reduce the finding of guilt to a lesser offence.  Similarly, the legal concept which enables the defence of diminished responsibility, under section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, to reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter, creates difficulties.  If the mental incapacity is not sufficient to negative the requisite mental element for murder, there are problems in describing the offence as any other crime.  If judges had discretion in sentencing, the issues of provocation and diminished responsibility could be considered in their proper place, as mitigating factors in the sentencing process." (paragraphs 244 and 245, p. 109)


"The change in the penalty for murder that we propose will throw up some important questions: what will be, for example, the distribution of determinate sentences for the different types of murder, and to what extent will defences of diminished resoponsibility and provocation be made redundant?" (paragraph 36, p. 14)

___________Homicide Act 1957, section 3;

"Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury shall take into account everything both done and said according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable man."
___________House of Commons,  Bill 178, Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill, 1878 in  Sessional Papers [British Parliamentary Papers] (1878), vol. 2, pp. 5-249, see sections 136-137 at  pp. 85-86; research notes: Bill 178 was drafted by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen and his comments on that Bill are in GREAT BRITAIN, House of Commons,  "Memorandum [by Sir James Stephen] 'Showing the ALTERATIONS proposed to be made in the existing Law by the CRIMINAL CODE (INDICTABLE OFFENCES) Bill [Bill 178], if Amended, as proposed by the Attorney General'", infra;

   Homicide, which would otherwise be murder, is not murder, but manslaughter, if the person who causes death does so in the heat of passion, caused by sudden provocation.

    Provocation means any wrongful act or omission of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person aggrieved thereby of the power of self-control.

    Whether any particular act or omission amounts to provocation shall be a question of fact, provided that no one shall be deemed to give provocation to another only by doing that which he had a legal right to do.


    Provocation shall not extenuate the guilt of homicide if it is sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing bodily harm to any person, nor unless the person provoked is at the time when he does the act actually deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation which he received, and in deciding the question whether this was or was not the case, regard shall be had to the nature of the act by which the offender causes death, to the time which elapsed between the provocation and the act which caused death, to the offender's conduct during that interval, and to all other circumstances tending to show the state of his mind."

___________House of Commons, Select Committee on Homicide Law Amendment Bill, Special Report from the Select Committee on Homicide Law Amendment Bill; Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Appendix, command number 315 dans Sessional Papers [British Parliamentary Papers] (1874), vol. 9, pp. 471-556 et 771-786 (index) (Président : R. Lowe); also published in Legal Administration Criminal Law, Dublin: Shannon University Press, 1971, pp. 369-579 (series; Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers: Royal Commission Select Committee and Other Reports on the Criminal Law with Proceedings Minutes of Evidence Appendix and Index; vol. 6), ISBN: 0716511428, copy at the University of Ottawa, law library, FTX General, KD 7850 .I75 1968 v. 6; research notes:  James Fitzjames Stephen is called as a witness; the Bill being studied by the Committee is Bill 44, Homicide Act, 1874 (long title: A Bill to consolidate and amend the law relating to homicide), Sessional papers (1874), vol. 2, at p. 365;.

___________House of Commons, "Memorandum [by Sir James Stephen] 'Showing the ALTERATIONS proposed to be made in the existing Law by the CRIMINAL CODE (INDICTABLE OFFENCES) Bill [Bill 178], if Amended, as proposed by the Attorney General'", number 276 in Sessional Papers [British Parliamentary Papers] (1878), vol. 63, pp. 159-175, see p. 165 for Stephen's comments on his "Clause 136 Provocation"; research note # 1: for Parliamentary Paper number 276,  the page is p. 7;  research note # 2: for Bill 178, see GREAT BRITAIN, House of Commons, Bill 178, Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill, 1878, supra;

"CLAUSE 136.
    By the present law hardly any provocation seems to be sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughtler, except a blow, or the sight of adultery committed with the offender's wife, though the matter is not absolutely clear.  By clause 136 the jury would in all cases have to consider whether the provocation given was such as to deprive the offender of the power of self-control."

___________House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment, Volume I - Report and Appendices, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office Office, 1989, 126 p., see pp. 27-31 on "Defences to Murder" (series; HL Paper 78-I, Session 1988-89), ISBN: 0104868899 (Président : L. Nathan); Research Note: this report has two other volumes: Volume II - Oral Evidence, Part I, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1989, [iv], 338 p., (series; HL Paper 78-II, Session 1988-89), ISBN: 010486589X; and Volume III: Oral Evidence, Part 2, and Written Evidence, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1989,  [iv] and  339-678 pp., (series; HL Paper 78-III, Session 1988-89), ISBN: 0104866896;

"[p. 27]

Provocation and diminished responsibility

    77. In England and Wales, although all the elements of murder described above are proved, the defendant must be acquitted of murder and convicted of manslaughter if

(a) he was provoked to lose his self-control by something said or done, which was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did; or
(b) he was suffering from an abnormality of mind which substantially impaired his mental responsibility for the act or omission in question (diminished responsibility).

    78.  In Scotland, diminished responsibility and provocation are also available as defences to murder.  However, provocation is defined rather more narrowly in Scotland from than in England and Wales.  In Scotland, it is required that:
    'there must have been actual injury or alarming threats producing reasonable perturbation'
for provocation to be made out.  The Lord Justice General (Q 2072) commented that there was a general feeling in Scotland that the defence should be widened, and said  that a re-consideration of the substance of the defence would be timely.


