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updated and corrections / mise à jour et corrections: 28 October 2011

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by / par ©François Lareau, 2002-, Ottawa, Canada
First published officially on the internet on: 11 July 2002

Selected Bibliography on Provocation
Bibliographie choisie sur la provocation

Part/Partie II: Provocation
Comparative Law-- Authors
Droit Comparé -- Auteurs


see also / voir aussi :

Part II: Provocation -- Comparative Law -- Authors A-G
Part II: Provocation -- Comparative Law -- Authors: H-O
Part  I:  Provocation --  Canadian Law / Droit canadien


    « Sous Louis XIV, l'adultère fut non seulement admis universellement, mais aussi affiché sans vergogne. [...]

    Une anecdote de Chamfort peint à merveille ce temps : " Madame Beauzée couchait avec un maître de langue allemande.  M. Beauzée les surprit au retour de l'Académie.  L'Allemand dit à sa femme: ' Quand je vous disais qu'il était temps que je m'en aille. '   M. Beauzée, toujours puriste, lui dit: ' Que je m'en allasse, monsieur. ' "  Dans des conditions pareilles il est tout à fait compréhensible que le crime passionnel ne pouvait exister. » (Léon Rabinowicz, infra, p. 126)

PAIN, J.H., "Some Reflections on our Criminal Law", (1960) Acta Juridica 289-311, and see "Provocation", at pp. 306-308;

PAINTER, Richard W., "Criminal Law - Provocation, The Reasonable Man and The Criminal Law Revision Committee", (21 July 1977) 127 New Law Journal 708-710 (issue number 5810); copy at University of Ottawa, KD 322 .N49, Location: FTX Periodicals;

PANTAZIS, Angelo, "The homosexual panic and gay advance defences", (1997) 10 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 85-93;

PAPATHANASIOU, Peter and Patricia Easteal, "The 'Ordinary Person' In Provocation Law: Is The 'Objective' Standard Objective?", (1999) 11(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 53-70; copy at the Supreme Court of Canada library, Ottawa;

PAPUA NEW GUINEA, Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, Criminal Responsibility: Taking Customs Perceptions and Beliefs into Account, Waigami, Papua New Guinea : The Commission, 1977,  39 p., see "Provocation" at pp. 8-9 (series; Working Paper; number 6); copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX Microfiche, K 235 .W67 v.32-016 1977a; also copy on microfiche at the the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, series: World Law Reform Commissions, number 32-016;

___________ Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, The Role of Customary Law in the Legal System, Waigami, Papua New Guinea : The Commission, 1977, 88 p. (series; report; number 7); copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX Microfiche, K 235 .W67 v.32-015 1977a; also copy on microfiche at the the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, series: World Law Reform Commissions, number 32-015; 

PARRY,  John T., "Progress and Justification in American Criminal Law", (2004-2005) 40 Tulsa Law Review 639-670; snd see on provocation, 648-655;

PARSONS, S., "Provocation: to be or not to be an attributed characteristic", (2000) Denning Law Journal 139-152; Denning Law Journal is published by the School of Law, The University of Buckingham; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy of this periodical available in the Ottawa area libraries;

PATHER, Sivakaly, "Provocation: Acquittals provoke a rethink", (2002) 15 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 337-352;

PEDAIN, Antje, "Intentional Killings: The German Law", September 2005, in The Law Commission, The Law of Murder: Overseas  Comparative Studies, [London: HMSO, 2005], at pp. 75-86; available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/comparative_studies.pdf (accessed on 27 December 2005);

PERKINS, Rollin M., 1889-,  and Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law, 3rd ed., Mineola (New York): The Foundation Press, 1982, xxiii, 1269 p., see "The Rule of Provocation" at pp. 84-104 (series; University Textbook Series), ISBN: 0882770675;

"Not without interest is the starting point in the development of the so-called rule of provocation, which was merely a matter of evidence at a time when the word 'aforethought' was assumed to have actual significance as used in the definition of murder.  Thus Lambard, writing in 158156 uses 'malice aforethought' in the sense of real and substantial premeditation although he does not require direct and positive evidence thereof.  Reflecting, perhaps, the current thinking of his day he resorts to an inference of fact -- that an intentional killing without any apparent motive must have been due to a concealed motive.  Hence he says that in case of such killing without apparent provocation the law judges the fatal act 'to have proceeded of former malice meditated within his owne minde, howsoever it bee kept secret form the sight of other men.'57  However, a killing in a sudden angry fist fight (anciently referred to as a 'chance medley')58 manifested its own explanation and gave no room for imputation of premeditation, hence the offense was manslaughter.  'Some manslaughters be voluntary and not of malice aforethought, upon some sudden falling out.'59

    When it came to be recognized that the crime of murder required no actual premeditation a killing in a sudden rage inflamed by an angry fist fight was still held to be manslaughter, but a different explanation was needed.60 Such circumstances, it was then said, are so mitigating that the slayer's state of mind cannot properly be characterized as 'malicious'.61" (pp. 84-85)
"56. William Lambard, 1536-1601.  His Eirenarcha was first published in 1581.
57. Lambard, Eirenarcha 239 (1619).  He expresses the same idea in this form: 'So, many times the law doth (by the sequelle) judge of that malice which lurked before within the partie, and doth accordingly make imputation of it.'  Ibid.
58. The term is sometimes employed to refer to homicide in a casual affray but more properly indicates the affray itself.  See 4 Bl.Comm. *184.
59. 3 Co.Inst. *55. 'There is no difference between murder, and manslaughter; but that one is upon malice aforethought, and the other upon a sudden occasion: ...'  Ibid.
60. East did not clearly distinguish the new theory from the old, saying: 'Herein is to be considered under what circumstances it may be presumed that the act done, though intentional of death or great bodily harm, was not the result of a cool deliberate judgment and previous malignity of heart, but imputable to human infirmity alone.'  1 East P.C. 232 (1803).
61. Such a killing 'is regarded as done through heat of blood or violence of anger, and not through malice...' Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) *295, 308 (1850).
  'There can be no such thing in law as a killing with malice, and also upon the furor brevis of passion; and provocation furnishes no extenuation, unless it produces passion.  Malice excludes passion.  Passion presupposes the absence of malice.  In law they cannot co-exist.'  State v. Johnson, 23 N.C. 354, 362 (1840)." (pp. 84-85)

PILLSBURY, Samuel H., "Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment", (1989) 74 Cornell Law Review 655-710, see "Provocation" at pp. 678-679;

___________Judging Evil Rethinking the Law of Murder and Manslaughter,  New York: New York University Press,  c1998, xiii, 264 p., ISBN: 081476665X; title noted in my research but book not consulted yet; no copy in the Ottawa area libraries;

PLATO, Plato:  The Laws, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Hamondsworth (Middesex, England): Penguin Books, 1975 (reprint): 553 p., see "Homicide in Anger", Book Nine, §18.  Homicide Law,  at pp. 380-385;

If someone kills a free man by his own hand, but the deed is done in anger, we must first make an internal distinction within this type of crime.  Anger is common to (1) those who kill a man by blows or similar means, owing to a sudden impulse: here the action is immediate, there is no previous intention to kill, and regret for the deed follows at once; (2) those who have been stung by insults or oppobrious actions and who pursue their vengeance until, some time later, they kill somebody: they intend to kill, and the deed causes no repentance.  So it looks a if we have to establish two categories of murder; broadly speaking, both are done in anger, but a proper description would be 'falling somewhere midway between 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' '; however, each type comes closer to one or other of these extremes.  The man who nurses his anger and takes his vengeance later -- not suddenly, on the spur of the moment, but with premeditation -- approximates to the voluntary murderer.  The man whose anger bursts forth uncontrollably, whose action is instant, immediate, and without premeditation, resembles the involuntary killer.  Yet even so, he is not an intirely involuntary killer: he only resembles one.  It is therefore sometimes difficult to categorize murders done under the influence of anger, and to know whether to treat them in law as voluntary or involuntary.  The best course, which corresponds most closely to reality, is to classify them both under what they most resemble, and to distinguish them by the presence or absence of premeditation.  We should lay down comparatively severe penalties for those who have killed in anger and with premeditation, and lighter ones for those who have killed on the spur of the moment without previous intent.  Something which resembles a greater evil should attract a greater punishment, whereas a lesser penalty should be visited on that which resembles a lesser evil.  This, then, is the course our laws should take." (pp. 380-381)

PLUTARQUE (PLUTARCHUS), Plutarque Oeuvres morales, Tome VII - Première Partie, Traités de morale (27-36).  Texte établi et traduit par Jean Dumortier avec la collaboration de Jean Defradas, Paris: Société d'Édition '"Les Belles lettres", 1975, xii, 367 p., voir "Du contrôle de la colère (De cohibenda ira)" aux pp. 49-85, copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General,  PA 3641 .A8 P577 1972 v.7/1;

POLK, K.,  "Masculine Scenarios of Violence: The Case of Homicide" in Judith Bessant, Kerry Carrington and Sandy Cook, eds., Cultures of Crime and Violence: The Australian  Experience,  Bundoora, Vic., Australia : La Trobe University Press Victoria,  1995, 221 p., ISBN:  1863244174; note: "A special edition of the Journal of Australian studies"; title of article noted in my research but no copy of this book found in the Ottawa area libraries; not consulted;

POLLOCK,  Pollock, Frederick, Sir, 1845-1937 and Frederic William Maitland, The history of English law before the time of Edward I, 2nd ed. reissued; with a new introduction and select bibliography by S. F. C. Milsom, London, Cambridge U.P., 1968, 2 v., v. 1, p. lxxv-xci,  ISBN: 0521095158 (v.1) and  0521095166 (v.2);

"On the other hand, anything like vengeance or the prosecution of a feud, even against the homicide, would have been sternly suppressed.  There are signs that the outraged husband who found his wife in the act of adultery might no longer slay the guilty pair or either of them, but might emasculate the adulterer.6
6 For the old law, see Alfred, 42 § 7; Leg. Will. I. 35 (which may be romanizing); Leg. Henr. 82, § 8.  Matthew Paris, chron. Maj. v. 35, tells how in 1248 a case of mutilation induced Henry III. to decree as law 'ne praesumat quis, nisi pro coniuge, adulterum membris mutilare genitalibus.'  See Select Pleas of the Crown, pl. 87: in an appeal of wounds the appellee pleads that he found the appellor in his bed room intending his shame.  Rot. Cl. i. 126: in 1212 King John orders that A who has emasculated B is to have his land restored to him, if an inquest finds that B committed adultery with A's wife after being forbidden to visit her." (vol. 2,  pp. 484-485)

PORTEAU-BITKER, Annik, Variétés, "Un crime passionnel au mileu du XVe siècle", (1981) 59 Revue historique de droit français et étranger 635-651; ne traite pas de la provocation mais l'article est rempli de renseignements sur l'homicide de l'époque et ses juridictions; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, Ottawa;

___________"Criminalité et délinquance féminines dans le droit pénal des XIIIe et XIVe siècles", (1980) 58 Revue historique de droit français et étranger13-56; voir sur l'adultère et le flagrant délit, les pp. 39-43; l'article explique aussi le rôle du mari dans le droit pénal; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, Ottawa;

"Mais, dans le domaine des crimes contre les personnes, le comportement criminel des femmes est différent de celui des hommes : si des femmes accusées de meurtre -- le plus souvent passionnel --, agissent parfois seules, comme des hommes, c'est-à-dire de sang-froid et après avoir longuement mûri leur forfait: 'attendu le cas et manière de murdre, proposé et appensé de longue main et à fait appensé...à sanc meur et à grant déliberacion...', le plus souvent, elles sont seulement des complices qui interviennent soit en coulisse, par instigation, soit par l'apport d'une aide matérielle à l'auteur principal de l'infraction. D'assez nombreuses femmes sont, en particulier, les complices de leur amant dans le meurtre de leur mari, soit qu'elles y participent effectivement, soit qu'après l'avoir fomenté, elles en attendent, dans l'ombre, l'accomplissement, pour s'enfuir, voire même convoler avec le meurtrier [...]." (pp. 34-35; notes omises)

POWER, Helen, "Provocation and Culture",
{October 2006] The Criminal Law Review  871-888;

PREVERSER, Sidney, "The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder", (1957) 57 Columbia Law Review 624-652, see "Provocation" at pp. 642-645;

PRINS, Adolphe, 1845-1919, Science pénale et droit positif, Bruxelles : Bruylant-Christophe : Paris : A. Marescq, 1898, 589 p.; copie à l'Université de Sherbrooke;

    "467.  Parmi les circonstances qui sont de nature à diminuer la culpabilité de l'agent, il en est que le législateur n'a pas laissé à la libre appréciation des juges; il a cru devoir, à raison de leur importance, les spécifier dans le code et fixer dans le texte même leurs conséquences obligatoires.

    On les appelle excuses légales.

    468. Les excuses légales se divisent en excuses proprement dites et excuses préremptoires. [...]

    469.  Les excuses proprement dites sont certaines circonstances spécialement définies par la loi et qui, lorsqu'elles existent, obligent le juge à réduire considérablement la répression ordinaire et même à transformer la peine [...]

    Les unes sont générales, c'est-à-dire qu'elle peuvent se rencontrer dans tous les crimes et dans tous les délits: ce sont le jeune âge et le surdo-mutisme.

    Il y en a une autre qui est spéciale à l'homicide, aux blessures et aux coups : c'est la provocation." (pp. 281-282)

PROAL, Louis Joseph Cyrille, 1843-,  Le crime et le suicide passionnels, Paris: Félix Alcan, 1900, vi, 683 p. (Collection; Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine); copie à l'Université de Montréal, 364.380944/P962c; livre rare au Canada; livre publié par la Bibliothèque nationale de France, Gallica, disponible à http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?E=0&O=N077009 (visionné le 19 janvier 2003);
aussi disponible en anglais / also published in English:
PROAL, Louis Joseph Cyrille, Passion and criminality  a legal and literary study. Translated from the French by A.R. Allinson, London: The Imperial Press, 1905, available at http://www.archive.org/details/passioncriminali00proaiala (accessed on 25 November 2008);

"Provocation -- Homicide Act 1957, s. 3 -- defence of provocation -- to be left to the jury whenever there was material capable of amounting to provocation: R. v. Baille", [1995] Criminal Law Review 739-740; commentary at p. 740;

QUEENSLAND (Australia), The Criminal Code Review Committee, Final Report of the Criminal Code Review Committee to the Attorney-General, June 1992, [Brisbane : the Committee, 1992], 314 p. (Chair: R.S. O'Regan);

Killing on provocation.  When a person who unlawfully kills another under circumstances which, but for the provisions of this section, would constitute murder, does the act which causes death suddenly and while under the effect of provocation and before there is time to regain the power of self-control, the person is guilty of manslaughter only provided that the force used is not disproportionate to the provocation."

___________Queensland Criminal Code Act 1899, see sections 268, 269 and 304; code of Sir Samuel Griffith, then Chief Justice of Queensland;

___________Queensland Criminal Code 1995, not yet in force;

"Killing on provocation
  102.(1) This section applies if a person unlawfully kils anyone in circumstances that would be murder, if this section did not apply.

   (2) The person is guilty only of unlawful killing if the person --

(a) is deprived of the power of self-control by provocation; and
(b) does the act that causes death suddenly, before there is time for the person to regain self-control."

___________Queensland Government, Department of Justice and Attorney- General, Review of the Accident and provocation defences of homicide, October 2007,  available at  http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/ourlaws/papers/ReviewBROCHUREHomicidediscussion.pdf  (accessed on 12 October 2007);

___________Queensland Law Reform Commission,  A review of the defence of provocation, Queensland Law Reform Commission, 2008, iv, 224 p. (series; Discussion paper; 63), ISBN: 9780724277560; available at http://www.qlrc.qld.gov.au/AccidentProvocation/docs/WP63.pdf (accessed on 27 August 2008);

___________Queensland Law Reform Commission,  A Review of the excuse  of accident and the defence of provocation, Queensland Law Reform Commission, 2008, xi, 524 p. (series; report; 64), ISBN: 978 0 7242 7757 9; available at http://www.qlrc.qld.gov.au/reports/R%2064.pdf (accessed on 11 November 2008);

___________Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code, Report of the Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code,  [Brisbane] : Office of Women's Policy, 2000, 1 volume, various pagings, and see Chapter 6, "Defences to Violence"; available at http://www.women.qld.gov.au/Docs/Women_and_the_Criminal_Code/Women_and_the_Criminal_Code.pdf (accessed on 8 February 2006) and http://www.qldwoman.qld.gov.au/?id=75 (accessed on 8 February 2006);

QUICK, Oliver and Celia Wells, "Getting Tough with Defences"", [June 2006] The Criminal Law Review 514-525, and see on provocation, pp. 521-523;

RABINOWICZ, Léon, "Le crime passionnel", (1930) Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 1223-1235; titre noté dans ma recherche mais article pas encore consulté; il semble que seulement Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nouvelle-Écosse aurait une copie de ce numéro;

___________Le crime passionnel - Préface de M. Léon Cornill, Paris: M. Rivière, 1931, ix, [5]-247 p., copie à l'Université d'Ottawa,  MRT General: HV 6515 .R25 1931; un livre très agréable de lecture, écrit par un criminologue;

___________"L'exécution du crime passionnel", (1977) Revue internationale de criminologie et de police technique 161-176; copie à la bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, Ottawa;

___________"La passion homicide", (1977) Revue internationale de criminologie et de police technique 27-54; copie à la bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, Ottawa;

"Amour, dira-t-on?  Non, mille fois non...'Le composé de toutes les basses passions de la terre, le mélange de l'égoïsme, de la jalousie, de l'amour-propre froissé, de la haine, de la vengeance, voilà la passion homicide." (p. 54)

RADFORD, Jill, "Womanslaughter: A Licence to Kill? The Killing of Jane Asher" in Jill Radford and Diana E.H. Russell, eds., Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing, Buckingham: Open University Press; New York: Twayne; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1992, xviii, 379 p., at pp. 253-266,  ISBN: 0805790268 and 0805790284 (paper); copy at the University of Ottawa, MRT General, HV 6511 .F46 1992;

RAMADAN,  Hisham M., "Reconstructing reasonableness in criminal law: moderate jury instructions proposals", (2002-2003) 29 Journal of Legislation 233-252;

RAPAPORT, Elizabeth, "Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era", (1996) 49 Southern Methodist University Law Review 1507; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries; copy at Sherbrooke  University; Université de Montréal;