    80. The primary function of the defences of diminished responsibility and provocation and the offence of infanticide is to free the judge from the duty to impose a mandatory sentence, originally a sentence of death and, since 1965, a sentence of life imprisonment, when the specified conditions are satisfied.  He is enabled to impose whatever sentence he thinks appropriate to the particular facts of the case.  If the mandatory sentence were to be abolished, there would then be a strong case for abolishing these defences as well.  Their primary function would have disappeared.  Abolition of the defences would bring the law of murder into line with the principles of the rest of the criminal law.  The defences are peculiar to the law of murder.  For example, a person charged with causing grievous bodily harm with intent, contrary to section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, may have been acting under provocation or with diminished responsibility or both....  These matters are no defence to the charge but will be taken into account by the judge in imposing sentence.  If the judge can do this adequately for an offenceunder section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, or any other offence (and the law assumes he can), then he can do so on a charge of murder.

    81.  This was the approach of the Advisory Council on the Penal System, the Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders1 (which was concerned only with diminished responsibility) and, at one time, the Law Commission.  Some of those who submitted evidence to the Committee, including three of the Judges who expressed views were of like mind.  But a majority of the Criminal Law Revision Committee2 saw virtue in retaining the defences even if the judge was given an unfettered discretion in sentencing for murder, for the following reasons:
    (i) The jury's verdict, accepting or rejecting the defence, would assist the judge in sentencing;
    (ii) a jury might be relunctant to convict of murder in a clear case of provocation or diminished responsibility and might acquit a guilty person altogether if told that the alternative of manslaughter was not open to them;
    (iii) the finding of provocation or diminished responsibility may enable the public to understand why a seemingly lenient sentence has been passed on a person who has taken another's life.
1 Cmd. 6244, Chapter 19.
2 Fourteenth Report, paragraph 76.

[p. 28]

    82.  The Law Commission is now of a similar opinion: even if the sentence became discretionary the defences would serve the valuable function of removing certain specific categories of acts from the stigma attaching to a conviction for murder and of ensuring that the facts were determined after a proper hearing before a jury.  The Lord Chief Justice stressed that it is not right that a person acting under diminished responsibility or provocation should be subjet to the stigma of a conviction of murder (Q 831).

Opinion of the Committee
    83.  The Committee agree with the opinion and recommend that these defences should be retained, whether or not the sentence for murder were to become discretionary.


The substance of the defences
    85.  The evidence to the Committee includes some weighty criticism of the substance of the defences.  Judges criticised the defence of diminished responsibility as being difficult to explain to a jury.  The Lord Chief Justice and nine judges thought that the defence of provocation should be reconsidered, considering the 'reasonable man' test  to be logically unworkable or as rendering the defence almost unworkable if it were strickly applied by juries (p 565, Q 831).  The Committee have not considered in detail the technical problems of the defences of murder, because this matter was outside their terms of reference.  The Committee note, however, that these matters have already been reconsidered by the Criminal Law Revision Committee in their Fourteenth Report,1 and that their recommendations (which, inter alia, would eliminate the concept of the reasonable man) have been incorporated by the Law Commission into the draft Criminal Code clauses 56-58. ....
1 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fourteenth Report, 1980, Cmnd. 7844, paragraphs 75-99." (vol. 1, pp. 27-28)


"Synopsis of views of the judiciary, prepared by Lord Justice Glidewell
Question 2
    Do the defences of
    (a) provocation, and
    (b) diminished responsibility and
    (c) the offence of infanticide
operate satisfactorily or they require amendment, and if so in what respect?

    Twenty-two of the Judges answered this question, or parts of it.  Four of these (Stocker LJ, Evans, Otton and Alliott JJ) think that these defences operate satisfactorily, so that the law with regard to them needs no amendment.

    In relation to 2(a), provocation, they are joined by three more Judges, French, Leonard and McNeill JJ, who think that this defence, though sometimes adopted by a jury as an easy option, generally operates satisfactorily.  On the other hand, nine Judges (Mustill and Mann LJJ, Nolan, McCowan, Tudor, Kennedy, Ognall, Hutchinson and Rougier JJ) with varying degrees of emphasis, consider this defence needs reconsideration or redefinition, or is absurd.  Mustill LJ regards it 'a nonsense as a substantive defence...The right course is to abolish the defence and make provocation a ground for mitigating sentence.'

    These nine Judges are unanimous in regarding the 'reasonable man' test as logically unworkable, or as rendering the defence almost ineffective if it were strickly applied by juries.  Mann LJ once had a juryman point out to him that the test was absurd.  McCowan J says: 'Provocation as defined at the moment should very rarely be found by a jury, but in fact it often is, because they obviously pay scant attention to that part of the definition which brings in the reasonable man.  As long as it is left to a jury to determine whether the procation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did, we must expect over-generous verdicts of manslaughter.'  His remedy is to suggest stiffer sentences for some cases of provocation manslaughter." (vol. 2, pp. 564-576)

___________Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fourteenth Report: Offences against the Person, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980, v. 150 p., see "Provocation" at pp. 33-38, paragraphs 77 to 90; the Recommmendations at pp. 43-44;  and at pp. 130-131, "The summary of recommendations and Concluding Remarks" on "Special defences to murder charges -- provocation and diminished responsibility"  (Command number 7844);

"[p. 35]
    79.  In our Working Paper2 we proposed that the reasonable man test should be replaced by the test of reasonable excuse.  Furthermore we tentatively proposed that the test of reasonable excuse should apply only to the defendant's loss of self-control3 and not to what the defendant did by way of reaction to the provocation.  These proposals produced a number of comments, including some from bodies who were particularly knowledgeable about the underlying problems, such as the Law Commission, the Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar, the Police Federation and the Association of Chief Police Officers.  The Law Commission, who would like to see the mandatory life sentences for murder abolished, suggested that if it is, the special defences to murder should go and in their place the jury should be empowered to bring in a verdict of murder (or unlawful homicide if murder as a separate offence goes too) with extenuating circumstances which would embrace all the relevant mitigating circumstances.  The other named bodies agreed in the main with our suggestions as did many others.

    80.  We considered all the comments carefully, particularly those which had been critical of our suggestions.  As regards the proposal of the Law Commission, we were of opinion that a general defence of extenuating circumstances to a charge of murder would let in too many issues far removed from traditional ideas of relevance: for example, it would allow the defendant to call witnesses to a genuineness of his beliefs whether political, social or religious, where he claims that the killing was motivated by one of them.

    81.  Our principal recommendation is that the law of provocation should be reformulated and in place of the reasonable man test the test should be that provocation is a defence to a charge of murder if, on the facts as they appeared to the defendant, it can reasonably be regarded as a sufficient ground for the loss of self-control leading the defendant to react against the victim with a murderous intent.  This formulation has some advantage over the present law in that it avoids reference to the entirely notional 'reasonable man', directing the jury's attention instead to what they themselves consider reasonable -- which has always been the real question.

    82.  A number of commentators queried one detail of the suggestions made in the Working Paper, namely that provocation would be sufficient if, on the facts as they appeared to the accused, it constituted a reasonable excuse for the loss of self-control on his part. They did not like the phrase 'a reasonable excuse': they preferred 'a reasonable explanation' because there never could be a reasonable excuse for taking another's life.  We found this matter difficult to resolve.  We accepted the criticisms made of the word 'excuse' but remained
2Paragraphs 55 and 56.
3See also paragraph 84 below.

[p. 36]
of opinion that 'explanation' was not a suitable word either.  We finally decided that 'a sufficient ground for the loss of self-control' would be an easier phrase for juries to understand and apply.

    83.  In our Working Paper we suggested, and now recommend, that the defendant should be judged with due regard to all the circumstances, including any disability, physical or mental, from which he suffered.  The jury may return a verdict of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility, or by reason of both diminished responsibility and provocation.  If our recommendation as to provocation is accepted, there may, in the future, be many more cases where the jury would return a verdict based upon both provocation and diminished responsibility. Nevertheless, the judge can be left to decide whether having regard to the evidence in any particular case the jury should be asked to signify upon what basis they are returning the verdict.

    84.  We propose no change in the present rule whereby the defence applies only where the defendant's act is caused by the provocation and is committed suddenly upon the provoking event, not to cases where the defendant's violent reaction has been delayed;  but the jury should continue to be allowed to take into consideration previous provocation before the one which produced the fatal reaction.

    85.  We confirm that any restatement of the law of provocation should secure that if provocation exists it need not be by the victim of the defendant's attack1. Generally it is the provoker who is killed, but occasionally this is not so.

    86.  We are also of opinion that the defence of provocation should not depend upon the particular mode by which the victim was injured or killed.  To this extent the 'reasonable relationship' test will go.  The question for the jury will be whether the provocation presented to the defendant was a sufficient ground for such loss of self-control as resulted in his killing the deceased.  Evidence of self-induced intoxication should be admissible in determining the facts as they appeared to the defendant but such evidence should be left out of account when judging whether the provocation afforded a sufficient ground for loss of self-control leading the defendant to react against the victim with a murderous intent2.

    87.  If the jury does adjudge that the prosecution has failed to disprove provocation (which is the correct way of saying 'if the defence of provocation succeeds'), of what offence should the defendant be found guilty?  Under the existing law the offence is manslaughter.  As will appear later in this report the wide range of acts and omissions which at present can make a person guilty of manslaughter requires critical examination.  One of the problems has been whether the word 'manslaughter' should be dropped.  It has an ugly sound; and in the past juries have sometimes been relunctant to find defendants guilty of manslaughter when the acts or omissions out of which the charge arose were within the range of their own experience.  This was particularly so in the so-called cases of motor manslaughter.  We are of opinion, nevertheless, that the word should be retained.  The unlawful killing of another human being,
1 Twine [1967] Crim. L.R. 710 and Peter Davies [1975] Q.B. 691.
2 See below paragraphs 276-278 for our recommendations as to evidence of voluntary intoxication in relation to defences.

[p. 37]
even under provocation, is an ugly deed for which the word manslaughter is, we think, the most appropriate description1.

    88.  Before the Homicide Act 1957 was passed, dissatisfaction was felt at the restrictive way in which the law of provocation had been applied by the judges, who had discretion to withdraw the defence from the jury on the ground that there was no evidence that a reasonable man in the defendant's situation would have been provoked.  Instead of reformulating the law, Parliament adopted the course of leaving this particular issue solely to the jury.  We are of opinion that this is unsatisfactory.  The trial judge is deprived of the power which he has in all other cases of withdrawing from the jury a defence which is utterly trivial and has no evidential basis.  Moreover, if the other reforms that we are proposing are implemented we think that the law will have received a sufficient measure of clarity and liberality to make it safe and desirable to restore the judge's normal power to decide whether there is any evidence on which the defence can properly be left to the jury. Accordingly, we recommend that the judge's discretion in this matter be restored.