RATHUS, Zoe, "There Was Something Different about him that Day: The Criminal Justice System’s Response To Women Who Kill Their Partners", Women’s Legal Service, Brisbane, 2002, 28 p.; note at p. 1: "Zoe Rathus was Deputy Chair of the Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code which reported to the Attorney-General, Matt Foley MLA, and Minister for Women’s Policy, Judy Spence MLA in 1999. The official report of the Taskforce was published in February 2000 and is available on the website of the Office for Women, <www.qldwoman.qld.gov.au> Much of the information in this paper is drawn from that Report." (source: http://www.naclc.org.au/docs/Fear_of_Women's_Violence.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2003);

RAWLINSON, P.G.A., " 'Le crime passionel' ", (3 July 1959) 103 The Solicitors' Journal 515-516; copy at the University of Ottawa, KD 322 .S625, Location: FTX Periodicals;

Recent Cases, "Homicide -- Defenses: Provocation -- Effect of Provocation by One Other Than Victim", (1938) 51 Harvard Law Review 928-929; copy at Ottawa University, KFM 2469 .H457, Location: FTX Periodicals;

REED, Alan, "Court of Appeal, Provocation: Relevance of Defendant's Jealousy and Possessiveness -- R v Weller [2003] EWCA Crim 815, [2003] Crim LR 724", (June 2004) 68(3) The Journal of Criminal Law 186-195;

___________"Duress and Provocation as Excuses to Murder: Salutary Lessons from Recent Anglo-American Jurisprudence", (1996-97) 6 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 51-92, see "Provocation" at pp. 70-92; copy at the University of Ottawa, K 521 .J675  Location: FTX Periodicals;

__________"R. v. BAILLE: Provocation: A Concession to Human Frailty", (1997) 61(4) The Journal of Criminal Law 439-447; copy at the University of Ottawa, KD 7862. J653  Location: FTX Periodicals;

REED, Alan and Nicola Wake, "Sexual Infidelity Killings: contemporary standardisations and comparative stereotypes", in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander, eds.,  Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Pesrpectives, Farnham, Surrey and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2011, 410 p., at approx.  pp. 115-134, ISBN: 978-1-4094-3175-6;

REILLY, Alex, "Loss of Self-Control in Provocation", (1997) 21 Criminal Law Journal 320-335; important contribution;

"This article analyses the possible interpretations of the concept of a loss of self-control.  It concludes from a survey of literature on the philosophy and psychology of emotion that the concept of a loss of self-control cannot have a definite meaning.  The article considers the implications of this conclusion on the role that the concept of a loss of self-control plays in the construction of 'narrative of excuse' in the defence of provocation.  It is suggested that the explanation of a loss of self-control is a powerful narrative in its own right, but that it inhibits a concurrent narrative which explains the conduct of the accused person in context.  The article suggests that while the focus of the defence of provocation remains on narratives of control, the defence will continue to excuse unacceptable conduct and the elements of the defence will remain obscure." (p. 320)

RENTELN, Alison Dundes, The Cultural Defense, New York : Oxford University Press, 2004, viii, 404 p., see in particular Chapter 3, "Homicide", at pp. 23-47 with notes at pp. 221-222; provocation is dealt with at pp. 31-36, ISBN: 0195154029; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General: K 5455 .R46 2004; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K 5455 .R46 2004;

___________"A justification of the culture defense as a partial excuse", (1993) 2 Review of Law and Women's Studies 437-526; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries; periodical published by the Students of the Gould School of Law, Law Center, University of Southern California, 1992-, ISSN:  1088-3525;

RIBOT, Théodule Armand, 1839-1916, La psychologie des sentiments, 8e éd., Paris : Alcan, 1911, xi, 453 p.; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa,  BF 532 .R52 1911 MRT;

RINALDI, Fiori, Case and Comment, "Provocation -- Ordinary man -- Intoxication: O'NEIL, Court of Criminal Appeal, Melbourne: Starke A.C.J., Crockett and McGarvie J.J.: 16th June, 1981", (1982) 6 Criminal Law Journal 109-110;

RIX, Keith, " 'Battered Woman Syndrome' and the defence of provocation: two women with something more in common", (April 2001) 12(1) The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 131-141;

ROBERTSON, A. J. (Agnes Jane), edited and translated by, The laws of the kings of England from Edmund to Henry I, Cambridge: University Press, 1925, [New York : AMS Press, 1974], xiii, 426 p., ISBN:  0404565476; copy at the University of Ottawa, KD 542 .R6 1974 FTX; Carleton University, Ottawa, DA150.G7; copy at the library of Parliament, Ottawa, KD 548 L397;


35. Si le pere truvet sa file en avulterie en sa maisoun u en la maisoun soun gendre, ben li laist ocire l'avultere.
[§ 1.  Similiter si filius matrem in adulterio deprehendit, patre vivente, licet adulterium occidere.]
35. If a father finds his daughter in adultery in his own or in his son-in-law's house, he shall have full permission to slay the adulterer(s).
[§ 1.  Similarly if a son finds his mother in adultery during his father's lifetime, he shall have permission to slay the adulterers(s).]" (pp. 253, 268-269; notes omitted)

ROBINSON, Paul H., 1948-,  "Abnormal mental state mitigations or murder : the US perspective", in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander, eds.,  Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Pesrpectives, Farnham, Surrey and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2011, 410 p., at approx.  pp. 291-310, ISBN: 978-1-4094-3175-6;

___________ "Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Doctrine", (1985) 71 Virginia Law Review 1-63; also published in Albin Eser et al., eds., Justification and Excuse: Comparative Perspectives, vol. 1, Dobbs Ferry (New York): Transnational Juris Publications 1987, p. 657, ISBN: 0929179226,

___________Criminal Law Defences, St. Paul (Minnesota): West, 1984, 2 volumes, vol. 1, "§ 102. Murder - Provocation/Extreme Emotional Disturbance"at pp. 479-493, ISBN: 0314815139 (set);

"Table of Subsections
(a) In General.: (1) Provocation.  (2) Extreme Emotional Disturbance.
(b) Provocation: (1) Defendant Must in Fact Have Acted Under Influence of Provocation.  (2) Provocation Must Arise From Adequate Cause.  (3) There Must Not Have Been Time to Cool off.
(c) Extreme Emotional Disturbance.  (1) Provocation Need Not Have Been From Victime or Directed Toward Defendant. (2) No Limitation on Circumstances That May be Deemed Adequate Provocation. (3) Adequacy of Provoking Conditions to be Determined from Circumstances as Defendant Believed Them to be.   (4) Adequacy of Provoking Conditions to be Determined from Viewpoint of a Person in Actor's 'Situation'.
(d) Overlap With Diminished Capacity, § 101(c).
(e) Sentencing Mitigation."    (p. 479)

___________"Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis", (1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 199-291; see "Provocation/Extreme Emotional Disturbance : Failure of Proof or Offense Modification?" at pp. 233-234;

ROMERO, Leo M., "Sufficiency of Provocation for Voluntary Manslaughter in New Mexico: Problems in Theory and Practice", (1982) 12 New Mexico Law Review 747-789; copy at Ottawa University, KFN 3669 .N49  Location: FTX Periodicals;

ROSEBURY, Brian, "On Punishing Emotions", (2003) 16(1) Ratio Juris 37-55;

ROSSI, Pellegrino, 1787-1848, Traité de droit pénal, deuxième édition revue et précédée d'une introduction par M. Faustin Hélie, 2 tomes, Paris: Guillaumin et Cie, Libraires, 1855, cvii, 328 p. (tome 1) et 429 p. (tome 2); copie à la bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, Ottawa;

    "Imaginons maintenant un autre cas.  Un jeune homme a obtenu la promesse d'épouser celle qu'il aime.  À la vieille de son mariage, il entend dans un dîner couvrir de ridicule sa fiancée.  Il prend sa défense.  Au lieu de cesser, le plaisant insiste; il ajoute au ridicule l'outrage et la calomnie.  Le jeune homme irrité lui donne un démenti et le provoque en duel.  L'offenseur se moque de lui, et renouvelle les outrages.  Une violente dispute s'ensuit, le jeune homme s'empare d'un couteau, et les coups de la vengeance ferment à jamais la bouche de l'offenseur.

    Non-seulement le meurtre n'est point prémédité, mais il a été provoqué.  Une cause extérieure, imprévue, instantanée, a troublé l'esprit de l'agent en excitant fortement sa colère.  Ce n'est pas l'homme qui peu à peu a lâché la bride à un désir qui devient une passion indomptable.  C'est encore moins l'homme qui pour exécuter une action illicite s'est placé dans une situation qui pouvait l'entraîner à des actes encore plus criminels.  L'emportement subit de la colère se distingue de la violence d'un désir.  Ira furor brevis.  Elle offusque l'intelligence.  La raison de l'homme est comme enveloppée tout à coup d'un nuage; il ne sait plus ce qu'il fait; il y a quelque chose de machinal dans la rapidité et la violence de ses mouvements.

    Sans doute la colère ne justifie point les actions humaines: sans doute l'atténuation morale dérivant de la colère varie selon les circonstances.  La colère a-t-elle été provoquée?  A-t-elle été provoquée par une cause grave?  Le tort était-il du côté du provocateur? Ainsi qu'on l'a remarqué : non tam ira quam causa irae excusat.

    Il n'en est pas moins vrai que si la provocation exclut dans tous les cas la préméditation de l'acte exécuté dans l'emportement subit de la colère, dans plusieurs cas elle doit être une cause d'atténuation ultérieure.  Non-seulement il n'y a pas eu réflexion de la part de l'agent, mais l'apperception du mal elle-même n'a pu être claire ni distincte.  La colère est une sorte d'ivresse incomplète.


    Mais en admettant que la provocation, à quelques exceptions près, doit être un motif général d'excuse pour tous les délits qui peuvent être, par leur nature, le résultat d'une colère subite, comment déterminer les causes de provocation et leur importance relative pour l'atténuation du délit?  Le législateur doit-il signaler à l'avance les faits de provocation qui, seuls, rendront le fait excusable, et déterminer jusqu'à quel degré la peine peut être diminuée?

    Telle est en effet la méthode suivie dans quelques législations : elle nous paraît peu rationnelle.

    Le même fait ne produit pas toujours une provocation également intense, ni une excuse également légitime.  Un fait négligé par la loi peut devenir, dans des circonstances données, une provocation violente, irrésistible, et légitimer l'atténuation plus encore qu'un fait matériellement plus grave.

    S'il y a des cas où la provocation doive exempter de toute peine, il peut être utile que ces cas soient déterminés par la loi, comme il est utile que la loi elle-même détermine quels sont les crimes que nulle provocation ne peut rendre excusables.

    Mais le principe d'excuse par la provocation étant une fois admis, c'est organiser une justice bien grossière et souvent bien embarrassante pour les juges que de tracer à l'avance le cercle où ils devront nécessairement se renfermer dans une matière sujette à tant de variations et de nuances diverses.  Le législateur devrait se borner à fixer le maximum de la diminution que la peine peut recevoir, dans le cas où le jury déclare que le fait de provocation est constant.  On pourrait aussi aller plus loin et demander au jury de déclarer si l'accusé a commis le délit dans le premier ou dans le second degré de provocation.  Les nuances dans chaque degré seraient ensuite appréciées par le juge pour l'application de la peine, car nous supposons que la loi se borne à en fixer le maximum et le minimum pour chaque degré de provocation.  Enfin, pour les rixes, où il y a ordinairement colère et délit des deux côtés, on a distingué dans quelques législations, entre le délit du premier provocateur et celui de l'homme provoqué; on a aussi prévu le cas d'une rixe où il serait impossible de reconnaître quel a été le provocateur." (tome 2, pp. 66-69).

ROUQUETTE, Théophile, Des excuses légales et des faits justificatifs en matière criminelle, Toulouse: Bonnal et Gibrac, 1866; disponible à http://books.google.com/books?vid=HARVARD32044103179586&printsec=titlepage#PPP5,M1 et  à http://books.google.com/books?id=D1kOAAAAYAAJ&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0 1 et (vérifiés le 30 mai 2008);

ROWLAND, C.J., "Review of Legislation", (1982) 6 Criminal Law Review 167-168, see "New South Wales" at pp. 167-168; discusses the proposed amendments to the New South Wales Crimes Act regarding the provocation provision and the sentence for murder;

ROZELLE, Susan D., "Controlling Passsion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense", (2005) 37 Rutgers Law Journal 197-233; available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=887823 (accessed on 13 March 2006) and https://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/csls/lawemotion_conference/papers/ControllingPassion.pdf (accessed on 9 September 2007);

SAMUELS, Alec, "Excusable Loss of Self-Control in Homicide", (1971) 34 The Modern Law Review 163-171;

"Provocation as a head of manslaughter could be abolished and replaced with the offence of criminal loss of self-control causing the death of another person, sentence being for culpable failure to exercise self-control.  Proposed new statutory offence:
'If the jury are satisfied that the accused lost his self-control so as to form the intent to kill [or to cause grievous bodily harm] and so caused the death of the deceased they shall return a verdict of criminal [culpable] killing [manslaughter] if, having regard to all the circumstances, including in particular the standard of self-control properly to be expected of the accused, they are satisfied that the act was to some degree excusable.' (pp. 170-171)
___________"Mental Illness and Criminal Liability", (1975) 15(3) Medicine, Science and the Law 198-204, see "Provocation" at p. 200; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;

___________"Notes: Provocation", (1978) 94 The Law Quarterly Review 19-22;

"One may draw the following conclusions:
8. The subjective approach to liability is the only just approach.
9. Proportionality is a factor that may properly be taken into account where appropriate, but the law should be open-minded about it, i.e. proportionality or disproportionality may or may not indicate genuine loss of self-control." (pp. 21-22)

SARRAU DE BOYNET, Aurélien de, Des Excuses légales en droit pénal,  Bordeaux : impr. de A. de Lanefranque, 1875, viii, 531 p.; disponible à http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5679930d.r=.langEN (vérifié le 10 octobre 2009);

SARRE, Rick, "Contemporary Comments: Comment on Papathanasiou & Easteal, ‘The "Ordinary Person" in Provocation Law’ ", (1999) 11(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 71-73;

SAUNDERS, Trevor J. (Trevor John), 1934-, "Plato on Killing in Anger: a Reply to Professor Woozley", (1973) 23 The Philosophical Quarterly 350-356; in reply to article by Woozley, infra; copy at the University of Ottawa, B 1 .P49, Location: MRT Periodicals;

__________Plato's Penal Code: Tradition, Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology, Oxford / New York: Clarendon Press / Oxford University Press, 1991, xvii, 414 p., see "Homicide in Anger (866d5-869e5) at pp. 225-231, ISBN:  0198148933;

SCHMITZ, G., "Étude sur la jalousie", (Janvier-avril 1938) Archives belges des sciences de l'éducation; titre noté dans ma recherche mais article non consulté; il semble qu'il n'existe aucune bibliothèque avec ce titre de périodique au Canada;

SCHREIBER, Hans-Ludwig, "Definitions of Criminal responsibility and of psychological and Pathological Factors which May Mitigate or Exclude Such Responsibility", in Criminological Colloquium (7th : 1985), Studies on criminal responsibility and psychiatric treatment of mentally ill offenders : reports presented to the seventh Criminological Colloquium (1985),  Strasbourg : Council of Europe, 1986, 103 p., at pp. 27-45  (series;  Collected studies in criminological research; volume 24), ISBN:  9287108994; also published in French / aussi publié en français dans: Colloque criminologique (7me : 1985 : Strasbourg), Études sur la responsabilité pénale et le traitement psychiatrique des délinquants malades mentaux : rapports/ présentés au septième Colloque criminologique (1985), Strasbourg : Conseil de l'Europe, Comité européen pour les problèmes criminels, c1986, 109 p. (Collection; études relatives à la recherche criminologique; volume 24), ISBN: 9287108986;

"Act of passion

    Heat of passion excludes criminal responsibility only in a few countries and then only in exceptional cases.  In Austria, passion excludes responsibility only if it is of high degree and has a pathological cause.  In Germany, a high-degree passion can come within the notion of 'derangement of senses' under Section 20 of the Penal Code.  The same is true in Switzerland.  In France in exceptional cases, passion can exclude criminal liability under the rules about constraint (contrainte) (Article 64, Penal Code).  In Iceland (Article 17, Penal Code of Iceland) and Spain (Article 9, Section 8, Spanish Penal Code), passion mitigates the sentence.  In the Netherlands and Belgium, passion does not influence criminal liability.  In Italy, it is even expressly provided in the law (Article 90, Italian Penal Code) that passion has no influence on criminal responsibility, but in the jurisdiction of the Italian criminal courts, it is agreed that high-degree passion can exclude responsibility." (p. 42)

SÉNÈQUE, Dialogues / Sénèque, volume 1, De Ira [De la colère], texte établi et traduit par A. Bourgery, Paris : Belles-Lettres, 1961, xxiv, 109 p. x 2 = 218 p. (cöté français et coté latin)  (Collection; Collection des universités de France. Auteurs latins, textes latins et traductions françaises); copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, PA 3641 .A9S457 1961 V0001, MRT library; je conseille ce livre comme culture générale sur le sujet de la colère;

SENTENCING ADVISORY PANEL, Consultation Paper on Sentencing of Manslaughter by Reason of Provocation, 11 March 2004; answer to a reference from the Home Secretary under section 81(3) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998; available at  http://www.cjsonline.org.uk/library/word/Manslaughter_ConsultationPaper.doc (accessed on 28 April 2005);

SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, "Manslaughter by Reason of Provocation -- Guideline", November 2005, ii, 11 p., available at http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/docs/Manslaughterbyreasonofprovocation-final.pdf (accessed on 30 April 2006);

SHAMLO, Bagher, La provocation en droit pénal français et iranien, Thèse de doctorat, droit privé, Université de Montpellier 1, France, 2000, 2 volumes, viii, 554 feuilles; titre de thèse noté dans ma recherche mais thèse non consultée;

SHAPIRO, Daniel, Comment, "Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York's Extreme Emotional Disturbance", (1976-77) 43 Brooklyn Law Review 171-199; copy at Ottawa University, KFN 5069 .B744, Location: FTX Periodicals;

SHARMA, K.M., "Provocation in New South Wales: From Parker to Johnson", (1980) 54 Australian Law Journal 330-343 (in two columns); Table of Contents: "I The Precursor of the New South Wales Position: 'Provocation' at Common Law...331; A. Common Law Provocation: Australian Adaptations...331; B. English Common Law and Statutory Supression?...333; II Provocation: The Position in New South Wales...335; A. Statutory Provision...335; B. The Parker Gloss on the New South Wales Statute...336; C. Does Johnson Depart from Parker?...337; (1) Burden of Proof...337; (2) Provocation and Proportional Retaliation...338; III Peregrinations in Provocation: Some Unresolved Issues?...340; A. The problem of Onus...340; B. Self-Induced Provocation and Section 23...340; C. Objective-Subjective: A Continuing Dilemma...341";

SHOEMAKER, Robert, "Male honour and the decline of public violence in eighteenth-century London", (May 2001) 26(2) Social History 190-208; copy at Carleton University, Ottawa, SER HN1.S56;

SILLAMY, Norbert, 1926-, "Colère" dans, sous la direction de Norbert Sillamy, Dictionnaire Encyclopédique de psychologie, Paris: Bordas, 1980, vol. 1 à la p. 237; copie à CISTI, Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical Information/ICIST, Institut canadien de l'information scientifique et technique, Ref  BF31 D555v.1;

"Colère (du latin cholera, qui a pris le sens de 'bile' par contamination du grec Kholê  [...]  Excitation affective se manifestant par une vive animation expressive, gestuelle et verbale, de tendance agressive, qui peut même devenir incontrôlable.  Simultanément, l'organisme est le siège de modifications physiologiques et neuvrovégétatives remarquables: vaso-dilatation (viasage congestionné) ou vaso-constriction (pâleur), respiration accélérée [...]  Toutefois, certains individus susceptibles, hyperémotifs, impulsifs, ou rendus plus vulnérables par des circonstances particulières (épilepsie, intoxication alcoolique, traumatisme crânien) sont incapables de cette maîtrise de soi et manifestent des réactions explosives de colère qui, dans quelques cas, s'accompagnent d'un obscurcissement de la conscience et d'une absence de souvenir."

SIMESTER, A.P., "Book Review: Criminal Responsibility and Partial; Excuses by George Mousourakis...",  (2001) 60(3) The Cambridge Law Journal 623-624;

SIMON, Jonathan, "Teaching Criminal Law in an Era of Governing Through Crime", (2004) 48 Saint Louis University Law Journal 1313-1335;

SING, James J., "Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of  Provocation and Culture in Criminal Law", (1999)108 The Yale Law Journal 1845-1884; on provocation, see pp. 1863-1877 ("III. PROVOCATION DOCTRINE AND THE CULTURAL DEFENSE...1863; A. Common-Law Roots of Provocation...1867; B. Revival of the Common Law: Emotion as the Embodiment in the Provocation and Cultural Defenses...1868; C. A Challenge from the Model Penal Code?...1870; D. Provocation's Link with Culture: Familiar and Unfamiliar Emotions...1872; Cultural Symmetry and Provocation: People v. Chen...1875); "

SINGER, Richard, "The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I -- Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and the Model Penal Code", (1986) 27 Boston College Law Review 243-322; Contents: I. Manslaughter and Provocation At Common Law -- The Early Centuries...249; II. 1800-1950: Apathy and Objectification...261; III. The Last Thity Years: Return to Subjectivity...288; IV. The Rationale of Provocation...304;

SLEIMAN, Le crime passionel, thèse de droit, Université de Paris, 1964; titre noté dans ma recherche mais pas encore consulté;

SMITH, J.C., Case and Comment, "Homicide - Homicide Act 1957, s. 3 - provocation - defendant addicted to glue sniffing - whether affecting gravity of provocation - whether to be taken into account by jury R. v. Morhall",  [1995] Criminal Law Review 890-892; the case is reported by N.P. Metcalfe at pp. 890-891 and the commentary by Smith is at pp. 891-892;

SMITH, Joel E., Annotation, "Spouse's Confession of Adultery as Affecting Degree of Homicide Involved in Killing Spouse or His or Her Paramour", (1979) 93 ALR 3d 925-942 with June 2001 Supplement at pp. 131-132; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;

SMITH, J.C., "Individual Incapacities and Criminal Liabilities", (Summer 1998) 6 Medical Law Review 138-160;

SMITH, John, "Homicide: Provocation -- effect of Homicide Act 1957 -- 'reasonable relationship' rule: Phillips v. R.", [1969] The Criminal Law Review 144-146 with commentary by Smith at pp. 145-146;

___________ "Homicide: Provocation -- 'reasonable relationship' rule -- whether applicable after Homicide Act: R. v. Walker ", [1969] The Criminal Law Review 146-148 with commentary by Smith at pp. 147-148;

SNELLING, H.A., "Manslaughter Upon Chance-Medley", (1957-58) 31 Australian Law Journal 102-109 (two columns per page); Table of Contents: "Tudor concepts...102; Hale...102; Foster...103; Blackstone...105; The Nineteenth Century...105; Use of a weapon in a sudden quarrel...106; Distinction from provocation...106; Suggested misconceptions of accepted doctrines in the case of R. v. Semini...106; The position of New South Wales...109"; note: the author is Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales;

"Distinction from provocation.
As has been seen the older writers maintained a distinction between manslaughter upon sudden quarrel and provocation reducing murder to manslaughter.  The distinction is illustrated by a passage in the judgment in Mawgridge's Case48 which may have given currency to the expression 'sudden combat'.  East, too, draws the distinction quite explicitly under the heading 'Of Homicide from Transport of Passion, or Heat of Blood'49.  He says50: 'Upon this head it is principally to be observed, that whenever death ensues from sudden transport of passion or heat of blood, if upon a reasonable provocation and without malice, or if upon sudden combat, it will be manslaughter' and after discussing at some length the question 'What is a sufficient provocation?' proceeds1: 'But there is another class of cases, where the degree or species of provocation enters not so deeply into the merits of them as in the foregoing: and those are where upon words of reproach, or indeed any other sudden provocation, the parties come to blows, and a combat ensues, no undue advantage being taken or fought on either side: if death ensue, this amounts to manslaughter.  And here it matters not what the cause be, whether real or imagined, or who draws or strikes first; provided the occasion be sudden, and not urged as a cloak for pre-existing malice.'2

    All editions of Russell up to and including the 9th Edition3 treat of provocation in a separate section from mutual combat4.  In recent times there has been a tendency by some text writers to blur the distinction and treat mutual combat as a mere form of provocation5.  This it is submitted is without justification and loses sight of the distinct historical evolution of the two notions.  The Royal Commissioners on Capital Punishment in their Report (1953)6 have fallen in with the same trend." (p.106 in two columns)
"48 (1707) Kel. 130.
49 Ch. 5, para. 19.
50 At p. 232.
1 At p. 241.
2 See Lord Byron's Case (1765) 19 St. Tr., at p. 1232.
3 (1936)
4 As to the latter there is a Note, 'Many of the earlier cases under this head were decided by reference to what was called chance medley or chaude melee.  See 22 Hen. VIII, c. 14, s. 4, repealed in 1828 by 9 Geo. IV, c. 31'.
5 See Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law, 7th Edn., Article 316; Roscoe, 14th Edn., 1921, 863 (cf. 12th Edn., 671 and 13th Edn., 633) and Kenny, 15th Edn., p. 134.
6 Para. 128." (p.106 in two columns)

___________"Manslaughter Upon Provocation", (1957-58) 31 Australian Law Journal 790-798; Table of Contents: "1. Historical (1600-1800)...790; 2. Developments in England since 1800...792; Intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm...792; The 'reasonable man' test...793; Reasonable relationship between provocation and act causing death...794; Suddenness - Time to cool...795; Onus of proof in England...795; 3. Provocation in New South Wales...795";

"1. Historical (1600-1800)
    By the beginning of the seventeenth century manslaughter upon provocation was emerging as a distinct species of manslaughter 'upon a sudden heat of blood', the term 'chance-medley' being thenceforward generally applied to sudden quarrels and fights.1  Coke writing early in the century does not appear to have perceived the distinction he says2: 'Some manslaughters be voluntary, and not of malice forethought, upon some sudden falling out. Delinquens per iram provocatus debet mitius.  And this for distinction sake is called manslaughter.  There is no difference between murder, and manslaughter; but that the one is upon malice forethought, and the other upon a sudden occasion: and therefore is called chance-medley.'  He does, however, in dealing with implied malice say3: '...if one killeth another without any provocation of the part of him, that is slain, the law implieth malice'4.
1 See Kel. 55.
2 3rd Inst., p. 55.
3 Ibid., p. 52.
4 Stephen says: 'The law as to the effect of provocation is traceable as far back as Coke but not much further'.  General View, 2nd ed., p. 141." (p. 790, left column)

SNYMAN, C.R., "Is there such a defence in our criminal law as 'emotional stress'?'", (1985) 102 South Africa Law Journal 240-251;

___________"The tension between legal theory and policy considerations in the general principles of criminal law", (2003) Acta Juridica 1-22, and see "The Defence of provocation", at pp. 11-22; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;

SORNARAJAH, M., "Commonwealth Innovations in the Law of Provocation", (1975) 24 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 184-204; contents: I. THE COMMON LAW RELATING TO PROVOCATION...184; The Innovations...186;  II. THE GRAVITY OF PROVOCATION...192; CONCLUSION...203; copy at Ottawa University, K 1701 .I569  Location, FTX Periodicals;

____________"The Doctrine of of continuing Provocation", (1971) Journal of Ceylon Law 101; title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries ; this periodical was published for two years, 1970-71, by  Colombo (Ceylon) : The Incorporated Council of Legal Education;

SOUTH AUSTRALIA, Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, Fourth Report -- The Substantive Criminal Law, 1977, xlviii, 460 p., see "Provocation" at pp. 21-28 (Members: The Honourable Justice Roma Flinders Mitchell; Professor Colin Howard; and Mr. David Biles);

"Recommendations with respect to Provocation

(a) Subject to recommendation (e) below, we recommend that the question whether the defendantho relies on provocation was  in fact provoked be an entirely subjective inquiry, directed in all aspects at ascertaining the defendant's actual state of mind at the relevant time.

(b)  We recommend in consequence the abolition of any rules of law importing objective tests, of which the ordinary man test, the rule of proportion and the requirement of an absence of cooling time may be instances.

(c) We recommend that if when the defendent killed he was in such a state of excitement as not to have been able to form a rational intention to kill or be reckless as to causing death, he be acquitted of unlawful homicide, but that if he had such an intention, or was sufficiently rational to be reckless as to causing death, he be guilty of manslaughter.

(d)  We recommend that if the defendant formed only an intention to assault another, he be guilty only of a non-homicidal assault.

(e)  We recommend that no conduct, whether blameworthy or innocent, whether lawful or unlawful, be incapable as a matter of law of amounting to provocation but that conduct innocent in the sense of performed without intent to provoke or reckless provocation be not a ground for complete acquittal of unlawful homicide." (pp. 27-28)

SPARROW, Gerald, 1903-, Crimes of passion, London : Arthur Barker, [1973], 154 p., ISBN:  0213164507; title noted in my research; not consulted; no copy in the Ottawa area libraries;

SPATZ, Melissa, "A 'Lesser Crime': A Comparative Study of  Legal Defenses of Men Who Kill Their Wives", (1990-91) 24 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 597-638; copy at the University of Ottawa, KFN 5069 .C656, Location: FTX Periodicals;

SPENCER, J.R., "Intentional Killings in French Law, revised August 2005, in The Law Commission, The Law of Murder: Overseas  Comparative Studies, [London: HMSO, 2005], at pp. 66-74; available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/comparative_studies.pdf (accessed on 27 December 2005); 

SPENCER, Margaret, "Provocation and the Reasonable Man", (22 June1978) New Law Journal 615-617; Table of Contents: "Defence of Provocation...615; The 'Reasonable Man'...616; DPP v Camplin...617";

STACY, Tom, "Changing Paradigms in the Law of Homicide", (2001) 62(3) Ohio State Law Journal 1087-1076, see "Distinguishing Manslaughter from Murder" at pp. 1020-1024 and "Heat of passion" at pp. 1063-1066; good contribution as the author discusses provocation in its wider concept, i.e. its role in the legislative scheme of homicide offences;

STAËL, Madame de (Anne-Louise-Germaine), 1766-1817, De l'influence des passions sur le bonheur des individus et des nations suivi de réflexions sur le suicide, Préface de Chantal Thomas, Paris : Rivage, 2000, 320 p. (Collection; Rivages poche/petite bibliothèque 1158-5609), copie à l'Université d'Ottawa,

"Il est une passion dont l'ardeur est terrible, une passion plus redoutable dans ce temps que dans tous les autres: c'est la vengeance.  Il ne peut être question de bonheur positif obtenu par elle, puisqu'elle ne doit sa naissance qu'à une grande douleur, qu'on croit adoucir en la faisant partager à celui qui l'a causée; mais il n'est personne qui, dans diverses circonstances de sa vie, n'ait ressenti l'impulsion de la vengeance: elle dérive immédiatement de la justice, quoique ses effets y soient souvent si contraires.  Faire aux autres le mal qu'ils vous ont fait se présente d'abord comme une maxime équitable; mais ce qu'il y a de naturel dans cette passion ne rend ses conséquences ni plus heureuses, ni moins coupables: c'est à combattre les mouvements involontaires qui entraînent vers un but condamnable que la raison est particuièrement destinée; car la réflexion est autant dans la nature que l'impulsion." (p. 139)

STALLYBRASS, W.T.S., "A comparison of the general principles of criminal law in England with the 'progretto definitivo di un nuovo codice penale' of Alfredo Rocco", (1932) 14 Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 45-61 and (1933) 15 Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 232-241; also with the same title in L. Radzinowicz and J.W.C. Turner, eds., The Modern Approach to Criminal Law, London: University of Cambridge, 1945, x, 511 at pp. 390-466, and see "Provocation" at pp. 436-440 (series; English Studies in Criminal Science, Department of Criminal Science, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge; volume iv);

STANISH, Garth, "Whither Provocation?", (1992-95) 7 Auckland University Law Review 381-401; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;

STANNARD, John E., "Making Sense of MacEoin", (1998) 8 Irish Criminal Law Journal 8-25; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;

_ __________"The View from Ireland", in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander, eds.,  Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Pesrpectives, Farnham, Surrey and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2011, 410 p., at approx.  pp. 151-166, ISBN: 978-1-4094-3175-6;

STATHAM, Bronwyn, "The homosexual advance defence: 'Yeah, I killed him, but he did worse to me Green v R'", (1999) 20(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 301-311; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .U537,  Location: FTX Periodicals;

STEPHEN, James Fitzjames, The Definition of Murder Considered in Relation to the Report of the Capital Punishment Commissioners, London: Longmans, Green, 1866, 57 p., see on provocation, pp. 53-55; notes: reprinted from Fraser's Magazine; note the Royal Commission referred to in the citation submitted its report in 1866;

"We next come to cases of provocation.  In these it is admitted that a considerable change in this part of the law is necessary.  The way in which the Commissioners propose to deal with the subject is by no means clear -- unless their proposal, that 'express malice aforethought, to be found as a fact by the jury,' means that the jury are in every particular case, and without any direction whatever from the judge, to say whether or not there was sufficient provocation to reduce the crime from the first to the second degree.  If  this is intended, the result will be to attach a most unreasonable degree of importance to the momentary impressions of ignorant and inexperienced men, under the influence of the excitement of a novel position, of a grave responsibility, and of powerful appeals to their feelings.  Surely they may fairly expect some guidance from the Legislature.  The law of provocation, as laid down by the Indian Code, goes far in this direction -- I should have thought too far; but at least it expressly requires that the jury are to decide as to what constitutes 'grave and sudden provocation,' and it lays down a variety of wholesome rules, adopted from English decided cases, as to what shall not be provocation.  It declares that if murder is to be reduced to manslaughter, 'the provocation is not to be sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm,' that the provocation 'is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant,' and that it 'is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.'  None of these explanations are proposed by the Commissioners.  Under the general words 'express malice aforethought', to be found as a fact by the jury,' anything and everything may be accepted by the jury as an excuse reducing an offence to murder to the second degree. They need not even find that there was any provocation at all; still less that it was either grave or sudden;  and thus they will be at liberty, if they like, to make the very motive which caused the crime, and which under the present law is taken as proof of malice, an excuse for it.  The Indian Code, whilst allowing considerable and, I think,* undue latitude to the jury on this point, does subject them to considerable restrictions, and furnish them with rules by which, if they wish to discharge their duty properly, they can always be guided."
* I addressed a paper on this point to the Commissioners, but it is too special to be referred to here in detail.
(pp. 53-55)

___________A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments), London: MacMillan, 1887, xl, 441 p., at pp. 168-172 (available at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html):

"[p. 168]
           ARTICLE 224.

     6Homicide, which would otherwise be murder, is not murder, but manslaughter, if the act by which death is caused is done in the heat of passion, caused by provocation, as hereinafter defined, unless the provocation was sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing bodily harm.
    The following acts may, subject to the provisions contained in Article 225, amount to provocation: --
    (a.)  7 An assault and battery of such a nature as to inflict actual bodily harm, or great insult, is a provocation to the person assaulted.
    (b.) 8 If two persons quarrel and fight upon equal terms,
6 Draft Code, s.176.
7 1 Russ. Cr. 713.
8 Lord Byron's Case, 11 S. T. 1177; R. v. Walters, 11 S. T. 114; and 1 Russ. Cr. 727-32 and 790, where other cases are cited.

[p. 169]
and upon the spot, whether with deadly weapons or otherwise, each gives provocation to the other, whichever is right in the quarrel, and whichever strikes the first blow.
    (c.) 1 An unlawful imprisonment is a provocation to the person imprisoned, but not to the bystanders, though an unlawful imprisonment may amount to such a breach of the peace as to entitle a bystander to prevent it by the use of force sufficient for that purpose.  An arrest by officers of justice, whose character as such is known, but who are acting under a warrant so irregular as to make the arrest illegal, is provocation to the person illegally arrested, but not to bystanders.
    (d.) 2  The sight of the act of adultery committed with his wife is provocation to the husband of the adulteress on the part both of the adulterer and of the adulteress.
    (e.) 3 The sight of the act of sodomy committed upon a man's son is provocation to the father on the part of the person committing the offence.
    (f.) 4 Neither words, nor gestures, nor injuries to property, nor breaches of contract, amount to provocation within this Article, excepts [perhaps] words expressing an intention to inflict actual bodily injury, accompanied by some act which shews that such injury is intended;  5 but words used at the time of an assault--slight in itself--may be taken into account in estimating the degree of provocation given by a blow.
    (g.) 6 The employment of lawful force against the person of another is not a provocation to the person against whom it is employed.
1  For the first part of the clause see Buckner's Case, 1 Russ. Cr.; R. v. Withers, Ibid.  For the latter part compare Huggett's Case, Sir H.  Ferrer's Case, Tooley's Case, and Adey's Case with Foster's remarks on Tooley's Case; 1 Russ. Cr. 753-7.  See also 1 Hawk. P. C. 489; R. v. Osmer, 5 Ea. 308.  Also Illustration (5), and Note IX.
2  Cases cited, 1 Russ. Cr. 786.  I am not aware that it has ever been decided that adultery by the husband is provocation to the wife.
R. v. Fisher, 8 C. & P. 182.
4 1 East, P. C. 232; 1 Russ. Cr. 711, 784.
5 1 Russ Cr. 711, note v.; Lord Morley's Case, 1 Hale, P.C. 455; R. v. Sherwood, 1 C. & K. 536, and see R. v. W. Smith, 4 F. & F. 1066.
6 Illustration (12).