    89.  We are concerned to ensure that acts performed in the proper exercise of lawful authority and known to the defendant to be so performed can never amount to provocation.  Before 1957 such acts could never have amounted at common law to provocation; for example, if a man was being lawfully arrested by a constable or was being evicted from premises by a bailiff acting under a court order and there was no evidence to suggest that the constable or bailiff was using excessive force, the trial judge would not allow a defence of provocation to go to the jury if the only provocation alleged by the defence was the arrest or eviction itself.  After 1957 it is arguable that such a defence would have to be left to the jury but it is more unlikely that any jury would return a vedrict of manslaughter by reason of provocation when the defendant knew that the force being used against him was lawful.  We have considered whether it should be expressly enacted that acts performed in the proper exercise of lawful authority do not amount to provocation but we do not think it is necessary to have express statutory provision to achieve the desired result.  If our recommendation in the preceding paragraph is implemented, judges will withdraw the defence from the jury in cases where the only evidence of provocation is an act done with lawful authority; even if the defence is not withdrawn, we have no doubt that juries will continue to convict of murder in such cases.

    90.  At present, when a jury returns a verdict of manslaughter by reason of provocation, the judge can impose any sentence up to life imprisonment, or indeed order the defendant's discharge.  We consider whether it was necessary to retain life imprisonment as the maximum sentence.  When we published our Working Paper some of our members were of opinion that a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment would be adequate.  This opinion found some support amongst our correspondents.  A small majority of the Society of Public Teachers of Law thought that 10 years' imprisonment was enough, as did the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO).  There is, however, the important point that it is an advantage to have a single offence covering killings under provocation and with diminished responsibility, particularly as there is often a fine line between provocation and diminished responsibility and the identification of that line by the jury may be difficult.  For so long as all are agreed that the offence is manslaughter not murder the identification may not be all that important and the judge will be left to decide the appropriate sentence on his assessment of the evidence; and since a life sentence may be necessary in the case of diminished responsibility, it must extend to the case of provocation also.  We all now take this view." (pp. 35-38)


Special defences to murder charges - provocation and diminished responsibility

    9.  Defences of provocation and diminished responsibility should be retained but with some changes (paragraph 75).

    10.  The test of provocation should be reformulated so that provocation is a defence to a charge of murder if, on the facts as they appeared to the defendant, it can reasonably be regarded as a sufficient ground for the loss of self-control leading the defendant to react against the victim with a murderous intent (paragraphs 81 and 82).

    11.  The defendant should be judged with due regard to all the circumstances, including any disability, physical or mental, from which he suffered (paragraph 83); the provocation need not be by the victim of the defendant's attack (paragraph 85); and the defence of provocation should not depend upon the particular mode by which the victim was injured or killed.  To this extent the 'reasonable relationship' test should go (paragraph 86).

    12.  The judge's discretion to decide whether there is any evidence on which the defence of provocation can properly be left to the jury should be restored (paragraph 88).

    13.  A person who kills under provocation or while suffering from diminished responsibility should continue to be guilty of manslaughter (paragraph 87) and the offence should be punishable with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment (paragraph 90)." (pp. 129-130)

___________The Law Commission, 3 July 2003, the Home office has asked the Law Commission to review the operation of diminished responsibility and provocation; a consultation paper is scheduled to be published in October 2003, followed by a report in Spring 2004; source:  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/Partial_Defences.pdf (accessed on 23 August 2003);

___________The Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law: A Report to the Law Commission, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1985, vi, 245 p., see comments on clause 60, "Provocation" at pp. 148-149; clause 60 at p. 203 and the illustrations at pp. 233-234; (series; Law Com. No. 143);

"60.  [Provocation.] This section applies where --

(a) the person who kills or is a party to the killing of another is provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both and whether by the deceased person or by another) to lose his self-control; and

(b) the provocation is, in all circumstances (including any of his personal charracteristics that affect its gravity), sufficient ground for the loss of self-control." (p. 203)


"Clause 60: Provocation
    15.16  This clause gives effect to recommendations 9 to 13 of the Committee's report [Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fourteenth Report: Offences against the Person].  A person can be 'provoked by' something only when he is aware of it.  The question whether there was sufficient provocation is to decided solely on the basis of the facts as the defendant perceived them.  Provocation is a 'special defence' which attracts the operation of clause 44(1).  A person who acts in the belief that a provocative fact  exists has any defence that he would have if it existed.  The Committee recommended that 'the defendant should be judged with due regard to all the circumstances, including any disability, physical or mental from which he suffered...'  We believe this is appropriately summed up in the phrase, 'any of his personal characteristics that affect its [sc. the provocation's] gravity'.  This is the same phrase as is used in clauses 45 (duress) and 46 (necessity).  A characteristic which is relevant for the purpose of one defence will not necessarily be relevant for the purpose of another.  The phrase should be sufficient to enable the judge to direct the jury so that they will take into account only relevant characteristics.  If the provocation consisted in an assault with intent to rob, the fact that the defendant was sexually impotent would not affect its gravity.  If the provocation consisted in taunts of sexual impotence it would be highly relevant.

  15.17  Burden of proof.  The clause makes no reference to burden of proof so the general rule stated in clause 17 applies. This abolishes the rule under the Homicide Act 1957, section 3, that the judge may not withdraw the defence from the jury on the ground that no reasonable jury could find that the alleged provocation was a sufficient ground for the loss of self-control.  This is in accordance with the Committee's recommendation 12.  Unless evidence capable of amounting to provocation is adduced by the prosecution, there will be an evidential burden on the defendant who wishes to rely on the defence; once he has satisfied that, the burden of disproving the defence will be on the prosecution." (pp. 148-149)

___________The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales, vol. 1: Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill and vol. 2: Commentary on Draft Criminal Code Bill, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, [1989], v, 278 p. see vol. 1, clause 58 on "Provocation", p. 70  and vol. 2, comments on clause 58 at p. 251  (series; Law Com. No. 177), ISBN: 0102299897;

"58. [Provocation.]  A person who, but for this section, would be guilty of murder is not guilty of murder if --

(a) he acts when provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both and whether by the deceased person or by another) to lose his self-control; and

(b) the provocation is, in all the circumstances (including any of his personal characteristics that affect its gravity), sufficient ground for the loss of self-control." (vol. 1, p. 70)


"Clause 58: Provocation

14.58  This clause gives effect to recommendations 9 to 13 of the Committee's report [Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fourteenth Report: Offences against the Person].  The defendant will be judged on the facts as he believed them to be (clause 41) and, as the Committee recommended 'with due regard to all the circumstances, including any disability, physical or mental from which he suffered...'  We believe this is appropriately summed up in the phrase, 'any of his personal characteristics that affect its [sc. the provocation's] gravity'.  The same words are used in clauses 42 (duress by threats) and 43 (duress of circumstances).  A characteristic which is relevant for the purpose of one defence will not necessarily be relevant for the purpose of another.  If the alleged provocation consisted in an assault with intent to rob, the fact that the defendant was sexually impotent would not affect its gravity; but, if it consisted in taunts of sexual impotence, that personal characteristic would be highly relevant." (vol. 2, p. 251)

___________The Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder, 31 October 2003, xiii, 249 p. (series; consultation paper; number 173); available at   http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173.pdf (accessed on 15 December 2003);

___________The Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder: Provisional Conclusions on Consultation Paper No 173, 1 May 2004, 16 p., available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173-prov.pdf (accessed on 2 May 2004); available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173.pdf (accessed on 15 December 2003); see also the Overseas Studies as part of the Appendices to the consultation paper, 231 p., available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173apps.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005);

___________The Law Commission, Partial defences to murder: report, London: Stationery Office, 2004, vi, 313 p., (series; report; number 290), ISBN: 0101630123; the report is available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/lc290.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005) and the Appendices at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/Appendices.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005);

___________Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 1956-57, cols. 48502-505;

___________ Regina v. Smith, [2000] 1 AC 146, 2000 4 All ER 289 (House of Lords, 27 July 2000), see Lord Hoffman judgment at pp. 299-301 about the history of provocation;

___________Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953, Report/ Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953: Report, London: Her Majesty's Stationery office, 1953, x, 506 p., on provocation, see in particular, pp. 45-56 (paragraphs 124-153), p. 213 (paragraph 609), pp. 274-275, and pp. 453-459, and the index (series; command number 8932); note: also covers Scotland so I apologize for having put this entry under Great Britain but I did so for ease of reference;


    1.  Before the Norman Conquest, homicide, intentional or unintentional, was treated by the law as a wrong to the victim's family, to be expiated by a pecuniary penalty, not as a crime against the State.  At that stage no mental elemnt seems to have been recognised as a necessary ingredient of criminal liability.  When the word 'morth' or 'murdrum' first appeared in this period, it meant a 'secret killing'.  It eventually came to be used for the fine imposed by William the Conqueror on any hundred where a Norman was found secretly killed; there was a presomption in any case of secret killing that the victim was a Norman unless there was 'presentment of Englishry', i.e. proof that the victim was an Englishman.  The law gradually became obsolete, until the fines were abolished by Edward III in 1340 and the term 'murder' began to acquire its present connotation of the most heinous form of homicide and to be specifically distinguished by the characteristic of malice aforethought. Under the Statute of Gloucester1 a man who killed another by misadventure or in self-defence was entitled to receive a pardon from the King.  It appears that as early as the first half of the fourteenth century it had become the practice in such cases for the jury to return a special finding that the killing was done 'in self-defence and not by felony or of malice prepense'.  In 1389 this practice was recognised by a statute of Richard II2 which provided that a pardon should not be valid in case of 'murdre, mort d'ome occis par agait assaut ou malice purpense' unless the circumstances were specified in the pardon.  There is reason to believe that this association of malice aforethought with 'lying in wait' (agait) as the criterion of the worst form of homicide, which replaced the old notion that murder was killing in secret, may ultimately derive from an Old Testament text (Exodus xxi: 14) which enjoined that 'if a man shall kill his neighbour deliberately and by lying in wait (per industriam ... et per insidias), thou shalt take him from mine altar that he may die'.  This doctrine may have been reinforced by the fact that waylaying on the King's Highway was an infringement of the King's special rights at the time when by no means all assaults or homicides were felonies cognisable by the King's courts.3

    2.  By a series of statutes passed between 1496 and 1547, of which the Act of 1531 (23 Hen. VIII, c. 1) was the most important, murder 'of malice prepense' was largely excluded from benefit of clergy.  Up to this time all homicides, unless justifiable or excusable on the ground of self-defence or misadventure, were felonies and therefore capital, but were within benefit of clergy.  Henceforward murder and what would now be called manslaughter, but had then no specific name, were clearly distinguished.  Murder, which was unlawful killing with malice aforethought, was without benefit of clergy and was therefore capital unless a pardon were granted; unlawful killing without malice aforethought was within the benefit of clergy, which was finally abolished in 1827, and until 1822 it could be punished only by one year's imprisonment and branding of the thumb.