[p. 170]


    (1.) 1 A, a woman, gives B, a soldier, a slap in the face.  A has not given B provocation within this Article.
    (2.) 2 A, a woman, strikes B, a soldier, with a heavy clog violently in the face and wounds him.  A has given B provocation within this Article.
    (3.) 3 A pulls B by the nose.  A has given B provocation within the meaning of this Article.
    (4.) 4 A attempts to arrest B on an irregular warrant and in an irregular way.  B shoots A dead.  This is manslaughter by reason of the provocation given by B to A.
    (5.) 5 A arrests B under an irregular warrant and conveys him to goal.  C, D, and others attempt to rescue B.  A resists, and one of the party shoots A dead.  This is murder in C, D and all their party.
    (6.) 6 A and B, armed with swords, quarrel, draw their swords, and fight.  Each gives the other provocation.
    (7.) 7 A and B quarrel, and agree together to fight, and do fight, a duel next day.  Neither gives the other such provocation as would reduce the offence to manslaughter if either is killed.
    (8.) 8 And and B quarrel, and upon the spot agree to fight with their fists.  A, from the beginning of the fight, uses a knife and kills B.  A has not received such provocation from B as reduces his offence to manslaughter.
    (9.) 9 A and B quarrel and agree to fight with their fists.  In the course of the fight A snatches up a knife, which happens to be near, and which he has not previously provided, and kills B.  A has received such provocation from B as reduces his offence to manslaughter.
    (10.) 10 A, at a tavern, throws a bottle at B's head and draws his sword.  B throws a bottle at A's head.  A kills B.  A has not received such provocation from B as reduces his offence to manslaughter.
    (11.) 11 A and B quarrel and fight in a public-house.  A leaves the public-house, says he will kill B, conceals a sword under his coat, returns to the public-house, tempts B to strike him with a stick, saying 'Stand
1 Stedman's Case, Fost. 292.
2 Ibid.
3 1 East, P.C. 233.
4 R. v. Stevenson, 19 St. Tr. 846.  This case must be understood to be subject to the provisions of the next Article.
5 This is the case of the Fenians executed at Manchester in 1867, for shooting Brett, a police constable in charge of a police van containing a Fenian prisoner.  See note IX.
6 R. v. Walters, 12 St. Tr. 113; and see R. v. Lord Byron, 11 St. Tr. 177.
7 R. v. Cuddey, 1 C. & K. 210; R. v. Barronet, and R. v. Barthelemy, Dears. 51 and 63, are recent cases of duelling.
8 R. v. Anderson, 1 Russ. Cr. 731.
9 Ibid.
10 R. v. Mawgridge, Kel. 128-9; Foster, 295-6.
11 Mason's Case, Foster, 132.

[p. 171]

'off, or I'll stab you,' and without giving B time to retreat, does stab him mortally.  A does not receive from B such provocation as reduces his offence to manslaughter.
    (12.) 1 A attacks B in such a manner as to endanger B's life.  B drives off and pursues A.  A in self-defence kills B.  This is murder in A.

           ARTICLE 225.
     2 Provocation does not extenuate the guilt of homicide unless the person provoked is at the time when he does the act deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation which he has received, and in deciding the question whether this was or was not the case, regard must be had to the nature of the act by which the offender causes death, to the time which elapsed between the provocation and the act which caused death, to the offender's conduct during that interval, and to all other circumstances tending to shew the state of his mind.


    (1.) 3 A and B violently quarrel, and throw bottles at each other at a tavern, A throwing the first bottle.  The company interfering, they remain quiet for an hour, B wishing to be reconciled.  A refuses, and says he will have B's blood.  When B and the rest of the company leave, A called B back in terms of insult, and fights with him with swords; B is killed.  A commits murder, though the fight is on equal terms.
    (2.) 4  B strikes A with his fist.  A, being the stronger man of the two, throws B down on the ground, and beats out his brains with a poker.  A commits murder.
    (3.) 5  A and B quarrel and fight.  B getting the best of the fight, leaves A.  A throws a coal-pick at B and injures him, and the wounds him with a knife.  B leaves the house, saying to A, 'You have killed me.'  A says to a third person, 'I will have my revenge.'   B returns to the house soon afterwards and A stabs him again and kills him.  A has committed murder.
1 Bacon's Maxims, 37, 38.  I suppose B is trying to arrest A.
2 See the cases quoted in the Illustrations, and R. v. Lynch, 5 C. & P. 324.  Draft Code, s. 176.
3 R. v. Oneby, 2 Str. 766; 1 Russ. Cr. 730-1.
4 Per Parke, B. in R. v. Thomas, 7 C. & P. 817.
5 R. v. Kirkham, 8 C. & P. 115.

[p. 172]

    (4.) 1 A is turned out of a house and kicked by B.  A runs to his own house, between 200 and 300 yards off, returns with a knife, and meeting B, stabs him after walking quietly with him some yards.  A then runs back and puts his knife in its usual place.  The deliberation shewn in fetching and replacing the knife are facts to be considered by the jury in deciding whether or not A committed the offence whilst deprived of self-control by passion.
    (5.) 2 Police-officers in charge of a police-van have in custody D, a person chargd with felony under 11 Vict. c. 12.  A, B, and C, and others assault the van in concert, rescue the prisoner, and shoot one of the policemen dead with a pistol.  The warrant under which D was in custody was informal, but not to the knowledge of A, B, and C.  A, B, and C, and the others are guilty of murder, and  it would have made no difference if they had known of the irregularity of the warrant.

           ARTICLE 226.
    Provocation to a person by an actual assault or by a mutual combat, or by false imprisonment, is in some cases provocation to those who are with that person at the time, and to his friends who, in the case of a mutual combat, take part in the fight for his defence.  But it is uncertain how far this principle extends.
1 R. v. Hayward, 6 C. & P. 157.
2 This is the case of R. v. Allen and Others, the Fenians, who murdered Brett, the policeman.  See Note IX."

___________A General View of the Criminal Law of England,  2nd ed., London: Macmillan, 1890, ix, 399 p., see 141; reprint in: Littleton (Colorado): Fred B. Rothman, 1985, ISBN:083771138X;

"The law as to the effect of provocation is traceable as far back as Coke, but not much further.  It anciently had much the same effect as it has now, but in another way.  If malice aforethought is construed in a popular sense, killing on a sudden provocation is not killing on malice aforethought.  When murder meant only secret killing, and when both murder and manslaughter were clergyable, the doctrine had little importance.   All these matters are set out with the fullest detail in my History of the Criminal Law, vol. iii,  pp. 28-87." (p. 141);

___________A History of the Criminal Law of England, London: MacMillan, 1883, 3 volumes, see vol. 3, Chapter XXVI, "History of the Law Relating to Murder and Manslaughter" at pp. 1-107; important contribution;

[vol. 3, p. 54]
    "This positive definition must be completed by reference to a negative definition given in the chapter on homicide.3  'Some manslaughters be voluntary, and not of malice aforethought upon some sudden falling out.  Delinquens per iram provocatus puniri debet mitius.  Another, for distinction sake, is called manslaughter.  There is no difference between murder and manslaughter, but that the one is upon malice aforethought, and the other upon a sudden occasion, and therefore is called chance medley.'"
3 Ib. p. 55 [Coke's 3rd Institute]"


[vol. 3, pp. 58-60]
    "The other rule to which I referred is as to the effect of provocation in reducing what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter.  The rule is not to be found in terms either in Coke or in the earlier writers, but the law as to what was called homicide by chance medley came very near to it, and in fact must have included most of the cases of what we should describe as provocation.  Coke mentions the absence of provocation as a presumption of malice prepense.  But he does no more than mention it.  In his reports (Part xii, fo. 87, vol. vi, p. 315, edition of 1826) he gives very shortly two cases of provocation, one of which certainly did not involve any falling out; but he does not seem to have seen the importance of these cases when he wrote the Third Institute, for he does not refer to them.  The decision seem to have been in 1612.

    The established distinction between murder and manslaughter was, as I have already shown, that the one was killing with premeditated malice in the popular sense of the words, and the other killing upon a sudden falling out.  It is obvious that this is a most imperfect account of the subject.  As the whole doctrine of implied malice shows there were many kinds of homicide which could not properly be referred to either class, and the descriptions given by Coke, Lambard, and Staunforde, of manslaughter by chance medley, nearly all turn upon the details of fights with deadly weapons, which were no doubt the common occasions of death in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The old law on this subject is adjusted at every point to a stage of things in which men habitually carried deadly weapons and used them on very slight occasions.  In substance it was to this effect: If two men quarrel and one attacks the other with a deadly weapon, it is the duty of the person so attacked to fly as far as it is physically possible for him to do so, whether he is in the right or in the wrong. If his ennemy follows him up and tries to kill him, and if solely in order to avoid instant death he defends himself and kills his ennemy, he is not to forfeit life and land like a felon, but he is to forfeit his goods and to purchase his pardon, and to be imprisoned till trial, no doubt because the presumption was that both parties were to blame in a quarrel.  If the person attacked does not run away but resists, and in the fight either is killed, the offence is manslaughter - a clergyable felony, punishable with forfeiture of goods, burning in the hand, and imprisonment for a year.

    This again is an intelligible law in a time when the use of deadly weapons was common, but it is obviously not intended to apply to the forms of manslaughter, which are common in our own day.  When the common mischief to be guarded against is the occurrence of set fights with deadly weapons, it is natural to lay down rules which treat each party as being pretty much on a level.  When the mischief is the taking of inordinate vengeance for comparatively trifling injuries (as for instance, returning a box on the ear by a pistol-shot or a deadly stab) the question is what degree of provocation is to be mitigate the legal denomination of the homicide caused by it.  The contrast between the earlier and the later form of the law on this subject thus marks the gradual progess of a change in the national manners."


[vol. 3, p. 62]
"Hale brings out, however, much more clearly and fully than Coke, the position of provocation in the general legal theory of homicide.  Coke says that malice is implied in three cases, 'first, in respect of the manner of the deed.  As if one killeth another without any provocation on the part of him that was slain, the law implieth malice.'  This is all that he has to say on the subject.  Hale1 gives six illustrations showing what did and what did not amount to such a provocation as Coke refers to in passing.  They are the following: --

    1. A. jostles B. to take the wall of him, or whips out of the track the horse on which B. is riding.  This is provocation in A. (Lambe's case, 17 Chas. 1, 1641 or 1642)
    2. Insulting language is not such a provocation as will reduce murder to manslaughter, but 'if A. gives indecent language to B. and B. thereupon strikes A. but not mortally; and then A. strikes B. and then B. kills A., that this is but again manslaughter, for the second stroke made a new provocation,' in the opinion of Hale himself and some others. (2Lord Morley's case, A.D. 1666.)
    3. A. demands a debt of B. or serves him with a writ.  This is no provocation.
    4. A. makes faces at B.  This is no provocation. (Brain's case, 42 Eliz., A.D. 1600.)
    5. A. takes the wall of B. without jostling.  This is no provocation.
    6. A. and B. quarelling, A. tells B. to pluck a pin out of
1 Hale, P.C. pp. 455-457.
2 6 State Trials, p. 769, and Kelyng, p. 85, ed. 1873 (53, old editions).

[vol. 3, p. 63]
A.'s sleeve, which B. doth accordingly, and then A. strikes B., whereof he dies.  This is no provocation (1) because A. consented; (2) because it appeared to be a deliberate artifice in A. to take occasion to kill B.

    It is very remarkable that in treating of provokation Hale does not mention the provocation given by adultery.  He does so, however, in1 another part of his work, where he quotes, out of its proper place, a decision on the subject given in 1762.  The2 report is very short, and is in these words: 'John Manning was indicted in Surrey for murder, for the killing of a man, and upon not guilty pleaded, the jury at the assizes found that the said Manning found the person killed committing adultery with his wife, in the very act, and flung a joint-stoll at him, and with the same killed him; and resolved by the whole court that this was but manslaughter; and Manning had his clergy at the bar, and was burned in the hand. The court directed the executioner to burn him gently, because there could be no greater provocation than this.'

    These cases give the most important part of our modern law on the subject of provocation, and are a curious instance of the gradual and casual manner in which a large part of the law came into existence.

    First, malice prepense is half accidently made the test of murder.  It is then defined to mean a deliberate premeditated design to kill or hurt.  This being found too narrow a definition, it is enlarged by the remark that killing without apparent provocation raises a presumption in fact of concealed motive. This being still too narrow, the presumption, in fact, becomes a presumption of law applying to all cases of unprovoked killing, even if, in fact, premeditation is disproved. This raises the question, what is such a provocation as will repel the legal presumption of malice arising from a sudden killing?  This question the judges decide as cases occur.

    The dates given show that the most important branches of the present law as to provocation are founded upon decisions
1 1 P.C. p. 486.     2 Sir T. Raymond, p. 212.

[vol. 3, p. 64]
given between 1642 and 1672, though one case on the subject was decided in 1600, and two others in 1612."


[vol. 3, p. 68]
    "In the interval between Hale and Foster (1who died in 1763, and published his Discourses in 1762) there were a variety of decisions on the law relating to homicide which are both more elaborate and better reported than those of earlier times.  Three of these deserve special attention as they form definite and important points in the history of the law.  They are the cases of 2R. v. Plummer (1701), 3R. v. Mawgridge (1707), and 4R. v. Oneby (1727).  The case of R. v. Plummer forms the foundation of a celebrated but unfortunate dictum of Sir M. Foster's.  Each of the other two turns on the question of provocation, and incidentally on the true meaning of the expression malice aforethought. ...
1 See preface to third edition, p. vii., and date of first edition, given in the preface to it reprinted in the third edition.
2 Kelyng, p. 155 (old ed. 109)
3 Kelyng, p. 166 (old editions, 119).  The case is reported by Lord Holt and appended to Kelyng's reports.  Kelyng died many years before his reports were published.
4 Lord Raymond, 1845."


[vol. 3, pp. 69-70]
    "Mawgridge's case, in a few words, was this: Cope and Mawgridge quarelled in Cope's room, and Cope desired Mawgridge to leave it.  Mawgridge thereupon threw a  bottle of wine at Cope, and hit him on the head, and drew his sword.  Cope rose and threw another bottle at Mawgridge.  Mawgridge gave Cope a mortal wound with his sword.  This was, upon a special verdict, adjudged to be murder, and Holt took occasion to deliver a judgment which contains a history of the law relating to murder, and an elaborate discussion as to the meaning of malice aforethought, and the nature of the provocation necessary to repel the presumption of it which arises from a sudden intentional killing.  Of Holt's history of the offence I will say only that it notices more or less fully most of the matters which I have already detailed.  After stating it, Holt proceeds to state what is the true meaning of malice as follows ....

[vol. 3, pp. 71-73]
    Having discussed the subject of malice, Holt proceeds to discuss the question of provocation.  1He considers, I think, every, or nearly every, case then decided, and brings out a result which is still law, though in some few particulars it might, I think, require modification.  In particular his2 view as to the provocation supposed to be given to the world at large by a wrongful arrest was dissented from by3 Foster, who seems to me to refute Holt's theory fully.

    This part of the judgment shows that at the time when it was delivered, manslaughter was more frequently distinguished from murder by the degree of provocation which the offender had received than by circumstances that it was an incident in a fray upon a sudden falling out.  The superficial view that when one man kills another it must be either upon waylaying and premeditation or upon a sudden falling out, has been superseded by the broader and deeper view that the moral character of homicide must be judged of principally by the extent to which the circumstances of the case show, on the one hand, brutal ferocity, whether called into action suddenly or otherwise, or on the other, inability to control natural anger excited by a serious cause. As to Mawgridge himself.  4'This miscreant was in the actual violation of all the laws of hospitality.'  On being asked to leave a room in which he was a guest, he threw a bottle at the head of his host, and followed up this murderous act by a deadly stab with his sword.  The fact that after the first bottle was thrown Cope threw another was just regarded as immaterial to Mawgridge's guilt as it was a 5justifiable act of self-defence.
1 Kelyng, pp. 178-186.    2 See pp. 185-186.
3 Pp. 315-318.  See Lord Blackburn's letter on the case of R. v. Allen, printed in my Digest, pp. 372-374.  Practically this letter may be regarded as equivalent to a judgment.
4 Holt's words, p. 182.
5 The throwing of the bottle by Captain Cope was justifiable and lawful, p. 176.

    The decision in Mawgridge's case seems to have been regarded as an extension of the law, for in the argument in Oneby's case the counsel said that it 'carried murder further than it had ever been carried before'.  It was, however, followed and possibly carried a little further still in the 1case of Oneby, a major in the army, who appears to have been much such another brutal ruffian as Mawgridge.  Sitting in a tavern with one Gower he took extreme offence at a harmless joke (if such it could be called) of Gower, who offered to stake half-pence when the party were playing for half-crowns. After a few words on this trifle Oneby threw a bottle at the head of Gower with great force, and Gower 'tossed a glass or candlestick at Oneby.'  Neither hit the other.  They all sat together for an hour.  Gower offered to be reconciled, but Oneby said, 'No, damn you, I'll have your blood." Gower and the rest after a time left the room.  Oneby remained, and called Gower back, saying, 'Young man, I have something to say to you.'  Gower returned.  A clashing of swords was heard.  Gower was mortally wounded, and Oneby was wounded slightly in three places.  Gower, 'being asked upon his death-bed whether he had received his wounds in a manner among swordsmen called fair, said 'I believe I did.' '

    This also was most properly held to be murder, Oneby's whole conduct having shown a bloodthirsty determination to kill or desperately injure Gower.  In giving judgment upon it Lord Raymond entered at great length into the law regarding malice and provocation.  His language was certainly not so happy as Holt's, but was much to the same effect. 2'In common acceptation malice is took to be settled anger (which requires some length of time) in one person against another, and a desire of revenge.  But in the legal acceptation 3it imports a wickedness which includes a circumstance attending an act that cuts off all excuse.'  He instances the phrase 'mute of malice', which he says means not
1 Lord Raymond, 1484; reported also in Stange and the State Trials.
2 P. 1487.
3 I do not know what this can possibly mean, except that malice means wickedness unexcused.