    3.  In Scotland the phrases 'malice aforethought', homicide per industriam' and forethought felony' are used by old Scottish legal writers and, as in England, they were originally designed to differentiate between premeditated homicide and 'slaughter on suddenty' or chaude melle, that is, homicide ommitted during a quarrel or in hot blood.  Thus a man who killed in hot blood was in Scotland allowed the benefit of clergy of the girth or sanctuary, which corresponded in some degree to benefit of clergy in England.  Even when the privilege of sanctuary was abolished at the time of the Reformation, the distinction between murder and chaude melle seems to have been retained and the penalty imposed was limited to an arbitrary (i.e. non-capital) punishment.4
1. 1278; 6 Edw. I, c. 9.
2. 13 Rich. II, s. 2, c. 1.
3. Maitland, 'The early history of malice aforethought' in Collected Papers, I, 304-308.
4. Hume i. 240-244." (p. 381)


"...'murder' originally meant a 'secret killing' and only gradually, from the fourteenth century onwards, came to be the name of the worst form of homicide characterised by 'malice prepense' or 'malice aforethought'.  The next stage is marked by a series of statutes in the reigns of Henry VII and VIII which largely took away the benefit of the clergy from murders of 'malice prepensed'.  It seems clear that at this period and for some time afterwards 'malice prepense' or 'malice aforethought' was understood to mean a deliberate, premeditated intent to kill formed some time beforehand, and that no killing 'on a sudden', even without provocation or on slight provocation, was considered to be murder.  In effect the law regarded unlawful killings as being of only two kinds --killing with malice aforethought and killing on a sudden quarrel." (pp. 27-28, para. 75)


    "125.  As we have seen (paragraph 75), as late as the sixteenth century the distinction between murder and manslaughter rested on a simple distinction between killing upon waylaying and premeditation and killing upon sudden falling out.  This superficial view was gradually superseded, as Stephen pointed out,3 'by the broader and deeper view that the moral character of homicide must be judged of principally by the extent to which the circumstances of the case show, on the one hand, brutal ferocity, whether called into action suddenly or otherwise, or on the other hand, inability to control natural anger excited by a serious cause.'   Early in the seventeenth century Lambard said in effect that killing without apparent provocation raised a presumption in fact of concealed motive; and a little later Coke made it a presumption of law that malice was implied in all cases of unprovoked killing.  The question then arose what constituted provocation sufficient to rebut this presumption; and, although the presumption may not be good law to-day,4 the existing doctrine of provocation is largely founded on the decisions in a number of reported cases in the second half of the seventeenth century.
3. History of the Criminal Law, III, 71.
4. Woolmington v. D. of P.P. [1935] A.C. 462" (p. 46, paragraph 125)


    "137.  It seems equally clear that the test of the 'reasonable man' was seldom, if ever, applied before the nineteenth century.6  Both Hale and Foster seem to have thought that an intentional homicide would be reduced to manslaughter if the accused had acted in a passion, on sudden provocation, and without deliberation.  East is the first institutional writer to suggest that only 'reasonable' provocation should be taken into account.  The question whether the provocation received in a particular case was sufficient to reduce the crime to manslaughter was for long decided by the Judge as a matter of law; and it was only in the course of the nineteenth century that the courts established the rule that the question was one for the jury to decide as a matter of fact, and that in doing so they should consider whether the provocation was sufficient to deprive a reasonable man of his self-control and ought not to 'take into account different degrees of mental ability' in different prisoners.  This rule was approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Lesbini7 and by the House of Lords in Mancini v. D. of P.P.
6. Russell on Crime, 10th Ed., pp. 592 ff.
7. [1914] 3 K.B. 1116."   (p. 51, paragraph 137)


"Proposals for amendment of the law
    139. We may now proceed to consider the two main proposals for amendment of the law that have been put before us.  The first is that, in considering whether there is provocation sufficient to reduce the crime to manslaughter, the sole test should be whether the accused was in fact deprived of self-control and that the jury should not be required to consider also whether a 'reasonable man' would also have been so deprived.  The second is that provocation by words alone should be recognised equally with other forms of provocation, or at least should be more freely admitted than the words used by the House of Lords in Holmes v. D. of P.P., 'in no case ... save in circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character', at present allow.

    140.  The first of these proposals received less support than the second, but some witnesses were in favour of both.  Both are prompted by the feeling that objective tests of provocation are unsatisfactory and inequitable, and that the question whether a crime is murder or manslaughter ought to depend only on whether the accused did in fact commit it in ungovernable passion caused by sudden provocation, of whatever kind.  The arguments for the two proposals are to some extent connected: for it may be conceded that to a reasonable man words will seldom give such provocation as to deprive him of self-control, but it may be said that there are many persons who, for various reasons beyond their control, are particularly sensitive to affront and that the law should take account of these individual reactions.  The abrogation of the test of the 'reasonable man' would, however, be a much more far-reaching change than the extended recognition of provocation by words, since it would affect all forms of provocation and might have repersussions on the other branches of the criminal law.  We shall therefore consider this proposal first.

The test of the 'reasonable man'
    141.  As we have mentioned in paragraph 137, the courts have laid down in a series of cases that, in considering a plea of provocation, the jury must consider not only whether the accused was deprived of self-control, but also whether a reasonable man would have been so deprived, and that a person who is mentally deficient or mentally abnormal or is 'not of good mental balance' or who is 'unusually excitable or pugnacious' is not entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led an ordinary person to act as he did.  The only witnesses who suggested that this test of the 'reasonable man' should be abolished were Mr. Basil Nield, K.C., M.P., and the representatives of the Society of Labour Lawyers and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis.  Their argument was simple and direct.  This test, it is said, is in-equitable.  If the accused is mentally abnormal or is of subnormal intelligence or is a foreigner of more excitable temperament or is for some other reason peculiarly susceptible to provocation, it is neither fair nor logical to judge him by the standard of the ordinary Englishman.  As Mr. Nield put it, 'the jury should be permitted to determine the effect of the provocation on this particular man whom they have seen and may have heard and whose whole circumstances have probably been described to them'.

    142.  This proposal was strongly opposed by the Judges who gave evidence before us, including the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Justice General.  Lord Cooper observed that if the existing rule was changed, 'there might be circumstances in which a bad-tempered man would be acquitted and a good-tempered man would be hanged, which, of course, is neither law nor sense.'   Lord Goddard objected that if the jury were allowed to take into account the fact that the accused was a peculiarly excitable person, it would let in considerations which do not apply to any other branch of the law and which are really imponderable.

    143.  We recognise the force of the Judge's objections.  It is a fundamental principle of the criminal law that it should be based on a generally accepted standard of conduct applicable to all citizen alike, and it is important that this principle should not be infringed.  Any departure from it might introduce a dangerous latitude into the law.  Those idiosyncrasies of individual temperament or mentality that may make a man more easily provoked, or more violent in his response to provocation, ought not, therefore, to affect his liability to conviction, although they may justify mitigation of sentence.  We think that this argument is in principle sound, at least so far as minor abnormalities of character are concerned. (It is relevant to mention here that in Scotland, if a person suffering from mental abnormality not amounting to insanity or from mental deficiency acted on provocation insufficient in itself to extenuate murder, he might nevertheless be convicted of culpable homicide on the ground of 'diminished responsibility'.  We shall discuss this doctrine in Chapter 5 and shall then consider in a wider context whether it would be desirable to adopt it in England.)

    144.  Nevertheless we feel sympathy with the view which prompted the proposal that provocation should be judged by the standard of the accused.  The objections of the Judges take no account of that fundamental difference between the law of murder and the law applicable to all other crimes which lies at the root of our inquiry and to which Lord Simon drew attention in the concluding words of his judgment in the Holmes case.  In the case of other crimes the court can and does take account of extenuating circumstances in assessing the sentence; in the case of murder alone the sentence is fixed and automatic.  Provocation is in essence only an extenuating circumstance, which in the case of lesser crimes, as Lord Simon pointed out, does not alter the nature of the offence, but is allowed for in the sentence.  The rule of law that provocation may, within narrow bounds, reduce murder to manslaughter, represents an attempt by the courts to reconcile the preservation of the fixed penalty for murder with a limited concession to natural human weakness, but it suffers from the common defects of a compromise.  The jury might fairly be required to apply the test of the 'reasonable man' in assessing provocation if the Judge were afterwards free to exercise his ordinary discretion and to consider whether the peculiar temperament or mentality of the accused justified mitigation of sentence.  It is less easy to defend the application of the test in murder cases where the Judge has no such discretion.

    145.  We have indeed no doubt that if the criterion of the 'reasonable man' was strictly applied by the courts and the sentence of death was carried out in cases where it was so applied, it would be too harsh in its operation.  In practice, however, the courts not infrequently give weight to factors personal to the prisoner in considering a plea of provocation, and where there is a conviction of murder such factors are taken into account by the Home Secretary and may often lead to commutation of the sentence.  The application of this test does not therefore lead to any miscarriage of justice.  At the same time, as we have seen, there are serious objections of principle to its abrogation.  In these circumstances we do not feel justified in recommending any change in the existing law." (pp. 51-53; footnotes omitted)

Specific Proposals for Amendment of the Law of Murder
(5) No change is recommended in the requirement of the existing law that, in order to reduce the quality of the crime from murder to manslaughter or culpable homicide, provocation must be such as might have deprived a reasonable man of his self-control (paragraph 145).

(6) There should be no distinction between provocation by words and other forms of provocation.  Where the jury consider that the accused killed the deceased upon provocation, that he was deprived of self-control as a result of that provocation and that a reasonable man might have been so deprived, the nature, as distinct from the degree, of the provocation should be immaterial.  The law should be amended accordingly (paragraphs 151 and 152).  Any legislation should apply to Scotland as well as to England (paragraph 153)." (pp. 274-275)

70.  In most European countries, therefore, provocation is regarded as an extenuating circumstance justifying the imposition of a lesser penalty; but only in Switzerland may the quality of the crime be reduced from intentional homicide to a less serious form of homicide.  In no country is there anything to suggest that the criterion of the reaction of the 'normal man' is applied in assessing provocation." (pp. 432 and 459)