'revenge, but 'refusing to submit to the course of justice wickedly, - i.e., without any manner of excuse, or out of 'frowardness of mind.'

    He proceeds to show that the whole conduct of Oneby showed brutal wickedness.  1Oneby, who was a habitual duellist, was greatly surprised at this decision and committed suicide in order to avoid being hanged.

    Probably both Mawgridge and he would have escaped under the law as it stood in Coke's time, as the cases might have been regarded as frays upon a sudden falling out.  I know of no better definition of malice aforethought than the one given in Mawgridge's case, and I have frequently used it in directing juries.

    I come now to the last writer on the subject whose views it is necessary to refer to at any length.  This is Sir Michael Foster, whose report and discourses on different branches of the crown law were published in 1762, though they had been written for a considerable length of time.  His discourse on homicide, though not in form as systematic as the works of Hale and the predecessors of Coke, is arranged with admirable perspicuity, deals with all the leading branches of the subject, and may, I think, be regarded as having completely settled all the fundamental questions relating to it, though there have been a great number of subsequent decisions. ....
1The report in 17 State Trials, p. 36, says that 'as the prosecutor had taken no steps towards bringing on the hearing of the special verdict, he '(Oneby) 'grew pretty confident that it would be determined manslaughter, and feed counsel to move the Court of King's Bench for a concilium to be made for arguing the special verdict.'  As to Oneby's suicide, see pp. 55-56.  Mawgridge escaped to Holland, where he stayed for two years, but was retaken and brought over to England, where he was hanged April 28, 1708. -- Ib. p. 72."


[vol. 3, p. 85]
    "It is a matter of considerable difficulty to enumerate all the circumstances which affect the guilt of such an offence as murder; but after much consideration and observation I have made a collection of such cases which I think is nearly, it is difficult to say that it would be altogether, complete.  They are as follows: --

    2. Cases in which the offender has received provocation from the deceased not falling within the line laid down by the existing law on the subject.  A man who kills his wife because she boasts of her unfaithfulness to him, and expresses her determination to continue it, is felt to be much in the same position as a man who revenges a blow by a pistol-shot.  Cases of this kind would be met by the alterations proposed to be made by the Code in the law relating to provocation."


[vol. 3, p. 87]
    "Upon the question of provocation, I think that a comparison of the statement of the law in the Digest, and the proposed enactment of the Code speaks for itself.  It would be a great improvement in the law to have a clear, definite rule upon the subject, for there is at present nothing which can properly be called by that name.  The whole law of provocation rests, as I have shown, upon an avowed fiction -- the fiction on implied malice.  Malice is implied when a man suddenly kills another without provocation.  What is the provocation which will rebut the legal presumption of malice in cases of sudden killing?  The answer is to be collected from a long string of cases, most of them decided by single judges; though some in early times, and especially in the early part of the sixteenth century, were decided by the full court upon special verdicts.  The result is given in my Digest, and though full of valuable materials for a more general rule, it is as incomplete as it is elaboratde." (vol. 3, p. 87)

SUFFREDINI, Kara S., "Pride acid Prejudice: The Homosexual Panic Defense", (2001) 21(2) Boston College Third World Law Journal 279-314; copy at Ottawa University, K 521 .B677, Location: FTX Periodicals; does not deal directly with provocation;

SULLIVAN, G.R., "Anger and excuse: reassessing provocation: a review article of Jeremy Horder's Provocation and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992)", (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 421-429;

"Indeed there is good cause not to abolish provocation but rather to extend its scope in more details concerning the psychological condition of the defendant so as to achieve a better balance between cognition and affect." (p. 429)

SUR,  Joseph, Barreau de Poitiers. Le jury et les crimes passionnels, discours prononcé à la séance solennelle de réouverture de la Conférence des avocats stagiaires, le 18 janvier 1908, Poitiers : impr. de Blais et Roy, 1908,  41 p.; note : Précédé d'un compte rendu de la séance, par M. Morand, secrétaire, contenant l'allocution du bâtonnier, M. Barbier; titre noté dans ma recherche; non-consulté; ne semble pas disponible dans les bibliothèques canadiennes;

SWEEDEN, The Sweedish Penal Code, 1962, chapter  29,  "On the Determination of Punishment and Exemption from Sanction", § 3(1);

"Section 3
In assessing penal value, the following mitigation circumstances shall be given special consideration in addition to what is prescribed elsewhere, if, in a particular case:

    1.  the crime was occasioned by the grossly offensive behaviour of some other person ...."

SWITZERLAND / SUISSE, Code pénal suisse du 21 décembre 1937, articles 63, 64 et 113; note pour des brefs commentaires sur l'art. 113, voir Hurtado Pozo, supra et Yotopoulos-Marangopoulos, infra;
"Art. 63
1. Règle générale
    Le juge fixera la peine d’après la culpabilité du délinquant, en tenant compte des mobiles, des antécédents et de la situation personnelle de ce dernier."

"Art. 64
2. Atténuation de la peine.
Circonstances atténuantes

Le juge pourra atténuer la peine:

lorsque le coupable aura agi

en cédant à un mobile honorable,

dans une détresse profonde,

sous l’impression d’une menace grave,

sous l’ascendant d’une personne à laquelle il doit obéissance ou de laquelle il dépend;

lorsqu’il aura été induit en tentation grave par la conduite de la victime;

lorsqu’il aura été entraîné par la colère ou par une douleur violente, produites par une provocation injuste ou une offense imméritée;

lorsqu’il aura manifesté par des actes un repentir sincère, notamment lorsqu’il aura réparé le dommage autant qu’on pouvait l’attendre de lui;

lorsqu’un temps relativement long se sera écoulé depuis l’infraction et que le délinquant se sera bien comporté pendant ce temps;

lorsque l’auteur était âgé de 18 à 20 ans et ne possédait pas encore pleinement la faculté d’apprécier le caractère illicite de son acte."

"Art. 113
Meurtre passionnel
Si le délinquant a tué alors qu’il était en proie à une émotion violente que les circonstances rendaient excusable, ou qu’il était au moment de l’acte dans un état de profond désarroi, il sera puni de la réclusion pour dix ans au plus ou de l'emprisonnement pour un à cinq ans."

TARRANT, Stella, "The 'specific triggering incident' in provocation: is the law gender biased?", (1996) 26(1) The University of Western Australia  Law Review 190-206; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .U46,  Location: FTX Periodicals;

"Traditional interpretation of the defence of provocation under the Western Australian Criminal Code is challenged by the author who argues, on the basis of the New South Wales case, R v Chhay, that no specific triggering incident is required.  In the alternative, the author claims that the requirement of a triggering event is in effect discriminatory towards women and may thus contravene section 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and be Constitutionally invalid." (p. 190)

TASMANIA (Australia), Criminal Code Act 1924 (No. 69 of 1924), section 160; available at  http://www.thelaw.tas.gov.au/view/69++1924+AT@EN+2002050500/;

160. [Section 160 Amended by 25 Geo. V No. 43, s. 3 ]

(1) Culpable homicide, which would otherwise be murder, may be reduced to manslaughter if the person who causes death does so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation.

(2) Any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control, and which, in fact, deprives the offender of the power of self-control, is provocation, if the offender acts upon it on the sudden, and before there has been time for his passion to cool.

(3) Whether the conditions required by subsection (2) were or were not present in the particular case is a question of fact, and the question whether any matter alleged is, or is not, capable of constituting provocation is a matter of law.

(4) No one shall be held to give provocation to another only by doing that which he had a legal right to do, or by doing anything which the offender incited him to do in order to provide the offender with an excuse for killing or doing bodily harm to any person.

(5) Whether or not an illegal arrest amounts to provocation depends upon all the circumstances of the particular case, and the fact that the offender had reasonable grounds for believing, and did, in fact, believe, that the arrest was illegal, shall be taken into consideration in determining the question whether there was provocation or not."

___________Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act 2003 (Tas); in effect 9 May 2003;

TAYLOR, Laurie J., "Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense", (1986) 33 University of California at Los Angeles Law Review 1679-1735; copy at the University of Ottawa, KFC 69 .U34, Location: FTX Periodicals;

TAYLOR, Paul R., "Provocation and Mercy Killing", [1991] The Criminal Law Review 111-114; discusses the Court of Appeal decision of Cocker, unreported, C.A. transcript number 4212/G3/88;

TAYLOR, Richard, "The model of tolerance and self-restraint",  in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander, eds.,  Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Pesrpectives, Farnham, Surrey and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2011, 410 p., at approx pp. 51-64, ISBN: 978-1-4094-3175-6; 

THERON-DU-TOIT, R., "Provocation to Killing in Domestic Relationships", (1993) 6(3) Responsa Meridiana 230-253; periodical published by Law Students' Councils of the Universities of Cape Town and  Stellenbosch (South Africa); title of article noted in my research but not consulted yet; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries; copy at McGill University, Nahum Gelber Law Library/Université McGill, Bibliothèque de droit Nahum Gelber;

THOMAS, D.A. (David Arthur), 1938-, Principles of Sentencing : the sentencing policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, 2nd ed., London : Heinemann, 1979, li, 410 p., see "Manslaughter by reason of provocation" at pp. 76-79 (series; Cambridge studies in criminology; volume 27),  ISBN: 0435828819; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General, KD 8406 .T46 1979; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada KF 9685 T5 1979;

THOMAS D'AQUIN (SAINT), 1225-1274,  Somme théologique, I-II Première section de la deuxième Partie, Paris : Éditions du Cerf, 1984, tome 2, 827 p., ISBN: 2204022306., Question 77, Le péché de passion" aux pp. 492-500; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, BX 1749 .T4414 1984 v. 2; for the English text, see Aquinas, supra; voir la question 77 au complet à http://www.tradere.org/biblio/thomas/som2/som20077.htm (vu le 2 juin 2002);

"ARTICLE 7 [de la question 77]
La passion excuse-t-elle entièrement ?
Réponse : Lorsqu'un acte est foncièrement mauvais, ce qui peut en excuser tout à fait, c'est uniquement ce qui le rend tout à fait involontaire. Donc, si la passion est telle qu'elle rende complètement involontaire l'acte qu'elle entraîne, elle excuse complètement du péché; autrement elle n'en excuse pas complètement.

Là-dessus il y a deux choses à considérer, semble-t-il. 1° Un acte peut être volontaire, ou en soi, quand la volonté s'y porte directement, ou dans sa cause, lorsque c'est vers la cause et non vers l'effet que la volonté se porte, ainsi qu'on le voit chez celui qui s'enivre volontairement; de ce fait, on lui impute comme un acte volontaire ce qu'il commet par ivresse. 2° Quelque chose est volontaire directement ou indirectement : directement si la volonté porte à cela ; indirectement si c'est une chose que la volonté a pu empêcher et qu'elle n'empêche pas. - Voici donc d'après cela les distinctions qu'il faut faire. La passion est parfois si forte qu'elle enlève complètement l'usage de la raison, comme il arrive chez ceux que l'amour ou la colère rend fous. Alors, si une telle passion a été volontaire dans son principe, ses actes sont imputés à péché parce qu'ils sont volontaires dans leur cause, comme on vient de le dire pour l'ivresse ; si au contraire la cause n'a pas été volontaire mais naturelle, comme lorsque c'est par maladie, ou par une autre cause de ce genre que quelqu'un tombe dans une passion telle qu'il en perd tout à fait la raison, l'acte est rendu complètement involontaire et par conséquent complètement excusé de péché. Mais lorsque la passion n'est pas tellement forte qu'elle interrompe totalement l'usage de la raison, alors la raison peut l'éloigner en détournant l'esprit vers d'autres pensées, ou du moins elle peut empêcher la passion de produire son effet, puisque les membres extérieurs ne s'appliquent à leurs actes que par le consentement de la raison, comme on l'a vu antérieurement. Aussi une telle passion n'excuse-t-elle pas complètement du péché." (pp. 498-499)

TIRAQUEAU, André, 1488-1558, Le «De Poenis Temperandis» de Tiraqueau (1559).  Introduction, traduction et notes par André Laingui et préface de Jean Imbert, Paris : Economica, 1986, vii, 342 p. (Collection Histoire), notes: Société d'histoire du droit et publié avec le concours du CRNS, ISBN:  2717810447. Note de recherche : voir la «Cause 1» sur la légitime défense et la provocation aux pp. 39-44;

TISSOT, J., Le droit pénal étudié dans ses principes dans les usages et les lois des différents peuples du monde, Paris: Cotillon, Librairie-Éditeur, 1860, 2 tomes (tome 1: lv, 420 p.et tome 2: 673, [1] p.); copie à la Bibliothèque nationale, Ottawa, Ontario;

    "Les passions proviennent en grande partie de la constitution; elles en sont des effets, que la liberté aidée de l'éducation ne parvient pas toujours à surmonter.  Les tempéraments bilieux sont, par exemple, plus portés à l'ambition, au ressentiment et à la vengeance; les constitutions sanguines le sont davantage au plaisir.

    Quoiqu'on ait dit avec une apparence de sagesse que ce n'est point la colère qui excuse, mais son juste motif 1, cela n'est vrai que pour les faits justificatifs, pour les excuses préemptoires.  La justice du motif rend les moyens légitimes, lors surtout qu'ils sont proportionnés à la fin qu'on avait le droit d'atteindre, et qu'ils sont ou reconnus par la loi, ou abandonnés à la conscience publique et à celle des juges.  Ainsi celui qui, dans un mouvement de colère, repoussant une attaque soudaine, sérieuse, défendant sa vie qu'il croit en péril, tue son agresseur, celui-là n'est point coupable : le motif de sa colère est superflue; il aurait tué de sang-froid son agresseur, s'il n'avait pas cru pouvoir autrement sauver sa propre vie, qu'il ne serait pas moins irréprochable.

    La colère et les autres passions ne peuvent donc, à proprement parler, servir d'excuse qu'autant que l'excuse est nécessaire; c'est-à-dire précisément lorsqu'on en a besoin, parce que le délit commis est bien un délit formel encore.  Ainsi, le mari outragé qui surprend sa femme en flagrant délit, surtout s'il est prévenu et qu'il cherche à constater son infortune, s'il venge lui-même son honneur, commet une véritable faute; il est réellement punissable, puisqu'il y a des lois protectrices, des magistrats préposés pour les faire exécuter, et qu'il n'est point dans la nécessité de se faire droit à lui-même, bien moins encore dans celle de se défendre.  Les meurtres commis dans de semblables occasions ne sont donc pas justifiables, mais excusables seulement; ils devraient être punis, mais beaucoup moins sévèrement que des meurtres ordinaires.  Ils devraient l'être non-seulement par la raison qu'on vient d'alléguer, mais encore parce que l'infidélité d'une femme, la séduction qui en est la cause, ne sont pas des crimes qui méritent naturellement la peine de mort.  Toute société qui laisse faire en pareil cas, devient donc un peu complice de cet acte d'atroce barbarie.

    Cela posé, reconnaissons avec la loi romaine 1que tout ce qui se fait ou se dit dans l'emportement de la colère ne doit être regardé comme parfaitement voulu qu'autant qu'on y persévère de sang-froid.

    Nous n'irons cependant pas jusqu'à dire avec Horace que la colère n'est qu'un délire de peu d'instants; il n'y a point là similitude, mais analogie seulement.  On ne peut donc regarder l'emportement, quel qu'en soit le degré, comme une excuse légale et préemptoire, par la raison que nous sommes plus libres d'éviter les occasions de la colère, ou de comprimer ce mouvement à sa naissance, ou de le réprimer dans son excès, que nous ne le sommes de tomber en démence ou d'en sortir.  Nous sommes aussi plus libres de nos actes dans l'emportement que dans l'état d'aliénation.  Enfin notre jugement n'est que séduit et non point perverti par la passion, tandis qu'il est nul ou désordonné dans la folie.

    Les jurisconsultes veulent encore, pour que la colère soit une excuse, que le motif en soit grave, qu'elle soit violente, qu'elle soit rapprochée de l'instant où elle s'est allumée, et que le crime ait suivi de près 2.  Tout cela est juste sans doute; mais il ne l'est pas moins de remarquer aussi qu'il y a des colères contenues et dont l'explosion ne précède pas le crime ; qu'il y a dans la cause de la colère un point de vue personnel ou relatif qui dépend  soit de la position particulière du sujet, de son tour d'esprit, soit de son irascibilité propre. C'est un malheur de plus d'être porté à prendre ombrage de tout et à s'exaspérer pour rien; et ce malheur doit aussi être pris en considération.  Une personne ainsi faite aura plus de peine à se contenir pour peu de chose, qu'une autre pour un sujet très-grave.

    On peut dire de la douleur de l'amour, de la jalousie, des autres passions, lors surtout qu'elles n'aboutissent au crime que par la colère, ce qui vient d'être dit de cette dernière." (tome 1, pp. 66-68)
1FARINACIUS, quaest. 91, no13.
1 L. 48, D., De div. reg. jur.
2 Muy. DE VOUGLANS, p. 14. -- JOUSSE, II, 614-615.