__________Sentencing Advisory Panel, Manslaughter by Reason of Provocation.  The Panel's Advice to the Sentencing Guidelines Council.  Foreword by the Chairman, 2005; available at  http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/docs/advice_manslaughter.pdf (accessed on 28 July 2005);

GREECE, The Greek penal code / translated by Nicholas B. Lotis; introduction by Giorgios Mangakis, South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman, 1973, xii, 205 p., see Article 24, "Criminal Self-Defense" at pp. 44-45 (series; The American series of foreign penal codes; volume 18), ISBN: 0837700388; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General, KKE 3794.31950 .A5213 1973;

Criminal Self-Defense
One who intentionally provokes an attack by another person for the purpose of committing an offense against that person by reason of self-defense shall not avoid punishment under the law." (pp. 44-45)

GREEF, Étienne de, 1898-, Amour et crimes d'amour, Bruxelles : C. Dessart, [1973], 322 p.;  (Collection; Psychologie et sciences humaines; vol. 46),  ISBN: 28700090005; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa,  MRT General, BF 575 .L8D43 1973;

___________"L'état dangereux dans les crimes passionnels", International Course in Criminology (2d : 1953 : Paris), Le problème de l'état dangereux : Deuxième Cours international de criminologie, organisé par la Société internationale de criminologie, avec le concours de l'U.N.E.S.C.O., en liaison avec le Conseil des organisations internationales des sciences médicales et le Centre international de l'enfance, Paris, 14 septembre-23 octobre 1953. Conférences publiées par Jean Pinatel, [Paris : International Society of Criminology, 1954], 632 p., aux pp. 194-205; titre noté dans ma recherche; je n'ai trouvé aucune bibliothèque au Canada qui possède ce volume; article non consulté;

___________Introduction à la Criminologie, 2e édition, Bruxelles: Joseph Vandenplas, 1947, 414 p., voir au volume 1, "crimes passionnels" aux pp. 356-377; copie à l'Université St-Paul, Ottawa, HV 6025 D4415 1947-1;

___________note de recherche: on retrouve une bibliographie des écrits de De Greeff dans Autour de l'oeuvre du Dr. E. de Greeff,  Louvain : Nauwelaerts, 1956, au  vol. 2, L'homme devant l'humain; études de psychologie et de psychopathologie, aux pp.193-208; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General, HV 6028 .A9 1956 v.1 et v. 2;

GREEN, Catherine Mary, Provocation and drunkenness in homicide : a comparative study, Ph. D. thesis, London, 1974, xxviii, 227, [xv] p.; title of thesis noted in my research but not consulted yet;

GREEN, Thomas Andrew, "The Jury and the English Law of Homicide 1200-1600", (1976) 74 Michigan Law Review 414-499; copy at the University of Ottawa, KFM 4269 .M52  Location: FTX Periodicals;

__________"Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability in Medieval England", (1972) 47 Speculum 669-694;

    "One related and extraordinary case [circa 1341-1342], for which coroner's indictment and trial enrollment are both extant, shows how the community sanctioned the slaying of an adulterer.  An aggrieved husband was not permitted to take the adulterer's life, but as in the case of a trespasser upon his land, he would have been able to drive him away.  Robert Bousserman returned home at mid-day, an inquest jury testified, to find John Doughty having sexual intercourse with his wife ('ad fornicandum cum illa').  Bousserman forthwith despatched Doughty with a blow of his hatchet.  The petty jury altered the facts to make Robert a self-defender who could not escape and to emphasize the aspect of trespass ..." (pp. 679-680; notes omitted)

GREENE, J., "A Provocation Defence for Battered Women Who Kill?",  (1989-90) 12 Adelaide Law Review 145-163;

GREENSPAN, Patricia, S., 1944-, Emotions and Reasons: Inquiry into Emotional justification, New York: Routledge, 1988, x, 197 p., ISBN: 0415900492; see on anger at pp. 48-55; copy at University of Alberta, Cameron Library, B 815 G815 1988; copy at the Université de Montréal, B/815/G74/1988; title noted in my resarch but book not consulted yet; no copy of this book in the Ottawa area libraries;

GROSS, Hyman, A Theory of Criminal Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, xviii, 521 p., see "Provocation" at pp. 157-158 and 174-175, ISBN: 0195023498 and 0195023501 (pbk.);

"Changing moral values elevate in importance some interests while reducing others, and this is reflected in the changing standards of acceptable provocation that are exhibited in jury verdicts, so that racial slurs of an extreme kind might in some circles now be regarded as a more substantial provocation than the sight of marital infidelity." (p. 175)

GUILLAIS, Joëlle, 1952-, Crimes of passion : dramas of private life in nineteenth-century France, translated by Jane Dunnett, New York : Routledge, 1991, vi, 248 p., ISBN: 0415903904; notes: Translation of: La chair de l'autre, infra; Reprint. Originally published: Cambridge, UK : Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1990; copy at the University of Ottawa, MRT General, HV 6053 .G8513 1991;

___________"Émergence du crime passionnel au XIXe siècle", (1985) Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé 549-565; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, KJJ 0 .R489, Location: FTX Periodicals;

___________La chair de l'autre : le crime passionnel au XIXe siècle, Paris : O. Orban, c1986, 346 p., ISBN: 255653150; aucune copie de ce livre dans les bibliothèques de la région d'Ottawa;

____________Recherches sur le crime passionnel au XIXe siècle, thèse de 3e cycle, histoire, juin 1984, Paris 7; dir. de thèse: Michelle Perrot;

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