TOCZEK, R., "The actions of the reasonable man.  Lawrence R Toczek examines duress, provocation and the 'reasonable man'", (7 June 1996) 146 New Law Journal 835; issue 6747;

__________"Self-control and the reasonable Man" (11 August 2000) 150 New Law Journal 1222-1223;

TOLMIE, Julia, “Alcoholism and Criminal Liability”(2001) 64(5) The Modern Law Review 688-709; see “Provocation” at pp. 701-703;

___________"Intoxication and Criminal Liability in New South Wales: - A Random Patchwork?",  (1999) 23 Criminal Law Journal 218-237, see on provocation, pp. 231-233;

___________ "Is the Partial Defence an Endangered Defence?  Recent Proposals to Abolish Provocation", [2005] New Zealand Law Review 25-52;

___________"Provocation or Self-Defence for Battered Women Who Kill?" in  Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, ed., Partial Excuses to Murder, Leichhardt (N.S.W., Australia): The Federation Press, 1991, xvii, 287 p. at pp. 61-79, ISBN: 1862870470;

This essay examines how the defences of provocation and self-defence have operated in respect of battered women who kill their partners.  It suggests that the courts have tended to automatically characterise such circumstances as raising the defence of provocation, outlines possible explanations of this tendency and proposes ways in which current legal principles might be used to develop an effective right of self-defence for battered women." (p. 61)

TOMSEN, Stephen, and Allen George, "The Criminal Justice Response to Gay Killings: Research Findings", (1997) 9(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 56-70; contents: Introduction...56; Research outline...57; Data sources and sampling...59; Methodology and details of the data...60; Trial patterns and outcomes...61; Results of analysis...65; Conclusion...67; List of cases...68; References...68; note: see reply by Woods, infra;

___________"Letter: More on 'Gay Killings'", (1997-1998) 9 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 332-334; copy of this periodical at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;

TOMSEN, Steve, "Hatred, murder and male honour: gay homicides and the 'homosexual panic defence'", (1994) 6(2) Criminology Australia 2-6; copy at the Solicitor General Canada, Ministry Library and Reference Centre, Ottawa/Solliciteur général Canada, Bibliothèque ministérielle et centre de référence, Ottawa;

TORRY, William I., "The Doctrine of Provocation and the Reasonable Person Test: an Essay on Culture Theory and the Criminal Law", (2001) 25(1) International Journal of the Sociology of Law 1-49; copy at Ottawa University, HV 6001 .I58, Location: MRT Periodicals;

___________"Social change, crime and culture: The defense of provocation", (2001) 36 Crime, Law and Social Change 309-325;

TREBILCOCK, M.J. (Michael J.), "Scope of the Defence of Provocation in New Zealand Law", (1963) New Zealand Law Journal 619-622 (2 colums each page);

TRIGEAUD, Jean-Marc, L'homme coupable: Critique d'une philosophie de la responsabilité, Bordeaux : Ed. Bière, 1999, 248 p. (Collection; Bibliothèque de philosophie comparée. Philosophie du droit; ISSN: 0298-2803; volume numéro 17), ISBN: 2852760711; voir le chapitre 6, "Aspects de la culpabilité chez Aristote et Thomas d'Aquin" aux pp. 109-131 et voir, en particulier, "Hors de nous et en nous" aux pp. 114-115 et "Volonté et intention" aux pp. 115-117; note: "Art. publié dans la revue Méditerranées, Paris: Assoc. Méditerranées, L'Harmattan, 1999, no 18-19, p. 133-152";

Volonté et intention
"C'est en définissant la faute morale marquée par la nécessité de l'intention, qu'Aristote montre plutôt l'intérêt d'une analyse de l'état passionnel, le pathos visant tout ce que subit l'individu en proie à sa sensibilité, parasité en somme par sa vie émotionnelle et affective.  L'homme de la passion perd de sa nature (phusis) ou de son humanité (anthropo) et il est significativement plongé dans une inconscience (pure agnoia) qui signifie l'absence de direction intentionnelle de sa pensée.  C'est ce qui explique que s'il ignore ou s'il commet une erreur, c'est, au regard de lui-même, sans vouloir ignorer ou être libre de le faire, par rapport à une autre connaissance plus vaste dont il est précisément dépourvu : il n'est pas mû par l'intention, et donc par cette perversité que requiert la faute morale.  La volonté libre à laquelle s'attache la responsabilité juridique ne sera jamais que déréglée mais non supprimée sous l'effet de la passion.  Par contre, la volonté libre qui conditionne la responsabilité morale n'est attribuée qu'au seul homme de l'intention, qu'au seul homme pervers (mochthèros) : la passion ne la dévie pas, mais elle l'efface, puisqu'elle écarte toute évaluation prévisionnelle." (pp. 115 -116)

TYSON, Danielle, "'Asking for It': An Anatomy of Provocation", (1999) 13 The Australian Feminist Law Journal 66-85; title noted in my research; article not consulted yet; no copy in the Ottawa area librarie; copy at Laval University;

_________ Trials of the Voice, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Melbourne, Dept. of Criminology, 2002, viii, 265 leaves;

UGLOW, Steve,  "Criminal Law 1998-1999, Lecture XI, Provocation", updated 26 February 1999, as seen on 11 April 1999 at http://speke.ukc.ac.uk/law/teaching_and_admin/Criminal/provo.htm; research Note: Steve Uglow is a lecturer at Kent Law School (England);

UNIACKE, Suzanne, "Emotional Excuses", (January 2007) 26(1) Law and Philosophy 95-117;

____________"What are Partial Excuses to Murder?" in Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, ed., Partial Excuses to Murder, Annandale (New South Wales): The Federation Press with the assistance of The Law Foundation of New South Wales,  [1990], xvii, 287 p., at pp. 1-18, ISBN: 1862870470;

"Obvious alternatives to admitting partial excuses to murder are the recognition of degrees of murder, the abolition of mandatory fixed penalties for murder in some jurisdictions, and the use of both prudent prosecuting procedures and flexible sentencing to reflect degrees of guilt.  As others have noted, these alternatives carry a very serious disadvantage for offenders in communities in which 'murder' is generally taken to refer to the most serious homicide offence, and where the label 'murderer' carries a very great social stigma; and the latter alternatives seem far too susceptible to arbitrariness to secure both individual justice and the social good in the absence of recognised partial excuses." (p. 15; footnote omitted)

VAN BROECK, Jeroen, "Cultural Defence and Culturally Motivated Crimes (Cultural Offences)", (2001) 9(1) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 1-32; copy at the Supreme Court of Canada Library, Ottawa;

VanNATTA, Michelle Marie Fahlstrom, Passion, provocation, anger and acquittal : emotion narratives in battered women's homicide cases, Thesis (Ph. D., Sociology), Northwestern University, 2003; title noted in my research but thesis not consulted;

VASDEV, K., "Provocation as a defense in Sudan criminal law", (1968) 17 Sudan Law Journal and Reports167-229; title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries;

"La vengeance", (Janvier 1937) Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie; titre noté dans ma recherche mais article pas encore consulté; aucune bibliothèque dans la région d'Ottawa possède une copie de ce volume (les collections de ce périodique commence plus tard);

VERVAECK, Louis, Maurice Dide et Henri Claude, "Discussion du rapport de M. Lévy-Valensi: Les crimes passionnels" (avril 1931) Annales de Médecine Légale, de criminologie et de police scientifique 637-656; note: le rapport se trouve aux pages 193-285;

VICTORIA (Australia), AUSTRALIA, Victoria, Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005, Act No. 77/2005, available at http://www.dms.dpc.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubStatbook.nsf/f932b66241ecf1b7ca256e92000e23be/F0B7C8D5D930EE26CA2570C1001F677F/$FILE/05-077a.pdf (accessed on 4 August 2006); defence of provocation is abolished;

___________LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF  VICTORIA, Homicide,  [Melbourne, Vic.] : Law Reform Commission of Victoria, [1991],  vi, 166 p., see "The provocation defence" at pp. 67-89 (series; report; number 40), ISBN: 730623149;


20.  The provocation defence should be retained [three dissenters].

21.  The test for provocation should be:

Where a person suffers a loss of self-control as a result of provocation (whether by things done or words said and whether by the deceased or by someone else) and intentionally kills or is a party to the killing of another, he or she is not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter if, in all the circumstances, including any of the defendant's personal characteristics, there is sufficient reason to reduce the offence from murder to manslaughter.
22.  Suddenness of reaction to provocation should not be a prerequisite to the provocation partial defence.  The provocation should be seen and assessed in the total context of the situation.

23.  The partial defence of provocation should be available whether or not the defendant was present at the time of the provocation.

24.  The partial defence of provocation should not be excluded either because the defendant was mistaken in believing that provocation had occurred or because the victim was not the source of the provocation.

25.  Provocation should be available to reduce a charge of attempted murder to attaempted manslaughter." (p. 131)

___________LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF VICTORIA, Homicide,  Melbourne : The Commission, 1988, 72 p.(series; discussion paper; number 13), ISBN: 0724167137; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF384 ZD7 D57 no. 13; on provocation, see pp. 23-27 and pp. 52-60;

___________LAW REFORM COMMISSIONER, Law of Murder (Degrees of Murder -- capital and non-capital Murder - narrowing definition of murder),  [Melbourne] : Law Reform Commission, 1974, 26 p. (series; Reports; number 1); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF 384 ZD7 R46 no. 1;

66. The authorities relating to provocation are difficult to reconcile and the doctrine, as it has developed in modern times, has received serious criticism.  I feel, however, that having regard, in particular, to the terms of reference set out in paragraph 1 above, it would be inappropriate for me, in this Report, to enter upon an examination of the problems in this field." (p. 20)

___________LAW REFORM COMMISSIONER VICTORIA,  Provocation and Diminished Responsibility as Defences to Murder, Melbourne: Law Reform Commissioner Victoria, 1982, 48 p., see "Part I: Provocation" at pp. 7-20 (series; Report; 12); contents of Part I: What is Provocation?...7; The "Reasonable" or "Ordinary" Person...8; Legislative Change...9; The Common Law...10; The Problem of the Ordinary Man...15; "Mere" Words as Provocation...18; Intoxication...19; Lawful Acts as Provocation...19; Recommendations...20;

1.30  In Working Paper No. 6 several options were set out as to the course of reform.  In the light of submissions received and what has been said before in this Report it is recommended that

(a) Legislation along the lines of Option A be adopted as follows:

1. Any rule of law whereby provocation is insufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter unless it would or could have caused a reasonable person or an ordinary person or someone with some of the characteristics of such a person to lose the power of self-control and, in consequence, to act as the accused acted in causing the death, and any rule of law requiring proportionality of response to provocation, or limiting the time which may elapse between provocation and response, are hereby abrogated.

2. Nothing in the preceding section shall limit in any way the matters which may be taken into account in determining any issue of fact.

(b) It be further enacted:

3. Provocation may be by things done or by things said or by both together, but does not include any lawful arrest or imprisonment or any conduct authorised by a lawful warrant or by any of the provisions of sections 457 to 463B inclusive of the Crimes Act 1958, unless the offender believed that what was so done was unlawful." (p. 20)

___________LAW REFORM COMMISSIONER VICTORIA, Provocation as a Defence to Murder, Melbourne: Law Reform Commissioner Victoria, 1979, 31 p.,  ISBN: 0724120556 (series; working paper; number 6); "Contents: Introduction...5; What is provocation?...5; 19th Century Views...6; The Emergence of the 'Reasonable Man' and the 'Ordinary Man'...7; 'The Ordinary Man' in Legislation...9; 'The Reasonable Man' and the Common Law...11; The Case of Holmes...11; More of 'The Reasonable Person'...13; Legislative Change...15; The New Zealand Crimes Act 1961...16; The New Zealand Case...16; Victoria Today...18; Ever the Problem of 'The Ordinary Man'...23; A Climate of Reform...24;  (a) Eire...24; (b) England...24; (c) U.S.A. - The Model Penal Code...25; (d) South Australia...26; Reform for Victoria...27; References...31";

___________VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Defences to Homicide: Issues Paper, Melbourne (Victoria): Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2002, ix, 129 p., on "Provocation", see pp. 41, 59-72, and 103-105, ISBN: 0957967853, available at  http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/Homicide/$file/Issues_Paper.pdf (accessed on 15 February 2003);

___________VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Defences to Homicide -- Final Report, Melbourne (Victoria): Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2004, lvi, 360 p., see Chapter 2, "Provocation", at pp. 21-58, ISBN: 0975149776; available at  http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/Homicide_Final_Report/$file/FinalReport.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2005);

___________VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Defences to Murder, Options Paper, Melbourne (Victoria): Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2003, xxxii, 410 p., see Chapter 3, "Provocation", at pp. 45-104, p.; provocation discussed elsewhere in the papare also; ISBN: 0958182973; copy available at complete paperavailable http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/Homicide/$file/Options_Paper.pdf (accessed on 14 December 2003);

___________VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, "Getting away with murder: The Key defences to homicide, including self-defence, provocation and infanticide are under examination", (July 2003) 77(7) Law Institute Journal 89 (1 p.); about their forthcoming discussion paper; copy at Ottawa University, KFW 2469 .M354  Location, FTX Periodicals; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;

__________VICTORIAN SENTENCING COMMITTEE, Sentencing : report of the Victorian Sentencing Committee/Report of the Victorian Sentencing Committee/ Sentencing, Victorian Sentencing Committee report, Melbourne, Vic. : Victorian Attorney General's Department, 1988, 3 v., ISBN:  0724170871, see  vol. 1, xliii, 386 p., at p. 262; copy at Solicitor General Canada, Ministry Library and Reference Centre/Solliciteur général Canada, Bibliothèque ministérielle et centre de référenceKTA 40 V5 1988 v.1;

As a matter of law, provocation reduces a charge of murder to one of manslaughter.  In other circumstances, however, it may be considered that while not constituting a defence to the crime, the presence of provocation reduces the culpability of the offender convicted of the crime.  The issue of whether or not provocation should reduce the culpability of the offender in any case will have to be determined by reference to:

• The nature of the provocation
• The degree of provocation
• The degree to which the retaliation of the offender was immediate or impulsive.

In the Committee's view provocation of the right type and of sufficient degree can have the effect of reducing the culpability of an offender and it should therefore be specified as a mitigating factor." (p. 262)

VIRGO, Graham, "Defining Provocation", (1999) 58 Cambridge Law Journal 7-10;

___________Feature, "Clarifying the Defence of Provocation", (22 December 2000) Archbold News, issue number 10, pp. 4-7; copy at McGill University,  Nahum Gelber Law Library, KD 8371 A7332 law; this periodical is issued 10 times  a year, ISSN: 0961-4249; available at  http://www.smlawpub.co.uk/online/newslet/archbold/Dec00.pdf (accessed on 31 May 2002);

___________"Provocation: Muddying the Waters", (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 23-25; House of Lords decision of Smith [2000] 3 W.L.R. 654;

___________"Provocation Restrained", (November 2005) 64(3) Cambridge Law Journal 532-535; Attorney General for Jersey v. Holley [2005] UKPC 23, [2005] 3 W.L.R. 29 (Privy Council);

VON HIRSCH, Andrew and Nils Jareborg, "Provocation and culpability", in  Ferdinand Schoeman, ed., Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, x, 358 p., at pp. 241-255 (chapter 10), ISBN: 0521327202 (hardcover) and 0521339510 (paperback);

"What, then, should the standard for provocation be?  We propose that the common law requirements be replaced by two separate tests, reflecting the two conceptions of impaired volition and resentment, respectively." (p. 253; footnote omitted)

WALL, Dr. Barry W., "Criminal Responsibility, Diminished Capacity, and the Gay Panic Defense", (2000) 28(4) The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 454-459;

WARBURTON, Damian, "Provocation: Objective Test; Precedent  R v Faqir Mohammed [2005] EWCA Crim 1880",  (April 2006) 70(2) The Journal of Criminal Law 121-126;

WASIK, Martin, "Cumulative Provocation and Domestic Killing", [1982] Criminal Law Review 29-37;

___________"Excuses at the Sentencing Stage", [1983] Criminal Law Review 450-465;

___________"Partial Excuses in the Criminal Law", (1982) 45 The Modern Law Review 516-533; important contribution; copy at the University of Ottawa, KD 322 .M62  Location: FTX Periodicals;

"The fixed penalty for murder
The second major objection to partial excuses in the criminal law is that, as far as English law is concerned, they are only of relevance in murder cases.  It is the general view of the commentators that the very existence of partial excuses is dependent upon the retention of the fixed penalty for murder, and that if the fixed penalty was abolished, partial excuses could go too.  Until very recently this view was shared by the various law reform bodies." (p. 520; note omitted)

___________Reviews and Notes, "Provocation and Responsibility by Jeremy Horder...", (1993) 109 The Law Quarterly Review 326-328; Wasik does not agree with Horder's main conclusion that provocation should be abolished;

WEBER, Jack K., "Some Provoking Aspects of Volontary Manslaughter Law", (1981) 10 Anglo-American Law Review 159-179; copy at the University of Ottawa, K 588 .A15 A535  Location: FTX Periodicals;

WEINBERG, Mark, "Moral blameworthiness -- The 'objective test' dilemma", (2003) 24 Australian Bar Review 173-198, see "the objective test in provocation", at pp. 184-191; copy at Ottawa University, K 1 .U768  Location: FTX Periodicals;

WEINSTEIN, Jeremy D., Note, "Adultery, Law, and the State: A History", (1986-97) 38 Hastings Law Journal 195-238;

WEIR, Susan, "Crimes Passionnels: Gender Differences in Perceived Justification for Murder in the Face of Marital Infidelity", (1992) 13(3) The Irish Journal of Psychology 350-360; copy at the University of Ottawa, BF 1 .I725  Location, MRT Periodicals;

"A total of 240 subjects (120 men and 120 women) participated in a study designed to assess reactions to a scenario which depicted events typical of a crime passionnel.  There were 8 different vignettes in all, in which the identity of aggressor (husband/wife), the identity of victim (spouse/perceived rival) and existence of children in the family (two/none) were varied.  Subjects were required to indicate how justified they thought the behaviour of the aggressor to be, to decide on a suitable length of term in prison and to specify, given a choice of alternatives, the type of punishment they thought most appropriate.  Demographic details relating to each subject's age, marital status (and number of children), level of education attainment and degree of religiosity were also recorded.  It was found that the length of the assigned prison sentence was related to the identity of the aggressor, which husbands being treated more punitively than wives irrespective of whether their victim was a rival or their spouse.  It was also found that female subjects were generally more punitive than males in assigning prison sentences, and that married respondents and those with families considered the act of killing in the face of infidelity to be more justified than their single or childless counterparts.  The findings are discussed in relation to both sociobiological theory and in terms of the way in which they relate to the outcomes of some recent court cases involving crimes of this nature." (p. 350).

WEISBROT, David, "Homicide Law Reform in New South Wales", (1982) 6 Criminal Law Journal 248-268, see "The Provocation Defence" at pp. 252-265; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735  Location, FTX Periodicals;

"The Crimes (Homicide) Amendment Act 1982 in New South Wales ushers in several very significant changes in the criminal law in that State.  In particular, the Act (a) abandons the mandatory life sentence for murder, allowing the trial judge the discretion to impose a lesser sentence in compelling cases; and (b) supplies a new statutory definition of the provocation defence.  This article discusses the nature and scope of these changes in light of judicial development of these areas of the law." (p. 248)

___________"Integration of Laws in Papua New Guinea: Custom and the Criminal Law in Conflict" in David Weisbrot, Abdul Paliwala and Akilagpa Sawyerr, 1939-, eds., Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea, Sydney : Butterworths, 1982, xxiv, 319 p., at pp. 59-103, see "The 'Ordinary Person' and Provocation" at pp. 78-79 and "Sorcery and Provocation" at p. 79,  ISBN: 0409309184; copy at Ottawa University, KTA .L39 1982 FTX;

WELCHMAN, Dr. Lynn, compiled by, "Extracted provisions from the penal codes of Arab states relevant to 'crimes of honour'", available at http://www.soas.ac.uk/honourcrimes/Mat_ArabLaws.htm (accessed on 26 October 2005);

WELLS, Celia, "Battered Woman Syndrome and Defences to Homicide: Where Now?", (1994) 14(2) Legal Studies: The Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 266-276; copy at Ottawa University, K 12 .E357  Location: FTX Periodicals;

___________"The Death Penalty for Provocation?", [1978] The Criminal Law Review 662-672; contents: 1. D.P.P. v. Camplin...662; 2. Should there be further reform?...665; 3. Should the defence exist at all?...668";

"3. Should the defence exist al all?
    As long as there is a mandatory sentence on conviction for murder, the answer must be in the affirmative.  The 'compassion to human infirmity' implicit in the defence of provocation appears to be widely accepted." (p. 668; footnotes omitted)

__________“Provocation: The Case for Abolition” in Andrew Ashworth and Barry Mitchell, eds., Rethinking English Homicide Law, Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2000, xx, 205 p., at pp. 85-106,  (Series; Oxford monographs on criminal law and criminal justice), ISBN: 0198299044 and 019829915X (pbk);  copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF9305 R48 2000;

WESTEN, Peter, "Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law", (2008) 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 137-162; available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/66826k182u4w2805/fulltext.pdf  (accessed on 3 June 2008);

WESTERMARCK, Edward, 1862-1939, The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, London : Macmillan, 1912-1917, 2 volumes, see in volume 1, chapter 11, "Motives" at pp. 283-301; copy at the Bibliothèque Université Saint-Paul Library - Collection générale -General collection, BJ 1313 W48O75 1912- 1917;  also translated in French / aussi traduit en français: L'origine et le développement des idées morales / édition française par Robert Godet, Paris : Payot, 1928-1929, 2 volumes, copie à Bibliothèque Université Saint Paul - Collection générale -General collection BJ 1312 W48O75 1928- 1929;

[p. 290]
    "Among many peoples who in other cases prohibit self-redress, an adulterer and an adulteress may be put to death by the aggrieved husband, especially if they be caught flagrante delicto.  Such a custom prevails in various uncivilised societies where justice is generally administered by a council of elders or the chief.6  Among the ancient
6 Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal, p. 45; Stewart, in Jour. As. Soc. Bengal, xxiv. 628 (Kukis).  Macpherson, Memorials of Service in India, p. 83; Hunter, Annals of Rural Bengal, iii 76 (Kandhs).  Anderson, Mandalay to Momien, p. 140 (Kakhyens).  MacMahon, Far Cathay and Farther India, p. 273 (Indo-Burmese border tribes).  Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, iii, 130.  von Brenner, Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatras, pp. 211, 213.  Modigliani, Viaggio a Nias, p. 495.  Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 364. Dyveyrier, Exploration du Sahara, p. 429 (Touareg).  Barrow, Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa, i. 207 (Kafirs).  Among the Gaika tribe of the Kafirs, however, 'a man is fined for murder, if he kills an adulterer or adulteress in the act, although he be the husband of the adulteress' (MacLean, Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs, p. 111).  Among the Wakamba, 'if a man is caught in adultery at night, the husband has a right to kill him; but if the injured man us takes the law into his own hands in the daytime, he is dealt with as a murderer' (Decle, op. cit. p. 487).

[p. 291]
Peruvians 'a man killing his wife for adultery was free; but if for any other fault he dies for it, unless he were a man in dignity, and then some other penalty was inflicted.' According to Chinese penal law, 'when a principal or inferior wife is discovered by her husband in the act of adultery, if such husband at the very time that he discovers kills the adulterer or adulteress, or both, he shall not be punishable.' By the law of Nepal, the Parbattia husband retains the privilege of avenging, with his own hand, the violation of his marriage bed, and anyone, save a learned Brahman or a helpless boy, who instead of using his own sword, should appeal to the courts, would be covered with eternal disgrace.3  In all purely Moslem nations custom 'overwhelms with ignomity the husband or son of an adulteress who survives the discovery of her sin; he is taboo'd by society; he becomes a laughing-stock to the vulgar, and a disgrace to his family and friends.'4  According to the 'Lex Julia de adulteriis,' a Roman father had a right to kill both his married daughter and her accomplice if she was taken in adultery either in his house or in her husband's, provided that both of them were killed, and that it was done at once.  The husband, on the other hand, had no such right as to his wife in any case, and no such right as to her accomplice unless he was an infamous person or a slave, taken not in his father-in-law's house, but in his own. However, it seems that in more ancient times, the husband was entitled to kill an adulterous wife;6  and his right of self-redress in the case of adultery was again somewhat extended by Justinian beyond the very narrow limits set down by the Lex Julia.7  According to an Athenian law, 'if one man shall kill another ... after catching him with his wife, or with his mother, or with a
1 Herrera, op. cit. iv. 338.
2 Ta Tsing Leu Lee, sec. cclxxxv. p. 307
3 Hodgson, Miscellancous Essays, ii. 235, 236, 272.
4 Burton, Sind Revisited, ii 54 sq.
5 Digesta, xlviii. 5. 21 sqq.
6 Gellius, Noctes Atticae, x. 23. 5.  Cf. Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht, p. 625.
7 Novellae, cxvii. 15.

[p. 292]
sister, or with a daughter, or with a concubine whom he keeps to beget free-born children, he shall not go into exile for homicide on such account.'1  Ancient Teutonic law allowed a husband to kill both his unfaithful wife and the adulterer, if he caught them in the act;2 according to the Laws of Alfred, an adulterer taken flagrante delicto by the woman's lawful husband, father, brother, or son, might be killed without risk of blood-feud.3  In the thirteent century, however, there are already signs that, in England, the outraged husband who found his wife in the act of adultery might no longer slay the guilty pair or either of them, although he might emasculate the adulterer.4  The present law treats the killing of an adulterer taken in the act in the same way as homicide committed in a quarrel; by slaying him, the husband is guilty of manslaughter only, though, if the killing were deliberate and took place in revenge after the fact, the crime would be murder.  This seems to be the only case in English law in which provocation, other than by actual blows, is considered sufficient to reduce homicide to manslaughter, if the killing be effected by a deadly weapon.5  There are corresponding provisions in other modern laws.6  As a rule, flagrant adultery does not justify homicide, but serves as an extenuating circumstance.7  But according to the French Code Pénal, ' dans le cas d'adultère ... le meurtre commis par l'époux sur son épouse, ainsi que sur le complice, à l'instant où il les surprend en flagrant délit dans la maison conjugale, est excusable.'8  And in Russia, though the law does not exempt from punishment a
1 Demosthenes. Contra Aristocratem, 53, p. 637.
2 Wilda, Strafrecht der Germanen, p. 823.  Nordström, op. cit. ii  62 sq.  Stemann, op. cit. p. 325.
3 Laws of Alfred, ii. 42.
4 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii.  484.  The same right is granted by a Spanish mediaeval law to a father, or a husband, who finds a man having illegitimate sexual intercourse with his daughter, or wife (Du Boys, Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne, p. 93).
5 Hale, op. cit. i. 486.  Harris, op. cit. p. 145. Cherry, Lectures on the Growth of Criminal Law, p. 82 sq.
6 Italian Codice Penale, art. 377. Spanish Codigo Penal reformado, art. 438.  Ottoman Penal Code, art. 188.
7 Gunther, Idee der Wiedervergeltung, iii, 233 sqq.
8 Code Pénal, art. 324.

[p. 293]
husband who thus avenges himself, the jury show great indulgence to him.1

    Whilst the law referring to self-defence has gradually become more liberal, the law referring to self-redress in the case of adultery has thus, generally speaking, become more severe.  The reason for this is obvious.  A husband who slays his unfaithful wife or her accomplice does not defend, but avenges himself; and it is to be expected that a society in which punishment has only just succeeded revenge should still admit, or tolerate, revenge in extreme cases. The privilege granted to the outraged husband is not the sole survival of the old system of self-redress lingering on under the new conditions.  According to Kafir custom or law, the relatives of a murdered man become liable only to a very light fine if they kill the murderer.2  The ancient Teutons, at a time when their laws already prohibited private revenge, did not look upon an avenger of blood in the same light as an ordinary manslayer;3  and even the Church recognised the distinction.4  Some of the ancient Swedish laws entirely excused homicide committed in revenge immediately after the crime.5  According to the Östgöta-Lag, an incendiary taken in flagrancy might be at once burnt in the fire,6 and ancient Norwegian law permitted the slaying of a thief caught in the act.7  In the Laws of the Ine there is an indication that a thief's fate was at the discretion of his captor,8 and a law of AEthelstan implies that the natural and proper course as to thieves was to kill them.9  In the Laws of King Wihtraed it is said, 'If any one slay a layman while thieving; let him lie without 'wergeld.' '10   So also, according to Javanese law, if a thief be caught in the act it is lawful to put him to death.11  For our present
1 Foinitzki, loc. cit. p. 548.
2 Maclean, op. cit. p. 143.  Cf., however, ibid. p. 110.
3 Wilda, op. cit. p. 562.  Stemann, op. cit. p. 582 sq.
4 Wilda, op. cit. pp. 180, 565. Labbe-Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio, xii, 289.
5 Nordström, op. cit. ii. 414 sq.
6 Ibid. ii 416.
7 Wilda, op. cit. p. 889.
8 Laws of Ine, 12.  Cf. Stephen, op. cit. i. 62.
9 Laws of AEthelstan, iv. 4.
10 Laws of Wihtread, 25.
11 Crawfurd, op. cit. iii. 115.

[p. 294]
purpose it is important to note that all such cases imply a recognition of the principle that an act committed on extreme provocation requires special consideration.  To declare that an adulterer or adulteress caught in flagrancy, or a manifest thief, may be slain with impunity, is a concession to human passions which are naturally more easily aroused by the sight of an act than by mere knowledge of its commission.  It was for a similar reason that the Law of the Twelve Tables punished furtum manifestum; much more heavily than furtum nec manifestum;1 and that the Laws of Alfred imposed death as the penalty for fighting in the King's hall if the offender was taken in the act, whereas he was allowed to pay for himself if he escaped and was subsequently apprehended.2

    The difference between an injury which a person inflicts deliberately, in cold blood, and one which he inflicts in the heat of the moment, under the disturbance of great excitement caused by a wrong done to himself, has been widely recognised.  There are instances reported of savages who distinguish between murder and manslaughter.  And the laws of all civilised nations agree in regarding, on certain conditions, passion aroused by provocation as a mitigating circumstance at the commission of a crime.

    The Australian Narrinyeri, as we have seen, have a tribunal, called tendi, consisting of the elders of the clan, to which all offenders are brought for trial. 'In case of the slaying by a person or persons of one clan of the member of another clan in time of peace, the fellow-clansmen of the murdered man will send to the friends of the murderer and invite them to bring him to trial before the united tendies.  If, after full inquiry, he is found to have committed the crime, he will be punished according to the degree of guilt.  If it were a case of murder, with malice aforethought, he would be handed over to his own clan to be put to death by spearing.  If it should be what we call manslaughter, he would receive a good thrashing, or be banished from his clan, or compelled to go to his mother's
1 Institutiones, iv, 1. 5.
2 Laws of Alfred, ii. 7.

[p. 295]
relations.'1  In the Pelew Islands, if two natives are quarrelling and the one says to the other, 'Your wife is bad,'  the insulted party is entitled to chastise the provoker with a stone, and is not held liable even if the latter should die in consequence.2  The Eastern Central Africans 'are aware of the difference between murder and homicide,' even though the punishment of the two crimes is often the same.3  Among the Kandhs only slight compensation is awarded 'for wounds, however serious, given under circumstances of extreme provocation.'4   'Valdeyak, or manslaughter,' says Georgi, 'is not capital among the Tungusians, when it has been occasioned by some antecedent quarrel.  The slayer is however whipped, and obliged to maintain the family of the deceased: he undergoes no reproaches on account of the affair; but on the contrary is considered as a brave and courageous man for it.'5

    Among the ancient Peruvians, 'when one killed another in a quarrel, the first thing enquired into was, who had been the aggressor; if the dead man, then the punishment was slight, at the will of the Inga; but if the surviver had given the provocation, his penalty was death, or at least perpetual banishment to the Andes, there to work in the Inga's fields of corn, which was like sending him to the galeys.  A murderer was immediately publickly put to death, tho' he were a man of quality.'6  Among the Mayas of Yucatan and Nicaragua, in case of great provocation or absence of malice, homicide was atoned by the payment of a fine.7

    From certain passages in the Mosaic law the conclusion has been drawn that the ancient Hebrews did not consider it obligatory to inflict death upon him who had killed his neighbour in a fit of passion.8  It is said that a man shall be put to death if he 'come presumptuously upon his neighbour, to slay him with guile,'9 or if he 'hate his neighbour, and lie in wait for him, and rise up against him, and smite him mortally that he die.'10  On the other hand, he shall be allowed a resort to a city
1 Taplin, 'Narrinyeri' in Woods, Native Tribes of South Australia, p. 34 sq.
2 Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln,' in Journal des Museum Godeffroy, iv. 43 sq.
3 Macdonald, Africana, i, 172.
4Macpherson, op. cit. p. 82.
5Georgi, Russia, iii, 83.  Cf. also Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. xi 186.
6 Herrera, op. cit. iv 337 sq.
7 Bancroft, Native Races of the Pacific States, ii. 658.
8 Goiten, Das Vergeltungsprincipim biblischen und talmudischen Strafrecht, p. 33 sqq.
9 Exodus, xxi 14.
10 Deuteronomy, xix 11 sq.

[p. 296]
of refuge if 'he lie not in wait,'1 or if he thrust his neighbour 'suddenly without enmity.'2

    Professor Leist suggests that in ancient Greece, at a time when blood-revenge was a sacred duty in the case of premeditated murder, homicide committed without premeditation could be forgiven by the avenger of blood.3  Plato, in his 'Laws,' draws a distinction between him 'who treasures up his anger and avenges himself, not immediately and at the moment, but with insidious design, and after an 'interval,' and him 'who does not treasure up his anger, and takes vengeance on the instant, and without malice prepense.'  The deed of the latter, though not involuntary, 'approaches to the involuntary,' and should therfore be punished less severely than the crime perpetrated by him who stored up his anger.4  Aristotle, also, whilst denying that 'acts done from anger or from desire are involuntary,'5 maintains that 'assaults committed in anger are rightly decided not to be of malice aforethought, for they do not originate in the volition of the man who has been angered, but rather in that of the man who so angered him.'6  And he adds that everyone will admit that he who does a disgraceful act, being at the same time free from desire, or at any rate feeling desire but slightly, is more to be blamed than is he who does such an act under the influence of a strong desire; and that he who, when not in a passion, smites his neighbour, is more to be blamed than is he who does so when in a passion.' Cicerolikewise points out that 'in every species of injustice it is a very material question whether it is committed through some agitation of passion, which commonly is short-lived and temporary, or from deliberate, prepense, malice; for those things which proceed from a short, sudden fit, are of slighter moment than those which are inflicted by forethought and preparation.'8

    Of ancient Rusian law M. Kovalewsky observes, 'L'existence d'une excitation violente est prise en considération, par notre antique législation, qui déclare le crime accompli sous leur influence imputable.'9  According to ancient Irish law, 'homicide was divisible into two classes of simple manslaughter and murder, the difference between which lay in the
1 Exodus, xxi. 13.
2 Numbers, xxxv. 22, 25.
3 Leist, Graeco-italische Rechtsgeschichte, pp. 325, 352.
4 Plato, Leges, ix. 867.
5 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, iii, i. 21.
6 Ibid. v. 8.9.
7 Ibid. vii. 7. 3.
8 Cicero, De officiis, i. 8.
9 Kovalewsky, Coutume contemporaine, p. 291.

[p. 297]
existence or absence of malice aforethought, the fine in the latter being double what it was in the former case'; and for a wound which was inflicted inadvertently in lawful anger, the payment was made upon a diminished scale.1  The ancient Teutons, also, held a wrong committed in sudden anger and on provocation to be less criminal than one committed with premeditation in cold blood;2  this opinion seems partly to be at the bottom of the distinction which they made between open and secret homicide.3  According to the law of the East Frisians, a man who kills another without premeditation may buy off his neck with money, not so he who commits a murder with malice aforethought.4  It is curious that Bracton should take no notice of the different grades of evil intention which may accompany voluntary homicide, and that he should omit altogether the question of provocation;5  Beaumanoir, the French jurist, who lived in the same age, mentions in his 'Coutumes du Beauvoisis' provocation as an extenuating circumstance,6  and the same view was taken by the Church.7  Coke, in his Third Institute--which may be regarded as the second source of the criminal law of England, Bracton being the first--gives an account of malice aforethought, and adds, 'Some manslaughters be voluntary, and not of malice forethought, upon sudden falling out.  Delinquens per iram provocatus puniri debet mitius.'8  Hume says that in Scotland 'the manslayer on suddenty was to have the benefit of the girth or sanctuary: he night flee to the church or other holy place;  from which he might indeed be taken for trial, but to be returned thither, safe in life and limb, if his allegation of chaude melle were proved.'9  All modern codes regard provocation under certain circumstances as a mitigating circumstance.10  According to the criminal law of Montenegro, great provocation may even relieve a homicide of all guilt.11

    It has been said that a man who acts under the influence of great passion has not, at the time, a full knowledge of the nature and quality of his act, and that
1 Ancient Laws of Ireland, iii, pp. xciii, cx.
2 Wilda, op. cit. p. 560 sqq., 701. Stemann, op. cit. p. 574.  von Amira, in Paul's Grundriss der germanischen Philologie, ii. pt. ii 174.
3 Wilda, op. cit. p. 569.  von Amira, loc. cit. p. 173.
4 Das Ostfriesische Land-Recht, iii.  17 sq.
5 Cf. Stephen, op. cit. iii. 33.
6 Beaumanoir, Coutumes du Beauvoisis, xxx. 101, vol. i 454 sq.
7 Gregory III.  Judicia congrua poenitentibus, 3 (Labbe-Mansi, op. cit. xii. 289).
8 Coke, Third Institute, p. 55.
9 Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, i. 365.
10 Giinther, op. cit. iii. 256 sqq.
11 Ibid. iii 255 sq.

[p. 298]
the clemency of the law is 'a condescension to the frailty of the human frame, to the furor brevis, which while the frenzy lasteth, rendereth the man deaf to the voice of reason.' But the main cause for passion extenuating his guilt is not the intellectual disability under which he acts, but the fact that he is carried away by an impulse which is too strong for his will to resist.  This is implied in the provision of the law, that 'provocation does not extenuate the guilt of homicide unless the person provoked is at the time when he does the act deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation which he received.'2

    That anger has been so generally recognised as an extenuation of guilt is largely due to the fact that the person who provokes it is himself blamable; both morality and law take into consideration the degree of provocation to which the agent was exposed.  But, at the same time, the pressure of a non-volitional motive of the will may by itself be sufficient ground for extenuation.  In certain cases of mental disease a morbid impulse or idea may take such a despotic possession of the patient as to drive him to the infliction of an injury.  He is mad, and yet he may be free from delusion and exhibit no marked derangement of intelligence.  He may be possessed with an idea or impulse to kill somebody which he cannot resist.  Or he may yield to a morbid impulse to steal or to set fire to houses or other property, without having any ill-feeling against the owner or any purpose to serve by what he does.3  The deed to which the patient is driven is frequently one which he abhors, as when a mother kills the child which she loves most.4  In such cases the agent is of course acquitted by the moral judge, and if he is condemmned by the law of his country and its guardians, the reason for this can be nothing but ignorance.  We must remember that this form of madness was hardly known even to medical
1 Foster, Report of Crown Cases, p. 315.
2 Stephen, Digest, art. 246, p. 188.
3 Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental Disease, p. 133 sqq.  von Krafft-Ebing, Lehrbuch der gerichtlichen Psychopathologic, p. 308 sqq.
4 Gadelius, Om tvangslankar, p. 168 sq.  Paulhan, L'activité mentale, p. 374.

[p. 299]
men till the end of the last century,1 when Pinel, to his own surprise, discovered that there were 'many madmen who at no period gave evidence of any lesion of the understanding, but who were under the dominion of instinctive and abstract fury, as if the effective faculties had alone sustained injury.'2  And there can be no doubt that the fourteen English judges who formulated the law on the criminal responsibility of the insane, made no reference to this manie sans délire simply because they had not sufficient knowledge of the subject with which they had to deal.3
1 Maudsley, op. cit. p. 141.
2 Pinel, Traité médico-philosophique sur l'aliénation mentale, p. 156: 'Je ne fut pas peu surpris de voir plusieurs aliénés qui n'offroient à aucune époque aucune lésion de l'entendement, et qui étoient dominés par une sorte d'instinct de fureur, comme si les facultés affectives seules avoient été lésées.'
3 Sir James Stephen (Digest, art. 28, p. 20 sq.) thinks it possible that, according to the present law of England, an act is not criminal if the person who does it is, at the time when it is done, prevented by any disease affecting his mind from controlling his own conduct, unless the absence of the power of control has been produced by his own default."

WESTERN AUSTRALIA (Australia), Criminal Code 1902, ss. 245-246 (for assault) and 281, "Killing on Provocation";

"245. "Provocation", meaning of
The term "provocation" used with reference to an offence of which an assault is an element, means and includes, except as  hereinafter stated, any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be likely, when done to an ordinary person, or in the presence of an ordinary person to another person who is under his immediate care, or to whom he stands in a conjugal, parental, filial, or fraternal relation, or in the relation of master or servant, to deprive him of the power of self control, and to induce him to assault the person by whom the act or insult is done or offered.

When such an act or insult is done or offered by one person to another, or in the presence of another, to a person who is under the immediate care of that other, or to whom the latter stands in any such relation as aforesaid, the former is said to give to the latter provocation for an assault.

A lawful act is not provocation to any person for an assault.

An act which a person does in consequence of incitement given by another person in order to induce him to do the act and thereby to furnish an excuse for committing an assault, is not provocation to that other person for an assault.

An arrest which is unlawful is not necessarily provocation for an assault, but it may be evidence of provocation to a person who knows of the illegality.

246. Defence of provocation
A person is not criminally responsible for an assault committed upon a person who gives him provocation for the assault, if he is in fact deprived by the provocation of the power of self-control, and acts upon it on the sudden and before there is time for his passion to cool; provided that the force used is not disproportionate to the provocation, and is not intended, and is not such as is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm.

Whether any particular act or insult is such as to be likely to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control and to induce him to assault the person by whom the act or insult is done or offered, and whether, in any particular case, the person provoked was actually deprived by the provocation of the power of self-control, and whether any force used is or is not disproportionate to the provocation, are questions of fact.

281. Killing on provocation
When a person who unlawfully kills another under circumstances which, but for the provisions of this section, would constitute wilful murder or murder, does the act which causes death in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation, and before there is time for his passion to cool, he is guilty of manslaughter only."

WHITE, Gregory L. and Paul E. Mullen, Jealously: Theory, Research and Clinical Strategies, New York, NY : Guilford Press, c1989, xii, 340 p., ISBN: 0898623855 and 0898625327 (pbk.); copy at Ottawa University, BF 575 .J4 W48 1989 MRT;

WHITE, Stephen,  "A Note on Provocation", [1970] The Criminal Law Review 446-452;

"Since the Homicide Act 1957 it has been a matter of constant debate whether that Act abolished the common law rule that 'the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation.'  The debate has centred around the meaning of the words 'do as he did' in the Act, surprisingly perhaps since these words appear simple enough.  It is the purpose of this note to suggest that the 'reasonable relationship' rule may indeed have been preserved after 1957 not by these words but by the words 'provoked' and 'provocation.'" (p. 446)

WIENER, Martin J., "Judges v. Jurors: Courtroom Tensions in Murder Trials and the Law of Criminal Responsibility in Nineteenth-Century England", (1999)  17(3) Law and History Review 467-;

"Close examination of English trial and post-trial proceedings in cases of murder during the nineteenth century reveals several developments in English criminal law.  Significant tension is found between judges, increasingly determined to repress interpersonal violence, and juries, increasingly receptive to defense arguments for mitigation. This tension impacted upon the law of criminal responsibility. Operating together with the wider reconceiving of notions of personhood and responsibility in the general culture, judge-jury conflict both exhibited and contributed to movement in the effective meanings of legal terms such as provocation, intention, and insanity.  Judges propagated, and juries gradually accepted, the idea of the "ordinary reasonable man," who was expected not to be easily provoked, nor to become dangerously intoxicated. On the other hand, juries (and the Home Office) were increasingly receptive to insanity defenses scorned by judges. By 1900, the scope of provocation and lack of intention defenses had narrowed, while that of insanity had broadened."

___________"The sad story of George Hall: adultery, murder and the politics of mercy in mid-Victorain England", (May 1999) 24(2) Social History 174-195; copy at Carleton University, Ottawa, SER HN1.S56;

WIKIPEDIA, the free encyclopedia, "Provocation in English Law", available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provocation_in_English_law (accessed on 8 March 2008);

___________"Provocation (legal)", available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provocation_%28legal%29 (accessed on 8 March 2008);

WILLIAMS, C.R., "The Defence of Provocation", (1977) Annual Survey of Law 173-191;

WILLIAMS, Glanville, "Domestic provocation and the ivory tower", (20 March 1992) 142 New Law Journal 381-382; issue number 6544;

___________"Provocation and the Reasonable Man", [1954] The Criminal Law Review 740-754; contents: The test of the reasonable man...740; Abnormal lack of self-control...742; Provocation as mitigating an intentional killing...744; Former rejection of the proportion rule...744; Physical peculiarities and provocation...747; Drunkenness and causal connection...750; Provocation and mistake...752;

___________Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd ed., London: Stevens and Sons, 1983, xlvii, 1007 p., see Chapter 24, "Provocation" at pp. 524-548, ISBN: 0420468501 and  0420468609 (pbk.);

"The 'immediacy' principle makes sense when the provocation is an assault, but immediacy doesn't seem very important when the provocation is a spouse's infidelity, which may be a long-standing grievance becoming worse for being brooded over.  It's irrational to think of 'simmering down' when jealousy and anger have been built up over the years.  'To be wroth with one we love doth work like madness in the brain.'
  You have a point. ...." (p. 530)

WILLIAMS, Glenys, "Provocation and Killing with Compassion", (2001) 65 Journal of Criminal Law 149-160;

WILSON, Kim, "Provocation in Papua New Guinea", (1981) 5 Criminal Law Journal 128-135;

"The Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea has held that 'provocation' as defined under the Criminal Code is a complete defence to a charge of manslaughter.  The high Court decision of Kapronovski v. R. was not followed and the 'literal' rule of interpretation was rejected." (p. 128)

WILSON, William, "The Filtering Role of Crisis in the Constitution of Criminal Excuses", (July 2004) 17(2) The Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 387-416, and see "Provocation", at pp. 410-414;

___________"The Structure of Criminal Defences", [2005] Criminal Law Review 108-121;

WOESTMAN, William H., 1929-, Ecclesiastical sanctions and the penal process: a commentary on the Code of Canon Law, Ottawa (Ontario): Faculty of Canon Law, Saint-Paul University, 2000, ix, 290 p., ISBN: 0919261450; see Can. 1324 § 1, 3o and  7o at pp. 32-33; Can. 1325 at pp.34-35 and Can. 1345 at p. 74; copy at St-Paul University, Ottawa, BQV 240 1311 W64E33 2000; see The Code of Canon Law - English / French / Latin / Spanish at http://www.prairienet.org/nrpcatholic/cicmenu.html;

WOLFGANG, Marvin E., 1924-, Patterns in Criminal Homicide, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958, xiv, 413 p.; reprint in: Montclair, N.J. : Patterson Smith, 1975, (series; Patterson Smith series in criminology, law enforcement, and social problems; publication no. 211),  ISBN:  0875852114; note: An Analysis of all criminal homicides listed by police in Philadelphia between Jan. 1, 1948, and Dec. 31, 1952; copy at University of Ottawa,  HV 6534 .P5W6 1975 MRT;

WOLSWIJK, Hein D., "Provocation and diminished responsibility in Dutch homicide law", in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander, eds.,  Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Pesrpectives, Farnham, Surrey and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2011, 410 p., at approx.  pp. 325-340, ISBN: 978-1-4094-3175-6;

WOODS, G.D., "Letter: A Reply on 'Gay Killings'" (1997-1998) 9 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 204-206; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada; reply to Stephen Tomsen and Allen George, "The Criminal Justice Response to Gay Killings: Research Findings", supra;

WOOZLEY, A.D., "Plato on Killing in Anger", (1972) 22 The Philosophical Quarterly 303-317; see reply by Saunders, Trevor J., supra; copy at the University of Ottawa, B1 .P49,  Location: MRT Periodicals;

YANNOULIDIS,  Steven, "Excusing Fleeting Mental States: Provocation, Involuntariness and Normative Practice", (2005) 12 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 23-35;

YEO, Stanley M.H. (Stanley Meng Heong), "Ethnicity and the Objective Test in Provocation", (1987-88) 16 Melbourne University Law Review 67-82; contents: 1. Recognition of ethnic derivation as a characteristic of the ordinary person...68; 2. The extent of recognition of ethnic derivation...70; A. Restricting ethnicity to the gravity of provocation...71; B. Extending ethnicity to the power of self-control...74; 3. Justification for extending ethnicity to the power of self-control...79; 4. Conclusion...81;

___________Case and Comment, "Ethnicity and the objective test in provocation -- Nature of threatened harm in self-defence -- Sentencing discretion in murder: SALIBA, Supreme Court, Sydney: Finlay J.: 10 July 1986", (1986) 10 Criminal Law Journal 420-422;

___________"Ethnicity and the Objective Test in Provocation", (1987-88) 16 Melbourne University Law Review 67-82;

___________"Lessons on Provocation from the Indian Penal Code", (1992) 41 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 615-631; contents: I. Accused's characteristics applicable to the ordinary person...616; II. An ordinary person's reaction to the provocation...620; III. Provocation assessed by severity of affront as opposed to loss of self-control...625; IV. Conclusion...630;

___________Case and Comment, "Peisley: Court of Criminal Appeal...[(1990) 54 A. Crim. R. 42]", (1992) 16 Criminal Law Journal 197-200;

___________"Partial Defences to Murder in Australia and India: Provocation, Diminished Responsability and Excessive Defence", being Appendix A in The Law Commission, Overseas Studies, which is part of the Appendices to the consultation paper, Partial Defences to Murder, 31 October 2003, xiii, 249 p. (series; consultation paper; number 173); this study by Yeo, at pp. iii-vi and 1-72  is available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173apps.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005); see also Appendix G, "Relevant Statutory Provisions and Proposed Provisions";

___________"Power of Self-Control in Provocation and Automatism", (1992) 14 Sydney Law Review 3-22; contents: A Preliminary Theoretical Discourse...4; Power of Self-Control in Provocation...5; Criticisms of the distinction...6; Age affecting power of self-control...9; Ethnicity affecting the power of self-control...11; Power of Self-Control in Psychological Blow Automatism...14; Determining whether psychological blow automatism is insanity...16; Bases for a Common Objective Test for Provocation and Automatism...20; Conclusion...22;

___________"Proportionate retaliation in provocation", (1988) (II) Malayan Law Journal lxxi-lxxviii; title of article noted in my research but no copy of this book found in the Ottawa area libraries; not consulted;

___________"Proportionality in Criminal Defences", (1988) 12 Criminal Law Journal 211-227, see "Provocation" at pp. 214-216;

"The defences of provocation, self-defence, duress and necessity all contain an element of proportionality spelt out, as the case may be, in terms of proportionate retaliation or proportionate force.  This article examines how the significance of proportionality is affected by the criminal theory of justification and excuse.  In the course of this examination, certain discrepancies in the present law are revealed and proposals made to rectify them." (p. 211)

___________ "Provocation: A Comparative Analysis of the Canadian, Australian and Indian Defence" in Gerry Ferguson and Stanley Yeo, eds., The Law of Homicide, Provocation and Self-Defence: Canadian, Australian and other Asia-Pacific Perspectives, Workshop Papers and Related Materials, Victoria (British Columbia): Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, 2000, vi, 194 p., at pp. 95-109, ISBN: 1550582119; note: "Procedings of a conference held in Victoria, B.C. on Nov. 19, 1999";

___________"Provocation Down Under", (1991) 141 New Law Journal 1200-1201;

___________"Provoking the 'Ordinary' Ethnic Person: A Juror's Predicament", (1987) 11 Criminal Law Journal 96-104; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735  Location: FTX Periodicals;

"Under the current law of provocation, juries are required to assess both the gravity of the provocation to an accused person and his or her power of self-control by reference to the yardstick of the 'ordinary' person.  The courts have recently ruled that the ordinary person is to be attributed with certain characteristics peculiar to the accused such as his or her ethnicity.  This article uses case illustrations to present the predicament confronting jurors in trials involving accused persons belonging to ethic backgrounds completely different from their own.  It is submitted that this predicament is a very real one, given the increasingly heterogeneous nature of our society, and should be avoided by removing altogether the ordinary person test from the law of provocation." (p. 96)

___________"Recent Australian Pronouncements on the Ordinary Person Test in Provocation and Automatism", (1992) 33 The Criminal Law Quarterly 280;

"This article presents the Australian High Cour's subscription [R. v. Stingel (1990) 65 A.L.J.R. 141; R. v. Falconer(1990) 65 A.L.J.R. 20] to the distinction between personal characteristics affecting the power of self-control of the ordinary person and those characteristics affecting the gravity of the provocation or psychological blow.  It argues that the distinction is a crucial one which the majority in Hill seems to have drastically downplayed, or even entirely lost sight of.  The submission will be made that a proper acknowledgement of the distinction will require a trial judge to instruct the jury on the personal characteristics it may ascribe to the ordinary person under the law of provocation.  Further, it will be contended that the Australian High Court's application of this distinction to psychological-blow automatism has, besides achieving consistency in the law, the benefit of ensuring that provocation continues to play a predominant role in cases of killings while under loss of self-control." (pp. 280-281)

___________"The Role of Gender in the Law of Provocation", (1997) 26 The Anglo-American Law Review 431-460; copy at the University of Ottawa, K 588 .A15 A535  Location: FTX Periodicals;

___________"Sex, Ethnicity, Power of Self-Control and Provocation Revisited", (1996) 18 Sydney Law Review 304-322; not at Ottawa; check Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;

___________Unrestrained killings and the law: a comparative analysis of the laws of provocation and excessive self-defence in India, England, and Australia, Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, xxi, 210 p., (series; Law in India series), ISBN: 019564400X;

YOTOPOULOS-MARANGOPOULOS, Alice, Les mobiles du délit: Étude de Criminologie et de Droit Pénal, Paris:  Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1973, xvi, 350 p. (Collection; Bibliothèque de sciences criminelles, sous la direction de G. Stefani et G. Levasseur, Professeurs à la Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Économiques de Paris; tome XVII); copie à la bibliothèque de droit de l'Université d'Ottawa, FTX Général, KJV 7972.3 .B52 V.17 1973;

    "L'art. 113 [du Code pénal suisse] prévoit un autre meurtre privilégié qui a, implicitement trait aux mobiles, le 'meurtre par passion'19.  Le délinquant dans ce cas agit sous l'influence d'une 'émotion violente' que les circonstances rendaient 'excusable'.  Le premier de ces deux termes ('violente') se réfère à l'intensité de l'émotion, cependant que le second ('excusable') se réfère à la qualité de celle-ci20; toutes les deux sont indispensables pour l'existence d'un 'meurtre par passion'.

    La notion 'excusable' implique une valorisation éthique de l'émotion.  Or, les mobiles sont un indice précieux de la qualité morale de cette émotion violente.  En effet, les mobiles sont des indices que l'émotion violente est excusable si, vue en rapport avec les autres circonstances, ils la justifient du point de vue de la morale; il faut donc qu'ils ne soient pas exclusivement ou principalement égoïstes, vils, provenant d'instincts vulgaires." (pp. 292-293; seulement les notes 19, 20 et 22 du texte sont partiellement reproduites ci-dessous; voir Switzerland / Suisse, supra, pour le texte de l'article 113)
"19 Le titre de l'art. 113 emploie l'expression 'par passion' cependant que le texte même parle d'émotion.  Dans l'interprétation doctrinale et jurisprudentielle on comprend, dans ledit article, ces deux notions indistinctement [...]
20 Nous soulignons le fait qu'il ne s'agit que du caractère excusable de l'émotion et non pas de l'acte. [...]
22 V. BJP [Bulletin de Jurisprudence Pénale (suisse)] 1953 no 25 (arrêt qui exige même que l'émotion paraisse compréhensive d'un point de vue moral élevé) [...]."  (pp. 292-293)


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